Context: West African affiliations to IS and the military capabilities of IS groups

The first group affiliated with the Islamic State in the wider Sahel was Jama’at ahl al-Sunnah li’l-Da’wah wa’l-Jihad (JASDJ aka ‘Boko Haram’ led by Abubakr Shekau) in 2015. In 2016, the now-renamed ‘Islamic State West Africa Province’ split in two: on the one side remained JASDJ, headed by Shekau, who was heavily criticised for the group’s violence towards civilians and using people, including women and children, to carry and detonate explosives in crowded places. On the other side, a new (initially smaller) faction favoured by IS retained the ISWAP name under the leadership of Abu Musab al Barnawi (reportedly the son of Boko Haram’s founder, Muhammed Yusuf). Between 2016 and 2021, ISWAP grew strong enough to lead a battle deep in the Sambisa Forest, the JASDJ headquarters, resulting in Shekau’s death and ISWAP’s emergence as the dominant force (Amadou & Foucher Reference Amadou and Foucher2022).

ISSP was formed in mid-2015 by Adnan Abu Walid al-Saharawi, leader of a splinter group from the Al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Mourabitoun based in Mali. A veteran of Sahelian militancy, Al-Saharawi managed groups that engaged in both terrorism and criminality (Raineri Reference Raineri2022a). Saharawi pledged allegiance to ISIS in May 2015 in a message sent to the Mauritanian news agency, claiming to represent al-Mourabitoun. Loyal to al-Qaeda, the al-Mourabitoun leadership disputed this, and Saharawi left al-Mourabitoun, establishing an IS group. Meanwhile, al-Mourabitoun merged with several other groups to form the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (JNIM) in 2017. This became the Sahelian ‘branch’ of al-Qaeda, while ISSP became the IS affiliate (Postings Reference Postings2019).

In 2019, ISSP and ISWAP were formally linked by IS, with ISWAP in the lead. While ISSP had the status of an ISWAP subunit according to IS’s bureaucratic structure, the two remained, practically speaking, independent, with ISSP operating in the tri-border regions of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger and ISWAP operating near Lake Chad (Thompson Reference Thompson2021). This situation shifted again following al-Saharawi’s death in 2021, and ISSP was recognised as an independent group within IS. At the time of writing, the two groups are said to report to the same al-Furqan office under the Islamic State’s General Directorate of Provinces.

IS: the military analysis of an insurgency-turned ‘hybrid’ army: Despite the rise of these provinces, the literature on the fighting capabilities of the IS network has focused predominantly on ‘IS Central’, reflecting IS’s trajectory from a terrorist group in the mid-2000s to a semi-conventional, or ‘unconventionally conventional’, army by the mid-2010s (Levy Reference Levy2021). Scholars have explored IS’s role as a ‘revolutionary warfare’ proponent, rising from a guerrilla force to capture territory through (semi-)conventional operations. As well as explaining their rise, this research has sought to de-essentialise IS by highlighting the similarities between its activities and other non-jihadist revolutionary warfare practitioners (Kalyvas Reference Kalyvas2018; Stoddard Reference Stoddard2019; Stoddard Reference Stoddard2020; Whiteside Reference Whiteside2016). Ingram (Reference Ingram2021) has documented IS’s stage-based model for insurgency escalation, building from terrorist attacks to guerrilla warfare to semi-conventional ‘hybrid’ operations. This reflects the strategy advanced by noted jihadist ‘theorist’ Abu Bakr al-Naji in his text ‘The Management of Savagery’ (which itself mirrors – without acknowledgement – the works of Mao, among others). Whiteside has documented the overlaps between IS insurgent activity and historic examples of ‘revolutionary warfare’ such as the Vietcong (Whiteside Reference Whiteside2016). Similar points are made by Kalyvas (Reference Kalyvas2018). Likewise, Stoddard has documented ISIS’s (and JASDJ’s) transition as an ‘emulative insurgency’ developing from a terrorism-focused actor to a ‘hybrid’ semi-conventional military force (Stoddard Reference Stoddard2020). This process is reversible, and IS has been through several cycles of rise and collapse since its precursor organisation was established in Iraq in 2004 (Bamber-Zryd Reference Bamber-Zryd2022; Ingram Reference Ingram2022).

IS itself has issued insurgency guidance following a long line of jihadist ‘strategists’ who have proffered strategic advice, often borrowing heavily from secular non-Muslim sources (Al-Tamimi Reference Al-Tamimi2019; Heller Reference Heller2020; Ryan Reference Ryan2013). It is clear that IS sees its insurgent practice as leading to the development of semi-conventional military capabilities capable of seizing territory (achieving ‘tamkin’, literally ‘empowerment’ – perhaps best understood as physical and ideological ‘hegemony’ in a given area). IS editorials in al Naba (IS’s newsletter) describe how this strategy works on the basis of a continual asymmetrical trade-off in attacks where IS fighters only attack when they are likely to be able to increase the ‘nikayah’ (injuries/vexation) of their enemies and capture military supplies, whilst limiting losses. While this is not an unusual approach (militaries always consider force ratios), as the editorial notes, ‘to the extent those two conditions are realised their nikayah of the enemy continues, such that the enemy grows weaker, and [these bands] grow stronger, until the conditions become appropriate to transition from the stage of guerrilla warfare to other stages necessary to realise tamkin (territorial control) in the land’ (Heller Reference Heller2020).

A key feature of IS’s military capability has been its innovative ‘conventionalisation’, creating a ‘hybrid’ between a guerrilla force and an army. Employing ‘low tech innovative disruption’, Levy stresses IS’s ability to use ‘old’ insurgent tactics (i.e., those common in IS’s previous terrorist/guerrilla phases, esp. the use of suicide vehicle-born improvised explosive devices [SVBIEDs]) in new conventional ways (Levy Reference Levy2021). Kilcullen (Reference Kilcullen2016) has similarly observed how ISIS was able to engage in ‘conventional tactics but employing unconventional means’ during combat that itself derives from an ability on IS’s part to turn tactics honed for some time in Iraq as a guerrilla force into conventional operations. Both Hashim and Ashour have observed similar dynamics (Ashour Reference Ashour2021: 20–21; Hashim Reference Hashim2018: 10–11).

An example of this is IS’s ‘up-armoured’ civilian vehicles. Kilcullen describes how, in Ramadi in 2015, IS used a re-engineered armoured bulldozer to breach defences, followed by the simultaneous deployment of six suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (SBVIEDs). Here, IS was engaging in a ‘conventional’ military operation, the seizure of a city, with unconventional means. Rather than precision airstrikes or artillery, IS used ‘precision SBVIEDs’ (Kilcullen Reference Kilcullen2016). Levy notes how ‘up-armoured’ SBVIEDs, highly mobile ‘technical’ (flat-backed pick-up trucks, sometimes armoured and often modified to hold a large gun on the back) and motivated, rapidly deployable dismounted forces were a hallmark of IS attacks (Levy Reference Levy2021). Like IS, it also pioneered the systematic use of improvised armed drones – a practice which has recently been imitated in West Africa by ISWAP (Samuel & Stoddard Reference Samuel and Stoddard2025).

Research gap: military activity of ‘provinces’ and the local/global debate: In Africa south of the Sahara, however, the military character of IS provinces has been less explored. All IS-affiliates in West Africa metamorphosed from pre-existing insurgencies or splinter groups thereof. Scholars have thus tended to categorise IS African affiliates among ‘standard’ African guerrillas and downplay the impact of affiliations as rebranding, with only a few exceptions (Amadou & Foucher Reference Amadou and Foucher2022; Bøås & Dunn Reference Bøås, Dunn and Hentz2013; Foucher Reference Foucher2020). This question speaks, however, to one of the most pronounced debates in the study of jihadist groups in Africa: whether group practices are influenced by ‘local’ (i.e., regional histories, religious/ethnic schisms, and state actions) or ‘global’ (i.e., affiliations to and direction/support from these wider parent organisations) (Brigaglia & Iocchi n.d.; Githing’u Reference Githing’u2019; Matfess Reference Matfess2019; Raineri Reference Raineri, Baldaro and Raineri2022b: 47). Zenn (Reference Zenn2018) and Brigalia and Iocchi (Reference Brigaglia and Iocchi2020), for example, forward a ‘global’ view, arguing that these relationships are important in determining behaviour. African jihadism thus represents ‘conflict extension’ – an example of conflict moving from one global site to another (Sheik Reference Sheikh2025). Others see links as rhetoric and stress the dangers of conflating locally-driven insurgencies with the ‘Global War on Terror’ (Bukarti Reference Bukarti2020; Higazi et al. Reference Higazi, Kendhammer, Mohammed, Perouse de Montclos and Thurston2018; Matfess Reference Matfess2019). Others seek a middle position (Filiu Reference Filiu2009; Foucher Reference Foucher2020; Marret Reference Marret2008; Pellerin Reference Pellerin2019; Raineri Reference Raineri, Baldaro and Raineri2022b). Ibrahim (Reference Ibrahim2017: 5), for example, argues that ‘the wave of jihadist insurgencies in Africa must be understood as a concatenation of processes at three levels: global, local, and individual’. While this debate simmers, the questions it raises remain under-explored through the prism of military practices – surprising given the centrality of this activity, IS’s desire to see the export of its practice (Heller Reference Heller2020), and the fact that military activity is often a precursor to other activities, such as governance (Rupesinghe, Naghizadeh & Cohen Reference Rupesinghe, Naghizadeh and Cohen2021).

ISSP and ISWAP military activity in West Africa

This section compares ISWAP’s and ISSP’s military approaches along several axes: strategic aims, command and control, hybridisation and tactics, including attack-type/target profiles and spatial dimensions.

Strategic aims: ISWAP’s military goals are linked to the expansion of its territory, its economic/resource control and its governance model. In this sense, they follow the IS mantra of ‘remain and expand’ (Al-Tamimi Reference Al-Tamimi, Barnes-Dacey, Geranmayeh and Levy2015) and appear to be aiming to reach the stage of ‘tamkin’ or ‘empowerment’ that IS seeks. ISWAP, however, embarked on a major expansion from 2021, moving beyond its original Lake Chad stronghold to establish administrative and fighting groups across Borno State, including the Sambisa and Alargano forests and close to both the Nigerien and Cameroonian borders in the north and south, respectively (Conflict Analyst[a] 2023 int.; Barkindo Reference Barkindo2023). Most significant of these was its aforementioned capture of Sambisa. It is thought this expansion directive came from IS central, arguing that if ISWAP wanted to grow, they needed to move out of their stronghold, eliminate Shekau and take Shekau’s heartland of Sambisa (Conflict Analyst[a] 2023 int.). There are also more prosaic reasons: firstly, expansion spreads out opposing (recently rejuvenated) Nigerian forces, reducing targeting and interception (Conflict Analyst[a] 2023 int.). Secondly, expanding allows ISWAP to exploit more economic resources. For example, the northern and southern areas of Lake Chad are the main entry point for cattle into Nigeria from Niger and Cameroon, respectively. This means revenue if ISWAP controls the areas they pass through and applies also to fishing with extensive fishing opportunities in Southern Borno State (Conflict Analyst[a] 2023 int.). While controlling the economic networks that traverse the lake is essential for ISWAP’s material survival, they cannot claim to be a political entity, let alone part of a ‘caliphate’, without exercising control over the economic activity in their areas of operation (NGO Security Specialists[a] & [b] 2023 int.). Thirdly, this expanded structure moves administration centres closer to where the group is wanting to operate (and closer to populations it wants to influence and tax) (Conflict Analyst[a] 2023 int.). Two examples perhaps stand out here: the visible imposition of taxation (Samuel Reference Samuel2022) and the enforcement of social rules and the implementation of ‘Hudud’ punishments – both symbolic in that they demonstrate ISWAP’s political authority. ISWAP films instances of punishment and distributes these films widely so people know they are ‘in charge’ (Nigerian conflict reporter[b] 2023 int.). It does the same with its taxation efforts and proselytisation. Fourth, expansion has facilitated an ISWAP resurgence following a relative lull over recent years (especially in its attacks against bases and large military formations). Since the start of 2025, ISWAP has overrun a string of bases across Borno state (and in Niger and Cameroon) in part facilitated by the shift southwards in terms of its operations that has allowed attacks far further south than before (Samuel & Stoddard Reference Samuel and Stoddard2025).

Evidence of ISSP aims has been more scant, but they too have demonstrated similar expansion and, more recently, ‘tamkin’ goals. Early on the group postured as a protection provider of local tribes and their cattle in the context of communal fights, with a view to gaining social acceptance (International Crisis Group 2020; Raineri Reference Raineri2022a). Subsequently, and most notably during the 2019–2021 rapprochement with ISWAP, ISSP has targeted local competitors – firstly, local states’ officials/forces, but also other non-state armed groups and non-aligned communities – in order to drive them away and ensure undisputed territorial control (Lyammouri Reference Lyammouri2021). In the pursuit of this goal, ISSP appeared to benefit from the coup d’états in the region and the subsequent withdrawal of French forces. Arguably, the breakthrough for ISSP came between spring 2022 and 2023, when ISSP defeated its remaining non-state armed challengers, including both its jihadist competitor, the al-Qaeda-leaning JNIM faction, and the coalition of Tuareg groups, driving them out of the rural areas in the Ménaka/East Gao regions in Mali where they are presently the dominant force (Abd’Allah Reference Abd’Allah2023).

This has paved the way for a third ISSP phase, progressively building a local province of the Islamic State. Since April 2023, ISSP has issued an increasing number of communiqués targeting local communities – including the leaflet ‘This Is Our Creed and Methodology’, the same one that was distributed across Syrian villages by IS in 2013 to increase public support or else compliance (Zelin & Cahn Reference Zelin and Cahn2023). Through these outreach efforts, ISSP purports its ambition ‘to establish a Caliphate everywhere in the Sahel, no matter the means or time it necessitates. We are part of a universal Ummah, and we are fighting for it’ (ISSP Commander cited in Soto-Mayor & Ba Reference Soto-Mayor and Ba2023). In the case of ISSP, too, territorial expansion through the resort to brutal military tactics appears to be increasingly linked to developing a wider base of looting opportunities for economic gains (Berger Reference Berger2023) as well as the parallel expansion of its – admittedly embryonic – governance model (Abd’Allah Reference Abd’Allah2023). Overall, then, ISSP and ISWAP exhibit significant similarities in their wider goals.

Command and control: ISWAP’s command and control picture has changed in recent years. Attacks were historically tightly organised, with orders given from the leadership in the Lake Chad islands. This cost ISWAP a lot to carry out attacks (fuel, transporting fighters, and travel time to and from south/central Borno) (Conflict Analyst[a] 2023 int.). More semi-autonomous units have addressed this in recent years with local leadership and military commanders in charge of attacks that are close to each locale. For larger attacks, however, carried out against major targets (a ‘supercamp’, for example), an Amirul Jaish (overall military leader) may lead such an attack with commanders/fighters coming from different local units (Conflict Analyst[a] 2023 int.). ISWAP’s command and control is somewhat loosened relative to the past but still ultimately, at least in theory, controlled from the centre. Indeed, ISWAP is historically highly bureaucratised relative to other groups (Amadou & Foucher Reference Amadou and Foucher2022). However, adding to an overall weakening of command and control, it appears that the absorption of JASDJ fighters into ISWAP ranks has necessitated some freedom for the latter and more difficulties in controlling their operations from the centre (Conflict Analyst[b] 2023 int.). The group remains far more centralised than its competitor JASDJ, which remains fundamentally more decentralised, more plunder-focused, less hierarchical and with more fighter autonomy (fighters keeping weapons between operations, for example)Footnote ² . JAS has also been consolidating in recent years, and as its recent attacks against Baga and Ngoshe show, it remains a capable force, including against state forces (@Sazedek 2025; @VincentFoucher 2025).

ISSP’s command and control has also waxed and waned. Under French pressure post-2020 and after the killing of Abu Walid al-Saharawi in August 2021, the group struggled to adopt a new leadership structure and became more fragmented. However, after France’s withdrawal, the group appears to have regained a more integrated and cohesive structure, at least in its most consolidated areas (Nsaibia Reference Nsaibia2024). During ISSP’s violent expansion into Mali in March 2022, military operations appeared to be led by Youssouf Ould Chouaib, an ethnic Arab from the Ménaka region (Security Analyst 2023 int.; UN Security Council 2020). Recent reports, however, suggest that the group’s new leader is Mohamed Ibrahim (Ibba) al-Saharawi, with Abou Albara al-Saharawi performing the role of supreme cadi (Security Expert 2022 int. & Local Resident 2023 int.). Like ISWAP, the centre reportedly cedes considerable autonomy to local leaders but retains strategic direction (Chief Negotiator 2023 int. & Local Resident 2023 int.). Local leaders are responsible for raising resources, mobilising armed forces (often forcibly), selecting targets and military operations. They may ask other groups’ forces for help, but these retain considerable room for manoeuvre to decide whether and how much support to provide. Recent reports, however, seem to indicate growing command and control centralisation within ISSP’s ranks. As Nsaibia (Reference Nsaibia2024) has documented, there has even been infighting between different commanders over this issue, with some of the fighters in the Haoussa area belonging to the Oubel Boureima (‘Oubel’) faction even facing amputations by the ISSP Hisbah (Islamic Police) for moral infractions linked to livestock theft, leading to clashes between groups. This faction is reported to have been more brutal and plunder/criminally focused in its operations relative to other areas of ISSP operations (Nsaibia Reference Nsaibia2024). This appears to have reached a climax when Oubel himself reportedly defected to state forces with 10 of his fighters in July 2025, claiming that the ISSP wanted to kill him for not following their rules (The Africa Insight 2025).

Overall, practices for both groups have somewhat converged (albeit from different starting points). A more centralised picture emerges for ISSP from a highly fragmented starting point (especially during the intense military pressure from 2020–2022), and a somewhat looser command and control, but wider and more spread-out structure, has developed for ISWAP from a more rigid and tighter and geographically closer structure in the period up to 2021. This looser command and control is probably temporary for ISWAP while more centralisation and more ISWAP-like control appear also to be the trajectory for ISSP.

Military hybridisation: At a most fundamental level, the basic fighting strategy attributable to both groups is that of guerrilla warfare. This refers to ‘a form of warfare by which the strategically weaker side assumes the tactical offensive in selected forms, times, and places’ (Huntington cited in Kalyanaraman Reference Kalyanaraman2003). Such an approach avoids open battles and uses ambush, sabotage and hit-and-run techniques to weaken the state’s control. However, like IS-Central, both groups have demonstrated semi-conventional ‘hybrid’ warfare capabilities, attacking fixed positions and, at times, defeating state opponents in battle. ISWAP has proven particularly adept at this. The group regularly attacks Nigerian military bases, including those army ‘Supercamps’ thought previously to be impenetrable. The group combines complex tactics: pincer movements; the use of security teams to defend from/ambush reinforcements; and rudimentary combined-arms tactics, with SVIEDs used alongside heavy gun-mounted SUV ‘technicals’, dismounted foot soldiers and artillery (Senior Nigerian Army Officer 2023 int.; Samuel Reference Samuel2025; Samuel & Stoddard Reference Samuel and Stoddard2025).

While ISWAP has proven more competent relative to ISSP here, ISSP has been catching up. Indeed, the UN noted in 2020, ‘Further to the establishment of a single narrative for ISSP and ISWAP (see S/2019/570, para. 34), ISSP deploys tactics that are usually associated with ISWAP operations against the Nigerian military forces. These include attacks not just on small outposts but also on large military camps to seize a substantial number of weapons, ammunition, vehicles and gasoline’. However, this is not a one-way process: from 2015 to 2017, ISSP mostly performed small attacks on isolated outposts and ambushes. By 2018, however, and until January 2020, it grew much stronger and managed to storm highly protected bases. Notably, this period broadly corresponds to the time in which IS-central placed ISSP under ISWAP’s banner. And indeed, tactical learning could be noted, for instance, regarding the use of IEDs for territorial access denial. Under French pressure in 2020–2021, ISSP went on the defensive and was incapable of carrying out major attacks (against the military). Post-French withdrawal, in 2022, it went on the offensive again, this time predominantly, however, against competing non-state armed actors (but also the military), displaying again the capacity to concentrate power. It should be noted, however, that while ISSP has developed some semi-conventional capabilities, it still often retains much of the guerrilla-style posture of the past. This permits an important observation: developing more advanced capabilities does not mean that a non-state rejects its previous operational patterns (a factor also seen in IS-Central [Whiteside, Hyink & Schramm Reference Whiteside, Hyink and Schramm2024]). Rather new tactics often exist alongside, rather than replace, existing ones.

ISWAP’s and ISSP’s strategic goals of pushing the military out of strategically important areas (in order to expand, capture resources and govern) require this hybrid approach. Making it impossible for the military to operate has necessitated tactics that have grown closer to the semi-conventional model adopted by IS in Iraq and Syria over time for both groups. This has not reached the same level of tactical sophistication seen in IS, but that level of sophistication was also not required in the theatre of Northeast Nigeria (Western military advisor 2019 int.) or the tri-border area. Across the lifetime of the group, ISWAP attacks have been most often focused on the military and especially on bases from where the Nigerian military can project force. These attacks have taken place to deny the Nigerian Army access to locations or to push them out of strategic zones (for ISWAP) (Senior Nigerian Army Officer 2023 int.; NGO Security Specialists[a & b] 2023 int.). These include major smuggling and trade routes through which they can ship goods, both for themselves and goods from others that they can tax (Conflict Analyst[a] 2024 int.; NGO Security Specialists[a & b] 2023 int.). This also reflects the highly cross-border nature of the operations of both groups.

It is worth noting that ISWAP and ISSP also attack military actors for supplies. Military bases have served as an ‘armoury’ for ISWAP, with attacks launched to replenish supplies, both military and non-military (Conflict Analyst[a] 2023 int.). This is true also for ISSP, although their attacks against state forces have been less common. The character of their operations varies, however; for example, ISWAP has often relied on a mixture of motorbikes, dismounted fighters and large ‘technical’ SUVs (equipped with repurposed heavy guns) for mobility in attacks. ISSP seldom uses technicals, however, relying more on motorbikes and lighter weapons.

Tactics and attack profiles: A comparison of ISWAP and ISSP violent events from 2015 to 2024 (see Figures 1–2) elucidates important comparative factors. Both groups are highly active, with ACLED data reporting higher overall numbers of attacks for ISSP (although because of the coding issues mentioned in the methodology, ISWAP’s numbers are likely an underestimate). Figure 1 below (conflict events associated with each group) and Figure 2 (the sub-event type of fig. 1) shows how ISWAP’s attack profile is skewed towards battles (predominantly armed clashes with the military) and remote explosions (principally IEDs) relative to ISSP, who engage in more violent attacks (principally armed attacks) against civilians, including looting and property destruction (which accounts for the high level of ‘strategic developments’ for ISSP that include looting). This pattern is also visible in the spatial maps (Figure 5) below. IEDs are notably less common for ISSP than ISWAP. Abductions are, however, common for both groups.

Figure 1.

ISWAP/ISSP Violent events (attacks) broken down by type of event. Own elaboration.

Figure 1 Long description

Two bar graphs depict violent events per year for ISWAP and ISSP groups from 2015 to 2024, broken down by event type. Panel A: The first bar graph shows ISWAP violent events per year from 2015 to 2024. The x-axis represents the year, and the y-axis represents the number of events. The graph is divided into four event types: Battles (red), Explosions/Remote violence (green), Strategic developments (light blue), and Violence against civilians (dark blue). The data shows fluctuations in the number of events over the years, with notable peaks in 2020, 2021, and 2023. Panel B: The second bar graph shows ISSP violent events per year from 2016 to 2024. The x-axis represents the year, and the y-axis represents the number of events. Similar to the first graph, it is divided into the same four event types. The data shows a significant increase in events from 2019 onwards, with the highest number of events occurring in 2022 and 2023.

Figure 2.

ISWAP/ISSP Violent events from fig. 1 broken down by sub-type of event. Own elaboration.

Figure 3 below highlights the different civilian targeting implications of both groups. Here, civilian targeting, as coded by ACLED, includes violent attacks against civilians and abductions but not looting/property damage. Overall, ISSP targets civilians more than ISWAP; however, ISWAP has targeted civilians more with an increase in 2019 and then again in 2022/23.

Figure 3.

ISWAP/ISSP Civilian Targeting. Own elaboration.

Figure 3 Long description

Two bar graphs depict civilian targeting events per year from 2015 to 2024 for ISWAP and ISSP. Panel A: The first bar graph shows ISWAP civilian targeting per year. The x-axis represents the years from 2015 to 2024, and the y-axis represents the number of events. The graph is divided into two categories: civilian targeting and others, represented by red and teal bars respectively. Notable trends include a peak in civilian targeting around 2023. Panel B: The second bar graph shows ISSP civilian targeting per year. The x-axis represents the years from 2015 to 2024, and the y-axis represents the number of events. Similar to the first graph, it is divided into civilian targeting and others, represented by red and teal bars respectively. This graph shows a significant increase in events around 2022 and 2023.

Figure 4 below shows civilian fatalities from ISWAP and ISSP actions. Notable here is how many more civilians ISSP kills relative to ISWAP, supported also by interview data (notwithstanding this is probably an underestimate). Also interesting is the dramatic decline in civilian fatalities from attacks in the Lake Chad Basin region after the split in mid-2016. As is consistent with the qualitative data we gathered from interviews, ISSP has seen a reduction in civilian attacks since 2022. This continues in the data for 2024. ISWAP’s less violent approach to civilians seen here is reflected in interview data that has stressed the much more restrained approach where attacks against civilians are often for looting or kidnapping but less often aimed at killing civilians (security and civil society informants in Chad and Cameroon 2023–2024 int.).

Figure 4.

ISWAP/ISSP Civilian fatalities over time. Own elaboration.

ISWAP’s main form of military activity has thus been armed assaults principally towards military targets, mostly bases or convoys, although they do at times attack civilians in the same way (Abubakar Reference Abubakar2023). Of these, attacks on bases are the most complex. When attacking bases, ISWAP engages in forms of diversion. They rarely attack just from one axis but rather will attack in different teams, with some fighters mounted on technicals and others on foot. This combination of ‘infantry’ armed with rockets and light machine guns and ‘light armour’ ‘technicals’ with large guns (sometimes improvised, sometimes captured) is commonly seen in ISWAP videos of base attacks (West Africa Islamic State Media Office 2023). When the reinforcements inside the base are committed to stem an initial attack, the group sends an attack team from a different axis (Nigerian conflict reporter [a] 2023 int.), essentially operating in a pincer movement, with one or two attack teams in a frontal assault but with the main attack team coming from the rear (Senior Nigerian Army Officer 2023 int.). These are classic military tactics taught at all military schools, but ISWAP has proven adept at them. Mirroring the ‘unconventional conventional’ tactics of IS, ISWAP has frequently used armoured SVBIEDs. First observed in 2018, in the early part of 2024 ISWAP used SVBIEDs in a series of attacks against the Multinational Joint Task Force (a coalition of Lake Chad-bordering states) forces and the Nigerian Army in Borno State in Nigeria (@HKaaman 2024a, 2024b).Footnote ³ These are used both offensively and defensively against Nigerian troops @HKaaman 2024a, 2024b; Senior Nigerian Army Officer 2023 int.).Footnote ⁴

Attacks tend to be late in the evening or the morning (Nigerian conflict reporter [b] 2023 int.). Soldiers often go on patrol in the early hours, presenting a time when there are fewer soldiers on base (Nigerian conflict reporter [a] 2023 int.). ISWAP will sometimes deploy a ‘security’ team to ambush returning reinforcements (Senior Nigerian Army Officer 2023 int.). ISWAP has invested considerably in intelligence gathering before attacks. The civilian population is a primary source of information, although individual civilians may not know that they are passing on valuable information to the group and may have little choice in doing so (Nigerian conflict reporter [a] 2023 int.). ISWAP may also send out a unit before an attack to carry out surveillance. This covert activity enables the group to understand the military presence, including the roads used; the timings and movement of military formations from one place to another (Conflict Analyst, 2023 int.); and the timings of patrols (allowing them to attack bases when fewer soldiers are on base) (Nigerian conflict reporter [a] 2023 int.).

They will come together before an attack and may attack in groups of 50–100 but then will disperse and rarely travel together when exfiltrating (Senior Nigerian Army Officer 2023 int.). Most will travel to attack sites by motorbike, but in attacks themselves, the use of larger vehicles will be seen (Nigerian conflict reporter [b] 2023 int.). ISWAP also relies on ambushes. They are helped by the terrain here, as it is difficult for the military to travel off the roads, especially during the rainy season (Senior Nigerian Army Officer 2023 int.). At other times, the dryness of the landscape impacts ISWAP: there have been instances where ambushes were foiled by the dust trail given off by ISWAP vehicles (Senior Nigerian Army Officer 2023 int.).

ISSP’s tactics similarly rely heavily on the group’s mobility. The group is organised in small cells, living in the bush, with some members living with communities (community members in the Tillabéry region, 2021; 2022 int.). When under attack, the group disperses to evade confrontation, while frequently engaging in ambushes when the opportunity arises. When attacking, ISSP tends to storm the target with surprise and overwhelming force: attackers gather in small groups on motorbikes (which are hard to detect) and less often on 4-wheeled vehicles, then attack the advanced bases of counterinsurgents from several fronts, plundering the barracks and retreating before the arrival of reinforcements (key informant 2021 int.). The use of such tactics, alongside IEDs for access denial, has reportedly increased since 2019 as ISSP (then ISGS) enhanced coordination with ISWAP, leading to more sophistication and lethality. ISSP appears to use deception as well: for example, a video from early 2020 appears to show the group attacking the Koutoukale Prison near Niamey from a vehicle carrying a Médecins Sans Frontières flag (AFP 2019; Islamic State West Africa 2020).

Reports of ISSP attacks highlight the use of modern small arms and light guns, at times installed on motorbikes, which are used to perpetrate surprise attacks and hit-and-run operations (EUCAP Sahel security specialist 2019 int.). ISSP demonstrated a large number of their motorbike-based troops in propaganda designed to show their pledge of allegiance to the new IS leader in 2023. Hundreds of fighters on motorbikes can be seen alongside a smaller number of ‘technical’ trucks (Zelin Reference J2023). ISSP appears little concerned about economising bullets, indicative of replenished stocks (Counterinsurgency force leader 2022 int.). Seizures demonstrate that most of the ISSP arsenal has been captured from the stockpiles of local state forces, something witnessed also in Lake Chad. A minor share of weapons also appears to come from further afield, including Libya and Nigeria. Interestingly, the single largest Sahelian hub for trafficking Libyan weapons is reportedly located in Agazragane, a village near Menaka known to be under ISSP influence (UNODC 2022).

Although not as often as ISWAP, ISSP fighters, too, have frequently targeted security forces. Early on, the group targeted security outposts, such as customs offices and gendarmerie commands. It also carried out assassinations against local leaders perceived as challenging ISSP authority. Subsequently, ISSP moved to direct military attacks. From February 2018, the group clashed repeatedly with French counterterrorism forces and allied militia groups under Operation Barkhane. In the subsequent months, the group managed to successfully carry out larger, more complex attacks, storming military barracks at the Mali-Niger border. These attacks suggest the adoption of more ISWAP-like fighting techniques and occurred during ISSP’s formal absorption into ISWAP in 2019–2020. From May 2019 to early 2020, ISSP orchestrated 18 attacks resulting in the death of more than 400 soldiers in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, including the large-scale attacks against Nigerien military installations in Inates and Chinegodar (Raineri Reference Raineri2022a). These exploits prompted an intensification of international counter-terrorism efforts, limiting ISSP. Since the French withdrawal, however, now less concerned with aerial detection, ISSP has since launched heavy, large-scale attacks against non-state rivals such as Tuareg groups and al-Qaeda-linked JNIM jihadists, as well as state actors.

ISSP has reportedly adopted an internal defensive intelligence structure shaped on the model of ISIS’s Amnyat in Syria (Abd’Allah Reference Abd’Allah2023). The system consists of four levels of security: informers positioned in a 30 km radius around ISSP centres tasked with early detection of enemy forces. Roaming mobile motorbike units within a 15 km radius of each village. Admission of any newcomers to the village itself is authorised only if a ‘guardian’ corroborates the reasons for their presence, informs them of the rules and accepts to take full responsibility for their actions. Finally, drones are sometimes used for surveillance against potential threats (security expert in Niamey 2022 int.).

Spatial patterns in ISWAP and ISSP attacks: Looking at the spatial patterns of attacks in Figure 5 below, we can see how both groups operate across state borders in their respective areas of influence. At the same time, ISSP is far less geographically clustered and operates transnationally across a wider space. ISWAP is overwhelmingly focused on targets in Nigeria with notable concentrations of attacks on the border regions with Niger and Cameroon. For ISSP, the group’s attacks are most concentrated in the riparian areas of the Niger River (substantially crossing the borders of Niger and Mali) and in the east of Burkina Faso on and across the border with Niger.

Figure 5.

Spatial distribution of ISWAP and ISSP attacks (by target type) 2015–2024. The rectangle shows the concentration of ISSP activity in the Niger River riparian area between Mali and Niger. The circle shows the concentration in north-east Burkina Faso. Own elaboration.

Figure 5 Long description

A map showing the spatial distribution of ISWAP and ISSP attacks in West Africa from 2015 to 2024. The map highlights the concentration of ISSP activity in the Niger River riparian area between Mali and Niger, marked by a rectangle. Another concentration area in north-east Burkina Faso is marked by a circle. Different colored dots represent various target types, including Boko Haram/JAS, Chadian Military, Civilians, ISWAP, MNJTF, Nigerian Government, Nigerian Military, and Police. The map includes major cities and geographic features, providing context for the attack locations.

Another interesting pattern emerges from the spatial plotting. ISWAP’s attacks closely follow the road network in Borno State. This makes sense given that the group in this period mainly attacks state forces, and these tend to be located near the road network (ambushes) and around towns (base attacks). As well as roads, ISSP attacks appear to cluster around water sources. The group’s focus on these and on the Niger River in particular makes sense given that ISSP most commonly attacks civilians, and in a very arid climate like the Sahel, civilians are likely to be located near water. This geographical concentration also matches qualitative data findings (local security expert in Niamey 2022 int.).

‘Glocal’ interplay and the military activities of ISWAP and ISSP

ISWAP has proven, over most of the period studied, to be the more militarily capable of the two IS provinces operating in the wider Sahel: ISWAP fighters have been more focused on targeting state forces, more geographically concentrated and have more closely approximated ‘IS’ hybrid ‘unconventionally-conventional’ military practice. However, ISSP has been catching up. Timing suggests this has been influenced by its growing relationship with ISWAP, although concrete details of the relationship between them remain scarce. The fluctuating capacity of its military opponents is also a key explanatory factor here. Post-French withdrawal, ISSP appears to be changing its behaviour to be more governance-focused and, in that sense, more like ISWAP’s post-2018 practice. As described below, ISWAP, by contrast, has fluctuated, struggling for a period to maintain its previous practices on account of a rejuvenated Nigerian military and having absorbed less disciplined fighters from JASDJ, but regaining its operational tempo in 2025 (Samuel & Stoddard Reference Samuel and Stoddard2025).

Accounting for similarities and differences: Overall, the analysis of the military behaviour by ISWAP and ISSP exhibits both similarities and dissimilarities. The two groups appear to share, by and large, the same strategic aims; the command and control structure, over the past few years, has been slightly loosened in ISWAP and tightened in ISSP, thereby showing some ‘convergence in the middle’; both groups are characterised by some degree of hybridisation of warfare, which is, however, far more pronounced in ISWAP, while the tactics and attacks profile continue to feature significant differences. This mixed picture can be explained by a series of factors, which contribute to highlighting the respective weight of global and local influences in shaping the military conduct of Africa’s IS factions.

The first factor lends credibility to the ‘global’ hypothesis, in as much as it highlights the impact of the affiliation to IS. IS influence can be seen in the growing resort to tactics such as ‘unarmoured’ VBIEDs and IEDs. Furthermore, IS has reportedly offered training directly in the Lake Chad area (Senior Nigerian Army Officer 2023 int.; Foucher Reference Foucher2020), with Arab trainers deployed in the Lake Chad region featuring in recent IS videos. IS has also driven the relationship between ISWAP and ISSP, which arguably led to an increase in ISSP capabilities and its hybrid development – which, however, remain rudimentary at this stage. Nevertheless, IS involvement also increased challenges for both ISWAP and ISSP, at least temporally. Reportedly at IS’s instruction, ISWAP expanded, attacked Shekau and ultimately engaged in an increasing level of conflict with JASDJ (including a revived ‘Bakura’ faction in the north of Lake Chad [Foucher Reference Foucher2024] elements), leading to some dilution of its message, loosening of its command and control (at least for a period) and strategic engagement with civilians and resulting frustration, disenchantment and defections of fighters and senior commanders (Civil society groups in Maiduguri 2023 int.). Similarly, it is arguably the pressure by IS-central which eventually prompted, since 2020, a deterioration of the relations between ISSP and al-Qaida-affiliated JNIM, whose peaceful coexistence until then had marked a ‘Sahelian exception’ of sorts (Baldaro and Diall Reference Baldaro and Diall2020).

A second important factor that contributes to explaining the differences observed in ISWAP’s and ISSP’s respective military behaviours is more linked to local contingencies. This includes the local starting point of the two groups when they switched to IS. ISWAP emerged from JASDJ, already a relatively militarily capable actor operating semi-conventional hybrid forces that had taken towns and bases (Stoddard Reference Stoddard2020). ISWAP built on, systematised, professionalised and improved this knowledge and adopted IS innovations (Conflict Analyst, Abuja, November 2019). The group was much smaller than JASDJ to begin with and lacked equipment, but senior commanders defected to ISWAP, giving the group substantial military experience and knowledge. ISWAP’s relatively less-violent towards civilians’ posture is also driven in part by a response to JASDJ’s extreme violence (Stoddard Reference Stoddard2019). ISSP, by contrast, emerged from al-Qaeda-leaning MUJAO and al-Mourabitoun. These were capable terrorist actors but had limited semi-conventional military experience. It is worth contrasting the key military ‘highpoints’ of these precursor groups previously: Al-Mourabitoun was responsible for the Blu Radisson hotel attacks in November 2015. While the event was highly impactful in Mali, it is worth stressing that one year before JASDJ had already gone as far as seizing the town of Gwoza and declaring a ‘caliphate’. ISSP thus started with less experience of incorporating higher-end military capabilities.

A third critical factor shaping military conduct outcomes for both groups is the local opposing forces facing them. After 2020/21 the Nigerian military improved its tactics and overall strategy (supported by actions of the Borno State government) (Western Diplomatic Official 2023 int.). Before then, multiple raids against the Nigerian Army and Multinational Joint Task Force provided a significant quantity of weapons and ammunition for ISWAP, as well as providing an active ‘training’ ground which allowed ISWAP to iteratively build up capacity over time. A similar situation with non-state enemies also initially favoured ISWAP. Until the ISWAP-JASDJ fighting, which culminated in the death of Shekau,Footnote ⁵ ISWAP faced a lower (although not zero) non-state threat. A semi-truce with JASDJ even saw localised ISWAP-JASDJ cooperation, notwithstanding the wider enmity between the two groups and their leadership. ISSP, by contrast, faced a sizeable threat by al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM and non-jihadist Touareg rebel groups over time, especially after the collapse of the ‘Sahel exception’ that saw an early truce between JNIM and ISSP that lasted until early 2020 (Baldaro & Diall Reference Baldaro and Diall2020).

More recently, however, we have observed some convergence between the two actors, as ISWAP has become looser in terms of command and control on account of its expansion and incorporation of some JASDJ elements and thus more guerrilla-like and less able to engage conventionally (like ISSP was), and ISSP has moved somewhat in the opposite direction. Since early 2021, the Nigerian military had been behaving more as would be expected from one of Africa’s largest militaries. This had included more effective and judicious use of force, better intra-service cooperation and greater availability of more capable airpower (Reuters 2021). This is twinned with a more sensitive position to civilians (reducing grievances) and a defection programme implemented by the Borno State government that has had an impact in a context where many ISWAP fighters are frustrated with ISWAP’s direction. This is accompanied by a (sometimes criticised) counterinsurgency approach led by the Borno state government that has seen displaced citizens resettled back into their communities who then defend them against militants (often at great risk) (Adamu Reference Adamu2024). ISWAP had been struggling in the face of increased resistance from both state and non-state actors and had seemed to have become more guerrilla-like as a result. This has nevertheless shifted in recent months following the major ‘Burning the Camps’ campaign by ISWAP that has seen a major wave of attacks against Nigerian (and Nigerien and Cameroonian) bases.

In recent years ISSP, too, has faced an evolving situation which, however, contrasting with ISWAP, ultimately proved more propitious. Since early 2022 and the French withdrawal from Mali (and subsequently from Burkina Faso and Niger), it has faced a far less dangerous state threat. The G5 Sahel has collapsed with the Alliance of Sahelian States, partly but so far ineffectively, replacing it. The withdrawal of France has reduced the air threat to ISSP and allowed fighters greater manoeuvrability than before. This is bolstered by an apparent truce (at least for now) between ISSP and al-Qaeda-linked JNIM in Mali (Karr Reference Karr2023). These factors in turn have allowed ISSP to strengthen its governance and have opened the space for semi-conventional attacks and the control of territory (Chason Reference Chason2023; @SimNasr 2023). Nevertheless, it is worth stressing that ISSP remains in a state of ‘in betweenness’ in terms of its operations between its original roaming and plunder-focused activities and the more territorially-focused activities it has been conducting more recently (in Mali’s Meneka region especially). In areas of greater consolidation, the group appears more ISWAP-like and territorially and governance-focused, yet, as noted above, in the fringes of its main area of influence, it has remained far more plunder-focusedFootnote ⁶ (Karr, Ford & Charles, Reference Karr, Ford and Charles2025; AES INFO 2025; Nsaibia Reference Nsaibia2024).