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Field of Education and Political Behavior: Predicting GAL/TAN Voting

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2024

LIESBET HOOGHE*
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, United States, and European University Institute, Italy
GARY MARKS*
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, United States, and European University Institute, Italy
JONNE KAMPHORST*
Affiliation:
European University Institute, Italy
*
Corresponding author: Liesbet Hooghe, W.R. Kenan Professor in Political Science, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, United States; Research Professor, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Italy, hooghe@unc.edu, Liesbet.hooghe@eui.eu.
Gary Marks, Burton Craige Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, United States; Research Professor, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Italy, marks@unc.edu, Gary.Marks@eui.eu.
Jonne Kamphorst, Postdoctoral Fellow, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Italy, Jonne.Kamphorst@eui.eu.
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Abstract

Education is perhaps the most generally used independent variable in the fields of public opinion and vote choice. Yet the extent to which a person is educated is just one way in which education may affect political beliefs and behavior. In this article, we suggest that the substantive field of education has an independent and important role to play over and above level. Using cross-national evidence for 15 European countries we find that a person’s field of education is robustly significant and substantively strong in predicting voting for GAL and TAN parties that have transformed European party systems. Analysis of panel data suggests that the effect of educational field results from self-selection, a direct effect during education, and a post-education effect in occupation.

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Research Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of American Political Science Association
Figure 0

Figure 1. Distribution of CECT in the European Social SurveyNote: The figure shows the distribution of educational and occupational CECT, whereby the bars represent the percentage of respondents with a given educational CECT score (left) and the percentage of respondents working in an occupation with a given average CECT score (right). Broken vertical lines indicate the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles. For example, educational CECT for those who studied engineering is 0.04; for economics students, 0.19; for medical and health students, 0.55; for social studies, 0.86; and for those who completed teacher training, 1.00. The occupational CECT score for engineers is 0.10; for builders, bricklayers, and stonemasons, 0.20; for finance or marketing managers, 0.40; for childcare workers, 0.59; for translators and interpreters, 0.70; and for primary school teachers, 1.00. ESS data for 2004–2008 for 15 European countries.

Figure 1

Figure 2. Field of Education and Voting GAL or TANNote: This figure plots the coefficients for factors that explain who voted GAL or voted TAN; the coefficients express differences in log odds (with 95% intervals) from multilevel mixed-effects logistic models with oim clustering by country and ISCO-3 occupations. For example, a coefficient of 0.78 for educational CECT indicates that, for a one-unit increase in educational CECT (from 0 to 1), the log odds of voting GAL instead of any other party increase by 0.78. Translated in probabilities, this is equivalent to an increase from 7.2% to 13.8%. Educational CECT taps the cultural-communicative content of an individual’s field of education; occupational CECT taps the average educational CECT in a respondent’s ISCO-3 level occupation. Full results are in Supplementary Table A.3.

Figure 2

Figure 3. Field, Occupation, and Voting GAL or TANNote: This figure plots the coefficients of variables that explain who voted GAL or TAN; the coefficients express differences in log odds (with 95% intervals) from multilevel mixed-effects logistic models with oim clustering by country and ISCO-3 occupations. Controls for the level of education, field income, gender, age, income, rural/urban, secularism, and time-fixed effects. For example, a log odds coefficient of −0.80 for occupational CECT means that for a one-unit increase in occupational CECT (from 0 to 1), the log odds of voting TAN decrease by 0.80. Translated in probabilities, this means a decrease in the probability of voting TAN instead of any other party from 9.6% to 4.4%. The reference category for occupation is production workers. Full results are in Supplementary Table A.4.

Figure 3

Figure 4. The Effect of Field of Education among Higher and Lower EducatedNote: This figure plots how the effect of educational CECT on voting GAL (left panel) or voting TAN (right panel) varies among those who completed higher education and those who did not; plotted here are predicted probabilities (with 95% confidence intervals) derived from multilevel mixed-effects logistic models with oim clustering by country and ISCO-3 category. Slopes with squares show how educational CECT (X-axis) is associated with vote propensity among higher educated (Y-axis). Slopes with circles show the same for lower educated respondents. Standard controls, with full results are in Supplementary Table A.5.

Figure 4

Figure 5. The Effect of Field on GAL and TAN Voting with or without Controlling for GenderNote: This figure plots the effect of field and gender on voting GAL (top panel) or TAN (bottom panel); the coefficients are differences in log odds (95% confidence intervals). Each panel compares two models: one model in which log odds for educational and occupational field CECT are estimated without controlling for gender, and one model that includes gender as control. The figure shows that including gender as control does not significantly change the effect size for educational or occupational CECT. The log odds are calculated from multilevel mixed-effects logistic models with oim clustering by country and ISCO-3, with standard controls. Full results are in Supplementary Table A.6.

Figure 5

Figure 6. The Effect of Educational CECT in High School, Post-Secondary Education, and Post-EducationNote: Explaining vote sympathy with educational CECT by life phase, regression coefficients with 95% intervals. The top panel (SOEP) plots the coefficients of a model that predicts vote intention for the Greens (0 or 1); the middle and bottom panels (LISS) plot the coefficients of models that predict sympathy (0 to 10) for GAL (GL, D66, and PvdD) and TAN (PVV, FvD) parties. These models control for level of education. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Full results are in Supplementary Tables A.10 and A.11.

Figure 6

Table 1. IFEct Within-Individual Effect of Attending Higher Education in a Particular Field on Voting Green

Figure 7

Figure 7. The Within-Individual Effect of Attending Higher Education with a Particular CECT Score on Vote Intention for the GreensNote: SOEP panel to predict leaning Green (1 or 0) using IFEct models (Liu, Wang, and Xu 2024). We focus on the effects among the full sample (top plot) and subsets with higher than median and lower than (or equal to) median CECT (bottom two plots). Dots and whiskers show the regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. Full results are in Table 1.

Figure 8

Figure 8. The Effect of Occupational CECT during Education and Post-EducationNote: Explaining vote sympathy with occupational CECT by life phase, regression coefficients with 95% intervals. Models in the panels on the left show the effect of occupational CECT on vote sympathy without controlling for educational CECT; models on the right control for educational CECT. The outcome is binary (leaning GAL) for SOEP (top panels) and the outcome is a thermostat scale from 0 to 10 for LISS capturing attitudes toward GAL parties (middle and bottom panels). All models use respondents for whom we have observations while they are in education as well as while they are on the job market. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Full results are in Supplementary Tables A.13 and A.14.

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