Sportswashing

Leaders worldwide increasingly use sports to advance political interests, realize national and international goals, minimize friction, and bring strangers closer together—a phenomenon scholars analyze under the concept of sports diplomacy. Stuart Murray defines sports diplomacy as:

This definition reflects the notion that the state does not have a monopoly on diplomatic affairs. Actors across the private, public, and third sectors can harness sportspeople, clubs, associations, and events to promote a state’s policy within a global setting. Given its social and cultural significance, sports can serve as a means to access key state actors, reach target audiences that might otherwise be inaccessible, and engage both local and global media audiences (Skey Reference Skey2023, 756). Murray (Reference Murray2020) identifies four main manifestations of sports diplomacy. Sports enable governments to reach broad publics by hosting events through which they disseminate political ideology; the popularity of sports makes it a powerful tool for pressuring regimes; states likewise harness sports to enhance their international image or solidify their emerging power; and nations, nonstate organizations, and athletes can misuse sports through cheating, violence, or other actions that deliberately increase friction.

The concept of sports diplomacy is influenced by that of soft power. In assessing US foreign policy during and after the Cold War, Joseph Nye (Reference Nye1990) argues that US global dominance derived not only from its military and economic strength but also from its values, culture, and ideology—factors he labeled as soft power. Initially, sports scholars enthusiastically adopted Nye’s concept, asserting that a country could enhance its global image and accumulate soft power by hosting high-profile sporting events. However, in recent years, scholars have challenged these perceptions through the concept of soft disempowerment, which reveals that a country can risk losing its attraction or credibility due to unforeseen risks or outcomes (Brannagan and Giulianotti Reference Brannagan and Giulianotti2018).

The recent utilization of sports by nondemocratic regimes has given rise to the development of another concept, that of sportswashing. The term gained significant media attention following the International Federation of Association Football’s (FIFA’s) selection of Qatar as the host of the 2022 World Cup. An initial scholarly definition describes sportswashing as “a phenomenon whereby political leaders use sports to appear important or legitimate on the world stage while stoking nationalism and deflecting attention from chronic social problems and human-rights woes on the home front” (Boykoff Reference Boykoff2022, 342). This is intended to distract attention from, minimize, or even normalize moral violations (Fruh, Archer, and Wojtowicz Reference Fruh, Archer and Wojtowicz2023, 101). A sportswasher seeks to launder a particular policy or ideology through sports, echoing other forms of “washing” that are designed to deceive, cover up, and distract public attention from wrongdoing (Skey Reference Skey2023).

Whereas both sportswashing and soft power relate to a state’s interest in utilizing the popularity of sports for promoting its interests, the two concepts represent different stages of a similar process. Sportswashing aligns with the initial stages of “soft power” accumulation for certain states (Grix and Brannagan Reference Grix and Brannagan2024b, 7). It is often embedded within a state’s long-term strategy that builds upon three “waves” (Grix, Dinsmore, and Brannagan Reference Grix, Dinsmore and Brannagan2025). The first wave is marked by widespread criticism from media outlets, fans, and advocacy groups who challenge the sportswasher’s involvement. The second wave emerges through media discourses that highlight negative narratives and counter-narratives surrounding the incompatibility of the sportswasher’s norms with those of the club or event. The third and final wave entails the normalization of the arrangement: criticism diminishes towards the sportswasher and over time the sportswasher accrues soft power.

As much as the popularity of sports can help gain soft power, it can draw criticism towards the sportswasher. As Brannagan and Giulianotti suggested in their analysis of the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar, there exists a “soft power–soft disempowerment nexus” in which “states risk a loss of attractiveness or credibility” due to “unforeseen contingencies and unintended outcomes” (Brannagan and Giulianotti Reference Brannagan and Giulianotti2018, 1140–41). Thus, sportswashing should be seen as a process that can have different and contradictory effects. It sits at the beginning of a continuum that can eventually lead to soft power gains over time, yet also to soft power losses.

Whereas sportswashing and sports diplomacy share commonalities concerning the employment of sports to promote the state’s interests on the world stage, writers tend to associate the former with negative usages. Sportswashing is mostly associated with propaganda―“efforts to deflect audiences’ attention away from less favorable perceptions of a country via a programme of investment in sport” (Chadwick Reference Chadwick2022, 696)―whereas sports diplomacy is viewed as the country’s ability to “promote international understanding and friendship, as well as dispel stereotypes and prejudices” (Murray and Pigman Reference Murray and Pigman2014, 1102). Sportswashing is used as a pejorative term, unlike sports diplomacy, which is viewed as a legitimate activity. Another difference between the two terms stems from the country’s identity. Sports diplomacy is associated with the activities of Western states, while sportswashing is mostly discussed in the context of non-Western states (Skey Reference Skey2023, 757).

Sportswashing is often associated with hosting hosting major sports events, obtaining ownership of a prominent club, or through sponsorship. Fruh, Archer, and Wojtowicz (Reference Fruh, Archer and Wojtowicz2023) attribute three goals to those involved in this practice. First, the sportswasher seeks to distract attention from a moral wrongdoing by hosting an event that will expose people to the positive aspects associated with the sportswasher. A second goal is to minimize the wrongdoing so that people will not deem tackling it urgent or crucial. A third goal is to normalize the wrongdoing. This can be achieved when fans or spectators celebrate a team and associate its success with the hosts or owners, so much so that they do not recognize the sportswasher’s moral wrongdoing.

Grix and Brannagan (Reference Grix and Brannagan2024a) offer a more critical approach to the term sportswashing. They claim that the adoption of sports by authoritarian regimes is a strategy to achieve an array of goals but not to cover up human rights abuses. The sponsorship of sports teams, the establishment of sports leagues, the high wages paid to attract players, and the hosting of mega sports events are aimed to “buy into the cultural power and prestige of global elite sport for economic gain, to improve the health of their citizens and for global recognition” (Reference Grix and Brannagan2024a, 1). Furthermore, according to this approach, countries such as Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have long-term goals to shift the current power structures in global sports. These countries seek to accrue power to decide where sports will be played and who will consume them.

The competing approaches as to what constitutes sportswashing attest to the need to explore it in new settings. Given that the concept is in its infancy, scholars have yet to discuss all of its aspects. First, most of the literature focuses on the same countries, yet, as Skey argues, “If sportswashing is to become a useful analytical concept, it needs to be applied to other parts of the world as well” (Skey Reference Skey2023, 760). The following examination offers an initial attempt to analyze the applicability of sportswashing to the Rwandan context. Unlike Voets (Reference Voets2023), who examined the Visit Rwanda campaign from a branding perspective, my research examines Rwanda’s sportswashing from a geopolitical perspective. Such an approach reveals that sportswashing serves as a useful prism to observe how the RPF is adopting sports as part of its broader authoritarian image management strategy to shape a more positive narrative of the country in the West. Simultaneously, the state’s investments in sports are intended to contribute to the social development of the population and to improve the level of Rwandan athletes. Nevertheless, unlike oil-rich Middle Eastern countries, which seek to change existing power relations in today’s global sports structures by attracting mega-sports events according to their preferred time of the year and by signing world-class athletes in their leagues, the RPF does not (yet) seek to follow suit. The RPF’s main goal is to utilize sports as a tool to improve Rwanda’s image worldwide and host more international sports events that would improve the country’s economy.

Second, prevalent media reports about sportswashing associate the phenomenon with nondemocratic states (Rosenberg Reference Rosenberg2022) without considering the role of Western-based capitalistic endeavors within this dynamic. Narrow observations of the term use sportswashing to criticize nondemocratic states but overlook the encouragement “afforded by notionally democratic global capitalism and the ‘West’” (Grix, Dinsmore, and Brannagan Reference Grix, Dinsmore and Brannagan2025, 2). All parties mutually cooperate to gain economic, cultural, and social capital, gains that would not have been possible without the Western, capitalistic conditions facilitating the sportswashing. Grix and colleagues demonstrate this point through the partnership between the FIFA and Qatar, and the World Wrestling Entertainment’s partnership with Saudi Arabia. The following examination extends these critiques that stem from Middle Eastern contexts to African contexts by exploring the BAL―which the NBA inaugurated in Rwanda―as well as Visit Rwanda’s sponsorship of European football clubs. Doing so exposes the mutual global mechanisms of sportswashing, as public sector agents and private, Western-based, capitalistic sector agents share intersecting interests that facilitate and expand this phenomenon to new authoritarian terrains. Authoritarian states share a mutual goal of attaining foreign policy goals through sportswashing, yet they are not alone in this process but supported by Western actors.

Third, it is necessary to improve evaluations regarding the impact of sportswashing. The following examination will analyze public reactions to Rwanda’s sportswashing, assessing whether sponsorship deals and event hosting contribute to the country’s development goals. This will shed much-needed light on how the public can oppose sportswashers. As Skey notes, “We need to actively investigate who supports and who resists, through what means and channels and to what ends” (Reference Skey2023, 760). Considering that sportswashing often occurs in nondemocratic regimes, resistance is even riskier. The following examination uncovers how resistance to Rwandan sportswashing is made possible, where, and by whom.

Data and methods

This article draws on more than 100 media outlets published by European, US, and African press, social media posts, reports of human rights organizations, and state publications. These sources were found through Google searches with a combination of general keywords such as “Rwanda,” “sportswashing,” “sports,” or “sponsorship”; sports activities, such as “football,” “soccer,” “basketball,” “NBA,” or “cycling”; and sports teams, such as “Arsenal,” “PSG,” or “Bayern Munich.” Since “studying authoritarian regimes necessarily entails data limitations” and given that “Obscuring information is a feature of authoritarian systems, not a bug” (Dukalskis Reference Dukalskis2021, 9), most of the data was gathered from media publications. Rwandan state reports are not always transparent on the financial details of their sports endeavors, and the lack of freedom of press in the country means that critical voices can only be found in the foreign press.

The study focuses on Rwanda as a single test case to allow deeper analysis of its authoritarian image strategy. It allows a detailed analysis of how sponsorships and hosting of sports events enable Kagame to promote Rwanda’s brand as a legitimate destination for business and tourism while enjoying Western support, despite its human rights violations. With over a third of the world’s countries classified as authoritarian regimes (Economist Intelligence Unit 2024, 4), Rwanda’s case yields insights that researchers can apply to other authoritarian regimes.

Western support of postgenocide Rwanda

The Rwandan genocide ended in July 1994 when the RPF, headed by Kagame, assumed control of the country. Since then, Western governments and organizations have aided Rwanda’s nation-building process. The international community’s assistance to Rwanda was motivated in part by its lack of intervention throughout the genocide and partially by the RPF’s policies. One way the RPF strengthens its dual image “as both hero and criminal” (Damman Reference Damman2015, 31) is by deploying peacekeeping forces. Following the genocide, many Hutus fled Rwanda to the neighboring DRC (then Zaire), including fighters who participated in the genocide. Kagame feared that these Hutus would regroup in the refugee camps in Congo and threaten Rwanda. As such, the Rwandan army combined forces with armed rebel groups in Eastern Congo to capture the Hutu extremists. In the early 2000s, as reports of the abuse and killing of thousands of civilians in Eastern Congo became public, and Western governments threatened to cut their aid to Rwanda, Kagame recognized that by sending humanitarian assistance to conflicts on the continent, he could improve Rwanda’s global image, regain the lost aid, and continue the army’s interventions in Eastern Congo. In 2004, Rwanda became the first African country to volunteer peacekeeping troops in Darfur as part of the African Union Mission in Sudan, following a prolonged international outcry for military action that did not result in any major actor willing to intervene (Damman Reference Damman2015, 44). Since then, Rwanda has deployed peacekeeping troops to multiple other conflicts in Africa. Rwanda is now the world’s second largest contributor of experts on mission, formed police units, individual police, staff officers, and troops, with a total of 5,879 personnel (United Nations Peacekeeping 2024).

Owing to the genocide credit and the RPF’s policies, the regime managed to secure support from Western countries, which often turn a blind eye to the regime’s growing authoritarian practices. Whereas the donor rhetoric reiterates the importance of promoting democracy in Rwanda, donors barely hold Rwandan policymakers accountable for its grave human rights violations. Paradoxically, the aid that Western donors provide to promote democratization enables the RPF to entrench its hold on power (Hayman Reference Hayman, Straus and Waldorf2011, 127).

This Western support has helped Kagame implement reforms that paved the way for building a new Rwanda. Rwanda presents itself as a country that has undergone a process of transitional justice, developing a market-oriented economy with a stable regime, visionary leadership, absence of ethnic frictions, a female majority in parliament, clean streets, and unique tourist attractions. However, these reforms―which Reyntjens calls “RPF-ization and tutsization” (Reyntjens Reference Reyntjens2013, 15)―have allowed Kagame and his allies to impede any chances of democratization. In the early 2000s, Rwanda passed laws outlawing the public identification of citizens based on their ethnicity to promote a unified nation rather than one still divided between Tutsis and Hutus. Yet in practice, key positions remain dominated by the Tutsi minority (Reyntjens Reference Reyntjens2004). Rwanda’s political governance engenders structural violence that has enabled Kagame to gain full control over the state’s affairs, while simultaneously placating or silencing international donors (Uvin Reference Uvin1998, 40–50). The RPF has been able to keep out critical observers from international NGOs, media, and academia, while simultaneously closing off the domestic space to political contestation by outlawing oppositional parties and arresting politicians who fail to adhere to the RPF’s line (Matfess Reference Matfess2015, 191). Civil society and independent media have also been weakened through intimidation. The elimination of opposing voices, repression, information management and communication, the imposition of a monopolistic narrative, and the use of military might domestically and regionally have all helped the RPF consolidate its hold on power.

The mastermind leading this change while garnering Western support is President Kagame, who receives “red carpet treatment” (Reyntjens Reference Reyntjens2011, 2) in international forums owing to his authoritarian image management. Kagame employs two core strategies to attract Western support (Fisher Reference Fisher and Gallagher2015). First, he has personalized diplomacy by making himself accessible to Western donors and think-tanks, including by giving frequent lectures at the latter. Second, public relations (PR) firms have been lobbying Western government officials while emphasizing Rwanda’s economic success and favorable investment conditions based on its adoption of neoliberal economic reform packages. Kagame’s image management attests to the potential power of images, as well as how they can be malleable and controlled (Gallagher Reference Gallagher and Gallagher2015, 2). Kagame’s portrayal of Rwanda as a stable, peaceful, market-orientated, and inviting country counters the negative images of Rwanda that followed the genocide while drawing Western support for the country’s nation-building.

Kagame’s authoritarian image management activities show “a multi effort to remake Rwanda’s reputation with the aim of enhancing regime security” (Dukalskis Reference Dukalskis2021, 140). The RPF hires PR firms that target Western state officials, leading businesspeople, and journalists in influential media outlets in order to counter negative portrayals of Rwanda. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, the RPF signed contracts totaling more than $1 million with Western-based PR firms, most of them hired to conduct lobbying and build good relations with members of the US government (Dukalskis Reference Dukalskis2021, 149). Simultaneously, to control the narrative circulating about Rwanda, the RPF restricts access to foreign journalists, researchers, and officials who are perceived to be critical of the regime. Researchers and development workers who are allowed to enter Rwanda report feeling under surveillance (Thomson Reference Thomson2018, 185). The RPF also attempts to preempt oppositional mobilization in the diaspora by discrediting those who publicly criticize the regime. When this fails, the government resorts to harsher repression.

Kagame’s authoritarian image management ranges from aggressive tactics to relatively “innocuous efforts” (Dukalskis Reference Dukalskis2021, 140) like sponsoring major European football clubs. Kagame recognized that the global popularity of sports could be used to promote Rwanda’s development goals, including improving the country’s image (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 2020). Yet Rwanda’s sports endeavors have also attracted a great deal of criticism, with many describing them as sportswashing. The following sections analyze the contributions of these endeavors to promoting the new Rwanda, as well as the vital role Western actors play in supporting Kagame’s image management. This support serves as a vital source of resilience for the RPF.

Rwanda’s sportswashing: Hosting sports events

Hosting sporting events is a common sportswashing practice, as embodied in—to name a few—the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympic Games, and the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar. Each of these countries had distinct interests in hosting the events, but in general terms, the host either sought to brand itself as an influential global power, improve its damaged reputation, or boost its global profile. Rwanda has followed suit by using sports events to promote its regional, continental, and global aspirations. To achieve these aspirations, Rwanda’s Sports Development Policy 2020–2030 outlines a multimillion-dollar plan to develop the country’s sports industry by highlighting the need to “improve and increase sports infrastructure facilities that meet international standards” and turn Rwanda into a “hub of sporting activities” that would increase its capacity to host international events (Ministry of Sports 2021, 16). Indeed, Rwanda has spent over $250 million in the last decade on the construction of new sports facilities or refurbishment of existing ones, including a national sports stadium ($165 million), a basketball arena ($104 million), a golf course ($16 million), and a cricket stadium ($1.3 million) (Agence France-Presse 2023). In addition, the policy links sports and physical activity with the country’s development by stressing that wider participation in sports would improve the health of the citizens, contribute to their well-being and happiness, teach vital values, challenge inequalities, and promote social cohesion.

The construction of sports facilities has enabled Rwanda to host international sporting competitions and to win bids to host future events. The most prominent and extended event so far is the BAL. In 2021, the NBA launched this annual competition as part of a broader drive to market the league in Africa. The Kigali Arena hosted the inaugural season in 2021; and in 2022, 2023, and 2024, the Kigali Arena hosted the crucial stages of the season. An agreement signed between BAL and the Rwanda Development Board (RDB)―the government institution responsible for promoting the country’s development through private sector growth―indicates that the Kigali Arena will also host the 2026 and 2028 seasons (NBA 2023).

Rwanda is a pioneer in hosting other sports events for the first time on the African continent. In 2023, the Kigali Arena hosted the FIFA Congress―the annual gathering of international football’s legislative body. This was the first elective FIFA Congress held in Africa (Republic of Rwanda n.d.). In 2025, Rwanda will become the first African country to host the Union Cycliste Internationale Road World Championships: the most prestigious bicycle road racing tournament of the year. The organizers expect the event to attract over 5,000 cyclists from around the world (Rwanda Convention Bureau n.d.). Rwanda’s hilly and mountainous topography helped cement the country as a leading force in African cycling, as is also evidenced by its hosting of the annual Tour du Rwanda cycling tournament, which brings twenty teams to the country for an eight-day race. Rwanda was also the first African country to host the International Volleyball Federation Beach Volleyball World Tour for men and women. In 2023, Rwanda became the first East African country to host the women’s AfroBasket. International Basketball Federation Africa Regional Director Alphonse Bile recognized Rwanda as a major sports host, noting: “Over the last three years Kigali became the capital of basketball in Africa” (FIBA 2023).

Whereas Rwanda’s landscape explains its attraction for cyclists, it is not obvious that one of the smallest countries on the continent would become the center of BAL. Goldman and Paller (Reference Goldman, Paller, Chadwick, Widdop and Goldman2023) offer several explanations for the NBA’s connection with Rwanda. One of them is rooted in Rwanda’s image as a secure and stable country in terms of personal safety and business. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Rwanda offered the NBA an ideal location to host hundreds of players safely owing to Kigali’s infrastructure and facilities. Rwanda’s safety is also noted by investors who seek to do business in the country (Hinks Reference Hinks2021).

While Rwanda does not have a long tradition of basketball culture, the NBA regards the country’s stable economy as an attractive factor that can help them expand the game across the continent. Another reason for the NBA’s connection with Rwanda stems from the personal relationships between Kagame and NBA executives (Goldman and Paller Reference Goldman, Paller, Chadwick, Widdop and Goldman2023, 177). Kagame is friends with Masai Ujiri, former president [as of June 28, 2025] of the Toronto Raptors and founder of Giants of Africa, a nonprofit organization that promotes basketball on the continent. Ujiri organized a Giants of Africa camp in Kigali in 2018, and Kagame granted him a large plot in the city to develop business and sporting facilities. On social media, Ujiri and Giants of Africa have praised Kagame’s work and persona, noting that “He exemplifies how those in positions of authority can empower entire nations” (Giants of Africa 2023). Commissioner Adam Silver has on more than one occasion spoken publicly about Kagame’s love of basketball. Kagame himself has attended several NBA games.

As part of the RPF’s image management, the Rwandan government seeks to host international sports events to promote the country’s name in Africa and beyond, goals that are deemed crucial for attaining the country’s development goals. The country’s ministers and governmental agency workers recognize the financial and social rewards deriving from the growth of the sports tourism industry, which has a trickle-down effect on local economies because sports tourists consume services and purchase goods. The hosting of sports events is also recognized as a means to showcase the positive sides of the country and to attract more business to Rwanda. Prior to the 2021 BAL, RDB CEO Clare Akamanzi noted, “We will reach millions of basketball fans from all around the world and promote Rwanda’s natural beauty, budding sports tourism, and conducive investment and business environment” (Kagire Reference Kagire2021). While there is no data on the financial returns from the 2021 BAL, according to Visit Rwanda―which is part of the RDB―the 2023 BAL brought nearly $10 million in revenue to Rwanda’s economy via services, such as hotels, tour operators, marketing, and event-planning companies (Prinsloo, Hoije, and Girma Reference Prinsloo, Hoije and Girma2024). Hosting sports events helps Kigali develop into a hub for both sports and business tourism. According to Minister of Sports Aurore Mimosa Munyangaju, “The end result of all those things is promoting Rwanda as a MICE [meetings, incentives, conferences, and exhibitions] destination. This means the sport industry is one that can play a significant role in the country’s economic development” (Thomas Reference Thomas2021). Munyagaju added that “sport and entertainment are interconnected. Having the privilege of hosting the BAL, Rwanda has positioned itself as a platform to accelerate the development of these industries locally and across Africa” (Rwanda Development Board 2023).

After the RDB signed a multiyear extension to host the BAL in upcoming seasons, Akamanzi further indicated the importance that the government attaches to Rwanda’s successful cooperation with the NBA, recognizing not only financial rewards but also the development of local talent. Rwandan clubs and athletes compete against prominent opponents in the competition hosted by the country, thus gaining international exposure and valuable experience. After the 2021 BAL, in which the local basketball club Patriots BBC reached an impressive fourth place, Munyangaju said: “By investing in the right infrastructure and bringing different events, we’re expecting our local players to raise their standards. … By competing with the best, you will be there one day” (Thomas Reference Thomas2021).

Whereas hosting international sporting events yields financial and social rewards for Rwanda while cementing its status as an African sports and business hub, these events have also attracted negative coverage. Most criticism highlights the NBA’s partnership with a tyrant, a connection that contradicts the league’s Social Justice Coalition (n.d.). Despite the NBA’s declared commitment to democracy, transparency, and a just penal system, none of these are to be found in Rwanda. According to Freedom House’s democracy index (n.d.), Rwanda is classified as Not Free, referring to the RPF’s suppression of political dissent “through pervasive surveillance, intimidation, arbitrary detention, torture, and renditions or suspected assassinations of exiled dissidents.” Despite this abysmal record, NBA officials praise Kagame as a basketball enthusiast without mentioning his human rights violations.

Given the NBA’s disregard for Kagame’s authoritarian practices, critics have accused the NBA of legitimizing a dubious regime. One of the most vocal critiques is Rwandan David Himbara, a former advisor to Kagame who has since adopted a critical stance towards the president. His critique mostly targets former US President Barack Obama, who serves as a strategic partner and minority owner in the NBA Africa endeavor. Himbara maintains that “by joining the NBA Africa as a strategic partner, Obama is joining one of the most brutal African strongmen” (Reference Himbara2021). He objects to Rwanda’s connection with the NBA not only for moral reasons but also due to financial concerns, arguing that the sports infrastructure constructed in Rwanda turns into white elephants due to infrequent usage.

Other critics direct accusations at NBA Commissioner Silver. CEO of the Human Rights Foundation Thor Halvorssen wrote a letter to Silver requesting that the NBA reconsider its collaboration with Rwanda given the country’s record of human rights violations. Halvorssen warned that “Kagame will use the prestige of the NBA to whitewash his crimes, and to give his regime the false appearance of legitimacy and stability” (Human Rights Foundation 2021). Silver also received a letter from Taciana Rusesabagina, wife of Paul Rusesabagina. The 2004 film Hotel Rwanda is based on his experiences as a manager of a hotel that saved the lives of Tutsis during the genocide. After the genocide, Rusesabagina became a critic of Kagame and in 1996 fled the country. Since then, the regime has targeted him. In 2020, Rusesabagina flew from Dubai to Burundi, yet the plane landed in Rwanda, where he was arrested. While imprisoned, his wife wrote to Silver, urging the commissioner to reconsider the NBA’s partnership with Rwanda in the wake of Rusesabagina’s arrest, as well as the harassment that other dissidents endure. She likewise warned that this cooperation would be detrimental to all sides in terms of PR (Zirin Reference Zirin2021).

While Rusesabagina was released after spending two and a half years in prison, the NBA’s links with Rwanda remain unchanged, indicating that sportswashing does not exist in a global vacuum but is encouraged and supported by Western-based capitalistic companies. This cooperation stems from the mutual interest authoritarian and Western-based business officials share in benefiting from the global capitalist world of modern-day sports. When confronted with Rwanda’s human rights violations, personnel working in the NBA or connected to the venture commonly respond that sports and politics should not be mixed. Such was the answer given by NBA Africa CEO Victor Williams, who “avoided any specific remarks on Kagame but stated that the BAL is part of the league’s apolitical effort to further basketball in Africa” (Zidan Reference Zidan2021). Paul Hinks also made similar comments, noting that “Politics Should Stay Out of the NBA’s Basketball Africa League” (Reference Hinks2021). By turning a blind eye to the RPF’s human rights abuses, Western organizations and companies help Kagame secure further international support and promote the game of basketball while simultaneously strengthening his international and national legitimacy.

Rwanda’s sportswashing: Sponsorship

Rwanda’s sportswashing is also demonstrated in the country’s advertising of the Visit Rwanda logo on the shirts of leading European football clubs. Since 2018, Rwanda has signed three major sponsorship deals: the first with the English club Arsenal, the second with French PSG, and the third with the German club Bayern Munich. These deals have cost Rwanda an estimated total of $161 million.Footnote ¹ The partnerships with Arsenal and PSG are primarily sleeve sponsorships, displaying the Visit Rwanda logo on the jerseys of both men’s and women’s teams as well as on interview backdrops and across the stadiums. This ensures the global visibility of the logo, particularly considering the clubs’ large fan bases and the regular broadcasting of their matches across the globe. As part of these deals, prominent players from these clubs have visited Rwanda, praised its landscapes, and publicly endorsed the country’s development trajectory (Volcanoes National Park Rwanda 2022).

The Bayern Munich partnership includes advertising Visit Rwanda across the stadium and access to the club’s business partners. According to Akamanzi, the rationale behind the partnership was that Germany ranks among Rwanda’s top six tourism markets, with German tourists spending more per capita than visitors from any other country (Spotify 2023). Also, Bayern Munich is Germany’s most successful football club and one of the leading powerhouses in Europe; thus, the deal sends a message to the world that Rwanda is striving to become a leading tourist and business destination. “We should not settle with simple dreams but think like giants―the giants of Africa. This is the message from our president,” Akamanzi explained (Spotify 2023). Lastly, the deal grants Rwanda access to Bayern Munich’s prominent German businesses, which Rwanda seeks to attract to invest in the country.

The Visit Rwanda campaign has also featured prominently in other sports competitions. Rwanda signed a sponsorship deal with the African Football League, a continental tournament that began in 2023. RwandAir―the country’s flag carrier airline―serves as the airline partner for that league. Visit Rwanda has also been a central sponsor of BAL.

These sponsorships underscore the pivotal role of Western PR agencies in crafting Rwanda’s branding (Voets Reference Voets2023, 147). In 2017, RDB tasked the London-based PR agency Portland Communications (PC) with changing perceptions of Rwanda in the UK media and increasing the number of visits from the UK. This task of rebranding Rwanda to attract more tourists accorded with the country’s Vision 2020 plan, which aimed to transform the country into a middle-income nation by developing its tourist sector. PC began promoting Rwanda as a tourist destination and a tech hub so that visitors would not simply leave after seeing gorillas but stay for longer periods. In 2018 PC created the Visit Rwanda brand. The official reveal of the logo occurred on May 23, the same day as the sponsorship deal with Arsenal was announced (Voets Reference Voets2023, 147).

According to state representatives, the Visit Rwanda sports sponsorship has been a success. Rwanda attracts more visitors, thus expanding its tourism sector, and sends a message to the world that the country is safe and open for business. Akamanzi (Reference Akamanzi2023) noted that the partnership with Arsenal and PSG generated over US$160 million in 2022, helping to generate US$445 million in tourism revenues owing to the over one million visitors to Rwanda that year. These figures suggest the Visit Rwanda sponsorships have been successful both economically and in terms of branding, given the positive image of the country that they have promoted. Akamanzi also explained that 10 percent of the revenues generated at national parks are shared with nearby communities, thus indicating that the Visit Rwanda sponsorship has a direct and indirect impact on the economy and livelihoods of Rwandan people. Akamanzi did not reveal the amount that Rwanda paid for the sponsorships but noted that the sponsorships are funded by the revenues from the country’s national parks. Akamanzi added that the Visit Rwanda sponsorship helped Rwanda form its links with the NBA because the latter was impressed by the country’s ambition.

Similar to the international sporting events Rwanda hosts, the Visit Rwanda sponsorships are enabled by Western-capitalistic disregard of the RPF’s human rights violations and mutual financial benefits. In 2022, a spokesperson for Arsenal was asked why the club cooperates with a tyrant, to which he replied: “Arsenal has always adhered to the principle of not involving itself in politics” (D’Urso and McNicholas Reference D’Urso and McNicholas2022). This is a dubious answer, considering that Arsenal has posted on social media about Ukraine, Black Lives Matter, and LGBT+ issues. In 2023, Arsenal was again asked about this cooperation. The Arsenal representatives replied that their agreement is with the RDB and not the government (D’Urso Reference D’Urso2023). This is similarly dubious because the RDB is a governmental department. Instead of addressing the critiques concerning Rwanda’s violations, Bayern Munich CEO Jan-Christian Dreesen emphasized how the deal has contributed to the development of grassroots football in Rwanda. He added: “It’s clearly—as stated also from Rwanda’s side—that they want to promote the issue of tourism in Rwanda. And I don’t see it as sportswashing that we as a club are promoting that” (Fahey Reference Fahey2023). Such responses indicate that sportswashing does not exist in a global vacuum but is encouraged and supported by Western-based capitalistic companies. The Visit Rwanda sponsorship is another manifestation of the RPF’s authoritarian image management, which is vital to its domestic and international efforts to secure international legitimization. The sponsorship deals reveal the extensive support the RPF gets from its Western facilitators—support that, in turn, contributes to the stability of the authoritarian regime.

Despite the Western-based capitalistic backing of Rwanda’s sportswashing, there are growing signs of criticism of the Visit Rwanda sponsorships. After the deal with Arsenal was publicized, British tabloids claimed that the UK was indirectly funding the Arsenal deal. According to a Daily Mail piece titled “Shirt of Shame,” in 2018 Rwanda received £62 million of aid and paid £30 million to Arsenal (Craven Reference Craven2018). Journalist Ian Birrell added that the sponsorship deal highlights “the utter absurdity of British aid policies.” The Sun criticized the British government and Kagame for spending millions while orphans in the country “are so poor they can’t even afford a football” (Dale Reference Dale2018). Whereas in practice, the UK aid to Rwanda in 2018 was £54,746,000 million (Department for International Development 2020), the tabloids raised public awareness concerning a potential link between the UK’s aid and the Visit Rwanda sponsorship. MP Andrew Bridgen criticized this dynamic, noting that “If this isn’t a perfect own goal for foreign aid, I don’t know what is. It serves to expose the complete idiocy this system is based on” (Craven Reference Craven2018). Such critics echo arguments made by economists who agree that fungibility exists, but it is not necessarily problematic since it allows receiving governments to allocate their budgets according to their needs (Apodaca Reference Apodaca2017). According to Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu (Reference Feyzioglu, Swaroop and Zhu1998, 30), ”An aid-recipient country could render earmarked aid fungible by reducing its own resources in the sector that receives aid and transferring them to other sectors of the budget.” Nevertheless, unlike the tabloids’ claims, there is no evidence that this occurred in the case of Rwanda’s sponsorship of Arsenal. Officials from both countries rejected such notions. The UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) spokesperson claimed that it “does not give any money to Visit Rwanda or the Rwanda Development Board. All UK aid to Rwanda is earmarked for specific programmes only, such as education and agriculture, and we track results to ensure value for money for UK taxpayers” (Dale Reference Dale2018). Rwandan Deputy Foreign Minister told the Associated Press that the sponsorship deal is funded by tourism revenue (Ssuuna Reference Ssuuna2018). Despite such refutes, the tabloids’ claims were widely circulated—including in reputable sources (BBC 2018)—thus giving further voice to the criticism surrounding the sponsorship deal. English and German football fans have also voiced their objection to the sponsorship deals, as covered by leading national media outlets (Augustus Reference Augustus2022; Krepela Reference Krepela2023). In England, fans have used the hashtag #Don’tVisitRwanda on social media to share posters calling on people to attend rallies against the sponsorship, videos of fans burning their jerseys, and information about the country’s human rights violations. Such negative coverage impedes the RDB’s goals of using the Visit Rwanda campaign to improve the country’s public image.

Given the lack of freedom of speech in Rwanda, there has hardly been any opposition to the Visit Rwanda campaign in the country. Victoire Ingabire, one of the few vocal opponents of Kagame who was jailed for eight years for her political activism, criticized the sponsorship deals as a waste of money (Agence France-Presse 2023). Ingabire’s claims were refuted by governmental officials. In a news piece bearing the headline “Sportswashing? No. Rwandans Benefit from the Business of Sport,” Akamanzi (Reference Akamanzi2023) claims that Ingabire’s criticism is “counterproductive and cynical.” Ruling party MP John-Ruku Rwabyoma called the critics “ignorant” (Africanews and AFP 2023). President Kagame likewise argued that “I am the one who knows what we put in; I know how much we are getting out,” without offering specific details regarding the return on investment of the Visit Rwanda deals. Rwandan Journalist Sanny Ntayombya (Reference Ntayombya2023) overlooked the core claim voiced against Kagame’s Rwanda and instead attacked the Western media, which doubts how Rwanda can afford the sponsorship deals.

In the wake of the futile opposition from within Rwanda and across Europe, more substantial resistance has been voiced by Rwanda’s neighbors. The Congolese football club, TP Mazembe, refused to display the Visit Rwanda logo on its jersey during their 2023 African Football League matches. They also refused to use the services of RwandAir, instead using the presidential airplane to fly to their quarter-final match against Esperance de Tunis. Mazembe explained that their refusal stemmed from Rwanda’s support of the M23 rebel group in the Kivu region in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (Mtuta Reference Mtuta2023). In 2024, Burundian club Dynamo taped over the Visit Rwanda logo on its jerseys at a BAL game, subsequently forfeiting two consecutive matches, which led to their withdrawal from the competition. This follows accusations voiced by Burundi’s President Évariste Ndayishimiye that Rwanda’s government has been backing the Red Tabara rebel group, which killed twenty people in the country. A club player revealed that the instructions to tape over the Visit Rwanda logo came from President Ndayishimiye himself (BBC 2024). These short-lived acts of resistance indicate the regional shortcomings of the Visit Rwanda campaign. The geopolitical tensions between Congo and Burundi, on the one hand, and Rwanda, on the other, motivated these protests. Likewise, the financial stakes are lower than those of Rwanda’s Western facilitators.