² See, generally, A History of Law and Lawyers in the gatt/wto: The Development of the Rule of Law in the Multilateral Trading System (Marceau, Gabrielle ed., 2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² See Shaffer, Greg, Elsig, Manfred & Puig, Sergio, The Extensive (but Fragile) Authority of the WTO Appellate Body, Law & Contemp. Probs. (forthcoming 2016,Google Scholar presenting various empirical indicators of the Appellate Body’s extensive authority).

³ For a recent critique of ISDS, see Gus Van Harten, Sold down the Yangtze: Canada’s Lopsided Investment deal with china (2015). For an overview of reform proposals, see Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap, Transnat’l Disp. Management (Special Issue) (2014), at http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/journal-browse-issues-toc.asp?key=52.

⁴ See Oliver, Christian, Public Backlash Threatens EU Trade Deal with the US, Fin. Times (Jan. 13, 2015)Google Scholar.

⁵ See European Commission, Online Public Consultation on Investment Protection and Investor to state Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) (2015), at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153044.pdf.

⁶ See Elsig, Manfred & Eckhardt, Jappe, The Creation of the Multilateral Trade Court: Design and Experiential Learning, 14 World Trade Rev. 13 (2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷ Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (Aapl) v. Republic of Sri Lanka, Icsid Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award (June 27, 1990).

⁸ See Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The Arbitration Game, Economist (Oct. 11, 2014) (describing ISDS as giving “foreign firms a special right to apply to a secretive tribunal of highly paid corporate lawyers”).

⁹ As coined by Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, and used famously by Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth in their study on international commercial arbitration, a legal field refers to “a symbolic terrain [social space or micro cosm] with its own networks, hierarchical relationships, and expertise, and more generally its own rules of the game, all of which are subject to modification over time and in relation to other fields.” Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Dealing in Virtue 16 (1996) (citing Pierre Bourdieu & Loïc Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology 94–100 (1992)).

¹⁰ Peter Haas defines an “epistemic community” as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.” Haas, Peter, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 Int’l Org. 1, 3 (1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ In Bourdieu’s terms, “a symbolical order of norms and doctrines [such as the institutions of the legal field]. .. does not contain within itself the principlesof its own dynamic,” whereas “the [legal or] juridical field itself contains the principle of its own transformation in the struggles between the objective interests associated with these different perspectives.” Bourdieu, Pierre, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 Hastings L.J. 805, 816–17 (1987)Google Scholar.

¹² See Dezalay & Garth, supra note 9, at 59.

¹³ Weiler, Joseph, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 35 J. World Trade 191, 194, 197 (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴ See supra notes 1, 2.

¹⁵ See Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet, Corporate Europe Observatory, Profiting from in Justice, How Law Firms, Arbitrators and Financiers are Fuelling an Investment Arbitration Boom (2013), at http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/profiting-from-injustice.pdf.

¹⁶ See, e.g., Van Harten, Gus, Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration (Osgoode Hall Law Sch., York Univ. Google Scholar, Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy Research Paper No. 41/2012, 2012). In a different direction, see Franck, Susan D., Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 Harv. Int’l L.J. 435 (2009).Google Scholar

¹⁷ See Cecilia Malmström (@MalmstromEU), Twitter (Mar. 18, 2015, 7:30 a.m.), at https://twitter.com/malmstromeu/status/578201842678640641, with reference to a longer speech: Cecilia Malmström, European Commissioner for Trade, Speech at the Discussion on Investment in Ttip at the Meeting of the International Trade Committee of the European Parliament (Mar. 18, 2015), at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_Speech-15-4624_en.htm.

¹⁸ Pauwelyn, Joost, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (2005)Google Scholar.

¹⁹ See Shihata, Ibrahim, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Role of ICSID and Miga, 1 ICSID Rev. 1 (1986).Google Scholar

²⁰ See The Role of the State in Investor-State Arbitration (Shaheeza Lalani & Rodrigo Polanco Lazo eds., 2014); Paparinskis, Martins, The Limits of Depoliticisation in Contemporary Investor-State Arbitration, in 3 Select Proceedings of the European Society of International Law 271 (Crawford, James & Nouwen, Sarah eds., 2010)Google Scholar

²¹ See Helleiner, Eric & Pagliari, Stefano, The End of an Era in International Financial Regulation: A Post crisis Research Agenda, 65 Int’l Org. 169 (2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²² See Grinberg, Itai, Breaking Beps: The New International Tax Diplomacy, Geo. L.J. (forthcoming 2016)Google Scholar (draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2652894); Grinberg, Itai & Pauwelyn, Joost, The Emergence of a New International Tax Regime: The Oecd’s Package on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), Asil Insights (Oct. 28, 2015)Google Scholar.

²³ Helleiner & Pagliari, supra note 21, at 182.

²⁴ European Commission Press Release, Draft Text on Investment Protection and Investment Court System in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (Ttip) (Sept. 16, 2015), at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_Memo-15-5652_en.htm. In support, see Pauwelyn, Joost, Why the U.S. Should Support the EU Proposal for an Investment Court System, The Summit (Nov. 24, 2015)Google Scholar, at http://thesummit.gjil.org/2015/11/why-us-should-support-eu-proposal-for.html.

²⁵ On December 2, 2015, the EU concluded a free trade agreement with Vietnam that formally includes the EU’s Investment Court System. See European Commission Press Release, The EU and Vietnam Finalise Landmark Trade Deal (Dec. 2, 2015), at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1409.

²⁶ See John Gray, Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus (1992) (similarly using the metaphor to highlight the differences between men and women in terms of their needs, desires, and behaviors) versus Robert Kagan, of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (2003) (attributing to the United States features of Mars, god of war, identified with realism or a Hobbesian world ruled by force, and comparing Europe to Venus, goddess of love, identified with idealism or a Kantian world governed by law and institutions).

²⁷ In total, 201 disputes, 251 individuals, and 603 appointments. In the WTO’s first 20 years of operation, 488 requests for consultation were filed. By the end of 2014, these requests led to (only) 201 distinct disputes for which a panel was established and composed. Moreover, in some cases, multiple complainants led to multiple, distinct requests for consultations that were then collectively addressed by one and the same panel. The figure of 201 disputes counts compliance panels as separate disputes.

²⁸ In total, 502 cases, 94 percent of which were registered in the last twenty years; 396 individuals; 1666 appointments.

²⁹ Compare Pauwelyn, Joost, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (2005)Google Scholar, with Pauwelyn, Joost, At the Edge of Chaos? Foreign Investment Law as a Complex Adaptive System, How It Emerged and How It Can Be Reformed, 29 ICSID Rev. 372 (2014)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁰ Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 UNTS 154.

³¹ Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Art. 52, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 UST 1270, 575 UNTS 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention], in International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Convention, Regulations and Rules, ICSID Doc. ICSID/15 (Apr. 10, 2006).

³² Australia’s law has been challenged by five WTO members in WTO dispute settlement (see Ukraine in WT/DS434; Honduras, WT/DS435; Dominican Republic, WT/DS441; Cuba, WT/DS458; Indonesia, WT/DS467) and also by Philip Morris (Asia) under the Hong Kong–Australia bilateral investment agreement, Agreement Between the Government of Hong Kong and the Government of Australia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, opened for signature, Sept. 15, 1993, 1748 UNTS 385, pursuant to Uncitral arbitration rules. See Notice of Arbitration (Nov. 21, 2011), at https://www.ag.gov.au/Internationalrelations/InternationalLaw/Documents/Philip%20Morris%20Asia%20Limited%20Notice%20of%20Arbitration%2021%20November%202011.pdf. Uncitral arbitrators in this case are Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel (president), Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, and Donald M. McRae (all professors). WTO panelists are Alexander Erwin (chairman), François Dessemontet, and Billie Miller. For more examples, see Puig, Sergio, The Merging of International Trade and Investment Law, 33 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 1 (2015)Google Scholar.

³³ A mining investment may require imports of machinery and engineering services, and survive only if minerals can be exported. Trading sugar or tobacco may require the establishment of a distribution center and investment in brand names and marketing.

³⁴ Richard Baldwin, 21st Century Regionalism: Filling the Gap Between 21st Century Trade and 20th Century Trade Rules (Centre for Economic Policy Research, Policy Insight No. 56, 2011), at https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/wtowps/ersd201108.html.

³⁵ Pursuant to some investment agreements, investor-state arbitrators are explicitly called upon to consider WTO treaty provisions (for example, when stating that compulsory licensing in line with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights does not amount to compensable expropriation). Similarly, under the WTO treaty itself—for example, the most-favored-nation requirement in the General Agreement on Trade in Services—WTO panelists may have to take cognizance of a Bit. One and the same treaty provision may thus be interpreted by ICSID and WTO adjudicators, possibly leading to different approaches. See Kurtz, Jürgen, The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in Investor-State Arbitration: Competition and Its Discontents, 20 Eur. J. Int’l L. 749 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁶ See Gregory Shaffer, Defending Interests: Publicprivate Partnerships in WTO Litigation (2003).

³⁷ Bodansky, Daniel, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law? 93 AJIL 596, 600 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990); Grossman, Nienke, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies, 41 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 107, 115 (2009)Google Scholar.

³⁸ See Grossman, Nienke, Sex on the Bench: Do Women Judges Matter to the Legitimacy of International Courts?, 12 Chi. J. Int’l L. 647, 651 (2012)Google Scholar.

³⁹ See Weiler, supra note 13, at 193 (describing “insiders,” or what he calls “internal sources of legitimacy,” as “the world of the WTO itself and its principal institutional actors: the Delegates and delegations, the Secretariat, the Panels, and even the Appellate Body among others”; compared to outsiders or external sources of legitimacy, which he describes as “the ‘Real World’ of States and their constitutional organs such as Parliaments, Governments and Courts as well as the world of multinational corporations, of Ngos, of the media and of citizens”).

⁴⁰ See supra notes 5, 24.

⁴¹ Some go as far as proposing to “move the ICSID into the WTO.” Hufbauer, Gary & Moran, Tyler, Investment and Trade Regimes Conjoined: Economic Facts & Regulatory Frameworks 6 (July 2015)Google Scholar (on file with author).

⁴² Mavroidis, Petros, Selecting the WTO Judges, in WTO Litigation, Investment and Commercial Arbitration: Crossfertilization Andreciprocal Opportunities 103, 103 (Huerta-Goldman, Jorge, Romanetti, Antoine & Stirnimann, Franz eds., 2013)Google Scholar.

⁴³ ICSID arbitrators are those nominated in pending and concluded cases (note that the list provided by ISCID includes both arbitrators and conciliators, though the number of conciliation procedures is extremely low: 9 out of 502). International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Arbitrators, Conciliators and ad Hoc Committee Members, at https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/icsidweb/arbitrators/Pages/Cvsearch.aspx?gE=cases&cases=all; WTO panelists are those who have served on completed panels, see http://www.worldtradelaw.net/databases/panelists.php), or on ongoing disputes, see http://www.worldtradelaw.net/static.php?type=dsc&page=currentcases.

⁴⁴ Only 2 of these 9, Gonzalo Biggs and Donald McRae, were appointed to WTO panels more than once.

⁴⁵ Abi-Saab, Bacchus, Baptista, Ehlermann, Feliciano, Janow, Lacarte, Ramirez, Sacerdoti, and Taniguchi (Bacchus and Lacarte under UNCITRAL, the others under ICSID). In Comparing WTO Panelists and icsid Arbitrators: The Creation of International Legal Fields, 1 Oñati Sociolegal Series 1, 14 (2011), José Augusto Fontoura Costa also lists David Unterhalter as having been appointed as an >ICSID arbitrator. The icsid website does not include that appointment under icsid, but Unterhalter is a well-known International Chamber of Commerce arbitrator. In addition, Seung Wha Chang has served as an arbitrator in commercial, but not investor-state, arbitration. Thus, if one includes commercial arbitration, the overlap is twelve out of twenty-five (or 48 percent).

⁴⁶ In eight out of ten cases, the ICSID appointments were subsequent to their WTO appointments. Only Feliciano and Baptisa served ICSID before serving the WTO.

⁴⁷ Feliciano overlapped in 1995.

⁴⁸ Puig, Sergio, Social Capital in the Arbitration Market, 25 Eur. J. Int’l L. 387, 403 (2014)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (ICSID-only appointments between 1972, year of the first ICSID dispute, and February 2014).

⁴⁹ Id. at 406 (11.5, 11, and 9.4 percent, respectively). Canada is a relatively distant fourth with 7.57 percent.

⁵⁰ World Bank, The ICSID Caseload: Statistics (Special Focus—European Union) 24 (April 2015), at https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/icsidweb/resources/pages/icsid-caseload-statistics.aspx.

⁵¹ World Bank, The ICSID Caseload: Statistics (Issue 2015-1) (2015) (as of December 31, 2014), at https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/icsidweb/resources/pages/icsid-caseload-statistics.aspx; see also Eberhardt & Olivet, supra note 15, at 8: “Just 15 arbitrators, nearly all from Europe, the United States or Canada, have decided 55 percent of all known investment-treaty disputes.”

⁵² UNCTAD statistics, presented in its Recent Trends in IIAs and ISDS (Feb. 2015) (collecting all known ISDS cases from 1987 to 2014, not just ICSID cases, 608 in total), at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb 2015d1_en.pdf, show that 72 percent of all known investor-state arbitration cases were filed against developing countries or economies in transition. Only 28 percent of defendant countries were “developed,” but this number has been rising in recent years. In 2013, for example, almost half of all known cases, 27 of 57, were filed against developed countries (especially the Eu), and in 2014, 40 percent were filed against developed countries.

⁵³ Michael Waibel & Yanhui Wu, Are Arbitrators Political? 27 (2012), at http://www.wipol.uni-bonn.de/lehrveranstaltungen-1/lawecon-workshop/archive/dateien/waibelwinter11-12 (data set includes 388 cases, between 1972 and 2011, and 341 arbitrations).

⁵⁴ World Bank, Country and Lending Groups (2015), at http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups.

⁵⁵ The number of developing country ICSID appointments is below 30 percent since, according to ICSID statistics, 69 percent of appointments are from western Europe or North America, and 5.6 percent from Australia (49) or New Zealand (44). Note, however, that people with more than one nationality have been counted twice (Donald McRae, for example, is counted as from both Canada and New Zealand), with the consequence that the total number of developed-country appointments may be inflated.

⁵⁶ For the number of ICSID cases filed against developing-countries, see ICSID case database at https://icsid. worldbank.org/apps/icsidweb/cases/. For the number of developing-country arbitrators, see ICSID arbitrator database at https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/icsidweb/arbitrators/.

⁵⁷ These numbers amount to 2.3 percent, 0.16 percent, and 1 percent, respectively.

⁵⁸ See supra note 49.

⁵⁹ Of these seventy-two “EU” appointments, quite a number occurred before the country in question joined the eu (as was the case with Peter Palecka of the Czech Republic). Only fifty-eight of the seventy-two appointments went to EU-15 countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom).

⁶⁰ World Trade Organization, WTO Dispute Settlement: A Statistical Overview: January 1995 to 31 December 2014 (2015). This number includes all WTU consultation requests, some of which did not lead to a WTO panel.

⁶¹ This percentage represents 313 out of 603.

⁶² All nationalities of the panelists are considered to be “developing” except Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Germany, Iceland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. Although Bulgaria and Hungary are classified as “upper-middle-income economies” in the World Bank’s regional system, we consider them “developed” because they are now part of the Eu-28, and the eu is as a WTO member in its own right and classified for WTO purposes as developed.

⁶³ Sixty-eight percent of WTO panels were cases against developed countries, and 59 percent of those cases were filed by developed countries. Note that in a good number of the cases filed by developed countries, the co-complainants may include developing countries. It is often the case, however, that these developing countries then simply “piggy-back” on the developed-country complainant(s) in terms of shouldering the political fallout of filing a WTO case, gathering the factual evidence, and formulating and presenting the legal argument to substantiate the claim. Considering both claimants (of which there can be many in a single case) and defendants (one single in each case), 68 percent of WTO panel cases involved at least one developing country, and 91 percent involved at least one developed country.

⁶⁴ World Bank, Country and Lending Groups, supra note 54.

⁶⁵ Taiwan is not listed as a separate country for the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, but its data were added to the world aggregate and the high-income countries aggregate by the World Bank. See World Bank, Data: Where Are Your Data on Taiwan?, at https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/114933-where-are-your-data-on-taiwan. For the purpose of this article, Taiwan is included in the category “high-income economies.”

⁶⁶ They are defendants in 68 percent of WTO panels, and the United States and the eu are defendants in 41.5 percent of all WTO consultation requests.

⁶⁷ This percentage represents 16.3 percent of the total number of panelists.

⁶⁸ Sixty-one percent of complainants, and 58 percent of defendants. See http://www.worldtradelaw.net/databases/classificationcount.php (as of January 23, 2015).

⁶⁹ Costa, supra note 45.

⁷⁰ Id. at 10. Cost a defines “governmental service” as including employment for any branch of government (diplomats, plus the executive, judicial, and legislative branches) but excluding advisory orconsultancy services to states.

⁷¹ Id. Costa defines “academic”as”work as professor, dean, president, coordinator, lectureror tenured researcher in universities or research institutes.”

⁷² Id. at 17, 21 (“their share of the population seems to have stabilized at around 80 percent”). Costa also finds that only 19 percent are from the private sector.

⁷³ Minimum three years in government as diplomats, negotiators, bureaucrats, ministers, and so on.

⁷⁴ Minimum three years of experience with a law firm either before or after the WTO appointment.

⁷⁵ Tenured or tenure-track academic appointment at a university—that is, full-time academics.

⁷⁶ Costa, supra note 45, at 23.

⁷⁷ Waibel & Wu, supra note 53, at 27.

⁷⁸ Costa, supra note 45, at 19. Our updated data put the figure for WTO panelists at 1.24.

⁷⁹ Ninety-five percent from 2005 to 2009.

⁸⁰ Costa, supra note 45.

⁸¹ Id.

⁸² If anything, the last five years provide the lowest proportion: 2.31 percent.

⁸³ Costa, supra note 45, at 15 (“no links to any legal background or professional activity”).

⁸⁴ Malacrida, Reto, WTO Panel Composition: Searching Far and Wide for Administrators of World Trade Justice, in A History of Law and Lawyers in the Gatt/WTO 311, 322 (Marceau, Gabrielle ed., 2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (“panels invariably include at least one lawyer”).

⁸⁵ As well as, to a lesser extent, panelists with a private law background, whose numbers have also increased over time; the number of academic jurists, by contrast, has decreased.

⁸⁶ ICSID arbitrators: 863 appointments; 273 individuals. WTO panelists: 430 appointments; 212 individuals.

⁸⁷ The 603 appointments have gone to 251 individuals.

⁸⁸ See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Art. 21.5, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, supra note 30, Annex 2, 1869Unts 401 [hereinafter DSU].

⁸⁹ The 1666 appointments have gone to 396 individuals.

⁹⁰ See The ICSID Caseload: Statistics (Issue 2015-1), supra note 51, at 20, for the total number of appointments.

⁹¹ Using the data from Puig’s study, supra note 48, 235 of 419.

⁹² Id. at 419. Puig defines “single shooters” as arbitrators who have three or fewer “ties” with other arbitrators— that is, who have served ICSID with three or fewer different individuals (serving on one tribunal, as it is composed of three individuals, gives a person two ties; if one of these is subsequently replaced, an additional tie is created).

⁹³ Using Puig’s definition of “single shooters,” 136 of 251, or 54.2 percent, of WTO panelists have three or fewer “ties” with other panelists. Defining single shooters as having only two ties gives 43 percent in icsid; 50.2 percent in the WTO. If one does not count ties, but rather number ofpanels served on, 46.2 percent (116 out of 251) served on one WTO panel only. If one excludes compliance panels as a second panel served on, 53 percent of WTO panelists served on only one case.

⁹⁴ An accessible explanation of heavy-tailed distributions can be found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heavy-tailed_distribution.

⁹⁵ The number is 136 of 251 arbitrators.

⁹⁶ The number is 247 of 450 disputes.

⁹⁷ Eberhardt & Olivet, supra note 15, at 38.

⁹⁸ Defined as having three or fewer ties.

⁹⁹ Excluding compliance proceedings: panelists with one appointment, 53 percent; with two to five, 43 percent; and with six to ten, 4 percent.

¹⁰⁰ The number is 87 of 603 appointments.

¹⁰¹ The number is 270 of 1350 appointments.

¹⁰² Eberhardt & Olivet, supra note 15, at 38. See also Costa, supra note 45, at 11, finding that a group of only twelve arbitrators (4.4 percent) of the ICSID population accounts for about a quarter of nominations, whereas seventeen WTO panelists (7.65 percent) correspond to the same quartile.

¹⁰³ The number is 94 of 603 appointments.

¹⁰⁴ Puig, supra note 48, at 404–05.

¹⁰⁵ Weiler, supra note 13, at 201–02.

¹⁰⁶ Id. at 197 (emphasis added).

¹⁰⁷ Id. at 202 (“I would further argue that the profile of the ideal individual Panel list, or the ideal Panel, given the new reality of WTO dispute resolution, is not reflected in the current roster nor in the selection and composition of Panels. The life experience, professional backgrounds of Panel lists have to be commensurate with the evident gravity and profundity of the issues decided in a globalized world. This I submit has conspicuously not been the case in some of the most important instances.”).

¹⁰⁸ Mavroidis, supra note 42, at 103.

¹⁰⁹ Elsig, Manfred & Pollack, Mark, Agents, Trustees, and International Courts: The Politics of Judicial Appointment at the World Trade Organization, 20 Eur. J. Int’l Rel. 391, 404 (2014)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹¹⁰ Id. at 407.

¹¹¹ Id. at 408.

¹¹² Puig, supra note 48, at 407, 419, 423.

¹¹³ Waibel & Wu, supra note 53, at 28.

¹¹⁴ Costa, supra note 45, at 20.

¹¹⁵ Id. at 24.

¹¹⁶ Eberhardt & Olivet, supra note 15, at 35.

¹¹⁷ Id. at 36 (citing Harten, Gus Van, Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 Osgoode Hall L.J. 211 (2012)Google Scholar).

¹¹⁸ Id. at 36 (citing Kapeliuk, Daphna, The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision Patterns of Elite Investment Arbitrators, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 47, 77 (2010))Google Scholar.

¹¹⁹ Barker, Alyx, Taking on the “Inner Mafia,” Global Arb. Rev., Oct. 2, 2012.Google Scholar

¹²⁰ Eberhardt & Olivet, supra note 15, at 43. Even though WTO panelists who are government officials representing WTO members on other occasions may, in principle, have more (and more difficult to track) conflicts of interest than, for example, academics serving on ICSID panels, the issue of conflict of interest has not often been raised in WTO circles.

¹²¹ For example, 34 percent of WTO appointments have been ambassadors or government ministers.

¹²² Elsig & Pollack, supra note 109, at 394.

¹²³ Id. at 402.

¹²⁴ Of these eight, five never served on a WTO panel.

¹²⁵ Costa, supra note 45, at 14 (“the exercise of a prestigious international function backed by the approval of states is an important asset to enter arbitration, while previous links to commercial and investment arbitration does not seem to be important to step into WTO’s courtroom”).

¹²⁶ Puig, supra note 48, at 413 (including Figure 5); Waibel & Wu, supra note 53, at 7, 21–23.A smaller number of arbitrators profile themselves as presidents, with a more neutral position.

¹²⁷ Eight or more appointments, excluding appointments on ad hoc annulment committees.

¹²⁸ Yves Derains, Gilbert Guillaume, and V. V. Veeder.

¹²⁹ Alexis Mourre, who is also the only person of the forty-five top arbitrators who was appointed in equal numbers by investors (four), host states (four) and neutrally (four).

¹³⁰ For a more detailed discussion of these numbers, see Sergio Puig, Blinding International Justice (on file with author).

¹³¹ Compare to Figure 1, representing the ICSID network, in Puig, supra note 48, at 411, where the dots are centralized much more toward the middle.

¹³² These factors do not explain everything. Other explanations may play a role, too—for example, the type of work of, and skills generally required from, WTO versus ICSID adjudicators. Given that all claims under the WTO treaty automatically fall under the compulsory jurisdiction of the Dsu, whereas consent to ICSID jurisdiction must be found case-by-case in the relevant Bit or contract, ICSID disputes generally involve more procedural matters. The importance of such legal matters may partly explain why more lawyers, including private lawyers and legal academics, are appointed to ICSID tribunals than to WTO panels. The latter focus more on substantive trade questions, which are typically limited to the four corners of the WTO treaty (not public international law or domestic law, as is more often the case in ISDS)—questions that government officials with trade expertise can more easily handle.

¹³³ Formally, secretariat proposals can be rejected only for “compelling reasons.” DSU, supra note 88, Art. 8.6. Yet, in practice, this authority to reject has amounted to a de facto veto right, and without much probing as to the exact reason for the objection.

¹³⁴ Id., Art. 8.7 (if so asked by either party, at least twenty days after the panel was established). A panelist proposed by the secretariat but rejected by one of the parties is traditionally not subsequently appointed by the DG.

¹³⁵ DG appointments in 129 out of 201 cases.

¹³⁶ WTO Dispute Settlement: A Statistical Overview, supra note 60.

¹³⁷ Malacrida, supra note 84, at 314 (“the Secretariat never proposes candidates until after it has consulted with the parties on the desired profile of any candidates”), 317 (“It is widely under-appreciated just how prominently the parties’ preferences feature at the Dg-stage.”).

¹³⁸ Of the 603 appointments, 381 were not from the list.

¹³⁹ Of the 382 on the list, 70 have served. The 382 figure comes from the latest version of the indicative list avail able in 2014. See Indicative List of Governmental and Non-governmental Panelists, WT/DSB/44/Rev.29 (Nov. 21, 2014).

¹⁴⁰ ICSID Convention, supra note 31, Art. 37(2)(b).

¹⁴¹ Id., Art. 57 (which also refers to the other, substantive qualification requirements in Article 14, though these additional requirements are difficult to check and have not, in practice, been raised as objections).

¹⁴² Id., Art. 37(2)(b).

¹⁴³ Id., Art. 38. Under Article 5 of the ISCID Convention, the president of the World Bank is chairman of ICSID’s Administrative Council.

¹⁴⁴ Id., Art. 38; Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, r. 4(4), in International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Convention, Regulations and Rules, supra note 31.

¹⁴⁵ ICSID Convention, supra note 31, Art. 52(3).

¹⁴⁶ Of these, 12.6 percent are annulment appointments.

¹⁴⁷ Puig, supra note 48, at 406.

¹⁴⁸ Pauwelyn, Joost, Minority Rules: Precedent and Participation Before the WTO Appellate Body, in Establishing Judicial Authority in International Trade Law (Jemielniak, Joanna, Nielsen, Laura & Olsen, Henrik Palmer eds., forthcoming 2016)Google Scholar (updated to end of 2013, counting the Eu-28 as one member).

¹⁴⁹ Costa, supra note 45, at 12.

¹⁵⁰ Id. at 17.

¹⁵¹ Formally, also host states can sue private investors under ICSID, but for that purpose, a contract between the parties must be in place. In practice, almost all ICSID cases have been investor-state disputes.

¹⁵² Waibel and Wu, supra note 53, at 29, show that the average number of years worked in the executive is slightly higher for arbitrators appointed by host states than for those appointed by investors (3.6 percent versus 3.2 percent, respectively). Their evidence, Id. at 34, also supports the hypothesis that “arbitrators who also wear the hat of counsel to private investors are more likely to affirm jurisdiction.”

¹⁵³ Malacrida, supra note 84, at 330–31.

¹⁵⁴ DSU, supra note 88, Art. 8.3.

¹⁵⁵ WTO Dispute Settlement: A Statistical Overview, supra note 60.

¹⁵⁶ In 143 out of 211 cases.

¹⁵⁷ DSU, supra note 88, Art. 8.10.

¹⁵⁸ ICSID Convention, supra note 31, Art. 39; Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, supra note 144, r. 3.

¹⁵⁹ ICSID Convention, supra note 31, Art. 38.

¹⁶⁰ Id., Art. 52(3).

¹⁶¹ See UN Conference on Trade and Development, Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (Apr. 2014). The report, which collects all known ISDS cases up to 2013 (not just icsid; 568 in total), shows that 85 percent of investor-state claims were filed by investors from developed countries and that, of those claims, 75 percent were by investors of either the eu (53 percent) or United States (22 percent). U.S., Dutch, and British investors top the list with, respectively, 127, 61, and 43 cases.

¹⁶² The EU is not, and is unlikely to soon become, a party to ICSID (as the EU is not a state, the ICSID convention would need to be amended). Thus, based on ICSID rules alone, nationality restrictions are unlikely to change. How ever, free trade agreements and Bits that provide consent to ICSID arbitration or other forms of ISDS may impose additional nationality restrictions. For example, the investment chapter of the Canada-Eu Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (Article X.25, paragraphs 3–4), at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/, states that when ICSID is asked to appoint arbitrators, it “may not appoint as presiding arbitrator a national of either Canada or a Member State of the European Union unless all disputing parties agree otherwise” (emphasis added). The sub-list of the arbitrator roster for presiding arbitrators under that agreement must be “neither nationals of Canada nor the Member States of the European Union.”

¹⁶³ DSU, supra note 88, Art. 8.11. To provide some compensation to governmental panelists, a practice has developed that allows payment of 600 Chf/day to governmental panelists who certify that they are doing their panelist work outside normal office hours (for example, during weekends).

¹⁶⁴ Puig, supra note 48, at 398.

¹⁶⁵ Id. at 398 n.61.

¹⁶⁶ In support, see Costa, supra note 45, at 22.

¹⁶⁷ Article 8.1 of the Dsu, supra note 88, provides:

Article 8.2 of the DSU provides: “Panel members should be selected with a view to ensuring the independence of the members, a sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of experience.” In terms of the argument presented in the remainder of the paragraph above, it should be noted that only the GATT/WTO work is described in detail. By comparison, the mention of teaching and publication is little more than an aside.

¹⁶⁸ Id., Art. 8.6.

¹⁶⁹ Article 17.3 of the DSU provides: “The Appellate Body shall comprise persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements generally.” As noted earlier, this provision has not prevented the appointment of three (of twenty-five, overall) AB members who had no law degree (although “expertise in law” does not necessarily require the possession of a law degree).

¹⁷⁰ ICSID Convention, supra note 31, Art. 14(1).

¹⁷¹ But see Puig, supra note 48, who notes that in the early ICSID years, various arbitrators were nonlawyers.

¹⁷² Recall, however, that although the DG appointed 64 percent of panels, the parties may have previously agreed on one or two of the panelists before asking the DG to appoint the third person. No data are available on the precise number.

¹⁷³ An average DG-appointed panelist has 3.7 ties, whereas an average non-DG-appointed panelist has 3.3 ties. These figures translate into 1.85 cases per panelist for the former and 1.65 cases per panelist for the latter.

¹⁷⁴ There have been 315 appointments for 138 panelists.

¹⁷⁵ There have been 288 appointments for 162 panelists.

¹⁷⁶ Twelve percent of them are in annulment proceedings.

¹⁷⁷ Only ten are appointed by ICSID itself.

¹⁷⁸ The ICSID Caseload: Statistics (Issue 2015-1), supra note 51, at 19. Statistics, up to the end of 2014, include conciliation and annulment proceedings: 1188 have been party appointed.

¹⁷⁹ World Bank, Theicsid Caseload: Statistics (Issue 2015-2) (2015), at 19. Of the 478 appointed by icsid, 220 (46 percent) have been from western Europe and 55 (11.5 percent) from North America.

¹⁸⁰ Id. at 31 (107 and 48, respectively).

¹⁸¹ ICSID Convention, supra note 31, Art. 52.

¹⁸² DSU, supra note 88, Art. 17.6.

¹⁸³ Costa, supra note 45, at 21.

¹⁸⁴ See http://www.worldtradelaw.net/databases/appealcount.php. This proportion, valid as of April 13, 2015, includes compliance panels.

¹⁸⁵ WTO Dispute Settlement: A Statistical Overview, supra note 60 (81 percent modified; 3 percent reversed).

¹⁸⁶ Eberhardt & Olivet, supra note 15, at 38.

¹⁸⁷ DSU, supra note 88, Art. 27.1 (“The Secretariat shall have the responsibility of assisting panels, especially on the legal, historical and procedural aspects of the matters dealt with, and of providing secretarial and technical support.”).

¹⁸⁸ See Nordström, Håkan, The WTO Secretariat in a Changing World, 39 J. World Trade 819 (2005)Google Scholar.

¹⁸⁹ Constantine Partasides, The Fourth Arbitrator? The Role of Secretaries to Tribunals in International Arbitration, 18 Arb. Int’l 147 (2002)Google Scholar.

¹⁹⁰ See Additional Opinion of Professor Jan Hendrik Dalhuisen Under Article 48(4) of the ICSID Convention (July 30, 2010) (appended to Companñía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Annulment Proceeding (Aug 20, 2007). For a critique, see Susan L. Karamanian, Case Report: Companñía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, 105 AJIL 553 (2011).

¹⁹¹ See, e.g., Jarrod Hepburn, Battling $50 Billion Yukos Awards on Two Fronts, Russia Focuses on Claimants’ Alleged Fraud and Linguistic Analysis of Tribunal Assistant’s Alleged Role in Drafting Awards, Inv. Arb. Rep. (Nov. 3, 2015), at http://www.iareporter.com/articles/battling-50-billion-yukos-awards-on-two-fronts-russia-focuses-on-claimants-alleged-fraud-and-linguistic-analysis-of-tribunal-assistants-alleged-role-in-drafting-awards/.

¹⁹² Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration 2000 (2d ed. 2014).

¹⁹³ That secretariat lawyers may influence legal reasoning or outcomes as much as panelists may also explain why conflict-of-interest concerns regarding panelists have attracted little attention. If the secretariat is basically calling the shots, why focus too much on the impartiality of panelists or Ab members. By the same token, however, more attention should then be paid to the impartiality of secretariat lawyers—an issue that also has attracted little or no attention.

¹⁹⁴ Costa, supra note 45, at 12.

¹⁹⁵ Indeed, at this moment, the WTO is going through a mini-crisis of its own: there are too many WTO panels and not enough secretariat members to staff them, leading to long delays (with waiting periods of up to fifteen months before a WTO panel can start its work). Rather than appointing panelists who themselves would do the bulk of the work or taking a critical look at the role now played by the secretariat, WTO members are looking, instead, into hiring more secretariat staff or making secretariat support more efficient. See WTO Press Release, Azeveˆdo Seeks WTO Members’ Views on How to Meet Increasing Demand for Dispute Settlement (Oct. 28, 2015) (address to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body), at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spra_e/spra 94_e.htm.

¹⁹⁶ For this article’s definition and approach to legitimacy, see supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.

¹⁹⁷ See Shaffer, Gregory, Power, Governance and the WTO: A Comparative Institutional Approach, in Power in Global Governance 130, 134 (Barnett, Michael & Duvall, Bud eds., 2005)Google Scholar.

¹⁹⁸ See Elsig & Eckhardt, supra note 6.

¹⁹⁹ Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. Arb/87/3, Final Award (June 27, 1990).

²⁰⁰ See supra note 196.

²⁰¹ Costa, supra note 45, at 13.

²⁰² Id. at 17.

²⁰³ Id. at 13.

²⁰⁴ Id.

²⁰⁵ Id. at 17.

²⁰⁶ Id. at 22. “The WTO system stays close to bureaucratic and formalized rational legitimacy, while investment arbitration seeks more support from charisma (maybe through the special attributes of arbitrators) and tradition (maybe from the strong links to commercial arbitration).” Id. at 24.

²⁰⁷ For notable exceptions, see Abi-Saab, Georges, The Appellate Body and Treaty Interpretation, in the WTO At Ten: the Contribution of the Dispute Settlement System (Sacerdoti, Giorgio, Yanovich, Alan & Bohanes, Jan eds., 2006)Google Scholar, which discusses the “judicial politics” of the Ab, and Richard Posner, Lee Epstein & William M. Landes, the Behavior Offederal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice (2013).

²⁰⁸ In the U.S. context, see Cass R. Sunstein, Are Judges Political? An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary (2006). See also Pauwelyn, Joost & Elsig, Manfred, The Politics of Treaty Interpretation: Variations and Explanations Across International Tribunals, in International Law and International Relations: Taking Stock 445 (Dunoff, Jeffrey & Pollack, Mark eds., 2013)Google Scholar.

²⁰⁹ Waibel & Wu, supra note 53, at 39, 33–34 (“arbitrators with a track record of past appointments by investors are more likely to affirm jurisdiction than the average arbitrator, and arbitrators with track record of appointments by the host country are less likely to uphold jurisdiction than the average arbitrator”). But see, for nuance, Kapeliuk, Daphna, The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision Patters of Elite Arbitrators, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 47 (2010)Google Scholar.

²¹⁰ Posner, Eric & de Figueiredo, Miguel, Is the International Court of Justice Biased?, 34 J. Legal Stud. 599 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²¹¹ The number of dissents by WTO panelists is, indeed, much smaller than that of ICSID arbitrators. See van den Berg, Albert Jan, Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration, in Looking to the future: Essays on internation allaw in honorof W. Michaelreisman 821 (Arsanjani, Mahnoush, Cogan, Jacob, Sloane, Robert & Wiessner, Siegfried eds., 2011)Google Scholar; Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark Pollack, International Judicial Dissent: Causes and Consequences (draft of paper prepared for presentation at the European Union Studies Association Biennial Conference, Boston, Ma, Mar. 5–7, 2015), at https://eustudies.org/conference/papers/download/84.

²¹² See Redfern, Alan, Dissenting Opinions in International Commercial Arbitration: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 20 Arb. Int’l. 223 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Romero, Eduardo Silva, Brèves observations sur l’opinion dissidente, in Les arbitres internationaux 179 (Société de législation comparée 2005)Google Scholar.

²¹³ Voeten, Erik, The Politics of International Judicial Appointments: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights, 61 Int’l Org. 669 (2007)Google Scholar.

²¹⁴ Bruinsma, Fred, The Room at the Top: Separate Opinions in the Grand Chambers of the ECHR (1998–2006), 28 Recht Der Wirtschaft 7 (2007)Google Scholar.

²¹⁵ Busch, Marc & Pelc, Krzysztof, Does the WTO Need a Permanent Body of Panelists, 12 J. Int’l Econ. L. 579, 589, 590 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²¹⁶ Malacrida, supra note 84, at 319 n.13.

²¹⁷ See supra notes 9, 11.

²¹⁸ See Kurtz, supra note 35, although there are also substantive arguments not to transpose WTO juris prudence too quickly to ISDS cases. See Pauwelyn, Joost & DiMascio, Nicolas, Non-discrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds a part or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AJIL 48 (2008)Google Scholar. Where cross-fertilization has occurred, it often involved adjudicators active in both fields. See Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9 (Sept. 5, 2008) (interpreting Argentina’s necessity defense with reference to AB case law on GATT Article XX necessity) (with Giorgio Sacerdoti, a former AB member, as president).

²¹⁹ Dezalay & Garth, supra note 9, at 16–17.

²²⁰ See supra note 196.

²²¹ Weiler defines “internal” sources of legitimacy as coming from “the world of the WTO itself and its principal institutional actors: the Delegates and delegations, the Secretariat, the Panels, and even the Appellate Body among others.” See Weiler, supra note 13, at 193.

²²² Id. at 197: “It would be nice if one could take the rule of law without the rule of lawyers. But that is not possible.”

²²³ Decisions based on a “logic of appropriateness” are biased toward what social norms (here, WTO rules) deem right rather than what cost-benefit calculations (here, a WTO member’s national interests) consider best. The latter is referred to as a “logic of consequences.” See James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions (1989).

²²⁴ See supra note 13.

²²⁵ Jackson, John, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations 110 (1997)Google Scholar.

²²⁶ Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutional Functions and Constitutional Problems of International Economic Law (2004).

²²⁷ Mavroidis, Petros & Neven, Damien, Land Rich and Cash Poor: The Reluctance of the WTO Dispute Settlement System to Entertain Economics Expertise: An Institutional Analysis, in The Use of Economics in International Trade and Investment Disputes (Jansen, Marion, Pauwelyn, Joost & Carpenter, Theresa eds., forthcoming 2016)Google Scholar.

²²⁸ Farewell Speech of AB Member David Unterhalter (Jan. 22, 2014), at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/unterhalterspeech_e.htm.

²²⁹ For a different narrative of the world trade system, based on a bidirectional interaction between law and pol itics (notaunidirectional process of ever more legalization), see Pauwelyn, Joost, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (2005)Google Scholar.

²³⁰ See the recent U.S. settlements in United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton (DS267) and United States—Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes (DS406), pursuant to which the United States kept the nonconforming cotton subsidies and tobacco-control measures in place, paid Brazil U.S.$300 million in cash, and granted unrelated trade concessions to Indonesia. See also the U.S.-Eu settlement in European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (DS26). See Simon Evenett & Jara, Alejandro, Settling WTO Disputes Without Solving the Problem: Abusing Compensation, Vox (Dec. 4, 2014)Google Scholar, at http://www.voxeu.org/article/settling-wto-disputes-without-solving-problem-abusing-compensation.

²³¹ See Shihata, Ibrahim, The Settlement of Disputes Regarding Foreign Investment: The Role of the World Bank, with Particular Reference to ICSID and MIGA, 1 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 97, 116 (1986)Google Scholar (describing icsid’s value as “an effective and truly neutral forum where disputes are to be settled according to objective non-political criteria”); Ser Puig, Gio, Recasting icsid’s Legitimacy Debate: Towards a Goal-Based Empirical Agenda, 36 Fordham Int’l L.J. 465 (2013)Google Scholar (arguing that icsid’s legitimacy is based on its claim to offer expert, specialized, and neutral settlement of investment disputes).

²³² See, e.g., Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, supra note 162.

²³³ For an influential argument against unilaterally appointed arbitrators, see Paulsson, Jan, Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution, 25 icsid Rev. 339, 352 (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, concluding: “The only decent solution— heed this voice in the desert!—is thus that any arbitrator, no matter the size of the tribunal, should be chosen jointly or selected by a neutral body.”).

²³⁴ See the EU Commission proposal, supra note 24, and Anna Joubin-Bret, Why We Need a Global Appellate Mechanism for International Investment Law (Columbia Center on Sustainable Development, Fdi Perspectives No. 146, Apr. 27, 2015), at http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No-146-Joubin-Bret-Final.pdf.

²³⁵ See Alschner, Wolfgang, The Return of the Home State and the Rise of ‘Embedded’ Investor-State Arbitration, in The Role of the State in Investor-State Arbitration 192 (2014)Google Scholar.

²³⁶ Dezalay & Garth, supra note 9, at 311.

²³⁷ Id. at 10.

²³⁸ Id. at 311–12.

²³⁹ Id. at 312.

²⁴⁰ Id. at 315.

²⁴¹ Article XX.25 of the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, supra note 162, provides for a roster of fifteen arbitrators appointed solely by the government parties, and stresses arbitrator neutrality. For other proposals to this effect, including the establishment of a permanent investment court or appellate review system, see EU Commission, Concept Paper: Investment in Ttipand Beyond—the Path for Reform (May 2015), at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF (proposing a requirement that all arbitrators are chosen from a roster preestablished by the parties to the investment treaty), and the communication by France to the EU Commission on ISDS, Vers un nouveau moyen de régler les différends entre etats et investisseurs (May 2015), at https://www.april.org/sites/default/files/267400569-20150530-isds-Papier-Fr-Vf.pdf (calling for arbitrators to be selected from government-appointed rosters, administered by a permanent investment court, and prohibiting arbitrators on the roster from serving also as counsel in any investment-treaty dispute). See also von der Burchard, Hans, Germany Pitches Plan to Break Ttip Stalemate, Politico (May 4, 2015)Google Scholar, at http://www.politico.eu/article/germany-pitches-plan-to-break-ttip-stalemate/.