If Hegel's philosophy were to be characterized by a phrase, it might be “The Dialectical System of Absolute Spirit.” The phrase would seem formidable to some but merely pretentious to others. There are recent signs of an exhumation of the systematic features of Hegel's philosophy in the English-speaking world, and it is to be hoped that the durable clichés of an earlier English period will not prevent a fresh look at Hegel's philosophy. There is, of course, no denying his systematic ambitions, nor any wish on my part to do so. It is just these that I find fascinating. He sought to bring within a comprehensive intellectual order the whole of reality—and a little more besides, say his detractors. In the Phenomenology of Spirit by a turbulent dialectic he scrabblesup to the top of Mount Parnassus in order to clutch the petticoats of the Absolute. In the Science of Logic and in the first part of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences he lays out the logical paradigm of intellectual necessities which are subsequently exhibited in the philosophy of nature and of concrete spirit.

L'Existence de choses telles que des propositions, conc,ues comme distinctes des phrases qui les expriment et dont elles constituent comme le sens — cela que l'on comprend en entendant une phrase — a été mise en question, par Quine, en particulier, et aussi défendue. Ce débat fera l'objet de ce texte.

La proposition, comme on l’entendra ici, se définit essentiellement comme une synthèse de concepts. Cette définition en a été donnée par G.E. Moore, un peu avant que Russell ne la reprenne dans trois grands articles publiés dans Mind en 1904, sous le titre de « Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions ».

George Berkeley and Martin Buber are philosophers whose views one might not expect to find being discussed in one and the same essay. Nevertheless, in what follows I hope to show that a comparison of their epistemologies reveals substantial similarities, both methodological and doctrinal. The ground for such a comparison lies in the religious orientation of these two very different philosophers. It is an orientation each has emphasized more than once, both in his philosophical and in his less formal writings.

One cannot determine whether a book is a work of political philosophy merely by glancing at its contents. Heidegger's Being and Time is a case in point. It offers no discussion of the topics which are commonly thought to constitute political philosophy—the state, the nature of law, human rights, and so on. But particular themes such as these reflect in large part the actual conditions which prevailed at certain times and places, fourth-century Athens and seventeenth-century England, for example, so they must not be thought to constitute an outline of the eternal problems of political philosophy. When a philosopher embarks upon a new line of thought at a different time and under novel circumstances, he may find himself instituting a new vocabulary for the problems of the human community.

Dans un premier article sur le rapport à établir entre les problématiques sartrienne et marxiste é la lumière de la Critique de la Raison Dialectique, nous avions tenté de circonscrire projet spécifique de Sartre face au Savoir marxiste.

Nous aimerions poursuivre aujourd'hui notre réflexion par une analyse de quelques thèmes majeurs nous permettant de voir dans quelle mesure et dans quel sens ces deux problématiques se recoupent ou non. A cet effet, nous distinguerons: I) le problème du matérialisme et de la dialectique, 2) la conception de l'homme, 3) la perspective de base (rareté et surproduit), 4) le concept de classe.

La Cybernétique a trop de visages et trop peu d'âge en même temps pour qu'une pondération juste soit tentée des affirmations qu'elle suscite. Ses préventions pourtant n'en demeurent pas moins colorées des reflets d'un soleil que Descartes fit lever et dont il semble que le soir est sans fin. Car loin de penser que le dualisme cartésien ait été aboli par la science nouvelle, il m'apparait que c'est une nouvelle confirmation qu'il en reçoit. Si une machine assumait toutes les fonctions de l'homme, elle n'aurait annexé ni la pensée ni l'âme que Descartes a définies.

Anotion employed very frequently by contemporary philosophers is that of the object of acts and emotions, as distinct from their cause. This paper assumes that the notion of objects of acts and emotions is viable, even though it has been plausibly argued that one cannot hope to pin down the notion with any generality or conciseness. I am concerned here with attempts to classify objects of acts and emotions, as a means to clarifying the logical behaviour of the notion. My purpose in the first two sections is to remove some obscurities in the classifications which have been proposed, without challenging their basic structure. In the third and longest section, I argue that this structure, though largely sound, does in fact stand in need of some modification if it is to be as useful as philosophers have hoped.

In the March 1971 issue of Dialogue Professors E.H. Madden and P.H. Hare attempt with much ingenuity and resource to resuscitate a pre-Humean theory of causal connection. Firmly disowning the “epistemological and metaphysical disasters” that have led to “terrible consequences”, (such as an appeal to volitional efficacy, Humean associationism, etc.), and making only a mildly favourable gesture in the direction of Michotte, they yet claim that the defence of Hume by modern regularists, even when abetted by the weapons of phenomenology, can be refuted by such indubitable facts as that we observe avalanches destroying villages, waves eating away the shoreline and the “wind-bending-the-trees” (pp. 17f).

Dans les réflexions générates qui terminent son livre, Michel Jouhaud rappelle, sous forme de question, quel a été «le problème initial » de son étude: « à quelles conditions l'expérience morale peut-elle avoir une portée ontologique? ou, en d'autres termes, à quelles conditions les valeurs peuvent-elles être le teémoignage de l'Etre (657) ? » Je ne pense pas que ces deux formulations d'une même question soient eéquivalentes dans le cas de Blondel et je tâcherai d'expliquer pourquoi, mais il reste que la premiere formule exprime bien l'objet central de cette belle thèse dont la lecture fut un vrai « bonheur philosophique ».

Roy Wood Sellars was born in Seaforth, Ontario in 1880. In 1970 he published two massive volumes. One is entitled: The Principles, Perspectives, and Problems of Philosophy; the other: Social Problems and Political Horizons. In the same year an extensive collection of his articles and essays, Principles of Emergent Realism appeared.