2.1. Truth-based argument for anti-pragmatism

The anti-pragmatist might take the connection between belief and truth to make their case. Specifically, consider:

The most controversial of the three premises (and the one I will deny in section 4.1) is (i). Nevertheless, the thesis that a belief is correct iff it is true is highly plausible and widely held. Jim Joyce (Reference Joyce1998) writes:

Alvin Goldman (Reference Goldman1999, Reference Goldman2001, Reference Goldman2015) has defended something similar for many years, calling it ‘veritism’Footnote ¹⁴:

2.2. Deliberation-based argument for anti-pragmatism

Shah (Reference Shah2006) argues against the existence of any practical reasons for belief based on the claim that when we deliberate about whether to believe p, we only consider whether p is true. Any thought that it is beneficial to believe p does not seem to be capable of guiding our deliberation. Add a principle such as ‘if a consideration cannot guide an agent's deliberation about whether to believe p then it cannot be a reason to believe p’, and anti-pragmatism follows. The argument can be reconstructed as (with the names Shah uses for closely related theses in parentheses)Footnote ¹⁵:

The conclusion entails anti-pragmatism (i.e. all reasons for belief are epistemic reasons). Specifically, the conclusion entails the version of anti-pragmatism that says that all reasons for belief are constituted by evidence (other versions of anti-pragmatism might connect reasons for belief with epistemic justification, truth, or knowledge).

2.3. Simplicity argument for austere pragmatism

Let's move on to two arguments for austere pragmatism. Rinard (Reference Rinard2017) suggests that positing epistemic reasons for belief would be metaphysically profligateFootnote ¹⁶:

The idea is that it is widely agreed that there are practical reasons e.g. for action. Given that one is already committed to practical reasons, it is simpler to use practical reasons to explain reasons to believe as opposed to positing some new type of reason. The result is austere pragmatism.

2.4. Univocality argument for austere pragmatism

A related, but separable argument is that rationality should speak with one voice. That is, there is always a single answer to the questions: what should I do? Or, what should I believe? And only austere pragmatism delivers this result.Footnote ¹⁷ Rinard writes:

Thus the argument seems to be that rationality provides guidance, providing guidance requires univocality, and univocality requires austere pragmatism.

2.5. Combinatorial argument against pluralism

Finally, there is an argument against pluralism that arises from the interaction of epistemic and practical reasons. Berker (Reference Berker2018) argues that purported practical reasons for belief exhibit permissive balancing, whereas epistemic reasons for belief exhibit prohibitive balancing.

Berker considers and rejects various ways of allowing practical and epistemic reasons to interact, and argues that none succeed. Berker accepts that there are epistemic reasons for belief, and so concludes that there are no practical reasons for belief (anti-pragmatism).

Obviously this does not exhaust the arguments against pluralism. But I take them to be a representative sample of the most influential arguments that pluralists need to engage with. Next I will introduce the semantic machinery that I will use to defend pluralism.

3.1. Propositions/possible worlds

The first parameter is a modal base that determines a proposition or set of live possible worlds. The live worlds are those compatible with the modal base. If the modal base is empty then all worlds are live. As the modal base grows, the set of live worlds is restricted. On the standard theory of modals (Kratzer Reference Kratzer, Eikmeyer and Rieser1981), ‘it must be that p’ means, roughly, that in all the live worlds, p.

The modal base need not correspond to the beliefs of the subject of the sentence. We can allow that the modal base consists of the beliefs of the subject of the sentence, or the speaker, or some third party or the collective beliefs of a group, or the propositions known by any of the former, or any of these plus a number of fixed propositions, and endless further options. This parameter is often called the ‘information set’, but using information here is too restrictive as information is naturally taken to imply truth. We can allow that the modal base includes falsehoods.

I mention the modal base because it is part of the standard semantics, but it will play no role in my argument. We can remain neutral on whether the modal base varies with context.

3.2. Standard/goal

The second parameter is a standard or goal that determines an ordering of the live possible worlds. The standard proposal is that ‘S ought to A’ is true iff S A's in every live world are at the top of the ranking. Although the semantics literature focuses on ‘ought’ I take contextualism about all normative terms to follow naturally. For example, if what you ought to do is relative to a goal, it is natural to say that what reasons you have are relative to a goal.Footnote ¹⁹

The standard need not be one that the subject cares about. If I say ‘you ought to start with the cutlery on the outer edge’, the standard might be the rules of etiquette. The more explicit sentence is ‘by standards of etiquette, you ought to start with the cutlery on the outer edge’. This sentence can remain true even if you don't care about etiquette. This allows us to say to the psychopath ‘you shouldn't kill people’; the full sentence is ‘by standards of morality, you shouldn't kill people’, which is true even if the psychopath doesn't care about morality.

For our purposes we only need to distinguish two standards: those corresponding to the epistemic ought and the practical ought. The epistemic ought determines a ranking of worlds based on which is epistemically best. We can get a grip on the epistemic ought by thinking about contexts where the conversation concerns some epistemic standard such as having true beliefs. Typical sentences might be ‘you ought to be uncertain’, or ‘we ought to expect defeat’. Again, the standard need not be one that the subject cares about, so we need not assume that agents care about any epistemic goals.

There is disagreement about what the epistemic standard is. Leading contenders for epistemic standards include having beliefs that are (a) true, (b) justified, and (c) knowledge. The differences between these positions won't matter here, so we remain neutral. And we can remain neutral on whether the standard (e.g. truth) is constitutive of belief or whether something can be a belief without having such a standard.

This brings us to the practical ought. The practical ought determines a ranking of worlds based on which is practically best. We can get a grip on the practical ought by thinking about contexts where the conversation concerns what is best to do. Typical sentences might be ‘you ought to stay in school’ or ‘should I boil or steam the vegetables?’.

There is also disagreement about what the practical standard is. Humeans might hold that the practical standard is grounded in one's desires. Non-Humeans might hold that the practical standard is grounded in objective value. There are further debates about whether the practical standard is to maximize actual value or expected value, and whether expected value is determined by beliefs or evidence. We can remain neutral on these issues.

We can leave open whether there are other standards. For example, one might argue that there is a moral standard, according to which holding beliefs can be morally good or bad. Positing a moral standard for belief seems to me at least as plausible as positing a practical standard for belief, so I will use moral standards occasionally in examples below. (Notice that we could incorporate a moral standard into a practical standard e.g. if agents care about morality then a Humean practical standard could include a moral standard.)

Someone might object that standards could be multiplied arbitrarily. For example, perhaps there is an aesthetic standard giving aesthetic reasons for belief. And perhaps there are similar standards for the coolest belief, or the zaniest belief. The objection would be that the contextualist has no way to block this implausible explosion of standards.Footnote ²⁰

In response, I agree that the semantics allows arbitrary standards, but it doesn't follow that the English word ‘ought’ can be relativized to arbitrary standards. Of course, one could easily introduce such a standard, but the resulting ‘ought’ would be a new word, not a word of our language.

We can also remain neutral on whether there are further parameters that determine the content beyond standards and propositions. For example, Carr (Reference Carr2015) argues that ‘ought’ must be relativized to a decision rule. This may be so, but it will not play a role below.

We need not be committed to any further details of Kratzer's theory. Indeed, contextualism is not the only way to generate the semantic variation I will use. One alternative is a polysemic theory according to which ‘ought’ has multiple meanings.Footnote ²¹ I think contextualism is more plausible given the wide range of meanings that would need to be posited, but my arguments do not depend on using contextualism. I use contextualism for concreteness, but if you have a preferred alternative semantic theory you should be able to plug it into my arguments.

4.1 Truth-based argument for anti-pragmatism

Recall the argument for anti-pragmatism based on the connection between belief and truth:

But contextualists will happily reject that (i) truth is the sole norm of belief. What is correct/best depends on the goals in the context. In a context where some practical goal is at stake, we can assess how well believing that P promotes the practical goal. Such practical goals explain the arguments for the existence of practical reasons to believe that we saw in section 2. Some argue that we have practical reasons to believe in God.Footnote ²³ Some argue that we have moral reasons not to have racist beliefs.Footnote ²⁴ Some argue that that we have moral reasons to have positive beliefs about our friends.Footnote ²⁵ Some argue that high stakes provide reasons not to believe.Footnote ²⁶

Contextualism predicts and explains the conflict between the truth norm and these arguments. It is plausible that truth is the sole norm of belief given the epistemic goal.Footnote ²⁷ But if we open things up and allow other goals then we can reject the claim that truth is the sole norm of belief. (An objector might bang the table and ask ‘Is the belief correct?’. But the contextualist will reject the question, holding that beliefs are correct or incorrect only relative to goals.)

4.2. Deliberation-based argument for anti-pragmatism

Recall Shah's (Reference Shah2006) argument against practical reasons:

But the deliberative constraint is not compelling. Shah gives the following argument for it:

Shah's defence of (4) is based on Williams' (Reference Williams and Harrison1979) influential argument that ‘the function of reasons is to guide agents’ (Shah: 486). Very roughly, Williams argues that if an agent has no motivation to join the army and is not capable of being guided by purported reasons in favour joining the army, then the agent has no reasons to join the army.

But Williams' claim is highly controversial, and there are numerous purported counter-examples involving reasons that cannot guide agents. One counter-example is that of psychopaths who are not moved by moral reasons, but of whom we are inclined to say that they have moral reasons not to kill people.

Another counter-example in which there seem to be reasons that cannot guide is the problem of surprise partiesFootnote ²⁸:

The fact that there is a surprise party waiting for him at home is a reason for Nate to go home, but this reason cannot guide him. If the fact that there were a party at home were guiding Nate's deliberation then the surprise would be ruined and Nate would not have this reason to go home.

Another type of counter-example comes from the truth norm e.g. a belief is correct iff it is true.Footnote ²⁹ Assuming a plausible connection between what is correct and what we have reason to believe, it follows that the fact that some proposition p is true is a reason to believe it.Footnote ³⁰ And, arguably, such reasons cannot guide, as in order to be guided I must first form a belief as to whether p; but that was the very question I wanted guidance on! Once I have formed a belief as to whether p, I simply do not need such guidance anymore. Furthermore, the only guidance I would receive would be to continue believing, as my belief that p implies that I think that p is true.

What does all this have to do with contextualism? Contextualism can explain the intuitive appeal of Williams' view that the function of reasons is to guide agents, as well as the counter-examples. Specifically, reasons guide agents in some contexts. In fact, we can specify what the modal base and goal parameters must be in order for reasons to be able to guide agents.

First, the modal base must contain no more than the beliefs of the agent. Thus, if an agent has not determined whether it is true that p, the modal base cannot determine whether it is true that p. So if the agent has not formed a belief about whether p (is true) then the modal base cannot include the claim that p (is true). Similarly, if Nate does not believe that there is a surprise party waiting for him then the modal base cannot include the proposition that there is a surprise party waiting for him. Second, the goal must be a goal of the agent. If a psychopath does not have the goal of behaving morally then they cannot be guided by moral reasons.

The counter-examples above are all cases where the parameters being invoked do not match the goals and beliefs of the agents. However, in common uses of reasons talk, the parameters invoked do match the goals and beliefs of the agent, and so the reasons can guide the agent. We rarely engage in moral discussions with psychopaths. And if we were to realize that this is what we were doing we would stop, as we would recognize that our moral goals are not shared by the psychopath.

The upshot is that contextualism explains why the deliberation-based argument for anti-pragmatism is tempting, but why it ultimately fails. It fails because it is too strong to say that the function of reasons is to guide agents. Where speakers invoke parameters of modal base or goal that do not match the agent's beliefs and goals, there are reasons that cannot guide the agent. But in typical conversations where reasons talk is used – about whether we have good reasons to be vegetarian, or study for exams, or get some exercise – the parameters invoked in the conversation do match the beliefs and goals of the agent, and the reasons will be able to guide.

4.3 Simplicity argument for austere pragmatism

Recall Rinard (Reference Rinard2017) argues that epistemic reasons for belief would be metaphysically profligate. I think the best response is to agree with the letter of Rinard's objection, but downplay its significance. That is, the pluralist does end up with a more complicated normative theory than the Austere Pragmatist, but the complication is not troubling.Footnote ³¹

The first thing to say is that parsimony is never a fatal objection by itself. Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. If a more complex theory is needed to explain the phenomena, so be it. My position is that the more complicated pluralist theory is needed, and the extra complications are anyway not significant.

Let's first get clear on the way in which pluralism is complicated. Distinguish ontological and ideological parsimony (Quine Reference Quine1948; Sider Reference Sider2013). Ontological parsimony concerns parsimony with respect to things posited by a theory, while ideological parsimony concerns parsimony with respect to concepts, or primitive concepts, employed by a theory.

Start with ontological parsimony. Is pluralism ontologically complex? I suggest not. Pluralism posits various standards or goals, but surely everyone posits such standards or goals. For example, even the austere pragmatist will posit a standard of etiquette. The difference is that the austere pragmatist will not use this standard in their normative theory. So perhaps the austere pragmatist will claim the virtue of having an ontologically simpler normative theory. But this does not seem to be a significant virtue. The overall worldview of the austere pragmatist and the pluralist is the same – both are committed to various standards. The pluralist is using tools that are already available, and this does not seem to be metaphysically costly.

Is pluralism ideologically complex? Pluralists certainly have more complex normative concepts i.e. concepts with a hidden parameter. But this extra complexity is independently supported by work in semantics. It would not be very convincing for the philosopher to say to the linguist ‘no thank you, your concepts are too complicated, I prefer my own simpler concepts’.

It is worth comparing contextualism about knowledge. The contextualist about knowledge says that ‘S knows P’ has a hidden parameter, such as a set of relevant alternatives. So the sentence is more fully expressed as ‘S knows P given alternatives Q’. This is of course a more complex theory, but it is noteworthy that few philosophers have criticized contextualism for being either ontologically or ideologically profligate. I suspect that this is for the reasons just discussed. The contextualist is using an ontology that the non-contextualist should admit exists e.g. alternatives; and the more complex ideology is independently motivated by semantics.

The extra complexity would be troubling if these plural normative goals came with some heavy-duty metaphysics attached. One form of heavy-duty metaphysics says that normative goals necessarily motivate us. Another, related, form of heavy-duty metaphysics is non-naturalism, which might leave us committed to one form of non-natural facts corresponding to practical reasons, and another form of non-natural facts corresponding to epistemic reasons. But neither type of metaphysics is needed here.

In fact, the pluralist could well make a case that they have a pleasingly simple theory, as they offer a reductive naturalistic normative theory in terms of goals and modal bases (Finlay Reference Finlay2014), promising to solve what Frank Jackson (Reference Jackson1998) called the location problem – the problem of finding a place to put troublesome ideas such as ‘ought’ and ‘reason’ in a physical world. If we cannot solve this problem we might have to posit normativity as a fundamental part of the world; in offering a reductive theory in terms of goals, we retain a simpler naturalistic theory of the world. But I should stress that contextualism does not entail naturalism. As a semantic theory, contextualism is compatible with any metaphysics.

This is a good place to point out that pluralism is neutral on whether there is a metaphysically privileged sense of ‘ought’ that has authority. Alex Worsnip writes:

If there is a metaphysically privileged sense of ‘ought’ that has authority then the anti-pragmatism vs pragmatism debate can return as a debate about which ‘ought’ is authoritative. I offer no arguments against this here. But positing a metaphysically privileged sense of ‘ought’ brings with it familiar metaphysical (what makes it privileged?) and epistemic problems (how do we know it is privileged?).Footnote ³² The contextualist need have no such problems, and can explain that it is natural to think that there is a metaphysically privileged sense of ‘ought’ because the parameters are usually implicit.Footnote ³³

4.4. Univocality argument for austere pragmatism

The univocality argument is that rationality should speak with one voice. Rinard motivated univocality by emphasizing that we look to rationality for guidance, which suggests that there is always a single answer to the questions: what should I do? Or, what should I believe?

Here the pluralist can simply deny that rationality always provides guidance. Consider cases where there is a conflict between moral and prudential reasons.

Is there a fact of the matter about whether you should sacrifice yourself? I have no inclination to say yes. I can just about see that ethics might provide an answer in terms of most-ethical-thing-to-do, but not that rationality will provide an answer in terms of overall-most-rational-thing-to-do. So it seems that there are cases where rationality does not provide guidance.

Furthermore, pluralism can explain the sense of irresolvability we sometimes feel when faced with such choices. There might be a fact about what we ought to do given some particular practical goal, and there might be a fact about what we ought to do given the ethical goal, but there is no fact about what we ought to do simpliciter.

4.5. Combinatorial argument against pluralism

Berker (Reference Berker2018) argues that purported practical reasons for belief exhibit permissive balancing, whereas epistemic reasons for belief exhibit prohibitive balancing, and that there is no acceptable way to combine practical and epistemic reasons. Berker's response is to reject practical reasons for belief.

But there is only a problem if we expect there to be a way to combine practical and epistemic reasons. Pluralism says that there are practical reasons and epistemic reasons, but does not say that there is a way to combine them. In fact, the contextualist theory suggests that there is no way to combine them, as the normative words have different meanings (content). There is the question of what one ought-given-the-practical-goal to believe, and the question of what one ought-given-the-epistemic-goal to believe, and there is no presumption that there will be a question of what one ought-overall to believe. As noted in section 4.4, the contextualist can posit such an ‘ought’, but has little motivation to do so.

Again, compare contextualism about knowledge. The contextualist says that we know-in-a-normal-context that we have hands, and that we don't know-in-a-sceptical-context that we have hands, but there is no presumption that there will be a question of what one knows-simpliciter. The contextualist can reject that question as ill-formed. Similarly, the normative contextualist can explain why it is so difficult to combine epistemic and practical reasons – it is because the question of what one ought to believe simpliciter is ill-formed.