Introduction
Since the unprecedented 2015 European migration crisis, the topic of ‘strategic use’ of migrants to meet state objectives has increasingly interested scholars and policymakers alike.Footnote 1 By December 2015, an estimated 911,000 refugees and migrants had arrived on European shores and borders.Footnote 2 The migration crisis also drove thousands of people to Norway’s and Finland’s borders. Still, the surprise was considerable when the well-established border control regime with Russia in the remote north collapsed. Approximately 5,500 migrants crossed the border from Russia into Norway. As border crossings to Norway stopped, traffic increased on Finland’s two northernmost border crossings with Russia, and approximately 1,800 sought asylum in winter 2015/16.
Since 2021, Belarus and Russia have been accused of directing migrants towards the European Union’s (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastern borders in an increasingly provocative manner. This action has caused intense political debate in the EU as the issue of the strategic use of migration balances concerns about national security and how states should manage malign foreign influence with upholding European legal commitments to human rights and the global migration regime.
The involvement of Russia’s state apparatus regarding the strategic use of migrants is typically masked, whereas Belarusian security forces have operated more openly.Footnote 3 Available contributions on the intentional use of migration in Europe have accordingly mostly focused on Belarus and connected the activity to the hybrid warfare framework.Footnote 4 Although Russia features as an actor in most of the contributions, Russia’s use of migrants to support its strategic goals in a European context is still a relatively understudied academic phenomenon. This article sheds light on this phenomenon through an empirical case study of the migration crises on the borders of northern Norway and Finland to Russia in 2015/16.
Finnish media and scholars have discussed the Norwegian and Finnish 2015/16 border crises as a possible Russian ‘hybrid operation’, connecting the events to the deepening conflict between Russia and the West in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Concrete evidence of Russia’s role has, however, been elusive. An early study by Arild Moe and Lars Rowe argued that Russian authorities did not orchestrate the migration flows, attributing them instead to migrants finding a less risky and cheaper route to Europe and a looser Russian border regime than Norway and Finland expected.Footnote 5 Virkkunen and Piipponen similarly analysed the events in a 2017 article as a migratory process, describing the hybrid-warfare interpretation as a popular reading and suggested that the event was narrowly securitised in the target states.Footnote 6 In later works (2024), Virkkunen, Silvan, and Piipponen characterise the case as instrumentalised migration. While cautioning that Russia’s ultimate objective was hard to verify, the authors emphasised potential ‘hypocrisy costs’ imposed on Finland, as the episode exposed a gap between its espoused liberal values and its restrictive border controls.Footnote 7
We contribute to this literature by analysing the border crisis within Russia’s broader foreign policy, bringing Russia’s operational role into sharper focus and situating the Norway and Finland case explicitly within Russia’s strategic practice.Footnote 8 This approach highlights features of the Russian state that allow us to discuss objectives beyond the target states’ migration policies. Moreover, with Russia and Belarus having adopted instrumentalised migration as an established policy instrument after 2015, the phenomenon itself merits further empirical and theoretical study.Footnote 9 Research so far has not had much to say about how such operations are carried out, how states attempt to resolve these instigated crises in accordance with their interests, and what their long-term strategic effects are.
Accordingly, we examine whether Russia instrumentalised migration during the 2015/16 crisis and, if so, to what ends. The article draws on Kelly Greenhill’s framework of coercive engineered migration (CEM) and the broader notion of strategically engineered migration (SEM), which analyse how states, particularly authoritarian regimes, use population movements for coercive or other strategic purposes. We assess our case against this framework and contribute new empirical insights on authoritarian states’ rationales and design choices in using migration as a tool. Related work by Virkkunen, Silvan, and Piipponen adopts a similar perspective but engages the CEM/SEM framework more lightly.Footnote 10 In addition, we draw on interviews with officials who managed the crisis, enabling a more granular assessment of state behaviour than previous accounts.
We argue that the 2015/16 migration crisis can best be explained as strategic engineered migration and a pilot project of the Russian security services to test the effectiveness of using organised migration as a tool to support Russia’s strategic foreign policy goals. As later uses of the tool suggest, Russia found some success and was able to establish coercive potential towards Norway and Finland, but we also found that the FSB’s operation made Norway and Finland expect and prepare for further Russian malign activities.
We identify six potential Russian goals, including restoring bilateral relations to the levels before Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, influencing the EU’s decisions on sanctions and cooperation, warning Finland against seeking NATO membership, testing the effectiveness of a new tool, collecting intelligence, and weakening Western influence according to Russia’s broader information confrontation towards the West.
Whereas the previous academic research has focused on the motivations of the migrants to use the ‘Arctic migration route’, we find that a fuller picture of the crisis emerges when we take into account motivations and agency of all relevant groups, the one with most agency being the Russian state: while the migrants had a motive to use the route, and the human traffickers had a motive to profit from it, the event was only possible because Russia, through the FSB, enabled and controlled it.
The article proceeds as follows. First, we discuss Russia’s use of various covert tools to undermine the West after 2014, often discussed by scholars as ‘hybrid war’. Second, we introduce the theoretical and methodological aspects of the study. Third, we describe the border regimes between Russia and Norway and Russia and Finland, as well as the role of the FSB and the Russian Border Guard. The fourth section analyses country-specific development during the 2015/16 crisis. The fifth section discusses insights from our empirical data in the light of our theoretical framework. Lastly, the conclusion highlights the study’s key findings and implications for future research.
Instrumentalised migration as part of the ‘hybrid’ toolkit?
Our case study occurred in a period of growing confrontation between Russia and the West. Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine caused a range of EU-led sanctions against Russia and a halt in political dialogue. This process also put under pressure Russia’s long-term strategic goals in the Nordic region, which focused on minimising the US, EU, and NATO influence and maximising Russian influence.Footnote 11
During this time, Russia engaged in various covert and malign activities to weaken and drive wedges between the EU and NATO and within Western societies. These activities, and the creative military operation Russia used to seize Crimea in 2014, are often discussed as Russia’s ‘hybrid war’ against the West. The term is often understood as the combined use of non-military and military means to meet strategic objectives below the threshold of conventional armed conflict but has also become contested, with some scholars arguing that it has become a catch-all term for all Russian malign activity and consequently has lost its analytical utility. Furthermore, the use of one term to describe both military operations that are supported by non-kinetic means and covert activities with no military component has led to a militarised language about Russia’s strategic practices.Footnote 12 Finally, the Russian analogous term, gibridnaya voina, refers exclusively to non-military subversive activities.Footnote 13
Scholars have found various ways to resolve the terminological confusion, while being in broad agreement about the confrontation between Russia and the West that took various non-kinetic forms. Galeotti and Chivvis have reserved ‘hybrid warfare’ for military operations and characterised Russia’s strategic conduct as political warfare.Footnote 14 Wigell has excised ‘warfare’ from the term and argues that ‘hybrid interference’ captures the essence of authoritarian states’ strategic practice to undermine democracies.Footnote 15 Mumford and Carlucci continue to find the concept of hybrid war useful, noting that it reflects an ambiguous method of conflict that great powers beyond Russia find useful in the current strategic environment.Footnote 16 Pynnöniemi and Saari have noted that ‘hybrid influencing’, a term favoured in Finland to describe unconventional but non-military types of malign activities, is just a contemporary way to refer to ‘active measures’, subversive activities that the Soviet Union employed against the West during the Cold War, and also refer briefly to our case in this context.Footnote 17 Curiously, we find that our case is referred to as part of the ‘hybrid’ phenomenon only by Finnish scholars. This reflects the ambiguous nature of the case, as evidence about the Russia’s role in the events has been elusive.
The conceptual debate surrounding Russia’s strategic practice after 2014 reflects its multifaceted nature. Ultimately, each concept has something important to say about Russia’s subversive strategic practices that most scholars agree are real. We contribute to this discussion by analysing our case through a strategic theory of instrumentalised migration. While instigating a migration crisis may be part of Russia’s ‘hybrid’ toolkit, it is at the same time an instrument widely used by authoritarian states. By analysing the use of the instrument itself and its utility as a component of Russia’s strategy, we contribute to this broader literature about the use of migration as well as literature on Russia’s strategy in northern Europe.
Strategically engineered migration as a component of Russia’s strategy
Russia has a long history of using human beings as instruments to further its interests. One example is the forced colonisation policy implemented during the Soviet Union. Today, Russia seeks to exert influence by engaging with Russian compatriots living abroad.Footnote 18 The latter category is useful in neighbouring countries with significant Russian emigree communities. Another example is Russia’s ‘passportisation’ policy in the occupied regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia or in occupied Ukraine.Footnote 19
Using third-country nationals as a form of pressure on neighbouring states is a less common contemporary Russian phenomenon. In the 1980s, Pakistan accused the Soviet Union of pressuring Afghans to flee across the border, in part to force Pakistan to seek a settlement with the Afghan regime and withdraw military aid to insurgents.Footnote 20 In 1990, the Soviet Union became a transit route for the organised illegal immigration of hundreds of people from Somalia to Finland. The possible role of the Soviet authorities or its security apparatus in organising the migration was never investigated and remains unknown.Footnote 21 Besides these, we were unable to identify other examples before 2015.
Strategic engineered migration (SEM), however, is a well-tested and successful foreign policy tool with long historical roots.Footnote 22 SEM is understood as creating and exploiting migration for political, economic, and military ends. The desired outcomes or concessions can be issued openly, privately, or in more ‘conspicuously ambiguous’ terms.Footnote 23 Thus, the objective of the migration flow is not always directly observable.
A SEM subtype is coercive engineered migration (CEM), which occurs when a challenger (typically a state) threatens with – or uses – migrants to gain concessions from the receiving state. Greenhill characterises CEM as a ‘coercion by punishment’ approach: the aim is to raise the cost or risk to a target state to induce changes in political behaviour. The punishment may be inflicted gradually as a risk management strategy while maintaining an ongoing threat of intensification for non-compliance. This risk management strategy also allows the challenger to maintain control. Too large outflows may risk military responses by the receiving state to try to stop or reverse them. Accordingly, the challengers usually prefer limited over large-scale migration flows.Footnote 24
Greenhill also identified an interesting dynamic that often occurs between the challenger and target state related to CEM. A challenger’s ‘dissatisfaction often stems from the fact that even before any outflow has occurred, [the] targets…are often themselves engaged in trying to coerce the perpetrators via the use of sanctions, embargoes, or diplomatic pressure’.Footnote 25 The 2015/16 crisis has a similar backdrop as Russia was under sanctions after its annexation of Crimea and military interventions in Ukraine.
There are several ways to strategically engineer migration flows. The case explored in this article falls within the category of opening what usually would be sealed borders, more precisely, upending border practices without breaking formal rules. Greenhill noted that in all cases, ‘this kind of coercion has been unambiguously cross-domain’ in that the outflows achieve ‘objectives in other realms and policy arenas’.Footnote 26 Although the coercer aims to ‘influence targets by force majeure’, target states are not entirely helpless. However, the states’ response options usually come down to weighing the anticipation of future pain and escalating costs against the costs and opportunities associated with ending a crisis immediately through concession.Footnote 27
Most SEM examples show smaller, often autocratic states coercing bigger, liberal democratic states – the SEM’s material power distribution typically favours the target state.Footnote 28 In cases where the power dynamic is reversed, migration is used to achieve objectives that military force or threats thereof cannot provide or are deemed too costly.Footnote 29 Our case is atypical in this regard. Bilaterally, Russia is a stronger actor than Norway or Finland, and despite being members of NATO or the EU, the target countries had to address the issue on their own.
We test our case against Greenhill’s theory and analyse whether the 2015/16 migration crisis can be classified either as SEM or CEM. Thus, our case must satisfy three strict criteria. First, was the migration controlled by Russia? Specifically, is there evidence of orchestration or overt control over the size, timing, and destination of an actual or imminently threatened migration? Second, can we identify strategic motivations, specifically, whether migration was used to satisfy identifiable and articulated objectives? Third, can we establish coercive intent by Russia? The final question is the most demanding criterion because it requires the researcher to prove intent as expressed by the coercer and that the target recognised it.Footnote 30
Methodological reflections
Methodologically, our analysis is based on a combination of open-source material and semi-structured interviews conducted with seven Norwegian and seven Finnish officials who participated in solving the crisis. We also interviewed one Norwegian journalist with in-depth knowledge of the events. We chose the interviewees based on the government organisations they represented and attempted to cover as many relevant and high-level stakeholders as possible.
All but the Norwegian journalist agreed to participate under the condition of anonymity. As a result, the interviewees are referred to as Finnish and Norwegian officials, regardless of their official titles.Footnote 31 The interviews were conducted in person in Finland and in Norway between May 2023 and November 2023, before Russia’s renewed migration pressure towards Finland. Most interviewees were asked the same opening questions concerning normal practices at the borders and in relation to Russia and their recollection of events, including anomalies. We also prepared a set of questions based on the expertise of the interviewee and occasionally modified the phrasing according to the flow of the conversation. We then asked follow-up questions based on the answers. The information provided by the interviews was triangulated to address potential memory-related concerns, given that the events occurred eight years prior. Interviews were treated as oral history, recognising the potential for memory lapses, misperceptions, and inaccuracies.Footnote 32
Bordering the Russian Federation
Norway and Finland share their only external Schengen land border with Russia, making them external borders of the EU. In 2015/16, the Norwegian border was also NATO’s outer border. Historically, Russia has enforced strict control on its side of the border and advocated low regional tensions. It has sought to strengthen its military capabilities and develop its economic ambitions in the Russian Arctic.Footnote 33
The Border Security Zone is a strip of land on the Russian side of its borders with Finland and Norway, where access and economic activity are restricted according to regulations set by the FSB.Footnote 34 The local FSB department issues a special permit to anyone visiting the zone and establishes checkpoints in the zone to inspect the documents.Footnote 35 Foreigners are allowed to enter the border zone and exit the territory of Russia using a valid Russian visa and identification documents.Footnote 36
All of Russia’s external border crossings have two or three checkpoints prior to exit. Barbed wire fences also control the area. The only border crossing at the Russian–Norwegian border, Boris Gleb (Storskog), and Finland’s two northernmost border crossings on the Russian border, Salla and Raja-Jooseppi, are in the Murmansk region of Russia’s north-western territories. To travel from Murmansk to Norway, one must pass three checkpoints: Titovka, Gulfstream, and Boris Gleb. There are three and two border checks, respectively, before crossing Salla and Raja-Jooseppi. The military significance of the region means that the Murmansk border area is heavily guarded. Consequently, although the number of checkpoints and the boundaries of Russia’s border zone have changed over time, the FSB has closely monitored the movement of people in the region.Footnote 37
The Russia–Norway border
In Norway, the Chief of Police of Finnmark County is responsible for border control along Russian–Norwegian border. They share this responsibility with the military garrison of Sør-Varanger, which conducts (civilian) border surveillance and patrols the border on behalf of the Chief of Police. The Finnmark police hold regular meetings with the FSB in Murmansk and Petrozavodsk. According to Schengen regulations and the 1949 border agreement with Russia, Norway must monitor the Russian–Norwegian border to prevent illegal border crossings into Schengen and Russia.Footnote 38 The position of border commissioner was created in 1950 to supervise compliance with the border agreement, resolve conflicts, and maintain cooperation with Russian border authorities.Footnote 39 Furthermore, the National Police Immigration Service handles immigration cases. The Finnmark police, Norwegian Border Commissioner, and National Police Immigration Service are subordinate to the National Police Directorate, which is subordinate to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security.
Russia has built a barbed wire fence along its border with Norway, which is rigged with a sophisticated alarm system triggered by touch. It was modernised in 2012 with additional sensors. A second barbed wire fence reinforces parts of the original fence.Footnote 40 Consequently, illegal border crossings have been rare, and Russia is considered to have control over people in the area.Footnote 41 In a typical year, the Storskog border crossing has between zero and ten asylum seekers.
The Russia–Finland border
Finland and Russia have nine border crossing points, two in the northern Lapland region. The border cooperation with Russia is less fragmented than Norway’s. The Finnish Border Guard is a military organisation subordinate to the Ministry of Interior (MoI) during peacetime, and the president of Finland serves as its commander-in-chief.
Cooperation between Finnish and Russian border guards has been based on an interstate border regulation agreement signed in 1960. The agreement stipulates how the border operates and lists all unwanted events that both parties have a duty to prevent, investigate, and resolve.Footnote 42 Another interstate agreement specifies the operation of the border crossing points.Footnote 43
Cooperation between Finnish and Russian border guards covers all levels of the two organisations – from station level to agency chiefs. The district commanders of both organisations are also border commissioners, who have the authority and obligation to implement the border regulation agreement. Below district commanders are the border-check station chiefs, between whom there is daily cooperation. Additionally, a systematic annual meeting calendar between the border authorities stipulates when border officials meet. This system has been the cornerstone of Russian–Finnish border cooperation for decades.
The 1960 border regulation agreement stipulates that both sides take necessary actions to prevent illegal border crossings. In practice, this means checking visas and, in their absence, advising the person that crossing the border would be illegal. Although the agreement does not explicitly require authorities to stop illegal border crossings, it has been an established practice to do so. That said, established practices aside, the stable border regime always depended on the political relationship with Russia. As one of our Finnish interviewees explained at length:
Already during the 1970s, the Soviets emphasised that the border is the barometer of the relations between our countries. In the late 1990s, we began to hear these voices again from Russia. They reminded us that our shared border is stable because of their efforts, and that we have a lot to thank them for because, if they loosened their grip, there would be trouble on the border. These Russian hints eloquently remind us that the situation at the border results from the high level of relations between our countries. Unfortunately, the adjustment knob of the barometer is in the hands of the Russians.
The role of the FSB and Russian Border Guard service
Russia can be characterised as hybrid intelligence state, comprising a complex blended space between the Russian state, society, and intelligence structures, with the latter occupying a central role.Footnote 44
The most powerful intelligence organisation is the FSB, which has been a central security organ for Putin’s political design and a formidable instrument for the president to ‘concentrate power in his hands and exercise pervasive control over all tiers of state and society’.Footnote 45 Although primarily a domestic security agency, the FSB also oversees external missions, including intelligence and covert action operations.Footnote 46
Between 1993 and June 2003, the RBGS was an independent agency, but in 2003 it became part of the FSB.Footnote 47 The Federal Border Guard Service Director holds the rank of First Deputy Director of the FSB and manages the RBGS, while the FSB director reports directly to the president of Russia.Footnote 48 As FSB Director, Bortnikov is a member of the Security Council, ‘giving the FSB both influence on Vladimir Putin’s perceptions and direct guidance from him about how to mitigate threats’.Footnote 49 President Putin is the principal decision-maker for Russia’s state security, with authority delegated to subordinate leaders.Footnote 50
As part of the FSB, the RBGS enjoys access to systems that allow the FSB to track all electronic traffic through the System for Operative Investigative Activities.Footnote 51 Because the RBGS is a military organisation, its personnel have military status and conduct military, intelligence, counter-intelligence, clandestine, and operational-investigative missions.Footnote 52
Explaining Russia’s modus operandi
Our interview corpus suggests that the crisis contained a hierarchy of agency in three groups: the migrants, the human traffickers, and the Russian state. Each group had more agency than those beneath them, and the FSB served as a coordinator and enabler. However, the migrants’ independent motives and the broader context surrounding their movement were instrumental in disguising the Russian authorities’ active participation and facilitating role.
The Russian agency hierarchy
Migrants
The migrants headed for Norway and Finland in 2015 had various motives to seek asylum in Europe. Many came from war-damaged countries, but a significant portion came from other countries or had lived in Russia for a long time.Footnote 53 In most cases, the primary choice of seeking a better life can be assigned to the migrants themselves. However, the migrants often had little control regarding their exact destinations. Human traffickers steered the routes and, in the case of the ‘Arctic migration route’, Russian state authorities, through the FSB, allowed and encouraged undisrupted and very specific traffic towards its three northernmost border crossings. One interviewee noted that many migrants had only a vague idea of where they were or where they were going, arriving during an arctic winter wearing clothes inappropriate for the season, some even in flip-plops.
Interviewed migrants from Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon told variations of the same story, describing it as a highly organised trip, a ‘packaged deal’. Everything was fixed, from the plane tickets to entry visas and cars waiting at the Murmansk airport to drive the migrants into the border zone. This level of organised travel to and inside Russia would be impossible within the Russian system without authorisation from, at least, the FSB. This realisation, combined with Russia’s shifting explanations, also calls into question arguments that the Arctic route was a spontaneous incident – especially as the interviewed migrants reported being enticed by advertisements a year before their trips.Footnote 54
Human traffickers and other middlemen
The operation’s hands-on managers were a mixed crew of human traffickers, criminals, shady businessmen, and other opportunists seeking to profit from the migrants.Footnote 55 The ‘travel package’ price varied from 2,500 USD to as much as 17,000 USD. Money was siphoned from the migrants throughout their journey. The human traffickers handled the practicalities, such as arranging the migrants’ transport and accommodation and handling interactions with the officials. For example, they arranged deportation orders from Russian officials or local courts. This gave Russia a legal pretext for refusing to take back any migrants who had left Russia.Footnote 56
Most of our interviewees believed this group of middlemen could act in this role only because the Russian state allowed it to. In interviews with the Finnish authorities, many migrants spoke of a ‘big boss’ in Russia who maintained contact with the Russian border authorities; however, the extent of that communication was unclear.Footnote 57 According to one human trafficker operating in 2023, they had deals with Russian authorities.Footnote 58 An interview conducted on 2 December 2015 provided another indicator that the smugglers followed orders. When asked why they informed people that they could go to Norway when Norway was returning asylum seekers to Russia, one human trafficker replied: ‘We no longer send people to Norway but to Finland’.Footnote 59
Although crime and human trafficking played a significant role, it should be seen in the context of the relationship between organised crime and the Russian state. According to Mark Galeotti, it is not uncommon for the Russian state to use criminals as instruments of its rule.Footnote 60 Some of our interviewees reiterated the same point.
The FSB and Russian border guards
The FSB appears to have acted as enablers and gatekeepers. The RBGS played a central role in facilitating the migrant flow by allowing people to be transported through all border checkpoints. Although we have no evidence that the FSB transported people to the border themselves, it could effectively control the process by deciding where and how human traffickers were allowed to operate. Despite having no legal obligation to prevent people from leaving Russia without valid visas, the RBGS stopped the decades-old practice of doing so – but only at the Storskog and two Finnish northern border crossing points.
The gatekeeper position was amplified by the fact that the migrants were transported in waves that followed the opening hours of the Russian border customs. One Russian border guard even revealed to a Finnish photojournalist that the FSB was organising traffic to the Finnish border. He noted that the local police and municipal authorities decided which car could leave for the border at what time and prioritised families with children and people with health issues.Footnote 61 At the Finnish border, the Russian border guards also often made the migrants sign papers accepting that they could not return to Russia.Footnote 62
Russian authorities
Russian public statements used the broader migration crises and the failure of EU migration policy to present the Arctic route as an organic flow of people rather than a Russian malign operation. Russia denied any state involvement, blamed the flow on Norway’s lenient migration laws, generous social benefits, and unclear border protocol, and argued that its human rights commitments prevented it from taking action to stop the migration.Footnote 63 Privately, Russia also argued that the worsening state of the Russian economy meant that foreigners living in Russia had to seek opportunities elsewhere.
Several of our interviewees strongly suggest that the Russian government played a role in instigating and maintaining the crisis. This included detailed descriptions of negotiations and the behaviour of the Russian counterparts. First, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) began issuing visas on tenuous terms to migrants. One of our interviewees called this ‘very unusual’, and another specified the role of the Russian consulates in the Middle East in this regard.Footnote 64 Second, as Norway and Finland attempted to reduce the flow through legal solutions on their side, Russia, among other activities, started deporting foreigners who had lived in Russia for a long time. This resulted in over forty-two nationalities arriving in northern Norway and Finland, including from Latin America and southern Asia. Finally, during the negotiation phase, Russia opposed all attempts to resolve the crisis, offering various and changing explanations about who the migrants were and why it could not restore border control until it decided otherwise and ended the crisis instantaneously.
Norway: Russian framing and changing behaviour
Russia’s border regime and Murmansk’s geographical remoteness mean that third-country nationals crossing at Storskog are rare. Accordingly, the appearance of the first few in early 2015 raised little concern. Several interviewees stated that by August, they were worried but had a hard time reconciling the uptick in migrants with their knowledge of the strict Russian border regime. By the end of August, the number of migrants crossing the border grew dramatically, resulting in a heightened readiness level on the Norwegian side not seen since World War II.
The topic of refugees on the Russian side of the Russian–Norwegian border had been discussed before 2015. In several meetings, the RBGS shared how many refugees were in Murmansk and, in some meetings, made sure their Norwegian counterparts knew they stayed in Murmansk only through the courtesy of the FSB. This suggests Russian awareness that this was a long-standing Norwegian concern.
The RBGS often suggested that Norway amend its protocol to give Russia a stronger mandate to deny third-country citizens entry across Storskog. Since 2003, Norway and Russia conducted joint document controls in cases of uncertainty tied to valid travel documents. In Norwegian entry cases, consultations would take place on Russian territory. From 2012 onwards, the Norwegian protocol informed people with valid Russian documents but inadequate entry documents to Norway and Schengen that they had to apply for a visa. Russian practice was to stop this category of people and not raise the issue of asylum. During a 2014 meeting, Russian border guards again raised the topic of a stricter protocol and ‘rolled their eyes in resignation’ when met with the standard reply that the message would be conveyed to the Norwegian Justice Department. However, the international law means that Norway is nonetheless obliged to allow people to seek asylum in Norway. This protocol became a feature story when Russia used it to frame Norway’s ‘unclear’ wording as a key enabler of the migration flow.
The RBGS now claimed the protocol did not give them the authority to continue the practice. As Storskog saw record numbers of border crossings, this framing received unexpected support: The head of the Norwegian Border Commission publicly supported the Russian stance. The Russian mayor of the border town, Nikel, also blamed the number of refugees in his town on Norwegian border practice. He claimed that Russia was unable to do anything and that only when Norway no longer accepted the refugees would the flow stop.Footnote 65 At the same time – and in direct opposition to these allegations – the Finnish Border Guard confirmed that Russia was continuing the border practice of stopping migrants without valid Schengen visas at the Finnish border.Footnote 66 Seeking to alleviate the situation, Norway decided to tighten the protocol on 7 November 2015.
The new protocol now explicitly stated that people could not enter without the proper documents. This, however, did not make Russia re-establish the border practice or alleviate the migration flow because Norway was still legally obliged to accept people seeking protection. Although the migration flow could initially be seen as proving Russia’s grievances with the Norwegian protocol, the sequence of Russian actions made it a less plausible explanation. It continued sending people through, even as Norway tried to use bilateral agreements and tougher wording of the protocol. Furthermore, the Russian grievances about the Norwegian protocol were an insufficient explanation given that Russia reinstated the practice of stopping people on 30 November, only to open the gates towards Finland.
Eventually, Russia also discontinued the border practice of joint document checks, framing the cooperation as an unacceptable Norwegian exercise of authority on Russian territory. In line with a 2007 bilateral return agreement, Norway tried to send back all asylum seekers with valid Russian residency permits and tourist visas.Footnote 67 Within hours, migrants appeared with freshly issued deportation orders from Russian courts.Footnote 68 When Norwegian authorities tried to return this category, Russia refused to accept them because they had already entered Norwegian territory and could not return because they had been expelled. Many deportation orders were issued in Moscow and St. Petersburg, leaving Storskog a strange exit route given the geographical distance.
By 26 November, Norway had implemented a record-fast change to its immigration act. It classified Russia as a safe country and removed the Schengen regulation requiring a migrant to have obtained asylum status in the return country to be considered safe.Footnote 69 This meant migrants could be returned if they had various forms of legal residence in Russia.Footnote 70 However, Russia continued to refuse the returnees because they had been expelled from Russia and already entered Norwegian territory.
At this point, the Norwegian screening centre was located a few kilometres from the border. On 27 November, the Norwegian Justice Department decided to ‘test’ Russia by sending twenty asylum seekers back on a bus. They were caught for days in the ‘no-man’s-land zone’ between the border checkpoints, causing much criticism nationally, internationally, and from Russia. Despite the criticism – and Norway eventually allowing the migrants to return – one interviewee said this made Russia uncomfortable. The ‘test’ resulted in Russia accepting that if the migrants were confined to the ‘no-man’s-land’ and did not cross the border barrier on the Norwegian side, they had not officially entered Norway and could return to Russia.
One interviewee described Russia’s modus operandi as well prepared with arguments and legal articles ready to stall cooperation on the migration issue. These allowed the operation to continue until deemed too costly for Russia. Russia was also described as a super bureaucrat, always ready to introduce a new problem as soon as one believed the issue was resolved. This approach frustrated Norway. Although Russia was not necessarily lying, it was not revealing the solution. Similarly, the political–diplomatic track came with its parallel challenges.
Throughout the autumn crisis, the Norwegian government seemed set on not politicising the border situation. One explanation was that Norway worried about escalating the crisis and sought to maintain good relations with Russia when possible. At this time, the notion of establishing a ‘new normal’ with Russia still featured in Norwegian policy on Russia. However, Norway also feared being perceived as the weak link in Western cohesion. Consequently, Norway maintained a condemning stance on Russia’s actions in Ukraine and joined in on the EU sanctions.
Norwegian authorities sought to maintain this balance by initiating negotiations at lower, bureaucratic levels and rocking the political boat as little as possible. This approach is part of a long tradition of informal meetings and engagement with Russia. Issues are rarely raised to the heads-of-state level, as is more common in Finland. Consequently, early on, the Norwegian bureaucracy, primarily the Foreign Ministry, oversaw initiating dialogue with Russia. However, finding the right people in Russia to discuss the issue with proved difficult. Several of our interviewees pointed this out, as did Prime Minister Erna Solberg in a 2021 interview.Footnote 71
In early and mid-October, Norway’s Foreign Minister Børge Brende first met with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Titov and then Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to ask why people could move freely in a heavily guarded military area and why the practice had changed only on the Norwegian border. He reported that Lavrov had realised that the different practices between Norway and Finland was a paradox and promised an explanation.
The issue was again raised a week later in an annual meeting between the consular sections of the two foreign ministries, but no explanation was provided. Brende reported unsatisfactory answers afterwards.Footnote 72 Lavrov was later approached directly with a list of Norwegian concerns. He listened to the concerns but replied that Russia could do nothing to stop the situation unless Norway wanted Russia to start locking up people. The Norwegian National Police Commissioner also had several meetings with Vladimir Kulishov, First Deputy Director of the FSB and Head of the Russian Border Service. The fact that contact was established at several relevant levels without a constructive solution suggests Russia was offered the chance to solve the crisis but chose not to.
At one point, Norway decided to show some political goodwill towards Russia. Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Tore Hattrem was called back from a work trip and sent to Murmansk with a diplomatic delegation. On 16 and 17 November, Hattrem met with the governor of Murmansk and a Moscow-sent governmental representative. He raised the migration issue and conveyed that Norway was ready to send a delegation to Moscow to negotiate an agreement. At this point, the Russian side seemed more agreeable; two weeks later, a delegation headed to Moscow for meetings on 1 December.
Because the negotiation process coincided with the end of the migrant flow, several interviewees pointed to the negotiations as a possible explanation for why Russia reestablished the practice of stopping migrants. However, the Russian decision to stop the flow had been made before the negotiations in Moscow started. When the meeting started on 1 December, the Norwegian delegation was unaware that the flow had stopped.
As the Norwegian delegation was en route to Moscow, stricter measures were enforced at the Norwegian border crossing. On 29 November, the East Finnmark Police District announced they would start physical border controls, moving the screening and asylum centre to the border crossing. The point was to stop migrants with deportation orders before they entered Norway. A note was passed to the local FSB border guards via the Norwegian border commissioner that no entry by third-country citizens would be allowed as of 30 November. This would have been difficult to enforce because Norway was obliged to process people who asked for protection. However, the message to Russia was clear: do not send anyone over the border. Norway was also openly debating the idea of closing the border.
What the police would have done if people asked for asylum on 30 November remains unknown. That day, asylum requests stopped. Several interviewees reported that the last group to approach was two Cuban citizens who returned without asking for protection. They were escorted by the FSB to the border crossing and observed what the Norwegian side did. The sudden stop in asylum requests was as surprising as the sudden surge. In one week, the number of crossings dropped from 314 to 0. The expectation was another busy day with thousands of verified people in Murmansk ready to try to cross the border. The FSB conveyed a similar message in meetings with the Norwegian side at the time. However, on 30 November, the argument that Russia could not stop the migration flow was put to rest once and for all.
Finland
Like Norway, Finland experienced a slight uptick in migrants crossing the northernmost Finnish border crossings before the upsurge in December 2015. These signals were closely monitored due to irregular migration Finland had experienced through Sweden earlier in 2015. Ministry of Interior Undersecretary Päivi Nerg later noted that the authorities immediately took notice when five or six people crossed the border from Russia in August 2015.Footnote 73 Norway also shared information with its Finnish counterparts at various levels.Footnote 74 The Finnish government anticipated that if Norway closed its border, migrants would be directed towards Finland – and President Niinistö publicly suggested the need to prepare for that eventuality.Footnote 75 After a Russian driver was caught trafficking people to Finland in late November, Nerg publicly raised the possibility that Russia was testing Finland.Footnote 76
However, only when the migration abruptly stopped on the Norwegian border did Finland see an upsurge in migrants at its two northernmost border crossings, Salla and Raja-Jooseppi. Two interviewees said they immediately identified this as a Russian ‘hybrid operation’, and all interviewees reported that they early on understood that Russia had a role in directing the movement of people.Footnote 77
The Finnish governmental structure facilitated a quick flow of information to the top leadership. Within days, the matter was on the agenda of the president and Ministerial Council of Foreign and Security Policy. However, the situational awareness was not unified. It took time to gather information about who was organising the human trafficking and who had the authority to stop it. The notion of Russian hybrid influencing gained public traction only after a Russian border guard revealed to a Finnish photojournalist in late January that the FSB was organising the transport of people to the border.
In the beginning, local-level corruption was included as a possible explanation for Russian border authorities allowing the human traffickers to operate. Once Russia’s refusal to stop the operation became apparent, a clearer image of Russia’s role appeared. However, this picture was not communicated clearly to the public. Finland, like Norway, hoped to resolve the issue through established frameworks. The government framed the crisis as a challenge related to illegal migration and Russia as a partner in solving it, reproducing elements of Russia’s own framing.Footnote 78
At the local level, the Finnish Border Guard bought the government time to seek solutions by using existing legal frameworks to slow the Russian operation. Russia reacted to and attempted to circumvent Finnish counteractions. Both sides operated according to the commonly agreed legal framework. Early on, the human traffickers drove the migrants across the border by car. When a Russian driver was criminally investigated for facilitating illegal immigration, the human traffickers reverted to selling bicycles to the migrants. When Finland questioned the RBGS about this, one interviewee reported that ‘the Russians argued that the Vienna Convention on Road Traffic encouraged European states to support crossing national borders with the bicycles’.
On 4 December, the Finnish Border Guard began restricting traffic across the border stations, claiming the situation hindered normal traffic. The border barrier boom was lowered every time a group of migrants reached the Finnish side. On 28 December, the Border Guard again used the regulatory framework and banned cycling across the border, noting that it had become a method of illegal entry into the country, there was no intention to continue travelling by bike, and winter conditions made cycling dangerous.Footnote 79
Two days after the ban was issued, migrants were packed into cars and made to drive themselves across the border.Footnote 80 The drivers also avoided criminal convictions by applying for asylum. The vehicles were in terrible condition and were abandoned immediately after the crossing.Footnote 81 In response, Finland again turned to the legal framework and started allowing only one car at a time, noting that it had every reason to state that the border crossing stations were full.Footnote 82
Finally, the traffickers had the migrants arrive in convoys of cars, making it impossible to lower the barrier boom after each car. By the new year, around twenty migrants a day crossed the border through both border crossing points.Footnote 83 In the end, Finland restricted the opening hours of the border crossing points to only two to three hours a day in Salla. This situation continued until the diplomatic track reached the presidential level and Russia stopped its operation in late February 2016.
Unlike Norway, Finland and Russia had an established systematic dialogue between the heads of state. The president traditionally manages relations with Russia. President Niinistö was involved with the crisis from the beginning, getting daily updates on the border crossings. One interviewee noted that Niinistö, a lawyer by education, favoured legal solutions to political problems. The outcome ultimately reflected all these factors.
The legal framework essentially allowed for three ways to restore border control: Russia could return to established practices, Finland and Russia could agree to close the border together, or Finland could unilaterally close the border. Although the last option appears simplest, and the Finnish government considered it, Russia had Finland at a disadvantage.Footnote 84 Unlike with Norway, Russia could escalate the crisis to Finland’s busy southern border crossing points.Footnote 85 Our interviews indicate that Russia expressed readiness to do so if the northern border crossing points were closed. As with Norway, Finland was also concerned that Russia would direct people across the land border if all border stations were closed.
Our interviews also suggest that the fear of millions of migrants leaving Russia provided the impetus for Finland to find a political solution.Footnote 86 The Russian authorities encouraged this interpretation. The head of Finland’s MoI Migration Department later confirmed that his Russian counterpart mentioned during negotiations that there were eleven million foreigners in Russia. This indicates how tense the situation was, even though the number of people crossing the border remained low.Footnote 87 Organising such a movement of people was probably not a realistic option for Russia. However, Finland did not know how far Russia would go.
Finland sought to resolve the issue at the lowest level possible, as was its customary approach to Russia. Negotiations were pursued through several tracks, starting with the local border authorities and moving on to higher level officials. The Minister of Interior, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Prime Minister eventually stepped in.Footnote 88 One interviewee concluded that all attempts failed because ‘it had been decided in Russia that it will be sent to the presidential level’.
Initially, the Finnish Border Guard attempted to solve the problem with the RBGS. However, for the first time since World War II, a solution was not found even at the heads of agency level.Footnote 89 Early on, the Finnish Embassy in Moscow asked Russia about the border crisis. As noted by one interviewee, the answers received ‘were of that type’ that the issue rose to a higher level. As with Norway, Lavrov argued at one point that Russia did not have the right to prevent people from leaving and was adamant that Russia would not take anyone back.Footnote 90
By late January, Russia’s unwillingness to resolve the issue had already become clearer. On 22 January, Foreign Minister Timo Soini suggested that Finland might close the border if negotiations failed.Footnote 91 Days later, news broke about FSB’s role in organising the transport of migrants to the border. However, President Niinistö noted that it was not wise to reveal Finland’s plans and added that after Minister of Interior Petteri Orpo and Prime Minister Juha Sipilä met their Russian counterparts in late January, Finland would have more information, presumably about Russia’s readiness to solve the problem.Footnote 92
These meetings turned out to be ineffective. The press release indicated that Russia wanted to put on the agenda not just ‘combating illegal immigration’ but also other criminal activity, using the Council of Baltic Sea States for this purpose.Footnote 93 A few days later, Sipilä met Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev in Russia, but the only result was that the ministers agreed to discuss the issue over the phone soon. For his part, Medvedev used the press conference to claim that Finland had become a hostage of the ‘short-sighted’ migration policy of the EU.Footnote 94
During the subsequent phone call on 3 February, Sipilä tried to get Medvedev to agree to close the border.Footnote 95 One interviewee noted that Medvedev’s answer was unclear enough that when the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Titov later arrived in Helsinki, Finnish officials argued that closing the border had been agreed upon. However, the attempt was unsuccessful.Footnote 96 By now, only two Russian candidates had the authority to resolve the situation: Director of the FSB Bortnikov and President Putin. During the winter of 2016, Orpo met the FSB twice in Moscow.Footnote 97 According to our interviews, the conclusions of the final February meeting were that Bortnikov did not want to stop the crisis, and it was not about local-level corruption. One interviewee concluded: ‘there had to be a state of national will behind it’.
Shortly after, President Niinistö was set to meet Medvedev. A day before the meeting, Medvedev gave an interview where he blamed the EU for the crisis and said Russia had no legal means to stop migration because it had joined the European Convention on Human Rights. Niinistö, for his part, questioned Medvedev’s arguments extensively in the presence of journalists, which is extremely unusual in diplomatic practice.Footnote 98
Russia’s refusal to stop the operation clearly frustrated the Finnish government. In 2024, Ambassador Mikko Hautala, Niinistö’s foreign policy advisor at the time, revealed that Finland had threatened to cancel Niinistö’s upcoming meeting with Putin scheduled for March if Russia would not restore border control.Footnote 99 At the same time, the MFAs of Finland and Russia were engaged in negotiations on a bilateral agreement that would provide the legal basis for closing the border. We are uncertain how these two events overlapped. However, they appear related to how the crisis was resolved: while being open to negotiations, Finland essentially threatened to turn the crisis into a diplomatic dispute.
The negotiations ended up favouring Russia. Finland proposed an agreement that would temporarily restrict cross-border traffic at the northern crossing points for everyone except Russian and Schengen citizens. Russia countered by proposing that only citizens of Finland, Russia, and Belarus would be allowed entry. Finland accepted the proposal, which was dated 22 March 2016 to coincide with a meeting of the presidents. The Finnish media framed the outcome as Russia humiliating Finland.Footnote 100
However, the agreement had no practical meaning because the FSB ceased its operation before the negotiations were concluded. During a meeting on 26 February, Putin ordered the FSB to strengthen control of migration in transit to European countries.Footnote 101 The decision had likely been made earlier, given that the FSB had already begun arresting migrants for being illegally in Russia. Although (according to one interviewee) Finnish authorities had provided detailed information to Russia about some human traffickers well before the arrests, without Russia acting, the traffickers were now also being arrested. The border crossings stopped completely on 29 February.Footnote 102
The presidents’ meeting in March was a symbolic conclusion to the crisis, but important to Russia in the sense that it had managed to raise the issue to the presidential level. This was evident in Putin’s statement during the press conference where he stated that Niinistö had ‘brought the situation to his attention’ and asked him to influence it.Footnote 103 Russia had showcased its capabilities and left the door open for initiating similar actions in the future.
Discussion
Terminology aside, we find our case a clear example of an FSB-run operation and part of the broader pattern of Russia’s post-2014 behaviour towards the West. After reviewing the evidence and Greenhill’s three criteria for coercive engineered migration, we also find that our case can be characterised by strategically engineered migration intended to establish coercive potential. First, we find strong evidence in the case study that Russia controlled and orchestrated migration. The relaxed visa regulations, the fact that decades-long practices on border control were abandoned only on three specific border crossings, the role of the FSB in organising the movement, the deportation of foreigners who resided in Russia amplifying migration, and that the original border practices were as readily restored as they were removed support the argument that Russia was in control. We cannot establish whether the FSB planned the operation from the beginning or turned human trafficking into its operation but find that the ultimate decision-maker nonetheless was Russia.
We also find strong evidence to back Greenhill’s second criterion, which is that the use of migrants was strategically motivated. Russia’s behaviour on the borders and in negotiations suggests a strategic manipulation of the flow through the simple act of temporarily upending the established border practice to achieve political ends. Adhering to the SEM literature, Russia’s use of migrants resembles a punishment strategy – in this case, in the form of capacity swamping, understood as manipulating the target state’s ability to ‘accept/accommodate/assimilate a given group of migrants’.Footnote 104
In answering Greenhill’s third criterion, we cannot classify the use of migrants as a purely coercive engineered migration flow. Russia never explicitly expressed demands for concessions, which is required for the third criterion. Instead, Norway and Finland were left to interpret and guess why the flow started and what Russia wanted in exchange for stopping it. A significant caveat is that we do not know whether Russia made explicit demands behind closed doors. Our relatively close access through our interviews suggests this was not the case.
Absent verified explicit demands from Russia, we classify the operation as strategically engineered rather than coercively engineered migration. However, we also caution that Greenhill’s strict criterion of articulated coercive intent risks overlooking an important feature of the Russian system. As Mumford and Carlucci argue, the essence of hybrid warfare (or influencing) is ambiguity, but the SEM/CEM delineation does not readily accommodate this.Footnote 105 Much of Russia’s activities below the threshold of armed conflict are concealed and conducted without articulated intentions. This was also the defining feature of our case.
Our interviewees reported explicit Russian utterances that they had many refugees on its side of the border ready to leave before, during, and after the migration flows. Several also described the operation as a display of capabilities, with Russia showcasing what it could do to Norway, Finland, and Europe. This type of signalling aligns with other studies on Russia’s military exercises in the High North at the time, which identified Russian exercise patterns as mainly political signalling.Footnote 106 On several occasions after the 2015 operation, the FSB mentioned the ‘danger’ of migrants fleeing into Norway through the open terrain or at sea. Possibly to maintain the fear, the FSB has also seemingly staged such attempts.Footnote 107 Our conclusion is that Russia’s pilot project in the North was not first and foremost about gaining immediate concessions but about establishing a coercive potential.
Russia’s goals
Without any public Russian demands, we must base our identification of Russian goals on our empirical data and interpretations of certain Russian activities and public statements during the operation that point indirectly to certain goals. Based on this information, we identified six possible goals with varying priority for Russia: (1) restoring bilateral relations to levels before Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, (2) influencing the EU’s decisions on sanctions and cooperation with Russia, (3) warning Finland against seeking NATO membership, (4) testing the effectiveness of its new tool or ‘hybrid weapon’, as one interviewee called it, (5) collecting intelligence, including stress-testing Norway’s and Finland’s systems, and (6) a more general strategic goal of undermining the Western belief in human rights policies and tarnishing its reputation both within and beyond Europe. This goal can be seen in connection with Russia’s broader information confrontation towards the West and the ongoing information campaign throughout the operation to help obfuscate Russian action.
The first four goals are interconnected. Their overarching context is Russia’s strategic goal to become a leading world power, as stated in its 2015 National Security Strategy and its preceding versions.Footnote 108 The sanctions imposed by the EU and Norway on Russia in 2014 over its invasion of Ukraine harmed its economic prospects, integral for reaching that goal. High-level political contacts with Russia were also mostly frozen. The FSB operation happened in this context. Although we should not overstate the importance of one pilot project for the Russian grand strategy, we argue that it is hard to imagine Russia using migration against Norway and Finland without the post-2014 political stand-off between Russia and the West.
At the time, Russia wanted to break out of isolation and re-establish contacts with Europe, allowing it to continue its long-term strategy. A similar motive was seen in Russia’s intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2015, which forced the United States to at least tacitly accept Russia as a negotiation partner.Footnote 109 As such, instigating an SEM during a Europe-wide migration crisis can be seen as a signal to the entire EU of Russia’s capabilities.
Another long-standing Russian strategic goal in the Nordic region has been to prevent and limit the presence of foreign great powers in the area.Footnote 110 Since the beginning of the Cold War, this had meant limiting NATO activities and opposing Finland’s (and Sweden’s) membership. Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine made the problem more acute: NATO began prioritising collective defence, which also meant increased allied military presence in Norway and the High North.
In Finland, debates about NATO membership intensified despite the low likelihood of joining the alliance at the time. The government formed in 2015 tasked a group of senior experts to analyse the effects of possible Finnish NATO membership.Footnote 111 At the same time, Galeotti notes that in 2016 there was a Russian multi-vector campaign to intimidate Finland against joining NATO, including disinformation, public diplomacy, and air space violations.Footnote 112 One interviewee suggested Russia wanted ‘a tacit speaking turn’ on the matter. Hautala saw the 2015/16 operation as part of the preventive logic of the hardliner group within the Russian political system, primarily the FSB and the security apparatus. They thought that even if NATO membership was not imminent, Finland was drifting towards the alliance and would eventually seek membership if Russia did not periodically warn about the consequences.Footnote 113 Several Finnish interviewees noted that Finland had experienced several ‘hybrid operations’ or other activities before and after the crisis and connected the 2015/16 operation to that timeline.
Russia’s unease about this development is evident in its foreign policy towards Norway and Finland at the time. An analysis of Russian MFA strategic communications in northern Europe between 2012 and 2022 revealed that after 2014, Russia began issuing warnings to all northern European countries against joining NATO or – if they were allied – intensifying military activities with NATO and the United States. In line with the listed potential Russian goals, the other main narratives of Russia’s MFA were to ease the EU sanctions policy and emphasise the economic benefits of good bilateral relations with Russia.Footnote 114 Following the wedge strategy Timothy Crawford postulated, bilateralisation of relations can be used to weaken stronger coalitions, such as NATO or the EU, and shape the environment in Russia’s favour. Wigell argues that this is also the underlying logic of hybrid interference.Footnote 115
Russia found some success, since the operation effectively reestablished some of the bilateral dialogue with Norway and Finland that had been frozen after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014. Finland had to conclude a bilateral treaty with Russia instead of handling the matter through the EU. By excluding EU citizens from the treaty, Russia managed to drive a small symbolic wedge between Finland and its EU allies.
In addition to these strategic goals, the FSB’s role as an intelligence service meant it had specific objectives in accordance with its function. The FSB gained information on how Russia’s potential adversaries act under stress, helping the FSB to plan future operations. Several interviewees reported that the ensuing chaos allowed Russia to stress-test the system and map Norway’s preparedness and crisis capacity on the border. One Finnish interviewee made similar observations, suggesting that Russia’s primary motivation was to test the Norwegian and Finnish border regimes and the Schengen countries’ and the EU’s reactions.
Moreover, in December 2023, after we concluded our interviews, the Norwegian Police Security Service revealed that Russia used the 2015 chaos on the Storskog border to send several migrants into Norway with intelligence-gathering tasks.Footnote 116 In 2024, the regional Finnmark counter-intelligence chief clarified that the FSB had instructed some migrants to report back by leaving unsent message drafts on social media platforms.Footnote 117 The FSB could quickly obtain information on how and by whom the migrants are met, what they are asked in interviews, and how efficient the apparatus is. This approach has historic parallels, as several Soviet spies were sent through the Boris Gleb border crossing to Norway under the cover of being Finnish refugees during the 1939/40 Winter War between the Soviet Union and Finland.Footnote 118 Although the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service did not publish similar statements in 2016, during the 2023 crisis they stated that Russia was trying to use migrants as spies.Footnote 119
Finally, Russia’s public and private statements should be seen as supporting its strategic objectives and as part of its information confrontation with the West. During the negotiation phase with Finland, Medvedev gave an interview to a German newspaper that contained two main arguments. First, the Western involvement in the Syrian civil war and Russia’s exclusion from the negotiation table was the indirect cause of the migration crisis. Second, the EU’s migration policy was a failure and open to social benefit exploitation, entry of terrorists, and uncontrollable Islamic immigration. Emphasising that the refugee crisis could become the most dramatic event for the EU, Medvedev concluded that Russia’s involvement was essential for resolving such issues.Footnote 120 These claims aligned with previous Russian narratives about the refugee crisis.Footnote 121 Additionally, in early 2015, Putin also blamed the migration crisis on the West’s involvement in destabilising countries in the Middle East and Africa. According to Putin, Europe suffered from ‘blindly following the American instruction’.Footnote 122
The two narratives have slightly different audiences. The narrative on the cause of the Syrian civil war and Medvedev’s conclusions that Russia should always be included in decision-making relates to foreign policy and can be seen as Russian strategic communication directed to Western decision-makers. Considering that the FSB was at the time organising illegal immigration to Finland, the narrative of perilous mass immigration enabled by the EU’s incompetence is disinformation. Targeted at the European public, it reproduced common anti-immigrant tropes to undermine public support of European governments.Footnote 123 Together, the two narratives constituted a veiled threat not only to continue organising illegal immigration to the EU but also to leverage immigration in Russia’s information confrontation campaigns against the EU.
Conclusion
This article examined Russia’s strategic use of migration, focusing on the migration crises on the borders of Norway and Finland during 2015/16.
We argue that Russia, through the FSB, controlled and directed the flow of migrants towards Norway and Finland despite efforts to obfuscate its intentions and confuse the target countries throughout the operation. Furthermore, evidence points to the use of migrants being strategically motivated, intended to establish coercive potential over Norway, Finland, and Europe. Accordingly, we agree with some of our interview subjects that the use of migrants is a tool in Russia’s unconventional – or hybrid – toolbox that should be understood as part of Russia’s broader strategy towards the West.
Russia’s pilot project can be described as relatively successful in establishing coercive potential, but it came at a price. Russia’s operation broadened Norway’s and Finland’s understanding of what tools Russia would be willing to use to assert pressure and influence in the region. One Norwegian interviewee reported that ‘hybrid activity’ was no longer contained to discussions about cyber-attacks or GPS jamming.Footnote 124 Several Finnish interviewees said Russia’s use of migrants removed any pre-existing gullibility regarding Russian capabilities and willingness to use them: the operation highlighted the importance of being prepared for other types of ‘hybrid’ activities. Two interviewees concluded that the operation contributed to worsening relations with Russia. Accordingly, if Russia’s long-term goal was to assert more influence in the region, it likely caused more distrust of Russia’s intentions and what to expect from the remaining cooperation.
Norway went furthest in amending its laws to ensure stricter border enforcement during the crisis. However, Finland also began a process for legislative changes after the crisis to ensure border security, and the Finnish Border Guard began preparing for similar future Russian operations. This gave Finland tools to respond to Russia’s renewed migration pressure in late 2023. However, little changed on Norway’s northern border after the crises ended.
Despite the increased distrust, cooperation and dialogue with Russia increased after 2016 – but was effectively demolished with Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The drastic change in relations and Finland’s NATO membership led Russia to reinstate its migration pressure towards Finland, only to meet a prepared Finland that closed its border. Similarly, the Norwegian government quickly warned that it could close the border should the situation escalate in Storskog. As such, one interpretation of events could be to conclude that Russia’s migration tool outplayed its role as an effective tool.
Another interpretation is that Russia’s use of migrants still serves a purpose in Russia’s broader strategic toolbox. The reactions of Finland and Norway, in addition to the border reinforcements in Poland and Lithuania as they battle migration pressure from Belarus, provided Russia with an opportunity to produce a ‘narrative flip’. When Finland closed its border after Russia’s renewed migration pressure in 2023, Russia framed the decision as Finland provoking Russia, creating new dividing lines in Europe, infringing on the rights of Russians, and ‘fuelling Russophobic sentiments’. In this way, sending migrants towards its neighbours’ borders can be a useful tool for closing the borders without the Kremlin making the official decision.Footnote 125 It shows the flexibility of Russia’s information confrontation as it adapts the description of, in this case, the migration tool to serve new interests.
This research bridges theoretical gaps between migration studies and security studies by illustrating migration flows as a geopolitical tool. It highlights how SEM can be used not merely for immediate concessions but also to establish coercive potential and shape narratives.
Although this article makes substantial empirical strides in explaining this phenomenon, we acknowledge its limitations. The evidence suggests Russia’s strong intent and orchestration, but conclusive proof of coercive demands remains elusive. Accordingly, future research would benefit from exploring the coercive potential of unconventional means in more detail. Furthermore, despite providing a fuller picture of the 2015/16 phenomenon, the role of human traffickers remains unexplored.
Member states of NATO and EU face a complex dilemma in addressing Russia’s strategic use of migration: enforcing stricter border controls risks undermining human rights obligations integral to their identities, whereas inaction leaves them vulnerable to manipulation. Governments must understand the dynamics of strategic migration and learn from past experiences to navigate this challenge. Such understanding includes how Russia can use this tool as part of its information confrontation and how to ensure readiness for future Russian unconventional methods that combine human, legal, and informational instruments.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Kristin Ven Bruusgaard and Magnus Petersson for their thoughtful readings of multiple drafts and invaluable comments. We are also grateful to our interviewees for generously sharing their knowledge. All remaining errors are our own.
Funding statement
The authors declare none.
Competing interests
The authors report there are no competing interests to declare.
Karen-Anna Eggen is a PhD fellow and Head of the Programme for Ukraine and Full-Spectrum Threats at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, and is affiliated with the Centre for International Security. Her research focuses on Russian strategy, information operations, full-spectrum warfare, and transatlantic relations.
Jyri Lavikainen is a research fellow in the Finnish Foreign Policy, Northern European Security, and NATO research programme at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. His research focuses on nuclear deterrence, deterrence theory, and Russian foreign and security policy. Lavikainen is also a doctoral researcher at the University of Tampere.
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