One of the latest turns in the field of comparative democratization has been an increased attention paid to different types of authoritarianism. There is a growing literature on the dynamics of different forms of autocracies, including the “hybrid” regimes located in the gray zone between democracy and autocracy (Geddes 1999; 2003; Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2002a; 2002b; 2006). In this chapter I shall contribute to this body of knowledge by testing the extent to which different authoritarian regimes have different propensities to democratize, both in and of themselves and in response to exogenous shocks. Since different institutional traits are what distinguish different regime types, I shall thus explore the institutional contingency of democratization. As opposed to most previous studies, however, I shall not be concerned with the institutional configurations distinguishing between democracies, such as forms of government and the electoral system (see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini 2003; Cheibub 2007) or other power-sharing institutions (Norris 2008). Instead I focus on the consequences of authoritarian institutions, mostly argued to be a neglected subject in the field (Snyder and Mahoney 1999).

In contrast to the theoretical eclecticism of previous chapters, I shall in this chapter take a more deductive approach. My theoretical point of departure will be Geddes’ (1999; 2003) seminal treatment of the logic of military, one-party and personalist dictatorships. Extending the argument into some other authoritarian regime types omitted by Geddes, I first derive expectations regarding how types of authoritarian regimes affect democratization, and how they respond to exogenous shocks. I then present my estimation strategy, followed by the findings. I conclude by stating the implications for theory and discussing some remaining puzzles.