Different Accounts of the Jing Ke Lore in the Shi ji and Excavated Texts

Previous studies of the Shi ji highlight the image of Jing Ke presented in the “Cike liezhuan,”Footnote ⁸ which profiles five well-known assassins, ending with Jing Ke.Footnote ⁹ It narrates Jing Ke’s early years in the state of Wei 衛, his encounters with Ge Nie 蓋聶 (fl. third century bce) and Lu Goujian 魯句踐 (fl. third century bce), and then Tian Guang’s 田光 (fl. 230 bce) recommendation of him to Crown Prince Dan of Yan. Jing Ke initially hesitated to accept the task, but Dan used money, women, and other gifts and favors to make Jing Ke feel indebted to him. Jing Ke finally agreed to conduct the assassination after he collected a poisoned dagger which he planned to use to assassinate the king, and two gifts he would use to entice the King of Qin to meet him in person—the head of the Qin traitor general Fan Wuqi 樊於期 (d. 227 bce) and a map of the Dukang region of the state of Yan. Once in the Qin court, Jing Ke drew the dagger and attempted to capture the king alive. He failed and was instead executed. Despite Jing Ke’s failure, “Cike liezhuan” highlights his bravery, integrity, and yi 義 (righteousness).

Yet “Cike liezhuan” is not the only time Jing Ke’s assassination attempt is mentioned in the Shi ji. Other accounts in the Shi ji describe this momentous act, often highlighting the attitudes of the different states towards it. These diverse accounts center on three questions: first, whether the King of Qin knew about the assassination plot; second, what role the King of Yan played in the assassination process; and third, what we know about Qin Wuyang 秦舞陽 (d. 227 bce) and Fan Wuqi.

In the “Cike liezhuan,” the Shi ji does not mention what knowledge the King of Qin had of the plot. The “Chu shijia” 楚世家 (House of Chu) does not mention the king having any prior knowledge in its brief mention of the assassination: “In the first year of the reign of Fu Chu 負芻 (r. 228–223 bce), Crown Prince Dan of Yan asked Jing Ke to assassinate the King of Qin” (王負芻元年，燕太子丹使荆軻刺秦王).Footnote ¹⁰ A similar description is provided in the Yan chronicle included in “Liuguo nianbiao” 六國年表 (The Chronicle of the Six States): “Crown Prince Dan of Yan sent Jing Ke to carry out the assassination of the King of Qin, and the Qin attacked us” (太子丹使荆軻刺秦王，秦伐我).Footnote ¹¹ In the “Bai Qi Wang Jian liezhuan” 白起王翦列傳 (Biographies of Bai Qi and Wang Jian), Sima Qian 司馬遷 (ca. 145–86 bce) comments negatively on the incident but does not mention any awareness on the part of the king: “The next year (227 bce), Yan assigned Jing Ke to murder the Qin king. The King of Qin sent Wang Jian to attack Yan” (明年， 燕使荆軻爲賊於秦， 秦王使王翦攻燕).Footnote ¹² This narration uses the word “murder” 賊 to describe the assassination attempt, which is understandable because it is a biography of Qin’s generals. The Shi ji contains several other Qin-oriented accounts of the act. The Qin chronicle, for example, appends the Qin rhetoric around Qin’s punitive campaigns: “The prime minister, Wan, the imperial counsellor, Jie, and the commandant of justice, Si, all said, ‘Your Majesty is now raising a righteous army, killing the brutal bandits, and pacifying the world’” (丞相綰、御史大夫劫、廷尉斯等皆曰：“ … … 今陛下興義兵，誅殘賊，平定天下”).Footnote ¹³ Sima Qian preserves the language used by the Qin officials, who call Qin’s army “righteous” (yi) and the armies of the other states “bandits” (zei).

In contrast to these accounts, which do not mention whether the King of Qin was aware of the plot, other accounts highlight his awareness, although they do not provide further detail. The “Qin Shihuang benji” 秦始皇本紀 (Biography of Qin Shihuang) records that the king was alerted to the assassination: “The King of Qin became aware of it and ordered Jing Ke publicly dismembered” (秦王覺之，體解軻以徇).Footnote ¹⁴ The chronicle of Qin from the “Liuguo nianbiao” also documents the King of Qin becoming aware of the plot: “Crown Prince Dan of Yan sent Jing Ke to assassinate the King of Qin, who became aware of it” (燕太子使荆軻刺王，覺之).Footnote ¹⁵ These records indicate that the King of Qin knew about the conspiracy, although they do not indicate when the king became aware.

There are several possibilities for when the King of Qin became aware of the assassination plot. Tian Guang held secret conversations with Jing Ke and Prince Dan separately. After Tian spoke with Jing Ke, he committed suicide. At this point, the likelihood of the plan being leaked was minimal. Jing Ke’s meeting with General Fan, who offered his head to facilitate Jing Ke’s audience with the King of Qin, should also have remained confidential. In other words, it is unlikely that the plan would have been leaked before the farewell at the Yi River. Although there were not many people present at the farewell, there were of course far more people involved than in the previous secret contacts, increasing the possibility of a leak. After bidding farewell at the Yi River, Jing Ke traveled to the Qin state where he bribed Meng Jia 蒙嘉 (fl. 227 bce) to secure a meeting with the King of Qin. It is conceivable that during his time in Qin, someone who was aware of Jing Ke’s intentions might have informed the king and revealed the assassination plot. Moreover, it is plausible that during a routine inspection prior to Jing Ke’s audience with the king, someone would have discovered his concealed dagger.

If the aforementioned scenarios had occurred, it would imply that Jing Ke’s assassination attempt might not have actually taken place at the Qin court, in which case it is plausible that the King of Qin fabricated the story to justify his subsequent military campaign against Yan. However, the likelihood of the event not occurring is low. As previously mentioned, the assassination of the King of Qin is documented in various biographies in the Shi ji, from the perspective of Qin as well as from the perspectives of other states. “Cike liezhuan” specifically names as a source Xia Wuju’s eyewitness account, which was then told to Gongsun Hong 公孫弘 (200–121 bce) and Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (179–104 bce). Shortly after Jing Ke’s attack on the King of Qin, the magistrate of Lingling in Qin submitted a memorial that alluded to Jing Ke. In the early years of the Western Han, scholars such as Jia Yi 賈誼 (200–168 bce) and Liu An 劉安 (179–122 bce) discussed this event and advanced their own arguments about the incident. These accounts, which will be discussed fully later in this article, provide substantial evidence of the existence of Jing Ke’s assassination attempt.

Another scenario regarding the King of Qin’s awareness of the assassination was that he was about to be assassinated upon noticing the dagger concealed within the map when Jing Ke unfolded it. If this is the case, this account aligns with the “Cike liezhuan.” Compared with the brief records in other biographies, the “Cike liezhuan” explores in detail the king’s reaction of panic and subsequent flight to save himself. Accounts and depictions of the King of Qin realizing that he was about to be assassinated serve to highlight his perceptiveness and vigilance, portraying him in a positive light. According to this version of events, despite the meticulous planning by Prince Dan and Jing Ke, the plot did not elude the comprehension of the King of Qin. These accounts minimize the clumsiness and panic that characterize the attempted assassination as portrayed in the “Cike liezhuan.”

The “Qin Shihuang benji” emphasizes the intimidating effect of the king, the ultimate victor of the contentions between the Central States, on his rivals. For example, it states, “The Han king was afraid of the Qin” (韓王患之),Footnote ¹⁶ and “Crown Prince Dan of Yan feared the arrival of Qin troops in his state, and he was so filled with dread that he sent Jing Ke to assassinate the Qin king” (燕太子丹患秦兵至國，恐，使荆軻刺秦王).Footnote ¹⁷ The use of the words “huan” 患 and “kong” 恐 emphasizes the emotional impact of the intimidating power of Qin. Compared with these brief accounts, the “Yan Shaogong shijia” 燕召公世家 (House of Yan Shaogong) instead highlights the context and process of the assassination:

This quote provides the context of Jing Ke’s assassination attempt—the destruction of Zhao and the impending invasion of Yan—and mentions the King of Qin’s knowledge of the plot. Similar accounts also occur in “Wei shijia” 魏世家 (House of Wei) and “Tian Jingzhong Wan shijia” 田敬仲完世家 (House of Tian Jingzhong). The accounts of the assassination provided in the Shi ji are therefore divided on whether the King of Qin was aware of the plot. These accounts also reflect the personality of Crown Prince Dan in times of turmoil and emergency. The bamboo-strip texts acquired by Peking University records that “Dan and Hou Sheng were both disorganized and befuddled” 丹勝誤亂.Footnote ¹⁹ Crown Prince Dan hired Jing Ke to assassinate the King of Qin but failed, and although Dan was later killed by the King of Yan, the Qin state nevertheless proceeded to invade and annex Yan. Hou Sheng 后勝 (fl. 221 bce), the prime minister of the Qi state, was generously bribed by Qin, so he persuaded the King Jian of Qi 齊王建 (r. 264–221 bce) to not help the other endangered states, which eventually led to the downfall of the Qi state. Although the primary purpose of the passage containing the quote was to help teach characters, owing to its historical allusions it advances multiple pedagogical purposes—teaching history as well as teaching characters.

Another central question around the assassination as presented in the Shi ji is about the role of King Xi of Yan 燕王喜 (r. 254–222 bce). King Xi was the ultimate authority in Yan, but numerous accounts of the assassination, including the “Cike liezhuan” of the Shi ji, the Yan account in the Zhanguo ce,Footnote ²⁰ and Yan Danzi, only mention Crown Prince Dan of Yan and do not discuss any role the king may have played. However, other accounts in the Shi ji mention the king briefly. “Qin Shihuang benji” mentions the role the King of Yan played in preparing the assassination: “The King of Yan was dazed and confused, so Crown Prince Dan of Yan secretly sent Jing Ke to be an assassin” (燕王昏亂，其太子丹乃陰令荆軻爲賊).Footnote ²¹ This account blames the king’s incompetence for Prince Dan’s decision to hire an assassin. This description is in line with other depictions of King Xi. For example, before the assassination, despite the protests of his generals, King Xi of Yan took advantage of the decline of Zhao’s military power after the Battle of Changping to renege on the alliance between the two states and attack Zhao. This attack was repelled by Zhao’s general Lian Po 廉頗 (fl. 283 bce). King Xi then took the advice of Ju Xin 劇辛 (d. 243 bce) and attacked Zhao again after Lian Po left the state, and he was once again defeated. These important historical events demonstrate the incompetence of the Yan king, which is further reflected in his decision to allow Crown Prince Dan to carry out his plans without regard for the consequences.

Another account of the King of Yan can be found in the “Meng Tian liezhuan” 蒙恬列傳 (Biography of Meng Tian). In the biography, the Qin prince Ziying 子嬰 (d. 206 bce) uses the example of the king to argue that Meng Tian (ca. 259–210 bce) should not be executed:

Ziying blames the king’s rash employment of the assassin for the destruction of his state and his family, drawing a direct connection between the two figures. Ziying’s admonition otherwise echoes the rhetoric of Qin, justifying the state’s military aggression by saying that the other states “betrayed their covenant with Qin” (倍秦之約).Footnote ²³ After the unification of the six states, the First Emperor toured his domain several times and used stone inscriptions to celebrate his “righteousness” and condemn the other states as outlaws. The “Yan Shaogong shijia” of the Shi ji also criticizes the King of Yan, holding him accountable for refusing to listen to the advice of General Jiang Qu 將渠 (fl. 251 bce), who advised him not to betray Zhao.Footnote ²⁴

The bamboo-strip texts acquired by Peking University provide a similar account. The “Zhao Zheng Shu” 趙正書 (Documents of Zhao Zheng) claims that Ziying does not agree with the newly established ruler Huhai’s 胡亥 (230–207 bce) plan to kill Fushu 扶蘇 (d. 210 bce) and Meng Tian, and to conquer the untamed land. To remonstrate with Huhai, Ziying uses historical examples from the states of Zhao, Yan, and Qi to make a convincing argument that the rulers of these states thoughtlessly accepted their ministers’ suggestions, which led to the demise of their respective states. One of these examples is, “Xi, the King of Yan adopted Jing Ke’s plan and betrayed Qin’s pact” (燕王喜而 (軻) 之謀而倍 (背) 秦之約).Footnote ²⁵ As mentioned, this account largely concurs with that of the Shi ji. The major difference between the two accounts is how each explains Huhai’s ascendance to the throne. The Shi ji records that when the First Emperor passed away, Huhai became the new emperor due to the efforts of the treacherous and cunning ministers Li Si 李斯 (d. 208 bce) and Zhao Gao 趙高 (d. 207 bce), while the bamboo-strip texts state that the First Emperor agreed to let Huhai accede to the throne while on his deathbed. All the evidence presented above suggests that different regional versions of the story of Jing Ke emerged in the process of its transmission, which enriches our understanding of the development of the lore.

The third major difference between the accounts of the assassination in the Shi ji concerns the inclusion or omission of details on other members of the conspiracy, such as Qin Wuyang and Fan Wuqi. The “Cike liezhuan,” provides no background on Qin Wuyang. He only appears when Crown Prince Dan pressures Jing Ke into carrying out the assassination. The “Xiongnu liezhuan” 匈奴列傳 (Biography of the Xiongnu) provides more details on who Qin was: “Yan had a worthy general, Qin Kai, who was sent to the Hu as a hostage. The Hu trusted him deeply. After he returned to his state, he raided, defeated, and expelled the Eastern Hu, who retreated more than a thousand li. Qin Wuyang, who accompanied Jing Ke to assassinate the Qin king, was Qin Kai’s grandson” (燕有賢將秦開，爲質於胡，胡甚信之。歸而襲破走東胡，東胡卻千餘里。與荆軻刺秦王秦舞陽者，開之孫也).Footnote ²⁶ The fact that Qin Wuyang, with his distinguished martial background, was also frightened at the Qin court highlights Jing Ke’s courage. With respect to Fan Wuqi, more details are provided in the “Lu Zhonglian Zou Yang liezhuan” 魯仲連鄒陽列傳 (Biographies of Lu Zhonglian and Zou Yang). These biographies describe Fan’s participation in the plot and dedication to Jing Ke as conforming to the saying: “There are those whose heads turn white, but they still treat each other as if they had just met, and those whose canopies meet for the first time, but it is as if they are old friends” (有白頭如新，傾蓋如故).Footnote ²⁷ Fan’s fidelity led him to sacrifice himself for Jing Ke’s mission. The Shi ji also presents Zou Yang’s 鄒陽 (ca. 206–129 bce) analysis of Fan’s deeds:

The description here portrays Fan as righteous. Zou Yang uses Fan’s example to emphasize the righteousness of “a man who dies for his soulmate” (士爲知己者死), with the aim of advising King Xiao of Liang 梁孝王 (d. 144 bce) not to listen to the slander of lesser men and recognize Zou’s loyalty.Footnote ²⁹ Zou’s praise of Fan’s trust in Jing Ke demonstrates that he regarded Jing Ke’s assassination attempt as a moral and righteous act.

It is typical for the Shi ji to record many different accounts of the same event. Sima Tan 司馬談 (ca. 169–110 bce) and Sima Qian had access to numerous sources—the many old records stored in the imperial archives as well as orally transmitted accounts. The different accounts likely reflect the differences among the primary sources, which were written, compiled, or orally transmitted according to the perspectives of each of the different states and individuals. These small nuances matter in understanding and interpreting Jing Ke’s lore. After the assassination took place, the news was spread and conveyed by many people in different regions. In its transmission, new details were probably added to embellish either the bravery of Jing Ke or the majesty of the King of Qin. For example, it makes sense that accounts based on records compiled by Qin adhere to a propagandistic Qin image of the extraordinary perceptiveness of the king.

The different accounts in the Shi ji of Jing Ke’s attempted assassination represent different voices within a complex history. Although these accounts are brief, they are an essential supplement to the detailed version presented in the “Cike liezhuan.” As will be discussed below, Han scholars would add even more complexity, alluding to, quoting, or directly discussing the Jing Ke lore in ways that would reflect its mixed reception in early Chinese culture.

Negative Reception of the Jing Ke Lore

The negative reception of the Jing Ke lore was produced by those Western Han scholars who were mostly concerned with li 禮 (ritual propriety). Jia Yi 賈誼 (200–168 bce) used the example of Jing Ke to argue for limiting the power of local feudal lords, who might otherwise cultivate and use agents like Jing Ke to eschew ritual propriety and threaten the central government. Liu An 劉安 (179–122 bce) also critiqued Jing Ke from the perspective of ritual propriety. He pointed out how the “Yishui ge” 易水歌 (Song of the Yi River), sung by Jing Ke as he prepared to assassinate the king, deviates from musical norms, and uses this deviation to explicate his understanding of the relationship of music to governance. Yang Xiong 揚雄 (53 bce–18 ce) was the most vehement of Jing Ke’s critics, because Jing Ke disobeyed ritual propriety and did not fit Yang’s conceptions of bravery and righteousness.

Juan 4 of Jia Yi’s political essays, Xinshu 新書 (New Writings), expresses his disapproval of the enfeoffment of the four sons of Liu Chang 劉長, the King of Huainan 淮南王 (198–174 bce).Footnote ³⁰ Although Liu rebelled against the Han court, Emperor Wen 漢文帝 (r. 180–157 bce) planned to allow Liu’s four sons to remain feudal lords.Footnote ³¹ Jia argued that even dividing their fief among four sons would not prevent them from banding together against the emperor: “Although the land is divided into four areas, the four enfeoffed sons are of one mind, without any differences between them” (雖割而爲四，四子一心未異也).Footnote ³² If the feudal lords joined forces, they would pose a major threat to central authority. Jia then assesses various plots against established authority. He argues that Wu Zixu 伍子胥 (559–484 bce) and Baigong Sheng 白公勝 (d. 479 bce) possessed the manpower and military assistance necessary for successful rebellion. Wu Zixu successfully challenged the power of Chu by persuading the state of Wu to ally with the states of Cai and Tang and fight Chu. Likewise, Baigong Sheng led the Chu army to defeat the Wu invasion, and later asked for support to maintain his army, which he then used to rebel against Chu. Wu and Baigong achieved their goals by making use of their state’s manpower and military advantages. Plots that rely on lone assassins require financial resources. Jia Yi attributes the failure of the assassin Yurang 豫讓 (fl. 453 bce) to “a lack of resources” (資力少也).Footnote ³³ The wealth of Helü 闔閭 (537–496 bce) and Crown Prince Dan of Yan laid the foundation for them to send assassins to carry out their missions. These logistical considerations form the context of Jia Yi’s admonition:

Jia Yi cites Jing Ke as an example of how people without righteousness and ritual propriety, if permitted to retain their estates, could use their resources to subvert the government. Jia advocated learning from the fall of Qin to increase centralization and weaken the power of feudal states, which had become more powerful after the implementation of the feudal system in the early Han Dynasty. Jing Ke was useful to Jia Yi as an example of the problem of the relationship between the central and local governments. In the view of Han scholars like Jia Yi who disapproved of Jing Ke, his assassination of the King of Qin was an act of violence against ritual propriety, and therefore could not be considered brave and righteousness. Their grand narrative of unification had no place for assassins like Jing Ke. In any case, Emperor Wen did not take Jia Yi’s advice, and allowed Liu Chang’s sons to retain their position.

Interestingly, the next case of citation is that of Liu Chang’s eldest son, Liu An 劉安 (179–122 bce), the King of Huainan, who compiled the Huainanzi together with his guests. Liu An was an adherent of Huang Lao Daoism, an erudite man, and a devoted zither player,Footnote ³⁵ which may help explain why music is key to the political philosophy of the Huainanzi. Liu An felt that music played an important role in educating people and influencing politics, and one of Liu An’s main purposes in compiling the Huainanzi was producing a guide for governance: “For this reason, I compiled twenty chapters to investigate the principles of heaven and earth, connect human affairs, and complete the Dao of becoming an emperor and a king” (故著書二十篇，則天地之理究矣，人間之事接矣，帝王之道備矣).Footnote ³⁶ “Taizu xun” 泰族訓 (The Exalted Lineage) chapter of this book discusses the Jing Ke lore. Liu An asserts that the farewell music played for Jing Ke at the Yi River was not elegant:

The noise of the “Yishui ge” offended Liu’s tranquil sensibilities.Footnote ⁴⁰ Liu rejected sophistry and advocated the pursuit of a pure heart freed from desire. The dominance of Huang Lao thought in the early Han, which combined pragmatism with respect to worldly affairs and an emphasis on rest and cultivation, proved a hostile environment for the lore of Jing Ke’s assassination attempt. Liu argued that Jing Ke’s song at the bank of the Yi River did not follow ritual propriety. It was inelegant, unrestrained, and thus inappropriate.

The most vehement criticism of Jing Ke in early China was offered by Yang Xiong. Yang believed that many ideals were misunderstood in his time, and to resolve these misunderstandings, he composed a series of philosophical anecdotes and aphorisms, entitled Exemplary Sayings (Fayan 法言), which imitated the Analects of Confucius in form.Footnote ⁴¹ Through this imitation, Yang aimed to demonstrate his superb rhetorical skills and outstanding command of Ru 儒 thought.Footnote ⁴² In this book, Yang unequivocally condemns Jing Ke in the following dialogue, “Someone asked about ‘bravery’. Yang said, ‘It is Ke’. That person asked, ‘which Ke do you refer to?’ Yang replied, ‘The Ke whom I mentioned is Meng Ke. As for Jing Ke, gentlemen regard him as a violent criminal’” (或問“勇”。曰：“軻也。”曰：“何軻也？”曰：“軻也者，謂孟軻也。若荆軻，君子盗諸。”).Footnote ⁴³ Discussing the value of bravery, Yang initially says “Ke,” but later clarifies that Ke here refers to Meng Ke (Mengzi) 孟軻 (372–289 bce) rather than Jing Ke. Yang contrasts Jing Ke’s courage with that of Mengzi: “He was courageous in righteousness and resolute in virtue. He did not change his mind because of poverty or wealth, eminence or disgrace, or matters of life or death. When it comes to bravery, he is close to it.” (勇於義而果於德，不以貧富、貴賤、死生動其心，於勇也，其庶乎).Footnote ⁴⁴ Yang Xiong’s compliment of Mengzi’s courage emphasizes his righteousness.

Yang Xiong contrasts the stories of Yao Li 要離 (d. 513 bce) and Nie Zheng 聶政 (d. 397 bce) with that of Jing Ke in his efforts to delineate what he views as righteousness. He argues that Jing Ke could not be viewed as a righteous man because he was doing a personal favor for Crown Prince Dan of Yan: “[Jing Ke] carried the head of Fan Wuqi and the map of Dukang into unpredictable Qin for the sake of Prince Dan. This is indeed formidable among assassins, but how could it be called righteousness?” (爲丹奉於期之首、燕督亢之圖，入不測之秦，實刺客之靡也，焉可謂之義也?).Footnote ⁴⁵ Yang Xiong claims that Jing Ke acted courageously only because he received many gifts from Prince Dan, when true courage, like that of Mengzi, is in accordance with morality: “A gentleman attaches supreme importance to righteousness. A gentleman who has courage without righteousness is disordered; a villain who has courage without righteousness is a thief.” (君子義以爲上，君子有勇而無義爲亂，小人有勇而無義爲盗).Footnote ⁴⁶ In addition, courage is also defined by restraint. Scholars like Mengzi opposed “small courage” (小勇): “The king should not invite small courage. The man with the sword looks around and says: ‘He dares to take me on?’ This foolhardiness only suffices to face one man. The king should enlarge it” (王請無好小勇。夫撫劒疾視曰: “彼惡敢當我哉!” 此匹夫之勇，敵一人者也。王請大之!).Footnote ⁴⁷ Elsewhere Mengzi writes: “A man who is brave and fierce will endanger his parents, and this is the fifth way of being unfilial” (好勇鬭很，以危父母，五不孝也).Footnote ⁴⁸ Yang takes up Mengzi’s argument and praises restrained, moral courage, but not bloodthirsty and unrighteous bravado. The failure of the assassination and the destruction of the Yan state could not be considered courageous. The commentary Li Gui 李軌 (fl. 317) offers on the line cited above is as follows: “The reasons why these three men died were in no case owing to difficulties faced by their rulers or their parents. The gentleman does not pursue an unrighteous righteousness” (三士所死，皆非君親之難也。非義之義，君子不爲也).Footnote ⁴⁹ This comment emphasizes that assassination cannot be pursued, because it is not for the good of a ruler or his parents. Yang Xiong’s understanding of benevolence and virtue cannot support and interpretation of Jing Ke’s acts as righteous.

Yang Xiong equated Jing Ke’s actions to thievery, believing these actions to be just as lacking in honor and integrity. He could not tolerate stealthy behavior. Yang was aligned with the school of guwen jing 古文經 (ancient script classics) and opposed Dong Zhongshu’s doctrine of the correlation between heaven and man. He sought to revive traditional studies of Kongzi and Mengzi and saw himself as the inheritor of their wisdom; his Fayan even imitates the style of the Lunyu. He held Mengzi in high regard and extensively praised his righteousness and virtue. By way of contrast, Yang Xiong held a mixed attitude towards Sima Qian. Yang applauded Sima Qian’s achievements in historiography and his talent in recording historical events, but he criticized certain biographies in the Shi ji for what he saw as their oddities and trivialities, including the “Cike liezhuan.”Footnote ⁵⁰ Yang likely objected to the accounts of the assassins in part because these accounts were sourced from Dong Zhongshu and Gongsun Hong, whose ideas clashed with Yang’s own. As a result, Yang denigrated Jing Ke’s assassination attempt in his Fayan.

The Western Han scholars above who criticize Jing Ke in their political and philosophical essays value ritual propriety and righteousness. Viewing these as imperative to allow the economy and society to recover from chaotic rebellions and wars, they opposed behavior like Jing Ke’s which challenges centralized authority. Jia Yi believed that local power should not be stronger than that of the central government and should be constantly curtailed to prevent violent assassinations and plots launched by such figures as Yurang, Wu Zixu, Baigong Sheng, and Jing Ke. In Jia’s view, power should be concentrated in the center for good governance. His emphasis on the consolidation and strengthening of centralized power and curtailing the power of feudal lords was due to the hierarchical principles of ritual propriety, whereby power and resources should be allocated according to hierarchy in order to prevent those in inferior positions from overstepping the bounds of their authority and plotting against the government.Footnote ⁵¹

Liu An focused on the relationship between music and governance, arguing that harmonious and elegant music is necessary for good governance, and the music of bidding farewell to Jing Ke at the Yi River was violent and powerful, inspiring improper conduct. Liu’s critique is based on evaluating music according to the orderliness emphasized by ritual propriety, which was generally held to correspond to social stability. In his view, Jing Ke’s attempt to assassinate the King of Qin was an egregious event that violated the hierarchical order and was not in line with the morality and legacy of previous kings and rulers.

Inheriting the tradition from Kongzi and Mengzi, Yang Xiong opposed the excessive pursuit of power, and asserted that Jing Ke’s crime was the use of power for revenge and personal gain. Yang Xiong upholds the view of benevolence and righteousness developed by Mengzi, who believes that ritual propriety is the form of benevolence and righteousness, and that benevolence and righteousness are the basis of ritual propriety.Footnote ⁵² In Yang’s opinion, because Jing Ke was treated well by Prince Dan, he attempted to assassinate the King of Qin without thinking of the risks for his family. Ultimately, both his family and the assassination attempt were doomed. Yang compares Jing Ke’s actions with such unrighteous deeds as Yao Li burning his wife and son and Nie Zheng sacrificing his sister.Footnote ⁵³ All the scholars cited above therefore understood ritual propriety and righteousness, and condemned Jing Ke’s behavior as lawless violence.

Positive Reception of the Jing Ke Lore

While some Han scholars used Jing Ke as a negative example, other Han scholars identified positive aspects of the Jing Ke tradition. Although Jing Ke’s assassination attempt failed, some Han scholars commemorated him. Zou Yang praised Jing Ke’s loyalty to persuade King Xiao of Liang for the sincerity of his advice. The story was recounted in the Shi ji and recounted again by Liu Xiang 劉向 (77–6 bce) in his Xinxu 新序 (New Preface). Mei Sheng 枚乘 (ca. 210–ca. 138 bce) adopted the Jing Ke allusion to admonish Liu Bi 劉濞 (r. 196–154 bce), the King of Wu not to rebel against central authority. Sima Xiangru 司馬相如 (179–118 bce) and other scholars composed works to eulogize Jing Ke. Jing Ke’s most important defense in this era was made by Sima Qian who praised Jing Ke for his conscience and good intentions at the end of the “Cike liezhuan,” which ensured that his fame and reputation would be transmitted to future generations. Wang Chong 王充 (27–ca. 97 ce) and Wang Fu 王符 (ca. 85–ca. 163) echoed Sima Qian and celebrated Jing Ke’s loyalty and righteousness.Footnote ⁵⁴

The first extant appearance of the Zou Yang story is in the “Lu Zhonglian and Zou Yang liezhuan” in the Shi ji. Zou Yang was unjustly imprisoned. In his letter to King Xiao of Liang asking for pardon, he mentions Jing Ke’s righteousness and loyalty: “In the past, Jing Ke admired Crown Prince Dan of Yan for his righteousness, which caused the white rainbow to cross the sun. The prince doubted him.” (昔者荆軻慕燕丹之義，白虹貫日，太子畏之).Footnote ⁵⁵ The “white rainbow crossing the sun” is an inauspicious sign that implies a failed endeavor. Zou Yang compared himself to Jing Ke and asked King Xiao of Liang to trust his loyalty: “Today I was fully loyal with all my heart. I spoke all my opinions without reservation, hoping that the king would accept them. Those officials on your left and right sides did not understand me, and handed me over to the jail for interrogation, causing the world to suspect me” (今臣盡忠竭誠，畢議願知，左右不明，卒從吏訊，爲世所疑).Footnote ⁵⁶ He again cites Jing Ke to explain his awkward situation: “It was as if Jing Ke and Master Wei were reborn, but the kings of Yan and Qin were still unable to understand. I hope the king will carefully examine this” (是使荆軻、衞先生復起，而燕、秦不悟也。願大王孰察之).Footnote ⁵⁷ Zou used Jing Ke to defend himself and persuade King Xiao of Liang not to believe the words of villains. The account of Zou Yang connects the Jing Ke lore with the baihong guanri (“white rainbow crossing the sun”) phenomenon, which adds a legendary dimension to the lore.Footnote ⁵⁸ Zou’s comments on Jing Ke have long been of interest to scholars and even Sima’s near contemporaries. This story is also recorded in the Xinxu, compiled by Liu Xiang, is a collection of historical examples of the relationship between the ruler and his ministers, and draws materials from previous text.Footnote ⁵⁹ It is likely that the Zou Yang passage in the Xinxu either draws directly from the Shi ji or the Xinxu and Shi ji both draw from an earlier text.Footnote ⁶⁰

Before Zou Yang served Liu Wu 劉武 (r. 168–144 bce), the King of Liang, he served the King of Wu together with Mei Sheng. Because they were both intelligent and good at witty ripostes, literary historians have referred to them together as “Zou Mei.”Footnote ⁶¹ Mei Sheng also employed an allusion to Jing Ke. When Liu Bi, the King of Wu, entertained thoughts of rebellion, Mei wrote a letter in an attempt to dissuade him. However, the King of Wu disregarded the advice, and rebelled against the Han central court on the pretext of purging lesser men like Chao Chuo 晁錯 (ca. 200–154 bce) who had gathered around the ruler. The Han court was intimidated by the actions of the King of Wu, and subsequently executed Chao to defuse the crisis. It was at this juncture that Mei penned another letter, offering his advice to the king of Wu, using an allusion from the Warring States period: “Six states took advantage of Xinling’s book, realized the pact proposed by Su Qin, encouraged Jing Ke’s audacity, and united their efforts wholeheartedly to confront Qin. However, Qin eventually conquered and eliminated the six states, and brought the world under their control” (六國乘信陵之籍，明蘇秦之約，厲荆軻之威，并力一心以備秦。然秦卒禽六國，滅其社稷，而并天下).Footnote ⁶² Confronted with the power of Qin, each of the six states endeavored to find ways to resist Qin’s dominance, but all efforts ultimately met with failure. Mei attributes this outcome to the disparity in resources and capabilities between the two sides. Mei believed that the King of Wu failed to grasp this point, a grave error especially when the Han Dynasty surpassed the Qin Dynasty in terms of territory and population. The inclusion of Jing Ke as a representative figure among the six kingdoms, alongside Lord Xinling 信陵君, Wei Wuji 魏無忌 (d. 243 bce), and Su Qin 蘇秦 (d. 284 bce) underscores the collective struggle of these states against the Qin. In contrast to Zou Yang’s admonition, which draws a comparison between Qin and Han, as well as the six states and Wu, Mei concentrates on the downfall of the Qin Dynasty and extracts a lesson from it. Mei submitted two admonitions to the King of Wu: one before his rebellion, the other after his rebellion. When the King of Wu was still plotting against the central government, Mei’s words were not as direct. However, on the second occasion, after the King of Wu had rebelled, Mei, who was already in another state at that time, wrote an admonition urging the King of Wu to comprehend the situation and refrain from heeding the words of lesser men, as doing so would result in disaster.

In the early Western Han, according to the “Yiwen zhi” 藝文志 (Bibliographical Treatise) of the Han shu 漢書 (History of the [Western] Han Dynasty), Sima Xiangru and other scholars composed five “Jing Ke zan” 荆軻讚 (Eulogies on Jing Ke). The “Yiwen zhi” states, “Jing Ke attempted to assassinate the King of Qin on behalf of Yan but failed and died. Sima Xiangru and others commented on it” (軻爲燕刺秦王，不成而死，司馬相如等論之).Footnote ⁶³ This fact was later confirmed by Liu Xie 劉勰 (fl. 500) in the Wenxin diaolong 文心雕龍 (The Literary Mind and the Carving of the Dragon), which states, “When Xiangru took up his pen, it started to praise Jing Ke” (至相如屬筆，始讚荆軻).Footnote ⁶⁴ Unfortunately, these eulogies are no longer extant, so it is difficult to speculate as to their actual content. At this early stage of its development, this genre was often used to convey praise.Footnote ⁶⁵ As the Wenxin diaolong records, “Based on its original meaning, the matter cultivates praise and admiration.” (本其爲義，事生獎歎).Footnote ⁶⁶ Although the “Jing Ke zan” was later lost, one cannot but imagine that it praises Jing Ke and recognizes the cultural significance of his act.

The other major positive interpretation of the Jing Ke lore in early China is Sima Qian’s final comment on the biographies of the assassins: “These five men from Cao Mo to Jing Ke—some of their righteous deeds were successful, some were not, but they established their aims clearly, and none of them failed to live up to their ambitions. Their fame has been passed down to future generations. Were their acts in vain?” (自曹沫至荆軻五人，此其義或成或不成，然其立意較然，不欺其志，名垂後世，豈妄也哉).Footnote ⁶⁷ Sima Qian argues that their place in historical memory and the nobility of their aims has to an extent justified their actions. Indeed, because of the Shi ji, the Jing Ke lore has been commemorated in various ways for more than two millennia. For example, the Western Jin poet Zuo Si 左思 (ca. 250–ca. 307) speaks highly of Jing Ke’s character and spirit, “Though nobles thought highly of themselves, he saw them as dust and dirt. Though inferiors saw themselves as inferior, he prized them as the most weight” (貴者雖自貴，視之若埃塵。賤者雖自賤，重之若千鈞).Footnote ⁶⁸

Wang Chong follows in the footsteps of the Shi ji and uses the example of Jing Ke to articulate criteria for a worthy person in his Lunheng 論衡 (Discourses in the Balance).Footnote ⁶⁹ Wang cites the examples of Jing Ke and Xia Wuju 夏無且 (fl. 227 bce) to prove the point that “when people handle affairs, they accomplish some of their aims but fail to achieve their larger goals. Despite their failure, their momentum is great enough to shake the mountains” (人之舉事，或意至而功不成，事不立而勢貫山).Footnote ⁷⁰ Wang further elucidates that “when intentions are good, it is not essential to achieve the goals. When righteousness is reached, it is not essential to complete the tasks” (志善不效成功，義至不謀就事).Footnote ⁷¹ Having the goodness and righteousness of the act as a standard rather than its success echoes the judgment of the Shi ji cited above. Wang bolsters his argument with the examples of Yurang, Wu Zixu, and Zhang Liang 張良 (d. 186 bce) who plotted the assassination attempt on the First Emperor: “For all three men, the objective circumstances were disadvantageous, and their plans and plots did not come to fruition. They had momentum but did not achieve their goals. They had revenge plans but could not realize them” (三者道地不便，計畫不得，有其勢而無其功，懷其計而不得爲其事).Footnote ⁷² Although circumstances made it impossible to realize their plans, these people are still remembered by later generations because of their motivations. Wang therefore argues that worthy people should not be judged solely by their accomplishments, but also by their efforts and motivations.

Wang Chong’s views probably influenced Wang Fu,Footnote ⁷³ who lived through the dark period at the end of the Eastern Han dynasty. His Qianfu lun 潛夫論 (Discourses of a Recluse) discusses the social and economic problems of his era using historical examples.Footnote ⁷⁴ Wang believes, “Once kindness brings people together, they will remain together until the very end. Hearts that sympathize with each other will only grow closer in hardship” (恩有所結，終身無解；心有所矜，賤而益篤).Footnote ⁷⁵ Wang gives the examples of Zhuan Zhu 專諸 (fl. 515 bce) and Jing Ke, who repaid kindness shown to them by dying for those who appreciated them. He criticizes “people who want to get to the top quickly; who scramble to revere their superiors but pay no attention to their subordinates; who compete with each other to rush forward without taking time to look back.” (是以欲速之徒，競推上而不暇接下，争逐前而不遑卹後).Footnote ⁷⁶ Wang denounces the fickleness and ingratitude that he contrasts with Jing Ke’s behavior.

Zou Yang’s allusion highlighted Jing Ke’s righteousness and loyalty, and Mei Sheng’s allusion emphasizes Jing Ke’s majesty and audacity. These views of Jing Ke are echoed by the comments at the end of “Cike liezhuan.” The claim that Jing Ke’s reputation will be transmitted to future generations in the Shi ji is validated by Wang Chong and Wang Fu’s use of the Jing Ke lore. All these Han scholars valued Jing Ke’s loyalty, righteousness, and good intentions. The positive and negative reception of the Jing Ke lore reflects the intellectual diversity of the Han. Even though Ru thought was established as orthodoxy by Emperor Wu of Han (r. 141–87 bce), the era nevertheless could accommodate a wide range of viewpoints. Despite their different views, all the thinkers discussed above view the question of what constitutes ritual propriety and righteousness as key to their evaluation of Jing Ke. Jing Ke’s personal righteousness was praised by Zou Yang, Mei Sheng, Sima Xiangru, Sima Qian, Wang Chong, and Wang Fu, but Jia Yi, Liu An, and Yang Xiong condemned what they saw as his lack of public virtue.

Mixed Reception of the Jing Ke Lore in the Yantie lun

The lively debates in the Yantie lun demonstrate the differences in interpretation of the Jing Ke lore in the early Han. In the sixth year of the Shiyuan reign (81 bce), Huan Kuan 桓寬 (fl. 81 bce) of the Western Han compiled Discourses on Iron and Salt.Footnote ⁷⁷ The debate between the dafu 大夫 (reformists) and the wenxue xianliang 文學賢良 (modernists, abbreviated as wenxue hereafter), covered various economic, social, political, and diplomatic problems facing the Western Han dynasty. As Mark Csikszentmihalyi summarizes, “Problems with state revenues prompted discussion of the nationalization of important industries such as salt production and mining, which was the occasion for the imperially sponsored debate preserved in the Discourses on Salt and Iron.”Footnote ⁷⁸

One of the debates focuses on how to safeguard the security of the empire, maintain peace, and avoid border problems with the Xiongnu. The Han dynasty had dealt with threats to the northern frontier since its founding. Early on, the Han dynasty fostered a peaceful relationship with the Xiongnu through marriage alliances. As the economic and political power of the empire grew, Emperor Wu led military campaigns against the Xiongnu, which somewhat eased but did not eliminate the threats to the frontier, and incurred immense costs in terms of material resources and manpower that tested the imperial treasury and the overall economy of the empire. This ongoing problem was the context for this debate.

Jing Ke lore makes its appearance in the section discussing bravery. The dafu and wenxue scholars held different attitudes towards Jing Ke. The dafu proposed using an assassin to solve the problem of the Xiongnu threat. They emphasized the need for deterrence: “It is said that strong Chu and powerful Zheng had armor made of rhinoceros skin and the sharp swords of Tangxi. The two states had firm walls inside and relied on sharp weapons for battles outside, so they could deter the Central States and force their enemies to surrender” (世言强楚勁鄭，有犀兕之甲，棠谿之鋌也。內據金城，外任利兵，是以威行諸夏，强服敵國).Footnote ⁷⁹ By way of contrast, the wenxue were idealistic and attempted to tame the Xiongnu via benevolent policy: “with morality as the city walls and benevolence and righteousness as the outer fortifications, no one dares to attack and no one dares to enter” (言以道德爲城，以仁義爲郭，莫之敢攻，莫之敢入).Footnote ⁸⁰ They believed that the problem of the Xiongnu should be solved through moral probity and consolidation of power within the Han dynasty, rather than conspiring to use assassins: “Now instead of building an unbreakable city wall and an unstoppable army, there are those who rely on the bravery of an individual to exert the power of a three-chi blade. How small of them!” (今不建不可攻之城，不可當之兵，而欲任匹夫之役，而行三尺之刃，亦細矣！).Footnote ⁸¹ The wenxue found such a despicable act shameful.

In addition, they argued, “Jing Ke had been planning to assassinate the King of Qin for many years, but he was unsuccessful because he could not rely on a mere one-chi eight-cun dagger.Footnote ⁸² The King of Qin was initially surprised and afraid, but he killed Jing Ke, using his seven-chi sharp sword with the same courage he used to crack Meng Ben and Xia Yu” (荆軻懷數年之謀而事不就者，尺八匕首不足恃也。秦王憚於不意，列斷賁、育者，介七尺之利也).Footnote ⁸³ The brave and positive image of the King of Qin established here is contrasted with the negative image presented in many of the texts discussed above. This depiction focuses on the quality of the king’s long sword. A similar depiction of the king’s majesty is documented in both the Han shu and the Wenxuan 文選 (Selections of Refined Literature). The Han shu records “Qin Lingling ling shangshu” 秦零陵令信 (A Letter from the Lingling Magistrate of the Qin).Footnote ⁸⁴ The Wenxuan records a slightly different title, “Qin Lingling ling shangshu” 秦零陵令上書 (The Lingling Magistrate of the Qin Presenting a Petition). This document describes the incident in a way that flatters the king: “Jing Ke held the dagger under his arm and suddenly assassinated Your Majesty. Your Majesty used your divine might to draw the long sword and save yourself.” (荊軻挾匕首，卒刺陛下. 陛下以神武，扶揄長劍以自救).Footnote ⁸⁵ This concise description of the assassination emphasizes the wisdom and bravery of the King of Qin as he defended himself with his own sword, resolving the crisis. In contrast to the “Cike liezhuan,” this account does not mention the King of Qin’s panic or that Xia Wuju had to prompt him to draw his sword. Instead, it serves as an illustration of the King of Qin’s valor and martial prowess, showcasing his fearlessness in the face of danger and his ability to handle the crisis on his own. The composed and unhurried manner in which he drew his sword amidst difficulties underscores the king’s strong mental fortitude. Conversely, the petition portrays Jing Ke’s actions as underhanded, deceitful, and ignoble. Both the Yantie lun and “Qin Lingling ling shangshu” praise the King of Qin’s composure and competence in handling the unexpected situation.

The Yantie lun contends that the reason for the failure of Jing Ke’s assassination attempt was the poor quality of the weapon. This explanation contrasts with that of the Shi ji, which emphasizes Jing Ke’s poor swordsmanship. As Michael Loewe emphasizes with respect to the Yantie lun, “This document is of almost unique value in so far as it sets out in the form of a dialogue and with remarkable clarity many of the controversial issues of the day.”Footnote ⁸⁶ The discussion of Jing Ke’s failed assassination in the Yantie lun broadens the possible explanations for Jing Ke’s failure. The Shi ji cites Lu Goujian to heavily imply that Jing Ke’s poor swordsmanship was partially responsible for the failure of the plot. In the Yantie lun, the wenxue perspective emphasizes the insufficiency of the weapons Jing Ke uses.

Although the Yantie lun cites Jing Ke’s failed assassination to demonstrate the importance of weapons, Huan Kuan records that the dafu countered the wenxue’s arguments: “If we have a brave man now, backed by the authority of the strong Han dynasty, we will defeat the unrighteous Xiongnu, put them to death, and punish them for their sins” (今誠得勇士，乘强漢之威，凌無義之匈奴，制其死命，責以其過).Footnote ⁸⁷ The dafu believed that an assassination would cause internal chaos among the Xiongnu tribes, and the Han troops could then take advantage of the opportunity to pacify them, thus solving the border problem. It is notable that the dafu cited the exemplar of Jing Ke as they advocated for assassination as a viable strategy for containing the Xiongnu. Despite the failure of Jing Ke, later thinkers often referenced his attempt, reflecting and contributing to his profound influence. Although his assassination of Qin was not successful, the panic his attempt caused the King of Qin had some brief deterrent effect. But the faction opposing the dafu referred to values such as benevolence and virtue to dismiss Jing Ke and disapproved of such underhanded tactics. The wenxue instead promoted better tools as the solution to the problem, again demonstrating their views using the story of Jing Ke. Although Emperor Wu of the Han 漢武帝 (r. 141–87 bce) dismissed the hundred schools of thought and revered Ru thought, his reign in fact saw the further development of all kinds of different ideas, as reflected in the historiographic and philosophical discourses.

These different interpretations of Jing Ke’s act were in part the result of differences in perspective. The debate between dafu and wenxue shows how “benevolence and righteousness” and quanli 權利 (potency and money) were conceptualized and understood.Footnote ⁸⁸ Jing Ke’s daring could easily encourage local people to defy the central government by force. This individual violence was incompatible with the way of benevolence and righteousness. The wenxue considered the act of assassination as an unacceptably destabilizing means of achieving an end. They emphasized benevolence and righteousness as values that would lead to long-term stability and unity.Footnote ⁸⁹ With this logic, wenxue opposed the subjugation of the Xiongnu by overwhelming force, and preferred to instead use benevolence and righteousness to persuade them.

The dafu, represented by Sang Hongyang 桑弘羊 (ca. 155–80 bce), on the other hand, supported the state monopolies on salt and iron production because he was concerned with accumulating the necessary human, material, and financial resources to prepare for the war against Xiongnu. He and his faction advanced the view that the state should make good use of individual interests, which provided the state with manpower and financial resources. In this situation, the dafu positively cited the brave warrior Jing Ke as a case that supports strengthening the central authority and highlights the importance of producing and using powerful weapons to accomplish tasks. A mid-Western Han renaissance greatly increased the state treasury and the power of the central government, allowing the state to orchestrate the assassination of the ruler of the Xiongnu and capitalize on the resulting chaos with a military campaign. As the lore evolved, not only did overall assessments of Jing Ke’s acts change, but also there was greater consideration of the details of the plot.

Critically Discussing the Details in the Jing Ke Lore

In fact, some discussions of Jing Ke eschew assessment to instead focus on the details of the plot. From the very establishment of the lore, there has been heated debate over the details of the assassination. Scholars have had different views on various rumors surrounding Jing Ke, on whether the assassin managed to wound the king, and on whether the King of Qin wiped out Jing Ke’s clan. The end of “Cike liezhuan” discusses the rumors around Jing Ke, commenting:

The Shi ji directly criticizes what it claims are invented rumors, validating its own account by citing a direct witness, Xia Wuju, and associates of the witness, Gongsun Hong 公孫弘 (200–121 bce) and Dong Zhongshu.Footnote ⁹¹ By making his sources clear in the “Cike lizhuan,” Sima Qian powerfully refutes these rumors. By way of contrast, passages attributed to Zou Yang linked an unusual celestial phenomenon, the “white rainbow crossing the sun,” with Jing Ke, and argued that Jing Ke’s sincere behavior moved heaven to produce this baleful phenomenon.

Yan Danzi also records some strange phenomena associated with the Jing Ke lore,Footnote ⁹² but this time, the emphasis is placed on Prince Dan. Compared with the Shi ji and Zhanguo ce, the story of Jing Ke in Yan Danzi is more openly fictionalized, incorporating some absurd and fantastic details.Footnote ⁹³ As a work of narrative literature, the Yan Danzi possesses a distinct novelistic style that sets it apart from historical biographies. The opening of the Yan Danzi, for example, is bizarre. Crown Prince Dan is taken as a hostage by Qin, but the King of Qin treats him unpleasantly and disrespectfully. Dan therefore asks to return home. The King of Qin gives him permission to return home only when “crows heads turn white and horses grow horns” (令烏白頭、馬生角).Footnote ⁹⁴ Crown Prince Dan looks up to the sky and sighs deeply, which makes those white crows and horned horses appear. These improbable omens are only the first of several extraordinary events the Yan Danzi records as Crown Prince Dan makes his way back to Yan. While James Liu compares and comments on the differences between the Yan Danzi and the Shi ji, he does not hold a high opinion of the Yan Danzi as a whole, considering the added details to be both implausible and trivial.Footnote ⁹⁵

The comments at the end of “Cike liezhuan” are openly skeptical of such surreal phenomena, which indicates that such stories were in circulation at the time the “Cike” was compiled. Based on how the Shi ji responds to these stories, Barbieri-Low reasonably assumes that the biography of Jing Ke may draw selectively from the Yan Danzi or similar oral lore, rejecting aspects of those stories that are overly romantic and dramatic.Footnote ⁹⁶ For example, Yan Danzi states that during the final assassination attempt on the King of Qin, the zither music conveyed a secret message to the King of Qin which helped him escape the assassination. By way of contrast, the Shi ji omits this detail. The Shi ji account cites its sources as Xia Wuju, who personally witnessed the assassination attempt in the Qin court, and the Western Han scholars Dong Zhongshu and Gongsun Hong, who learned the details of the event from Xia.Footnote ⁹⁷ The similarity in content between the Shi ji and Yan Danzi accounts is intriguing. It indicates that the Jing Ke lore entered the collective memory of later generations. Similar plots appear in many different documents. The circulation of Jing Ke lore has flourished since its inception. Its many versions circulated in different regions, which in turn contributed to an even more complex and divergent Jing Ke lore.

Later Han scholars would also question the authenticity of the cosmic phenomena associated with Jing Ke. Ying Shao’s 應劭 (153–196 ce) Fengsu tongyi paraphrases and summarizes the account of Jing Ke in the Shi ji, and then refutes the circulated rumor that the “millet rained from sky” because of Jing Ke. Ying argues, “Dan indeed liked to retain scholars and guests, and he was not stingy. This story was therefore refined and developed out of the small sayings then circulating among the common people.” (丹實好士，無所愛恡也，故閭閻小論飾成之耳).Footnote ⁹⁸ According to this argument, the rumor was made up or exaggerated by the followers of Crown Prince Dan of Yan in order to glorify his image. In this light, it is noticeable that the saying was apparently still so prevalent in the Eastern Han that Ying Shao felt the need to refute it.

Ying Shao offered a reasonable explanation for these strange reported phenomena, but some Han scholars, most notably Wang Chong, were even more strongly critical of these legends. Although, as discussed above, Wang praised Jing Ke’s good intentions and righteousness in assassinating the King of Qin, he believed that a man’s sincerity could not move heaven and earth. Wang was skeptical of the belief that nature and humans could interact with each other, and that natural phenomena served as omens for the world of men. Wang instead believed that the relationship between natural phenomena and historical developments was merely coincidental. Wang acknowledged that it was possible for such strange phenomena as “a white rainbow crossing the sun and Venus swallowing the lunar lodge Mao” (白虹貫日、太白蝕昴) to appear, but he did not think such scenes related to “Jing Ke’s plan and Mr. Wei’s plot.” (荆軻之謀，衛先生之畫).Footnote ⁹⁹ Wang’s conclusions strongly contrasted with those of scholars who believed in tianren ganying 天人感應 (the resonance between nature and humans).

In juan 15 of the Lunheng, Wang again questions the relationship between Jing Ke’s attempted assassination of the King of Qin and the “white rainbow crossing the sun”:

Wang also raises the problem of causality: “How do we know that a white rainbow crossing the sun did not cause Jing Ke’s assassination of the Qin king?” (何知白虹貫日，不致刺秦王).Footnote ¹⁰¹ Furthermore, if this omen was supposed to indicate the success of Jing Ke’s assassination attempt, how can his failure be understood? Through the case of Jing Ke, Wang questions the validity of tianren ganying.

The context of Wang’s argument was the integration of Ru thought with the doctrine of the five phases (wuxing) and yinyang. Employing both wuxing and yinyang, the theory of omens was introduced into the political sphere. According to this theory, interactions between heaven and humans go both ways. On one hand, human actions influence celestial phenomenon. As Zou Yang argued, Jing Ke’s sincere belief moved heaven, thus creating the “white rainbow crossing the sun” phenomenon. On the other hand, celestial phenomena also influence human actions. For instance, Liu Xiang’s Lieshi zhuan 列士傳 (Biographies of Exemplary Officials) record of the same event notes that the white rainbow did not completely cross the sun, predicting the failure of Jing Ke’s assassination attempt. Tianren ganying and the calamities theory of yin and yang gradually developed into the belief in prophecy in the Han, which became so powerful that it seriously threatened the power of the monarch. Out of the need to bolster imperial power, scholars in the Eastern Han criticized the concept of prophecy. In addition to the political motivations for arguing against prophecy, scholars were critical of a doctrine that could not reasonably explain the frequent destructive natural disasters of the Eastern Han.Footnote ¹⁰²

In the Eastern Han Dynasty, scholars such as Wang Chong were dissatisfied with the fusion of Ru thought with yinyang theory. They wanted to return to the original Ru thought focused on objective reality and wary of subjective speculation, superstition, and fengshui. Therefore, when they discussed the Jing Ke incident, they also criticized the celestial phenomena associated with it. Wang took several minor official positions, but he often came into conflict with superiors and noble family members due to his personal beliefs. As a result, he had to leave government service and return home to become a private teacher to earn a living. The bitterness of a largely unsuccessful political career may have contributed to his opposition to contemporary thought. Wang used the Jing Ke case several times to make his points, and each time, his arguments were mostly directed against the use of celestial phenomena as omens.

Along with the problem of celestial phenomena, another much discussed aspect of the Jing Ke lore during the Han was Gao Jianli’s attempted assassination of the First Emperor of Qin, which took place after Jing Ke’s failed attempt and the Qin unification. Gao Jianli attempted to avenge him and assassinate the First Emperor by throwing a zhu (a stringed musical instrument) at him.Footnote ¹⁰³ This detail is also recorded in Shi ji but the material Wang cites adds new and bizarre details: “Gao Jianli used the zhu to hit the forehead of the King of Qin. The king was wounded and died in three months.”Footnote ¹⁰⁴ (漸麗以筑擊秦王顙。秦王病傷，三月而死). This unbelievable detail, Wang argues, makes the whole account dubious. Because of the exaggerated and propagandistic fenshu kengru 焚書坑儒 (burning books and burying of Confucian scholars) policy of the First Emperor of Qin and the need for the Han to establish their legitimacy, anti-Qin sentiment was strong among Han scholars. It is therefore possible that some fabricated plots may have been added to the story to further denigrate the First Emperor. The Shi ji documents Gao Jianli’s assassination without mentioning the First Emperor’s wound by the zhu, and Wang agrees that Gao’s attempt was unsuccessful and he was executed: “Later in an unknown year, Gao Jianli attacked the First Emperor with a zhu; however, he failed and was executed.” (後不審何年，高漸麗以筑擊始皇，不中，誅漸麗).Footnote ¹⁰⁵ Wang instead presents two popular claims about the death of the First Emperor of Qin: “As for the First Emperor, some said that he died in the sand dunes and some stated that he died in Qin. The cause of his death was said to be the consequence of long-term illness.” (一始皇之身，世或言死於沙丘，或言死於秦，其死，言恒病瘡).Footnote ¹⁰⁶ Wang viewed the second claim as dubious because it lacked support from historical records: “Most of the zhuanshu sayings are often not true,Footnote ¹⁰⁷ but the general public is unable to determine their authenticity.” (傳書之言，多失其實，世俗之人，不能定也).Footnote ¹⁰⁸ The rumor that Gao mortally wounded the First Emperor may be related to the general anti-Qin atmosphere of the Han.Footnote ¹⁰⁹

The account of Gao Jianli’s assassination attempt against the First Emperor in the Fengsu tongyi is like that of the Shi ji and Lunheng.Footnote ¹¹⁰ It discusses the Gao Jianli story in the passage on the musical instrument zhu: “With the opportunity to get close to the King of Qin approaching, Jianli filled his zhu with lead. As he came near the king, he raised the instrument to strike the king, but did not hit him. As a result, Gao Jianli was put to death” (稍益近之。漸離乃以鈆置筑木中，後進得近，舉筑撲始皇，不中，於是遂誅).Footnote ¹¹¹ Gao Jianli strummed the zhu to bid Jing Ke farewell at Yishui. He also struck it and attempted to avenge Jing Ke’s death. The Gao Jianli story was circulated together with the Jing Ke lore, and the image of Gao Jianli was used to express anti-Qin sentiments. However, scholars in the Eastern Han disputed these rumors, especially the idea that Gao Jianli injured the king. Wang Chong felt that the story was in fact exaggerated throughout to highlight Jing Ke’s fierceness. Wang quotes an account that is similar to that of the Shi ji, except for the final dramatic detail: “Jing Ke attacked the King of Qin for Crown Prince Dan of Yan with a dagger, but the assassination was unsuccessful. The King of Qin drew his sword and stabbed him. Jing Ke threw his dagger at the king and missed the target, but the dagger hit a bronze pillar and penetrated one chi deep” (荆軻爲燕太子刺秦王，操匕首之劍，刺之不得。秦王拔劍擊之。軻以匕首擿秦王，不中，中銅柱，入尺).Footnote ¹¹² Wang asserts that the last part of that account is implausible: “Even though he had been injured by the [king’s] Longyuan sword, Jing Ke had enough arm strength to throw a light and small dagger into a hard bronze pillar” (以荆軻之手力，投輕小之匕首，身被龍淵之劍刃，入堅剛之銅柱).Footnote ¹¹³ Given Jing Ke’s condition, Wang felt this superhuman dagger throw was inconceivable.

The third point of controversy with respect to Jing Ke among Han scholars was whether the First Emperor also wiped out Jing Ke’s clan. The “Lu Zhonglian and Zou Yang liezhuan” states, “As for the destruction of Jing Ke’s clan to the seventh degree and Yao Li’s burning of his wife and son, how could this be worthy of praise?” (然則荆軻之湛七族，要離之燒妻子，豈足道哉!).Footnote ¹¹⁴ Jing Ke is alluded to in this case as an example of draconian punishment. Zou Yang used the Jing Ke example to persuade the king not to be influenced by villains. Zou’s broader point is that a superior need not know a subordinate for a long time to trust them. For instance, Fan Wuqi believed in Jing Ke and was willing to sacrifice his life for him, even though they only knew each other for a short time. Zou Yang commented: “Their conduct was in accordance with their intentions, and [they] had a boundless admiration for righteousness” (行合於志，而慕義無窮也).Footnote ¹¹⁵ Zou felt that this kind of trust was unshakable and persuaded King Xiao of Liang to invest such trust in him: “Now, a ruler should put aside his pride, hold a sincerity that makes people want to serve him, reveal his heart, show his authenticity, be faithful and loyal, carry out his profound virtue, share hardships and glories together with people, and be unchanged in how he treats scholars” (今世主誠能去驕傲之心，懷可報之意，披心腹，見情素，隳肝膽，施德厚，終與之窮通，無變於士).Footnote ¹¹⁶ Zou Yang hoped King Xiao of Liang would use benevolence to influence people. Such an environment of governance would be one in which events like “Jing Ke’s clan being exterminated to the seventh degree and Yao Li 要離 (d. 513 bce) burning his wife and children to death”Footnote ¹¹⁷ (荆軻之沉七族，要離之燔妻子) would not happen again. The Shi ji does not document the extermination of Jing Ke’s clan, which places Qin in an extremely negative light. This event may have circulated in folklore to highlight the unrestrained violence of the King of Qin. Sima Qian must have been aware of this rumor about the execution of Jing Ke’s clan, but as with other dubious rumors such as the “sky raining millet,” he chose not to record it in his biography.

Yang Xiong affirmed an even more extreme version of this story:

Yang’s account changes the seventh degree in the previous texts to the ninth degree and adds that even villagers not related to Jing Ke were slaughtered. This intensification reflects Yang’s strongly anti-Qin attitudes. Even as Yang criticized Jing Ke for his lack of righteousness, he condemned the First Emperor for his cultural policies, such as the alleged burning of books and burying of scholars.

As with the previous cases, Wang Chong often disputes popular opinions and expounds what he feels is an objective and impartial evaluation of historical figures. Wang strongly objected to false additions to historical records. Wang felt that the execution of Jing Ke’s fellow villagers was such an addition: “Even though the King of Qin was tyrannical, he would not have killed all the people in Jing Ke’s village” (夫秦雖無道，無爲盡誅荆軻之里).Footnote ¹¹⁹ Furthermore, Wang points out that there is no documentation of such an event in the records: “In the twentieth year of the First Emperor’s reign, the state of Yan sent Jing Ke to assassinate him. The First Emperor became aware of it and had Jing Ke dismembered in the market. The records do not say that all the people in his community were killed” (始皇二十年，燕使荆軻刺秦王，秦王覺之，體解軻以徇，不言盡誅其閭).Footnote ¹²⁰ Indeed, the Shi ji and other early accounts do not document the incident.

The exaggeration of the consequences of Jing Ke’s assassination attempt is likely related to the anti-Qin ideology of the time. Han scholars often found faults with the Qin dynasty and its ruler and exaggerated his paranoia and cruelty. The Jing Ke lore became almost immediately widespread in early China and consequently became a topic of debate and a useful reference point. As the lore was disseminated in different regions and strata of society, it was adapted to the demands of the local environment. Even scholars adopted, adapted, and changed the Jing Ke lore to serve their own purposes.

The Jing Ke Lore in Shrines and Tombs

The Jing Ke lore has not only appeared in transmitted texts, but also in excavated materials, such as huaxiang shi 畫像石 (pictorial stones) in shrines and tombs. Huaxiang shi were prevalent from the reign of Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty to the end of the Eastern Han dynasty, and they depict a wide array of subjects, from historical stories to families socializing and court scenes to cosmic phenomena.Footnote ¹²¹ Scholars attribute the prevalence of huaxiang shi to three phenomena: land consolidation, the rise of houzang 厚葬 (elaborate burial practices), and new attitudes toward death. The consolidation of land in the mid and late Eastern Han dynasty provided an economic basis for the production and purchase of huaxiang shi.Footnote ¹²² The Han court officially endorsed Ru thought and used a system in which honest and filial people were recommended for office, incentivizing elaborate burial practices, which were a way to demonstrate filial piety.Footnote ¹²³ Finally, during the Han, beliefs about the interaction between nature and human beings and the possibility of an afterlife were further developed. Many images in the huaxiang shi represent scenes from real life, but they are often more luxurious than the life of the deceased, reflecting the aspiration for a better life in the hereafter.

The huaxiang shi also includes historical stories. Jing Ke’s assassination attempt was often represented, especially in the Eastern Han. The Eastern Han was a time of private feuds and loyalties, and of vengeance on behalf of both family and friends;Footnote ¹²⁴ and many respected Jing Ke’s bravery. Like the Qin, the Han Dynasty prohibited private vengeance until the outbreak of the Lulin Red Eyebrows (綠林赤眉) uprising. Afterward, Emperor Zhang 章帝 (r. 75–88) made it legal to seek revenge for the humiliation of one’s parents. Such vengeance could be justified as evidence of filiality, loyalty, and righteousness from the perspective of private morality which existed in tension with official legal prohibitions. During the Eastern Han, many men fulfilled their obligations to their rulers and family members through revenge and their actions were often pardoned.Footnote ¹²⁵ Most of the extant huaxiang shi were carved during this period. The story of Jing Ke is one of righteous bravery on the part of an individual and was naturally popular during a time of private feuds.

Moreover, since the target of Jing Ke’s assassination attempt was the King of Qin, the Jing Ke lore was used in huaxiang shi to express the anti-Qin sentiments that were popular during the Han. In all huaxiang shi of the Jing Ke lore, the King of Qin is depicted as a diminutive villain. This demeaning depiction also occurs in huaxiang shi of other Qin-related events such as “Wanbi gui Zhao” 完璧歸趙 (Returning the Complete Jade to Zhao) and “Sishui lao ding” 泗水撈鼎 (Retrieving the Tripod from the Si River). In the first story, the Zhao official Lin Xiangru 藺相如 (ca. 329–ca. 259 bce) uses deft diplomacy to protect the precious jade from the Qin king. In the second story, the First Emperor attempts and fails to retrieve a tripod that represents power and legitimacy from the Si River. These stories might reflect Han contemplations of the lessons of the Qin.

Jing Ke’s assassination attempt is depicted in twenty-one extant huaxiang shi, distributed widely throughout China.Footnote ¹²⁶ There are six in Shandong province, including three in the Wu Liang ci 武梁祠 (Wu Liang Shrine Ancestral Hall),Footnote ¹²⁷ one in Nanyang 南陽 in Weishan 微山 prefecture,Footnote ¹²⁸ one in the Han tomb of Beizhai village 北寨村 in Yi’nan 沂南 prefecture,Footnote ¹²⁹ and one in tomb No. 1 of Balimiao 八里廟 in Yanggu 陽谷 prefecture.Footnote ¹³⁰ In Sichuan and Chongqing, there are nine:Footnote ¹³¹ one each in tombs AM1, No. 40, BM19, and BM101 of Mahao 麻浩 in Leshan 樂山,Footnote ¹³² one each in Tombs BM1 and No. 22 of Shiziwan 柿子灣 in Leshan,Footnote ¹³³ one in the Han tomb of Hechuan 合川 village in Chongqing,Footnote ¹³⁴ one in Sarcophagus No. 2 of the Wei-Jin tomb in Jiang’an 江安 prefecture,Footnote ¹³⁵ and one in Qu prefecture 渠縣.Footnote ¹³⁶ There are two in Jiangsu: one at Siyang Dagudun 泗陽打鼓墩Footnote ¹³⁷ and one at Gaochun Gucheng 高淳固城.Footnote ¹³⁸ In the Shanbei region, there are two: one in Suide 綏德 villageFootnote ¹³⁹ and the other at Dabaodang 大保當 in Shenmu 神木.Footnote ¹⁴⁰ There is one in Zhejiang in the east wall of the front room of the Han tomb in Haining 海寧Footnote ¹⁴¹ and one in Tanghe 唐河 of Nanyang in Henan.Footnote ¹⁴²

Richard Edwards has commented on the Sichuan Mahao yamu 麻浩崖墓 (Mahao cliff tombs, Appendix Figure 7).Footnote ¹⁴³ He primarily compared these reliefs with the Jing Ke huaxiang shi in the Wu Liang Ancestral Hall in Shandong, emphasizing their differences. For instance, the image of Qin Wuyang in the former shows him curled up and kneeling, while in the latter, Qin Wuyang is depicted lying on the ground in an awkward manner. Thinking about the iconography more broadly, Edwards argues that the King of Qin in the huaxiang shi of Mahao is generally portrayed as more agitated, similar to the depiction of the king in other huaxiang shi, all of which highlight and expose his weaknesses and flaws, reinforcing the legitimacy of the Han dynasty that overthrew Qin rule and claimed the Mandate of Heaven. In the scholarship on the Jing Ke iconography, the exquisite engravings of the Wu Liang Ancestral Hall, constructed by the Wu family in the late Eastern Han Dynasty, has fortunately been preserved and restored, allowing for the most fruitful studies so far of the Jing Ke huaxiang shi,Footnote ¹⁴⁴ which will be discussed substantially later. To enhance studies of the huaxiang shi, Anthony J. Barbieri-Low discussed the examples in the Wu Liang shrine in Shandong province, in Yi’nan prefecture in Shandong, in Tanghe prefecture in Henan, and in Leshan in Sichuan, all of which emphasize Jing Ke’s loyalty and righteousness.Footnote ¹⁴⁵ The following section builds on previous scholarship to describe several representative images from different regions, such as Shandong, Henan, Shaanxi, Sichuan, and Zhejiang provinces, to closely read their content and examine their characteristics to gain a better understanding the reception of the Jing Ke lore in this fine arts form.

First, the depiction (Appendix Figure 5) on the north side of the west wall in the middle chamber of the Han Tomb in Yinan 沂南, Shandong Province, captures the essence of the story with a concise composition. The key elements of the pillar, the dagger, the King of Qin, Jing Ke, and the torn sleeve are portrayed, albeit with fewer figures and less detail. In the center of the scene, a slender pillar takes prominence. The King of Qin and Jing Ke are positioned close to each other on the right side of the pillar, engaged in a fierce struggle. A slender and agile Jing Ke launches an attack on the bloated and startled King of Qin. The King of Qin stands frozen in fear, his posture rigid. Meanwhile, Jing Ke’s clothing and belt are depicted fluttering, imbuing the scene with a sense of movement and dynamism, and capturing the fleeting instant of action. It is noteworthy that this depiction of Jing Ke diverges from the tall and heroic depictions seen elsewhere. Instead, he is depicted as thin, emphasizing his association with the barbarian. Furthermore, Jing Ke is depicted wearing bandit-like attire, adding a somewhat scandalous element to the portrayal.

Second, the image of “Jing Ke ci Qinwang” (Appendix Figure 21) on the west wall of the main north-south room of Nanyang Knitwear Factory 南陽針織廠 in Henan province shows Jing Ke leaning forward to attack with his dagger, and the king of Qin hastily preparing to stand up and respond with his sword. Jing Ke is on the right side of the picture and is shown in a frontal view. Jing Ke stands on powerful legs, with the hem of his coat raised in a chivalrous and righteous manner, with his coat sash floating in the air and with his dagger thrusting at the King of Qin. On his left is the King of Qin, who appears shorter in comparison. At this point, Jing Ke takes a dagger and stabs the King of Qin, who leans to his right to avoid the thrust. The image exaggerates the length of Jing Ke’s dagger. Jing Ke’s sleeve is cut off in mid-air. The King of Qin has drawn his sword and holds it in his right hand. The figure on the far left of the picture is harder to identify. His arms and legs are splayed open. He is unlikely to be Qin Wuyang, who was already trembling with fear once Jing Ke began his attack. This figure could be the imperial physician Xia Wuju with his medicine box, ready to throw it at Jing Ke, or he could be a member of the king’s guards. In comparison with the other huaxiang shi, the pillar in the center is missing, and the overall sense of dynamism is strong.

Third, the “Jing Ke ci Qinwang” portrait (Appendix Figure 7) in the cliff tomb of Mahao in Sichuan province. The image is divided into different sections by pillars. In the middle section, there is a pillar with daggers inserted into it. The right side of the image depicts Jing Ke and the left side depicts the King of Qin. On the right side, a king’s guard is holding Jing Ke, while another two guards stand at the left side of the king. The compartment on the right shows a case that holds the head of General Fan. The figures’ movements and positions reflect the character of each man and create a dynamic narrative. The direction of Jing Ke’s hair suggests that the image depicts the moment Jing Ke was grabbed by the guard. His headdress has already fallen off, and he is in a ferocious attacking posture, still struggling to free himself. He has just thrown his dagger, which pierces and passes through the pillar but does not hurt the King of Qin. The king’s sleeve has been cut away, but he has raised his sword in defense, and taken several large steps back. The frightened guards of Qin have fled in a panic, scurrying away. Qin Wuyang on the far-right side crouches timidly, cowering on the ground. In front of him is the case that holds General Fan’s head.

Fourth, the portrait of “Jing Ke ci Qinwang” (Appendix Figure 20) in Haining 海寧 Middle School of Haining in Zhejiang province is indistinct, but when compared to other portraits, it possesses a stronger sense of dynamics while maintaining exquisite details. The pillar remains at the center of the composition. On the right side of the pillar, Jing Ke is depicted attempting to seize the King of Qin and break through the protective barrier of his guard. Qin Wuyang, positioned next to Jing Ke, is shown kneeling in a curled-up posture. While his body is on the ground, his head is slightly raised, suggesting that he is observing the unfolding assassination scene. The depiction of Qin Wuyang is slightly different from that of other huaxiang shi, in which his head is completely lowered in terror. On the left side of the pillar, the King of Qin raises his arms and flings his sleeves, taking flying steps to dodge the attack. At his feet lies the case containing General Fan’s head. The identity of the person on the left of the King of Qin is a subject of scholarly debate. Some scholars argue that it is Xia Wuju depicted bowing and throwing a medicine bag at Jing Ke,Footnote ¹⁴⁶ but the medicine bag is not visible in the picture. Considering the leftmost figures in other huaxiang shi, it is likely that the person on the left of the King of Qin is a frightened guard who was unprepared by the sudden attack.

As discussed above, most extant huaxiang shi related to Jing Ke lore share a similar content and layout. The paintings are centered on a pillar. On one side of the pillar is a magnificent, tall Jing Ke with his sash floating in the air, the trembling Qin Wuyang kneeling curled up on the ground, and the head of Fan Wuqi presented in an open container. On the other side is the King of Qin, fleeing the assassin in a panic. Jing Ke is often shown facing the viewer in the posture of a chivalrous warrior, with his legs standing strongly apart and the hem of his coat raised, held back by a Qin warrior right after having thrown the dagger. The King of Qin, by way of contrast, looks battered and exhausted by his flight.

The similarities among these depictions are due to how huaxiang shi are produced and how carving knowledge and skills were shared. A certain popular style and set of carving techniques for huaxiang shi emerged during the Western Han dynasty and quickly spread across regions, thus producing consistency in composition, expression, and carving methods.Footnote ¹⁴⁷ The production of huaxiang shi was complex manufacturing process consisting of six major steps: planning and design, selecting and processing stones, drawing the base, carving the pictures, and coloring the images.Footnote ¹⁴⁸ Practitioners received special training and there was a set, unified style for the composition and layout of the paintings—uniform to the point where some painters developed mnemonics to remember guidelines. The Han huaxiang shi have certain sets of frames which are stable and generally taken from the core plot of the story. As Xing Yitian 邢義田 states, the huaxiang shi have a stable grid set for production, though there are variations in the process of painting images.Footnote ¹⁴⁹ This standard production procedure was responsible for the stylistic uniformity and consistency in content seen in the extant huaxiang shi. Furthermore, Barbieri-Low explains the similar layout and depictions appearing in both northern and southern regions by speculating that the southern carvers learned these compositions from their northern counterparts, but did not fully understand every detail, resulting in a great degree of similarity with some discrepancies in style.Footnote ¹⁵⁰ All the extant huaxiang shi of Jing Ke’s assassination attempt demonstrate a high degree of consistency with some small discrepancies due to the functions and levels of detail of the different huaxiang shi.

Jing Ke paintings decorated not only tombs but also ancestral halls. These were spiritual places which connected family members, ancestors, and descendants, and encouraged living family members to actively reflect on the past for the benefit of the future of the family and clan. Ancestral halls also reflect defining characteristics and the overall strength of the family, thus shaping family and clan tradition. The ancestral hall is therefore a place to celebrate moral values of the family or the individual. A representative example is the Wu Liang Ancestral Hall, located in Jiaxiang 嘉祥 prefecture of Jining 濟寧 city in Shandong province. It consists of sacrificial halls, constructed in the Wu family graveyard during the late Eastern Han Dynasty, featuring exquisite engravings. Fortunately, this hall has been preserved and restored. Three pictorial stones are about the Jing Ke lore, among which Appendix Figure 3 is the best-known and most artistically refined. The scene is divided into two parts by a bronze pillar at the center. On the right side, the King of Qin is depicted leaning back unsteadily in a defensive posture. On the left side, Jing Ke is shown with his hair disheveled and his headdress slightly askew, conveying the strong emotional moment. Wu Hung speculates that Jing Ke’s headdress may have fallen off during his struggle with the King of Qin.Footnote ¹⁵¹ Alternatively, the headdress may have intentionally been depicted as falling off to emphasize Jing Ke’s bravery and fury at that moment. The presence of this headdress serves as a visual representation of this intense expression. A similar scene is also found in the story of Lin Xiangru’s 藺相如 (fl. 279 bce) meeting with King Zhaoxiang 昭襄 of Qin (r. 306–251 bce).

Another pictorial stone of “Jing Ke ci Qinwang” (Appendix Figure 2) in the Wu Liang Ancestral Hall was not as well preserved and clear as Appendix Figure 3—in particular the upper left portion of the image is somewhat worn—but the general composition is still visible. Unlike Appendix Figure 3, here Jing Ke is depicted surrounded by two guards. One guard is holding onto Jing Ke, preventing him from escaping, while the other guard is poised to strike him, with a shield in his left hand and a raised sword in his right hand. The tension and imminent danger are palpable in their stances. Additional guards can be seen around the King of Qin. The two guards on the left side of the king are visibly terrified and are attempting to flee or prostrating themselves on the ground. The King of Qin himself is shown ducking and dodging, trying to evade any potential harm. His image is noticeably larger than those of the guards, emphasizing his position of power and authority. Another guard, standing next to the King of Qin, is depicted holding a shield, ready to defend himself and the king. This detail highlights the protective measures taken by the Qin court.

Jean M. James has extensively analyzed the content of the three images in the Wu Liang Ancestral Hall (Appendix Figures 1–3) that relate to the story of Jing Ke, emphasizing the tense scene of Jing Ke stabbing the King of Qin and the latter fleeing around the pillar upon seeing the dagger.Footnote ¹⁵² These images of Jing Ke in the Wu Liang Ancestral Hall symbolize loyalty and integrity. Judging from these images, despite the failure of his attempt to assassinate the King of Qin, Jing Ke’s sacrifice for Prince Dan and disregard for his own life established him as a model of loyalty and earned him widespread recognition. The story of Jing Ke therefore served an educational purpose within the Wu Liang Ancestral Hall.Footnote ¹⁵³ Wu Hung’s monograph on the topic also discusses the Jing Ke huaxiang shi, providing a summary of the “Jing Ke ci Qinwang” story within the context of the Shi ji and the Zhanguo ce. Furthermore, Wu explains the content of the images by comparing them with written narratives to identify the discrepancies between those narratives and the images. For example, the depiction of Jing Ke’s dagger piercing through the pillar in the huaxiang shi strays from the account provided by Shi ji. Citing Wang Chong’s Lunheng, Wu argues that certain books on Ru thought during the Eastern Han period already contained similar accounts of the episode, accounts which these images likely reflected. Wu believes that it is likely that the tomb owner cherished history, as the hall is filled with depictions of historical and mythical characters: daughters, filial sons, wise brothers, close friends, loyal servants, benevolent people, assassins, and loyal subjects.Footnote ¹⁵⁴

The content of the Jing Ke story as depicted in the huaxiang shi is slightly different from the story as presented in the transmitted materials. Although both versions are concerned with Jing Ke’s bravery, the huaxiang shi in tombs emphasize physical bravery, while the transmitted texts may discuss the broader cultural significance of bravery, such as its connection with righteousness. The huaxiang shi were usually carved on stone tombs and sarcophagi and were not intended to be displayed to the public sphere, but instead were supposed to protect the deceased. As Lydia Thompson argues, it was thought that the valor and bravery of a warrior like Jing Ke would serve to guard the tomb.Footnote ¹⁵⁵ Barbieri-Low echoes Thompson’s understanding of this function of huaxiang shi depicting Jing Ke in tombs, and believes the image was especially used in this way when it was placed at a prominent location in a tomb. From the perspective of those tomb commissioners who valued his bravery, Jing Ke’s conduct was heroic and righteous. For example, in the huaxiang shi of Tanghe (Appendix Figure 21), Jing Ke is shown in the posture of a warrior, and the scene has a strong sense of dynamics, with Jing Ke extending his dagger to the King of Qin’s neck as the latter tries to escape. They largely emphasize the bravery of Jing Ke and the distress of the King of Qin. Dramatic bravery is a mainstay not only of Jing Ke huaxiang shi but also huaxiang shi in general. For instance, “Er tao sha san shi” 二桃殺三士 (Two Peaches Killing Three Warriors) and “Gaozu zhanshe” 高祖斬蛇 (Emperor Gaozu Killing Snakes) were also common themes for huaxiangshi in tombs.Footnote ¹⁵⁶ However, bravery is a quality that often needs to be demonstrated in a conflict, and Ru thought sought to mitigate conflict. Unlike the huaxiang shi in tombs, which were concealed underground, the scholars’ records of and commentaries on Jing Ke were public and often understood as political, so scholars had to be cautious about how they discussed bravery in their writings.

Another important difference in the representation of “Jing Ke ci Qinwang” in transmitted and in excavated materials is that whereas the former describes Jing Ke throwing his dagger towards the King of Qin and simply hitting a pillar, the latter (i.e., Appendix Figures 2, 3, 4), shows the dagger fully penetrating through the pillar. Was Jing Ke strong enough to make the dagger pierce the bronze pillar? Wu Hung agrees with Wang that this image is an expressive embellishment of the Jing Ke lore.Footnote ¹⁵⁷ Modern archaeological discoveries suggest that the Qin dynasty palace was made of a mixture of earth and wood, and most of its pillars were wooden and placed on top of the foundation stones.Footnote ¹⁵⁸ This finding gives us a new understanding of the nature of the pillar. It was likely made of wood, precisely tung wood, and so “bronze pillar” tongzhu 銅柱 is likely a corruption of “tung pillar” tongzhu 桐柱. While it might seem impossible that a dagger would penetrate a chi deep into a bronze pillar, it might be possible for a wooden pillar.

The third noticeable difference is that in the huaxiang shi, a guard is holding Jing Ke (see Appendix Figures 7, 11, and 12), preventing him from committing the assassination. The transmitted texts do not describe any such intervention. As matter of fact, Qin law prohibited anyone with a weapon from entering the court. As the Zhanguo ce records, “It was the law in Qin that groups of courtiers in the court were not allowed to hold even short weapons. The imperial guards with weapons all took their positions outside the main hall.” (秦法，羣臣侍殿上者，不得持尺兵。諸郎中執兵，皆陳殿下).Footnote ¹⁵⁹ If there were no warriors in the main hall, how could one get hold of Jing Ke so quickly?

The fourth major difference between the transmitted texts and the huaxiang shi concerns Qin Wuyang. The transmitted texts record that Qin Wuyang trembled in the Qin court, so he was not allowed to enter the hall to approach the king. However, in the huaxiang shi (see Appendix Figures 18, 19, and 20), Qin Wuyang appears next to Jing Ke. These huaxiang shi also depict Qin Wuyang as much smaller than the other figures, and he is often huddled, crouching, or prostrating on the ground. The contrast between Jing Ke and the other two figures highlights the superior courage of Jing Ke. The huaxiang shi is an exaggeration of the historical narrative, reflecting how Jing Ke’s assassination attempt was understood outside of official contexts.