¹ For a helpful overview of the engagement of business ethics scholarship around human rights, see Brenkert, George, ‘Business Ethics and Human Rights’ (2016) 1:2 Business and Human Rights Journal 277 Google Scholar. For an analysis of the disconnect between the literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the ‘business and human rights debate’, see Wettstein, Florian, ‘CSR and the Debate on Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Great Divide’ (2012) 22:4 Business Ethics Quarterly 739 Google Scholar.

² Arnold, Denis, ‘Corporations and Human Rights Obligations’ (2016) 1:2 Business and Human Rights Journal 255 Google Scholar. The original article of mine that Arnold criticizes is Hsieh, Nien-hê, ‘Should Business Have Human Rights Obligations?’ (2015) 14:2 Journal of Human Rights 218 Google Scholar. In that article, I use the term ‘multinational enterprises’ or ‘MNEs’ and extend the argument to for-profit business enterprises more generally. Following Christopher Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal, Arnold uses the term ‘transnational corporation’ to encompass ‘multinational companies’ (companies with a ‘decentralized governance structure with self-sufficient companies cooperating in host nations’), ‘global companies’ (companies with ‘centralized governance of a parent company operating from a home nation’), and ‘international companies’ (companies characterized by a combination of centralized and decentralized core competencies’). See Bartlett, Christopher and Ghoshal, Sumantra, Managing across Borders: The Transnational Solution, 2nd edition (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2002)Google Scholar.To avoid confusion, I will use the term ‘transnational corporation’ or ‘TNC’ when referencing my own argument. This does not affect the nature of my initial argument as the account was meant to extend to all for-profit business enterprises.

³ Arnold, , note 3, 275 Google Scholar.

⁴ Ibid; emphasis in original.

⁵ For Arnold, ‘there are compelling reasons to believe that TNCs have agentically grounded moral obligations to respect basic human rights and that there are also sound social contract-based reasons for concluding that businesses have human rights obligations’. Arnold, , note 3, 275 Google Scholar.

⁶ For an earlier account of Arnold in which he defends the agentic conception of human rights, see Arnold, Denis G., ‘Transnational Corporations and the Duty to Respect Basic Human Rights’ (2010) 20:3 Business Ethics Quarterly 371–399 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Arnold, Denis G., ‘Global Justice and International Business’ (2013) 32:1 Business Ethics Quarterly 125–143 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Arnold, Denis G. and Valentin, Andrew, ‘CSR at the Base of the Pyramid: Exploitation, Empowerment, and Poverty Alleviation’ (2013) 66:10 Journal of Business Research 1904–1914 Google Scholar.

⁷ Arnold, , note 3, 264 Google Scholar.

⁸ These include The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; and The Genocide Convention.

⁹ Buchanan, Allen, The Heart of Human Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013) 14 Google Scholar.

¹⁰ This distinction parallels the debate in philosophy and law about the nature of human rights. For a helpful overview, see Cruft, Rowan, Liao, S. Matthew and Renzo, Massimo, ‘The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights: An Overview’ in Rowan Cruft, S. Matthew Liao and Massimo Renzo (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 1 Google Scholar.

¹¹ Hsieh, Nien-hê, ‘Multinational Enterprises and Incomplete Institutions: The Demandingness of Minimum Moral Standards’ in Michael Boylan (ed.), Business Ethics, 2nd edition (Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, 2013) 409 Google Scholar. Hsieh, Nien-hê, ‘Multinational Corporations, Global Justice and Corporate Responsibility: A Question of Purpose’ (2013) 23:111 Politeia 129–147 Google Scholar. Hsieh, Nien-hê, ‘The Responsibilities and Role of Business in Relation to Society’ Business Ethics Quarterly ( forthcoming)Google Scholar.

¹² Buchanan, Google Scholar, note 10.

¹³ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights; The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; and The Genocide Convention.

¹⁴ Nickel, James, ‘Human Rights’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/rights-human/ (accessed 3 November 2014)Google Scholar.

¹⁵ This is the not case for the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework developed through the work of John Ruggie. In his account of developing the framework, Ruggie makes clear the framework needs to encompass all rights and not only ‘an arbitrary subset’. See Ruggie, John, Just Business (New York: W.W. Norton, 2013), 79 Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Arnold, , note 3, 264 Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Hsieh, , note 3, 219 Google Scholar.

¹⁸ See Popova, Alexandra, ‘Business and Human Rights after Ruggie’s Mandate’ in Jean Martin and Karen Bravo (eds.), The Business and Human Rights Landscape: Moving Forward, Looking Back (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016) 106 Google Scholar. Arnold writes, ‘Hsieh’s position is inconsistent with that of Buchanan, whose conclusions regarding the current international legal human rights system include the idea that, “In principle, there appears to be no barrier to modifying the system of international legal human rights” to hold “non-state actors such as global corporations” legally accountable for human rights duties articulated in the Guiding Principles’. See

Arnold, , note 3, 274 Google Scholar.Depending on the nature of the obligations, my account is consistent with making them legally binding. It also should be noted that new negotiations for such a treaty are currently ongoing at the United Nations, and that an open-ended working group has been established for his purpose. I thank Florian Wettstein for calling my attention to this.

¹⁹ Raz, Joseph, ‘Human Rights without Foundations’. In Samantha Besson and John Tasiouls (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 321, 327 Google Scholar.

²⁰ Gewirth, Alan, Human Rights: Essays on Justifications and Applications (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982)Google Scholar and Griffin, James, On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The approach I adopt in my original account and develop in this commentary is also consistent with Besson, Samantha, ‘The Bearers of Human Rights Duties and Responsibilities for Human Rights: A Quiet (R)Evolution’ (2015) 32:1 Social Philosophy and Policy 244 Google Scholar.

²¹ Buchanan, , note 10, 30 Google Scholar.

²² Ibid, 29–30.

²³ Ibid, 30.

²⁴ Hsieh, , note 3, 225 Google Scholar.

²⁵ Ibid, 226.

²⁶ Arnold, , note 3, 272 Google Scholar. He writes, ‘On this interpretation firms should be free to discriminate in hiring based on race, sex, or caste, they should be free to discriminate against women by paying men more than women for equal work, and they should be free to discriminate against the poor by requiring them to work overtime to earn subsistence wages and by neglecting their health and safety at work’.

²⁷ Arnold writes, ‘If this interpretation is correct, it is a puzzling criticism of corporate human rights obligations (both agentically grounded human rights obligations and obligations grounded in the work of the UN and the ILO). The Guiding Principles, for example, were carefully designed specifically to avoid confusion about the roles of corporations versus states in the promotion and protection of human rights. … There is no expectation that TNCs and other business enterprises take on a state-like role regarding human rights in the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’. He also writes, ‘even under such circumstances the expectation is not that TNCs ensure status equality for everyone, or even status equality for those directly impacted by their operations, but instead the expectation is that they meet a more limited scope of obligations’. Arnold, , note 3, 273 Google Scholar.

²⁸ Ibid, 274. Emphasis in original.

²⁹ Hsieh, , note 3, 227–230 Google Scholar. As I write in the original account, ‘none of this is to deny responsibilities on the part of business enterprises and their managers in relation to human rights’, p. 230.

³⁰ Hsieh, Nien-hê, ‘Does Global Business Have a Responsibility to Promote Just Institutions?’ Business Ethics Quarterly 19:1 (2009) 251 Google Scholar.

³¹ Hsieh, Google Scholar, note 31, Hsieh, Nien-hê ‘Multinational Enterprises and Corporate Responsibility: A Matter of Justice?’ in Michael Boylan (ed.), Morality and Global Justice: The Reader (Boulder: Westview Press, 2011) 185 Google Scholar; Hsieh, Nien-hê, ‘Multinational Enterprises and Incomplete Institutions: The Demandingness of Minimum Moral Standards’ in Michael Boylan (ed.), Business Ethics, 2nd edition (Hoboken: Wiley 2013) 409 Google Scholar; Hsieh, Google Scholar, note 12.

³² Arnold writes, for example, accounts of human rights grounded in considerations of human agency ‘provide an appropriately deep foundation for corporate human rights obligations, particularly when limited in scope to basic rights such as liberty, physical security, and subsistence’. Arnold, , note 3, 264 Google Scholar.

³³ The difference between ‘obligation’ and ‘responsibility’, for example, is not intended to capture the difference between a perfect and imperfect duty as it has by others. See, for example, Wettstein, Google Scholar, note 1.

³⁴ Hsieh, , note 3, 228–229 Google Scholar.

³⁵ Arnold, , note 3, 262 Google Scholar.

³⁶ Raz, , note 20, 328 Google Scholar.

³⁷ Human Rights Council, ‘Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development. Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights’, A/HRC/8/5 (7 April 2008). Human Rights Council, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’, A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011).

³⁸ Ruggie, Google Scholar, note 16.

³⁹ Besson, , note 21, 254 Google Scholar. Here Besson draws on Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 215 Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ The discussion in Hsieh, Google Scholar, note 3, provides one way to justify rejection by John Ruggie of assigning to TNCs human rights obligations within their ‘sphere of influence’.

⁴¹ Besson, , note 21, 254 Google Scholar.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, ‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty’. Article 7 states, ‘All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination’.

⁴⁴ At one level, this is similar to Robert Nozick’s point about the way in which to value the minimization of rights violations. Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974)Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Hsieh, , note 3, 226 Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ Besson, , note 21, 258 Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ Onora O’Neill, for example, is one who takes seriously this question with respect to questions of human rights and justice. See O’Neill, Onora, Justice Across Boundaries: Whose Obligations? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016)Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ One account that argues for human rights obligations on the part of TNCs on grounds they are de facto authorities is Wettstein, Florian, Multinational Corporations and Global Justice (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2009)Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ On attributing moral agency to corporations in relation to corporate responsibility, see Hsieh, Nien-hê, ‘Corporate Moral Agency, Positive Duties, and Purpose’ in Eric Orts and N. Craig Smith (eds.), The Moral Responsibility of Firms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming)Google Scholar.