The third wave of democratization that has swept the globe since the mid-1970s has brought profound change to millions of people around the world. Regardless of whether democracy leads to other valued outcomes such as growth, peace and prosperity, having a democratic system of government in and of itself is an improvement in the quality of life for most citizens. Democracies, by their very nature, to a lesser extent than autocracies harass and jail people for having political views opposing the government. Democracies, also by their very nature, to a lesser extent than autocracies outlaw political and civil society organizations for criticizing incumbent rulers. Political power in democracies is bestowed upon those that win free and fair elections, not according to hereditary succession, threats from the barrel of a gun, or simply from the lack of free choice at the ballot box. Since these are features of democracies that make them democracies, by definition, they are not independent outcomes. Nevertheless, they are in and of themselves highly preferred moral virtues.

How does democracy, thus being a preferable system of government, come about? What are the determinants of democratization? In this book I have tried to answer these questions through a combination of two types of empirical evidence: a large-n statistical analysis of 165 countries around the world in the period 1972–2006, measuring democratization as change in the average Freedom House ratings and Polity scores, and small-n case study work on nine episodes of democratization occurring in Argentina, Bolivia, Hungary, Nepal, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Turkey, and Uruguay. In this concluding chapter I will summarize my findings and discuss their implications.