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Are there any irrational beliefs?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 July 2009

W. G. Runciman
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Extract

The purpose of this article is to argue that sociologists, anthropologists, and historians have no need to invoke the, or a, concept of rationality in order either to report or to explain the beliefs of the individuals or groups whom they study. I do not dispute that they may invoke it, or that a range of other purposes can be served thereby. But I do dispute that they must.

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Type
Research Article
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European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , November 1991 , pp. 215 - 228
Copyright
Copyright © Archives Européenes de Sociology 1991

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