The hard problem of consciousness

While the question of the relation of consciousness to matter has been of central interest to philosophers through the ages, since the mid-1990s, a particular articulation of the problem – the hard problem of consciousness – has gained currency in analytic philosophy of mind. Directed at the physicalists (and scientific) theories of consciousness, Chalmers (Reference Chalmers1995) drew a distinction between two problems of consciousness. First is the problem of explaining the mechanisms of various cognitive functions, such as reportability, discrimination, access to information, and so on, which he dubbed the (relatively) ‘easy’ problems of consciousness. These problems, he noted, seemed directly susceptible to the methods of cognitive science. On the other hand, there is the problem of accounting for subjective, conscious experience – the question of why some of these cognitive functions were accompanied by experience, ‘why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion?’ (Chalmers Reference Chalmers1995, 201, emphasis added) This, he called the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness (henceforth, HPC).

The explanandum that the HPC is concerned with is the subject-level consciousness of humans and other organisms (and artificial entities, if there are any that are conscious). Such consciousness is typically: (i) phenomenal: possesses qualities that have a what-it-is-like-for-me aspect accessible through introspective contrast (i.e. seeing green vs. blue), and subject contrast (i.e. for Anand vs. for Siddharth); (ii) the phenomenal component that accompanies an organism/artificial entity’s intentional states.

It is common for philosophers to distinguish between the phenomenality and intentionality of consciousness; and often, the two problems are dealt with separately.Footnote ³ Nevertheless, a solution to the hard problem ought to explain phenomenal consciousness in a manner that does not render intentionality a mystery – a satisfactory account, in addition to explaining how and why human mentality sometimes has phenomenal consciousness, also ought to be able to explain how and why such phenomenal states are also intentional. Such phenomenal-intentional consciousness of subjects is what HPC is concerned with.

As noted earlier, the HPC is primarily directed at materialists. Anti-materialist arguments abound in the literature in philosophy of mind; and some of them have evoked a huge amount of responses and discussion (e.g. Jackson’s (Reference Jackson1982) knowledge argument, Searle’s (Reference Searle1980) Chinese room argument, and Chalmers’s (Reference Chalmers2010) conceivability/zombie argument). Chalmers (Reference Chalmers and Warfield2003) uses these anti-materialist arguments to categorize the different positions in the debates surrounding HPC. While it may not be possible to discuss these in detail here, it is important to note that most of the early discussions around these arguments and the hard problem of consciousness focused mostly on various materialist positions and the debates over theories of conceivability. The self and its role in an answer to HPC hardly figured in these debates. However, with increased prominence of views such as Russellian monism and panpsychism,Footnote ⁴ there has been increased talk of the self in the discussion. One specific question featuring the self in such discussions is in relation to the twin problems of combination and de-combination of subjects facing panpsychism.

In the current discourse, two kinds of panpsychist views have been identified. First, one can hold that the micro-level is fundamental, which then entails that consciousness of macroentities such as human being, dogs, and cats derives from the consciousness of microphysical entities such as electrons and quarks. Such views are referred to as micropsychism (e.g. Strawson Reference Strawson2006). On the other hand, one might take the cosmos-as-a-whole to be the fundamental entity, with all other concrete entities deriving from the cosmos. On such a view, the consciousness of humans, dogs, and cats derive from the cosmos’s consciousness. Such views are referred to as cosmopsychism (e.g. Shani Reference Shani2015; Nagasawa and Wager Reference Nagasawa, Wager, Brüntrup and Jaskolla2016; Goff Reference Goff2017; Shani and Keppler Reference Shani and Keppler2018).

Both micropsychism and cosmopsychism face the challenge of explaining how macro-consciousness (of humans and other conscious organisms) derives from fundamental consciousness. In the case of micropsychists, it takes the form of the combination problem, of explaining how micro-consciousness of electrons, quarks and so on combine to form the consciousness of humans and so on.Footnote ⁵ In the case of cosmopsychists, it is the de-combination problem, of explaining how universal consciousness de-combines and individuates into the multiple macro-consciousness.Footnote ⁶

In both these, it is the combination/de-combination of subjectivity that is especially tricky. Subjects of experience seem to possess two characteristics – ontological privacy, such that its contents are not experienced by other subjects; and ontological unity, such that they are single thing in their very being, and not just as a matter of convention.Footnote ⁷ Given these features, combination of subjects seems impossible, claim the proponents of the subject combination problem. If a composite subject were to come into existence, in addition to the microsubjects, it would be a totally new fact, as Willian James (Reference James1890) famously noted. Similarly, the de-combination of the universal subject of experience into ‘smaller’ subjects also seems unintelligible.

The panpsychist discourse is thus forced to confront the challenge of explaining the human subject-of-experience, even if they do not discuss the self as such. If the question of the subject of experience is central to explaining what HPC is concerned with – intentional, qualitative subject-level phenomenal-consciousness – it seems fair to say that HPC is concerned with questions of both why at all there are selves, and why and how selves are intentionally and phenomenally conscious in the what-it-is-like-for-me sense. After all, HPC is not focused on explaining why there is phenomenal consciousness outside of entities that are subjects of experience. While views such as contemporary panpsychism posit consciousness at the fundamental level to explain human consciousness, the primary goal is not an explanation for the former but the latter. The HPC can hence also be understood as the question of why and how a self is intentionally and phenomenally conscious.

Thus, to address the twin problems of combination/de-combination facing panpsychism, we must inquire into the nature of subjects, which leads us to discussing the nature of the self. Such a discussion, it is hoped, would enable the panpsychist to explain how one can get from fundamental consciousness – micro-consciousness or universal consciousness – to non-fundamental, phenomenal-intentional consciousness of humans and other organisms, and thus provide a satisfactory answer to the HPC.

As Vaidya (Reference Vaidyaforthcoming) notes, we can ask three kinds of questions about the combination/de-combination problems. First is the question of modal coherence – whether the very idea of combination of micro-conscious entities to form a macro-conscious entity (or analogously, the de-combination from a universal consciousness to a macro-consciousness) is a coherent one. Second is the question of mechanical generation, pertaining to the mechanisms that bring about such combination/de-combination. Finally, one can also ask the question of purpose or metaphysical explanation – why does such a combination/de-combination even occur?

Various classical Indian philosophies seek to answer some version of all the three questions. Our focus is on two Vedāntic views, Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita.

Consciousness in classical Indian philosophy

There exist a wide variety of views on consciousness among the various schools and sub-schools of classical Indian philosophy. The only wholly materialist school is that of the Cārvākas (Gokhale Reference Gokhale2015); the others hold views that can be understood as forms of dualism, idealism, or panpsychism. Among these, among the most prominent are the various schools of Vedānta, many of which are also theistic. All schools of Vedānta are committed to the Upaniṣadic insight that the ultimate ontological ground of all reality is a single conscious entity, Brahman, with everything else – the universe of sentient and non-sentient entities – deriving from it. This allows for interpreting at least some of the Vedāntic schools as forms of cosmopsychism. Further, in laying out their metaphysics, these schools sought to answer some version of all the three questions: modal coherence, mechanical generation, and metaphysical explanation.

Here, a point to note: while a particular Vedāntic tradition may posit some kind of universal consciousness, and on its basis address the combination/de-combination problem, it may not necessarily address HPC, for it is not clear if the kind of consciousness they are discussing applies to HPC. For example, per the proponents of SAV, consciousness is to be distinguished from the content of consciousness. Metaphorically speaking, the light that illumines an object is different from the object that is illuminated. Consciousness is only the light, ‘in itself it is devoid of any content or structure and can never become an object’ (Fasching Reference Fasching2021, 679). Such an understanding of consciousness is different from how it usually is understood (as qualia) in discussions surrounding HPC.

Nevertheless, this does not mean SAV’s theory of consciousness is not relevant to HPC. Typically, most Advaitins contend that the essence of Brahman is prakāśa (illumination/manifestation) (Gupta Reference Gupta2003, 103). Illumination consciousness here can be understood as subjectivity qua subjectivity – a locus of consciousness that experiences some what-it-is-like qualities, without reference to any specific qualitative content. Fasching (Reference Fasching2021) argues that a solution to the HPC is dependent on a theory of illumination consciousness of the sort provided by SAV. That is, we need to think about the kind of consciousness SAV discusses to make sense of qualia in HPC. However, even if we were to agree with Fasching, it is not clear if SAV’s theory of illumination consciousness alone can provide a satisfactory answer to HPC; nor is it clear that SAV is even the best Vedāntic view that can contribute to a theory of phenomenal consciousness. Other sub-schools, often in tension with SAV, such as Rāmānuja’s Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, also employ the concept, and might be better suited for our purposes.

The hard problem of the self

Similar to HPC, one can formulate the HPS – the task of explaining how the self fits into a unified picture of reality, the kinds of knowledge that we can have of it, and how such knowledge can lead us to liberation. Some version of HPS has been the central intellectual problem for many classical Indian schools, including the various Buddhist and Vedāntic schools.

Vaidya (Reference Vaidyaforthcoming) suggests that we can understand the HPS in terms of the illusion-trade-off question: which illusion, if any, should we accept – the self, consciousness or both? There are primarily two kinds of things that can be said to be illusory in HPS: (a) the self and (b) consciousness. Both these concepts, and other ones central to our purpose (such as ‘reality’, ‘illusion’, etc.) have been understood in various different ways across traditions.Footnote ⁸ These differences aside, if we were to foreground the illusion trade-off question, we can distinguish between four kinds of responses to HPS:

We may not have the space to expand on this taxonomy here; nevertheless, it provides a useful framework to understand and contrast various views, including SAV and RVV.

What kind of cosmopsychism?

Rāmānuja* is a cosmopsychist because he holds that all all-reality-considered-together (or the cosmos) is one conscious substance – Brahman or the supreme person with all its essential and non-essential attributes; the other entities in the cosmos derive their existence from the One. To clarify further, we would like to distinguish between two kinds of panpsychist claims, actual and modal.

Since consciousness could have different meanings, these versions are not mutually exclusive. Rāmānuja* is an actual panpsychist (cosmopsychist) when consciousness is understood as illumination consciousness, for in this view, everything’s inner controller is Brahman who is the source of illumination consciousness. However, Rāmānuja* is only a modal panpsychist (and not an actual panpsychist) when consciousness is understood in its phenomenal sense, for everything in the universe, by virtue of possessing illumination consciousness is potentially phenomenally conscious, while only some entities (humans, etc.) possess dharmabhūtajñāna or intentional-phenomenological-knowledge that is an attribute of the self (and are hence actually phenomenally conscious).

Drawing this distinction between illumination and phenomenal consciousness also allows us to examine and characterize Rāmānuja* in other useful ways. Rāmānuja* is a cosmopsychist about illumination consciousness, for he holds that the substrate of the cosmos-as-a-whole possesses illumination consciousness, from which the illumination consciousness of a finite-self derives. However, this does not entail that he is a cosmopsychist about phenomenal consciousness as well. For example, one might even have good reasons to be a micropsychist about phenomenal consciousness, wherein the phenomenal-intentional properties of finite selves derive from the phenomenal properties of microentities. Or, for any finite-self to have phenomenal consciousness, it must reside in that neighbourhood of reality where there are phenomenal properties, and it must have the capacity through its finite being to instantiate phenomenal properties (which it would by virtue of deriving its illumination consciousness from the Supreme person).

Thus, per Rāmānuja*, everything is dependent on and is a fragment of the cosmic consciousness, a singular entity, a single substance that exists with a nature of illumination consciousness, changeless and eternal. However, there are other realities – perhaps some neighbourhoods of Reality – that do change and instantiate phenomenal properties. What phenomenal properties and how they are realized depend on the reality a finite-self inhabits.

What kind of panentheism?

Rāmānuja* is a panentheist because everything is dependent on, and in the reality that is Brahman, the supreme person. Rāmānuja was able, in part through his distinctive use of the metaphor of the ‘body’, to elaborate a theology according to which the universe is an inseparable attribute of Brahman, with Brahman also being the universe’s material and efficient cause, as well as its inner controller. Brahman thus retains a causal asymmetry and independence in certain crucial respects (Barua Reference Barua2010, 4). Rāmānuja* can adopt this position.

What kind of freedom?

Rāmānuja held that individual selves are agents, who can act freely. However, he also held that Brahman is the inner controller of all entities, including individual selves. How Rāmānuja reconciles the two, and to what extent he is successful, is a matter of debate (Ganeri Reference Ganeri, Dasti and Bryant2014). The gist of his approach is as follows: Each individual self, by the power bestowed upon it by Brahman, is able to act freely as an agent. Brahman here is only an enabler. One way in which Rāmānuja does this is by holding that Brahman only gives consent (anumati) to an individual self’s free actions. Such consent, while necessary, is not sufficient for the action to have taken place – the free choice of the individual self is a necessary component too. Rāmānuja draws an analogy to the joint-ownership of an asset by two persons – one cannot sell it without the consent of the other; nevertheless, if the first seller convinces the other owner and obtains the latter’s consent, the credit (analogous to karma) is due to the former alone (Śrī Bhāṣya, 2.3.6.41, Raǹgācharya and Aiyangār Reference Raǹgācharya and Aiyangār1965, 122–123; Ganeri Reference Ganeri, Dasti and Bryant2014).

Rāmānuja* can borrow this framework and hold that Brahman is the energetic source of all action, by virtue of Brahman being the inner controller of all entities. However, Brahman need not determine how any individual will use their energy. Without Brahman’s energy, all is lost. However, the supreme person’s energy does not by itself make the events of the world happen as they do; rather, only finite parts of Brahman do this, by inhabiting a nested reality – a reality that is suffused by Brahman. The following analogy might help make this clearer.

The analogy of the electric bus for the self: we all inhabit a finite material bus in the ordinary world. The bus needs electricity to move or do anything at all – even resting and staying stationary requires energy. In receiving energy, we can choose what to do with it, be that good or evil. We are given energy by virtue of our nature; and the bus we inhabit is connected to something larger, that is energy. Our connection to energy is not one of numerical identity, but as a modification of a part or fragment of the totality of energy, The redness of a rose is not identical to what the rose is, in the way in which each of us are self-identical. Similarly, each of us is not identical to the totality of energy.

We have the choice to do what we want to do with the energy available to us, given our dependence relation. While we depend on energy for existence, nothing that comes from the totality of energy wholly determines what we do with it. We can use it to turn the bus left, right, go straight or around in circles. We can use it to stop the bus. We are in control of the bus, but without the energy we are dependent on we can do nothing, not even exist.

If anything can be done, it is because there is energy. Perhaps, what is done ought to be within the bounds of the laws that govern energy. However, energy does not determine what will be done.

What kind of knowledge?

Rāmānuja conceptualizes knowledge as an attribute of the finite self, as encapsulated in the concept of dharmabhūtajñāna. Self and its knowledge are distinct yet inseparable. It is the nature of knowledge to reveal something about its object, but by itself it cannot know. It is the nature of the self to know what is revealed by its attribute, knowledge.

Since knowledge is only an attribute of the self, a self’s knowledge can change over time without any change in the self’s essential nature. Thus, Rāmānuja* ought to hold that the self’s knowledge contracts and expands and gets modified in various ways, depending on the neighbourhood of reality that the self is located in, and the various causal networks it is enmeshed in at any given time. Change is real, and the attributes that change are also real.

Goff vs. Rāmānuja* vs. SAV

Based on the criteria that Goff outlines for a theory of consciousness, we can compare the three cosmopsychist views. First, it seems that SAV is the weakest, for it simply denies the reality of local or limited subjects and ultimately accepts as real only the single cosmic consciousness devoid of any relations. Phenomenal properties, including those that humans possess, are not absolutely real, but real only relative to the limited (and ultimately illusory) self that we are. Further, SAV’s posit that the complex reality that we seem to inhabit is ultimately not real also entails that the knowledge we obtain through the sciences do not correspond to reality but are only relatively real at best. For these reasons, both RVV* and Goff’s HC offer better prospects of a solution to the hard problem of consciousness.

RVV* and Goff’s accounts are both prima facie equally compatible with science. In terms of their accounts of phenomenal properties that human subjects experience, the two views differ. As we saw in the previous section, RVV* accounts for this in terms of the neighbourhood of reality that a limited-self inhabits, while Goff (Reference Goff2024) accounts for it in terms of the phenomenal properties that a local subject inherits from the cosmic subject’s phenomenal properties. At this juncture, we have no reason to think that one is better than the other.

It is on its account of the local subject that we think RVV* holds a significant advantage over Goff’s HC. Goff is required to posit strong emergence to explain how local subjects come into existence from the cosmic subject. This would require further fundamental laws that prescribe the conditions under which such emergence can occur. RVV*, on the other hand, is not required to posit strong emergence, for the limited selves are not individual substances that have an existence separate from the supreme person, but only attributes of the supreme person that derive their illumination consciousness from the latter. To the extent that RVV* does not have to posit strong emergence and additional fundamental laws, it has an advantage over HC.

RVV* also holds an advantage in terms of how well it can account for the possibility of human freedom. The limited-self derives from the supreme person only illumination consciousness; its phenomenal properties are derived not from the phenomenal properties of the cosmic subject – as is the case in Goff’s view – but dependent on the neighbourhood of reality that it inhabits. More importantly, like the electric bus, the limited self has the freedom to decide what it does with the energy and the capacity to instantiate phenomenal properties, which is only partly determined by the neighbourhood of reality it inhabits. On the other hand, in Goff’s view, the phenomenal properties of a human self are inherited from the cosmic self; and hence, it is not clear the extent to which a such a self has the freedom to act.

Other realist Indian cosmopsychisms

As noted earlier, while Advaita has been the school of Indian philosophy that was first brought into dialogue with analytic cosmopsychism, there are a few other works that engage with views of other philosophers and schools. Among these, the most sustained has been Swami Medhananda’s works engaging the modern, realistic Vedānta of Swami Vivekananda and Sri Aurobindo with analytic cosmopsychism (Medhananda, Reference Medhananda2022b, Reference Medhananda2022a, Reference Medhananda2024). While an in-depth comparison between RVV* with these views would be most valuable, such an exercise is beyond the scope of this article. In what follows, we offer some points of similarities and differences, and possible ways in which RVV* might hold an advantage over these views.

Both Swami Vivekananda and Sri Aurobindo contend that contrary to the classical Advaitic view (of Śaṅkara), the world of plural individual selves and material reality are not ultimately illusory; rather, they are manifestations of the divine cosmic consciousness, wherein the individuation into plurality occurs on account of their divine play (līlā), through a mechanism of involution and evolution. To the extent that they are realist about the universe, they are similar to RVV and RVV*. However, there are some key differences. Swami Medhananda interprets both Swami Vivekananda and Sri Aurobindo’s views as versions of opaque cosmopsychism – the conscious experiences of individual selves are not transparent to the cosmic subject (hence opaque). This, he contends, allows them to address the de-combination/individuation problem. Per Swami Medhananda (Reference Medhananda2024), the individuation problem arises only in the case of transparent cosmopsychism; only then will one have to explain how the same conscious experiences (of individual selves) be experienced by two subjects – the respective individual self and the cosmic subject. If one eschews transparency in favour of opacity, one does not need to contend with this problem.

However, in our evaluation, this is not the case. The de-combination/individuation problem arises in a different way in the case of opaque views. If, as noted earlier, the individual self enjoys ontological privacy – such that its contents are not experienced by other subjects – and is an ontological unity, how can it be a ‘part’ of or grounded in another unity (the cosmic subject)? Further, to address the de-combination problem, it is not enough to explain the mechanism through which such opaqueness comes about; one is also required to account for the very possibility of such opaque subjects deriving from other opaque subjects. Or, in the terminology we introduced earlier, the really hard part of the de-combination problem is the modal coherence question – is the derivation of ontologically private subjects from other subjects at all possible – and not just the mechanical generation question. Swami Medhananda does not address this issue in his interpretation of Sri Aurobindo and Swami Vivekananda’s views.

RVV*, following RVV, can adopt transparency, and admit that an individual self’s conscious experiences are available to the cosmic subject as well. This is not a problem, for the limited selves are not full individuals that have an existence separate from the supreme person but are only attributes of the supreme person that derive their illumination consciousness from the latter. Given this, they do not have to explain how ontic points of view de-combine or individuate. Further, RVV* could contend that because the conscious content of every individual self is phenomenologically unified, they are not ‘shared’ with other finite subjects (which are in turn phenomenologically unified qualities); nevertheless, all such phenomenologically unified content of individual selves are ultimately experienced by the source of all illumination consciousness – the supreme self.Footnote ²⁰ This is what it means for individual selves to derive their illumination consciousness from the supreme self.