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Radicalism in Mass Movements: Asymmetric Information and Endogenous Leadership

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 November 2020

HENG CHEN*
Affiliation:
University of Hong Kong
WING SUEN*
Affiliation:
University of Hong Kong
*
Heng Chen, Associate Professor of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics, The University of Hong Kong, hengchen@hku.hk.
Wing Suen, Professor of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics, The University of Hong Kong, wsuen@econ.hku.hk.

Abstract

Asymmetric information and diverse preferences for reform create an agency problem between opposition leaders and citizens. Dissatisfied citizens are unsure of how bad the current situation is but infer this information from the scale of the leader’s reform proposal. Because radical leaders have an incentive to exaggerate and mislead, to command credibility, they must paradoxically radicalize the proposal further as a way of signaling the necessity of change. Radicalism motivated by signaling is costly, as it reduces a movement’s chances of success. This mechanism also contributes to leadership radicalization when the leaders of movements arise as a compromise among diverse interests.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Political Science Association

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