Hostname: page-component-77f85d65b8-8wtlm Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-03-28T05:33:54.135Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Candidate Equilibrium and the Behavioral Model of the Vote

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Robert S. Erikson
Affiliation:
University of Houston
David W. Romero
Affiliation:
University of California, Riverside

Abstract

Most applications of spatial modeling to the problem of electoral competition are pessimistic regarding the prospects for candidate equilibrium in more than one policy dimension. Probabilistic models of the vote, however, increase the likelihood of equilibrium. We expand the probabilistic model to include measured nonissue variables, thereby representing the general multivariate model of behavioral research. For this model we offer a general candidate equilibrium solution and illustrate with some simulations based on 1988 National Election Study data. The more complicated one's model of voters' motivations, the greater appears to be the chance of locating a candidate equilibrium position in policy space.

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1990

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.