¹ “Address of His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI to the Roman Curia Offering Them His Christmas Greetings,” December 22, 2005, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2005/december/documents/hf_ben_xvi_spe_20051222_roman-curia_en.html.

² For discussions of this debate, see John W. O'Malley et al., in Vatican II: Did Anything Happen? ed. David G. Schultenover (New York: Continuum, 2007); Matthew L. Lamb and Matthew Levering, eds., Vatican II: Renewal within Tradition (New York: Oxford, 2008); and Massimo Faggioli, Vatican II: The Battle for Meaning (New York: Paulist Press, 2012).

³ Owen Chadwick situates this in the context of Roman Catholic–Protestant polemics, arguing that both sides equated novelty with heterodoxy. Chadwick, From Bossuet to Newman: The Idea of Doctrinal Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 1–20. For some examples of Roman Catholic attitudes toward novelty, see Pope Gregory XVI, Encyclical, Mirari Vos, August 15, 1832, §§5, 7, 14, 21, http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Greg16/g16mirar.htm; Pope Pius XII, Encyclical, Humani Generis, August 12, 1950, §13, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xii/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xii_enc_12081950_humani-generis_en.html; and Pope Pius X, Lamentabili Sane Exitu, July 3, 1907, http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Pius10/p10lamen.htm. Interestingly, the recent (2011) report of the International Theological Commission, Theology Today: Perspectives, Principles and Criteria, §55, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_cti_doc_20111129_teologia-oggi_en.html, takes a more nuanced attitude toward the theological challenges posed by modernity and gently chides the Roman Catholic Church for “over-caution.”

⁴ This material is surveyed in many places. See, for example, Mark Schoof, A Survey of Catholic Theology, 1800–1970, trans. N. D. Smith (Glen Rock, NJ: Paulist Newman, 1970); and Jan Hendrik Walgrave, Unfolding Revelation: The Nature of Doctrinal Development (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1972), 278ff.

⁵ See, for example, Pope Pius X, The Oath against Modernism, September 1, 1910, http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Pius10/p10moath.htm; the propositions condemned in Lamentibili Sane Exitu, §§54, 58, 59, 62–64; and Pope Pius X, Encyclical, Pascendi Dominici Gregis, September 8, 1907, §§13, 26–28, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_x/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-x_enc_19070908_pascendi-dominici-gregis_en.html. This is illustrated by the disapproving reception given to Newman's thought on the development of doctrine by the leading Roman theologian, Carlo Passaglia. Ian Ker, John Henry Newman: A Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 329–30. Newman attempted, with at best only limited success, to convince Giovanni Perrone, another influential Roman theologian, of the similarity of their views. Lynch, T. has edited this material and Perrone's comments in “The Newman-Perrone Paper on Development,” Gregorianium 16 (1935): 402–47Google Scholar. Allen Brent argues that ultimately their views were incompatible. Brent, “Newman and Perrone: Unreconciliable Theses on Development,” Downside Review 102, no. 349 (October 1984): 276–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ Pope Paul VI, Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation (Dei Verbum), November 18, 1965, §8, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651118_dei-verbum_en.html (hereafter, DV), broadens the concept of tradition beyond the life of doctrine and includes in its description the idea of tradition's dynamic development, displaying the influence of Newman and other nineteenth-century theologians.

⁷ Bradford Hinze explores some of the theological and cultural origins of these sensitivities. His citations are particularly helpful in tracing them out. Hinze, “Narrative Contexts, Doctrinal Reforms,” Theological Studies 51 (1990): 417–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸ John E. Thiel, Senses of Tradition: Continuity and Development in Catholic Faith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 79–82.

⁹ Ibid., 25–26, 57–76. See also Thiel, John E., “The Analogy of Tradition: Method and Theological Judgment,” Theological Studies 66 (2005): 369–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰ Thiel, Senses, 82–83.

¹¹ Ibid., 26, 81–82, 94, 102–5, 157–58.

¹² Ibid., 77.

¹³ Ibid., 84–88.

¹⁴ Ibid., 10, 26.

¹⁵ Ibid., 31–33, 38–39.

¹⁶ Ibid., 46–51, 102–6.

¹⁷ Ibid., 101.

¹⁸ Ibid., 102–4. See Noonan, John T. Jr., “Development in Moral Doctrine,” Theological Studies 54 (1993): 662–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Noonan, A Church That Can and Cannot Change: The Development of Catholic Moral Teaching (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005).

¹⁹ Thiel, Senses, 129–30.

²⁰ Ibid., 140–42.

²¹ Ibid., 46–51, 183.

²² Ibid., 106.

²³ Ibid., 127, 171.

²⁴ Ibid., 181.

²⁵ Ibid., 132.

²⁶ Ibid., 130–32, 170–71, 181; Thiel, “Analogy,” 359–62.

²⁷ Thiel, Senses, 127.

²⁸ Ibid., 93–94; Thiel, “Analogy,” 372–74.

²⁹ Thiel, Senses, 93–94.

³⁰ Thiel, “Analogy,” 372.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Thiel, Senses, 87.

³³ Thiel, “Analogy,” 374.

³⁴ Ibid., 378; Thiel, Senses, 127.

³⁵ Thiel, Senses, 87.

³⁶ Ibid., 127.

³⁷ Ibid., 135–39.

³⁸ Haight, Roger, SJ, Tanner, Kathryn, Espin, Orlando, Thiel, John E., and Tilley, Terrence, “Editorial Symposium: Roman Catholic Theology of Tradition,” Horizons 29, no. 2 (Fall 2002): 303–4CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a fuller treatment of her historical-critical analysis of theories of tradition, see Kathryn Tanner, Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1997), 128–38.

³⁹ Haight et al., “Editorial Symposium,” 307.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 308–10. For an elaboration of this point, see Tanner, Culture, 124–28.

⁴¹ Tanner, Culture, 87, 90–92, 140, 158–59, 163–64.

⁴² Haight et al., “Editorial Symposium,” 318–19; Thiel, “Analogy,” 371–72.

⁴³ Thiel, “Analogy,” 371–72.

⁴⁴ Thiel, Senses, 42.

⁴⁵ Haight et al., “Editorial Symposium,” 311; Tanner, Culture, 125–27.

⁴⁶ Thiel, Senses, 42–43. This is not to say that Thiel is insensitive to the ambiguities of revelation and tradition, which are rooted in the mystery of the revealer (Senses, 5, 176–78, 185). He, however, interprets them analogically whereas Tanner does so dialectically.

⁴⁷ Tanner, Culture, 162–63.

⁴⁸ Thiel, Senses, 48–51, 106–7.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 53–55.

⁵⁰ Haight et al., “Editorial Symposium,” 319.

⁵¹ Ibid. This issue surfaces in Thiel's discussion of “universal consent.” On the one hand, citing Lumen Gentium, §12, he argues that the consent of the universal church is both necessary and sufficient for the establishment of the literal sense. If it is lacking, the literal sense is simply not there, although theological truth can be present in the other senses (Senses, 53–54). On the other hand, developing criteria for establishing the universality of an act of consent appears to be very difficult, if not impossible. Should the fidelium whose sensus is to be normative include only committed Roman Catholics, or should it include dissenters as well? Lapsed Roman Catholics? Non-Roman Catholic Christians? See Thiel's important argument in Senses, 107, 184. The significance of this issue is underscored by the fact that it surfaces repeatedly in John Burkhard's three surveys of articles discussing the Sensus Fidei. See Burkhard, John J., “Sensus Fidei: Theological Reflection since Vatican II (1965–1989),” Heythrop Journal 34 (1993): 41–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar and 123–36; Burkhard, “Sensus Fidei: Recent Theological Reflection (1990–2001) I,” Heythrop Journal 46 (2005): 450–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Burkhard, “Sensus Fidei: Recent Theological Reflection (1990–2001) II,” Heythrop Journal 47 (2006): 38–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Burkhard concludes his 2005 article with the observation that Vatican II and the postconciliar discussions exhibited a certain naïveté concerning the Sensus Fidei, noting that a consensus fidelium has yet to be achieved, an observation that would surely be congenial to Tanner. It stands to reason that the wider the membership in the fidelium, the smaller the area of consensus will be and the more difficult to achieve.

⁵² Tanner, Culture, 174.

⁵³ Ibid., 124–25, 153–54, 162–63.

⁵⁴ Haight et al., “Editorial Symposium,” 308–9. See also Tanner, Culture, 173–74.

⁵⁵ Haight et al., “Editorial Symposium,” 320.

⁵⁶ Tanner, Culture, 154, 173.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 174.

⁵⁸ Thiel, Senses, 106; Thiel, “Analogy,” 370. Thiel's analysis of the argumentative logical appeal of Leo's Tome to more basic beliefs to warrant his interpretation of the person of Christ as a sign that development is taking place is instructive in this context (Senses, 107–8). A distinction between more and less basic beliefs need not commit Thiel to the foundationalism that he is concerned to avoid (Senses, 220 n. 30). For a discussion of the ecumenical significance of the distinction between more and less basic beliefs, see Henn, William, OFMCap, “The Hierarchy of Truths Twenty Years Later,” Theological Studies 48 (1987): 439–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁹ Thiel, Senses, 47, 185–86; Thiel, “Analogy,” 374.

⁶⁰ Thiel, Senses, 116–25. He notes with appreciation Walgrave's distinction between logical and theological theories of development but argues that it should not be drawn too sharply, since reason and argument have important roles to play in an adequate theological theory (Senses, 233 n. 73). Thiel is wise here. Ever since Roman Catholic theology abandoned neo-Scholastic patterns of logical inference as its preferred model for doctrinal development, it has, particularly under Newman's influence, relied on perceptual analogies and nonlinear patterns of thought to describe the process and evaluate its results. As it did for Newman, this has increased the importance of distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate developments and assessing the adequacy of different configurations of the tradition. At times it appeals to an analogy with instinctive or intuitive reactions (the Sensus Fidei) and at other times to a relatively unanalyzed concept of coherence to illustrate these patterns. Given the plurality of interpretations that both Thiel and Tanner acknowledge, appeals to such unspecified criteria make the resulting assessments seem arbitrary or circular. As discussed in note 133 below, Vatican II did not address the issue of criteriology, except perhaps with its reference to “universal agreement” as a mark of “unerring belief” resulting from a “supernatural sense of the faith” (Lumen Gentium, §12). As pointed out above (note 51), this criterion has proven very difficult to apply. Additionally, it is hard to see how, by itself, it could be of use to Thiel in his argument with Tanner, since she denies that such “universal agreement” exists. The criteriological problem remains, and the viability of Thiel's appeal to the literal sense as the norm against which proposed developments are to be measured requires its being successfully addressed. In terms similar to MacIntyre's analysis of the dialectical aspects of a tradition's life, Zoltan Alszeghy, SJ, makes a similar point, arguing that consent by itself is not a sufficient criterion of truth. There are diachronic and critical criteria as well. “Consent becomes a sure criterion of truth when the community of believers perseveres in its spontaneous inclination towards a doctrine, becomes aware of all its aspects, considers all the objections raised against it, and examines all its consequences.” Zoltan Alszeghy, SJ, “Sensus Fidei and Development of Dogma,” in Vatican II: Assessment and Perspectives; Twenty-Five Years After (1962–1987), ed. Rene Latourelle (New York: Paulist Press, 1988), 2:151. Two classic discussions of the complex interactions between logical and theological factors in assessing continuity and development are Karl Rahner, SJ, “Considerations on the Development of Dogma,” in Theological Investigations, trans. Kevin Smyth (Baltimore: Helicon, 1966), 4:3–35; and E. Schillebeeckx, OP, “The Development of the Apostolic Faith into the Dogma of the Church,” in Revelation and Theology, trans. N. D. Smith (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967), 1:57–83. Ormond Rush, The Eyes of Faith: The Sense of the Faithful and the Church's Reception of Revelation (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2009), pursues the discussion in light of contemporary hermeneutical theory and biblical scholarship. Although, as the title of his book indicates, he emphasizes intuitive and instinctive dimensions of the various sensus, his discussion makes room for the application of “prudential” criteria in the evaluation of various sensus fidei and sensus fidelium in trying to achieve a consensus fidelium (148–51).

⁶¹ Thiel, Senses, 167.

⁶² Ibid., 127.

⁶³ Jaroslav Pelikan astutely raises the question of the methodological limits that ought to be observed in finding “hints and traces” of later doctrines in early documents. Jaroslav Pelikan, Development of Christian Doctrine: Some Historical Prolegomena (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969), 53. This question is pertinent to Thiel's reliance on the analogy of faith to warrant his assertions and Tanner's critique of the literal sense as too porous to serve Thiel's purposes.

⁶⁴ Tanner, Culture, 122–25, 174.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 154, 162–63; Haight et al., “Editorial Symposium,” 310–11.

⁶⁶ Thiel, “Analogy,” 376.

⁶⁷ Thiel, Senses, 132.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 101–2, 132, 170–71.

⁶⁹ I say “perhaps” because it might be the case that a given practice or doctrine was adequate at a specific time but inadequate subsequently in different circumstances. Thus it might be abandoned or replaced without its necessarily having been inadequate in different circumstances in the past. This might apply to the prohibition against usury, for example, or, as some have argued, to the magisterial rejection of religious liberty in the nineteenth century.

⁷⁰ In “Analogy,” 374, Thiel briefly notes the possibility that, under pressure from the sense of incipient development, a traditionally held belief might be judged as “disanalogous with a re-configured analogical continuity that binds the tradition into a whole.” He only mentions this and does not take into account the fact that an argument for correcting or replacing a disanalogy might require different kinds of warrants and bear a heavier burden than an argument for an analogy.

⁷¹ Hans Küng's Infallible: An Inquiry (New York: Doubleday, 1972), 43–57, sympathetically examines conservative concerns about changing the Roman Catholic Church's prohibition against the use of what it calls artificial means of contraception on the grounds that such a change would in fact admit previous error in teaching. He argues that, given Roman Catholic assumptions about the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium, these concerns are warranted. The conclusion that he draws in his book's larger argument, however, is that those assumptions are mistaken, not that the traditional prohibition is correct. Regardless of challenges to Küng's view about the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium, I think his larger point has merit. Over time, the Roman Catholic tradition developed an intricate scheme of the levels of doctrinal authority of various infallible and noninfallible teachings and corresponding levels of required assent. Older versions of this scheme are more fine-grained than contemporary ones. For an example of an older version, see Ludwig Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, ed. James Canon Bastible, trans. Patrick Lynch, 4th ed. (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1960), 4–10; and Ernst, Harold E., “The Theological Notes and the Interpretation of Doctrine,” Theological Studies 63 (2002): 813–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Current streamlined versions are presented in Pope John Paul II, Apostolic Letter Motu Proprio (Ad Tuendam Fidem), June 30, 1998, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/motu_proprio/documents/hf_jp-ii_motu-proprio_30061998_ad-tuendam-fidem_en.html; Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian (Donum Veritatis), May 24, 1990, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19900524_theologian-vocation_en.html; and Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Doctrinal Commentary on the Concluding Formula of the “Professio Fidei,” June 29, 1998, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_1998_professio-fidei_en.html. Theological analyses, with reference to contemporary controversies, are offered by Francis Sullivan, Creative Fidelity: Weighing and Interpreting Documents of the Magisterium (New York: Paulist Press, 1996), 12–27; and Richard Gaillardetz, Teaching with Authority: A Theology of the Magisterium in the Church (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1997), 101–28. Suffice it to say here that the Roman Catholic tradition has historically demanded a very high level of assent even to noninfallible teachings on the lower end of the scale, since their credibility is rooted in the promised assistance of the Holy Spirit. Such demands, made routinely, make dramatic developments, even in the case of noninfallible teachings, risky to the tradition's credibility. This is one of the large issues that has stimulated Thiel's project. These perceived risks are displayed in the heated controversy over the permissibility of dissent from authoritative, noninfallible teachings stimulated and intensified by the publication of Humanae Vitae and continuing to the present day, generating conflict between traditional magisterial authorities and a number of dissenting theologians and laypeople. The literature on this topic is vast, proportionate to the controversy. Some contemporary discussions can be found in Charles Curran and Richard McCormick, SJ, eds., Dissent in the Church (New York: Paulist Press, 1988); William May, ed., Vatican Authority and American Catholic Dissent (New York: Crossroad, 1987); and Richard Gaillardetz, ed., When the Magisterium Intervenes: The Magisterium and Theologians in Today's Church (Collegeville, MN: Michael Glazier, 2012). Anthony Godzieba laments the loss of the traditional gradations of “theological certainty” in the current ecclesiastical climate (Godzieba, “Quaestio Disputata: The Magisterium in an Age of Digital Reproduction,” in Gaillardetz, When the Magisterium Intervenes, 148). I am not certain that the current position of magisterial authority, as articulated in the documents cited above, would permit a lowering of the degree of demanded assent far enough down the traditional scale sufficient to lessen the risks presented by dramatic reversals. If anything, it seems inclined to raise it, thus expanding and intensifying future debates concerning areas of potential dramatic development. For examples of the intensification of magisterial authority, see the history of recent magisterial disciplinary interventions discussed by Bradford Hinze, “A Decade of Disciplining Theologians,” in Gaillardetz, When the Magisterium Intervenes, 3–39.

⁷² Haight et al., “Editorial Symposium,” 309–10; Tanner, Culture, 162–63.

⁷³ Thiel, Senses, 181–86; Tanner, Culture, 93, 132–33.

⁷⁴ Thiel, Senses, 157–60.

⁷⁵ Tanner, Culture, 90–92.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 162–63.

⁷⁷ Haight et al., “Editorial Symposium,” 310. Tanner, Culture, 77, puts this point in the broader context of her general theory.

⁷⁸ Acknowledgement of pluralism of interpretations is a central premise in both Thiel's and Tanner's works. See, for example, Thiel, Senses, 4–5; and Tanner, Culture, 122–24, 133, 158.

⁷⁹ Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 6–7, 326–48; MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry: Encyclopedia, Genealogy, and Tradition; Being the Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of Edinburgh in 1988 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 170–95 and MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 220–23.

⁸⁰ MacIntyre, Virtue, 221–22. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 30, lists several other examples drawn from the post-Homeric world.

⁸¹ MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 88–145; MacIntyre, Rival Versions, 82–126.

⁸² MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 241–59.

⁸³ MacIntyre, Virtue, 23–35; MacIntyre, Rival Versions, 3–4, 170–95.

⁸⁴ MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 13, 100.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 351–52.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 12–13.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 166, 328–29, 352–53; MacIntyre, Rival Versions, 4–5, 9–14, 109–13.

⁸⁸ MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 352–55; MacIntyre, Rival Versions, 172–73.

⁸⁹ The importance of narrative is a constant thread throughout MacIntyre's work. See Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics: A History of Moral Philosophy from the Homeric Age to the Twentieth Century (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 9; MacIntyre, Virtue, 143–45, 204–25; MacIntyre, “Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science,” in The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1:4–8, 11, 15; MacIntyre, Rival Versions, 79–82, 116–20; MacIntyre, First Principles, Final Ends, and Contemporary Philosophical Issues (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1990), 52–68; and MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 363.

⁹⁰ MacIntyre, Virtue, 221–22; MacIntyre, “Epistemological Crises,” 11.

⁹¹ MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 12; MacIntyre, “Epistemological Crises,” 11–12. MacIntyre, Virtue, 222, offers an earlier, similar version of this characterization and notes, almost parenthetically, that this is a partial, but central, characterization. See also MacIntyre, First Principles, 39, on the often “tortuous, uneven” progress in the course of a tradition. Jean Porter captures this aptly: “Thus, a tradition is characterized by the sorts of questions it generates, the issues that are of recurring concern within it, and the forms of institutional life that embody it, as much, or even more, than by the substantive convictions that its inhabitants share.” Porter, “Openness and Constraint: Moral Reflection as Tradition-Guided Inquiry in Alasdair MacIntyre's Recent Works,” Journal of Religion 73 (1993): 518Google Scholar. This compares nicely with Tanner's description of a tradition's life.

⁹² MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 354–55.

⁹³ Ibid., 366.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 354–55; MacIntyre, Rival Versions, 116.

⁹⁵ MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 7–8.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 354–55; MacIntyre, Rival Versions, 116.

⁹⁷ MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 359–65.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 361–62.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 172; MacIntyre, Rival Versions 81, 120.

¹⁰⁰ MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 365.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 118.

¹⁰² MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 79–80, 328, 363; MacIntyre, Rival Versions, 119. A comparable point is made in MacIntyre, “Epistemological Crises,” 5, 10–12. This is similar to MacIntyre's borrowing from Nietzsche's genealogical strategies in his criticisms of modern moral philosophy (MacIntyre, Virtue, 36–61; MacIntyre, Rival Versions, 146, 170–95) and epistemology (MacIntyre, First Principles, 52–68). A strength of genealogical critique is that it can diagnose systemic errors in a tradition that lead its adherents unawares into predictable intellectual quandaries. Though this sort of critique is typically employed in intertraditional rivalries, I don't see why, suitably modified, it is not applicable in an intratraditional process as well. Such a critique of a tradition's past may assist in understanding not only how problems or controversies arose and why they proved intractable but also how they might have been predictable and are related to other problems and controversies, perhaps ones looming on the horizon.

¹⁰³ MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 80.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 81.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 80–83.

¹⁰⁶ These different positions are summarized in John Courtney Murray, SJ, The Problem of Religious Freedom (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 7–45. The preconciliar emergence of the progressive opinion among Catholics is surveyed by A. F. Carrillo de Albornoz, Roman Catholicism and Religious Liberty (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1959). For some representative statements of traditional preconciliar thought, see Shea, George W., “Catholic Doctrine and the ‘Religion of the State,’” American Ecclesiastical Review 123 (1950): 161–74Google Scholar; Ottaviani, Alfredo Cardinal, “The Church and the State: Some Present Problems in Light of the Teaching of Pope Pius XII,” American Ecclesiastical Review 128 (1953): 321–34Google Scholar; and Central Pontifical Commission Preparatory to the Second Vatican Council, “‘Constitution on the Church’: A Schema Proposed by the Theological Commission; Second Part, Chapter IX: On the Relations between the Church and the State and On Religious Tolerance,” in Michael Davies, The Second Vatican Council and Religious Liberty (Long Prairie, MN: Neumann, 1992), 295–302 (cited hereafter as “Preparatory Schema”). Shea references the manual tradition extensively, and Davies cites from magisterial documents and conservative theologians in The Second Vatican Council and Religious Liberty, 43–55 and 216–31. Statements of the preconciliar progressive tradition can be found among other places in the writings of Murray. For a sampling, see the essays collected in John Courtney Murray, SJ, Religious Liberty: Catholic Struggles with Pluralism, ed. J. Leon Hooper, SJ (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1993). For an analysis of the development of Murray's views and his shifting relationship with church authorities, see Donald E. Pelotte, SSS, John Courtney Murray: Theologian in Conflict (New York: Paulist Press, 1975). In the background are the historical studies of Roger Aubert; see Aubert, “Liberalism and the Church in the Nineteenth Century,” in Tolerance and the Catholic: A Symposium, trans. George Lamb (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955), 47–76; and Aubert, “La liberté religieuse du Syllabus de 1864 à nos jours,” in Roger Aubert et al., Essais sur la liberté religieuse (Paris: A. Fayard, 1965), 13–25.

¹⁰⁷ Richard J. Regan, SJ, Conflict and Consensus: Religious Freedom and the Second Vatican Council (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 24. The different texts are analyzed in detail in J. Robert Dionne, The Papacy and the Church: A Study of Praxis and Reception in Ecumenical Perspective (New York: Philosophical Library, 1987), 135–38; and Jerome Hamer, OP, “Histoire du text de la Déclaration,” in La liberté religieuse: Déclaration “Dignitatis humanae personae,” ed. J. Hamer and Y. Congar (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1967), 52–105.

¹⁰⁸ “Preparatory Schema,” 298. A presupposition of this view, unexpressed in this draft, is that, since “only truth has an objective right to exist,” only Roman Catholicism has a right to public existence. For discussion of this principle, see Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom, 10; Giovanni Miccoli, “Two Sensitive Issues: Religious Freedom and the Jews,” in History of Vatican II: Church as Communion; Third Period and Intersession, September 1964–September 1965, ed. Giuseppe Alberigo and Joseph A. Komonchak, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2002), 96–97; and Davies, The Second Vatican Council and Religious Liberty, 49–55. Its insistence on the objectivity of truth and its morally compelling character forms the philosophical basis for the Roman Catholic tradition's categorical rejection of relativism, subjectivism, indifferentism, and laicism, which positions it saw as underlying post-Enlightenment calls for freedom of conscience and religion.

¹⁰⁹ “Preparatory Schema,” 298.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 299.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 300.

¹¹² Ibid., 301.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ See, for example, Bishop Emile De Smedt's initial Relatio to the chapter on religious liberty in De Oecumenismo, reprinted as “Religious Liberty,” in Council Speeches of Vatican II, ed. Hans Küng, Yves Congar, OP, and Daniel O'Hanlon, SJ (Glen Rock, NJ: Paulist Press, 1964), 237–53; Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom, 52–84; and Murray, “Vers une intelligence du développement de la doctrine de l’Église sur la liberté religieuse,” in Hamer and Congar, La liberté religieuse, 118–47.

¹¹⁵ Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom, 88–89, 104–5; Murray, “Vers une intelligence,” 147. See also “Religious Freedom,” Murray's commentary on The Declaration on Religious Freedom, in The Documents of Vatican II, ed. Walter M. Abbott, SJ (New York: The America Press, 1966), 673, 677–78 n. 4, on the significance of the idea of doctrinal development in this context.

¹¹⁶ Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom, 64–69.

¹¹⁷ De Smedt, “Religious Liberty,” 237–38. Miccoli, “Two Sensitive Issues,” 125–27, outlines some of these practical arguments.

¹¹⁸ De Smedt, “Religious Liberty,” 245. In The Problem of Religious Freedom, 58–59, Murray notes in a manner anticipating Thiel that all development is accompanied by a ressourcement, a new review of the past stimulated by a new historical perspective.

¹¹⁹ These criticisms (skepticism, false irenicism, liberalism, modernism, etc.) are summarized in Miccoli, “Two Sensitive Issues,” 108–17; Regan, Conflict and Consensus, 133–43; Hamer, “Histoire du texte,” 77–78; and Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom, 89.

¹²⁰ Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom, 85–89.

¹²¹ Peter Hünermann, “The Final Weeks of the Council,” in History of Vatican II: The Council and the Transition; The Fourth Period and the End of the Council, September 1965–December 1965, ed. Giuseppe Alberigo and Joseph A. Komonchak, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2006), 451.

¹²² Miccoli, “Two Sensitive Issues,” 96.

¹²³ Gilles Routhier, “Finishing the Work Begun: The Trying Experience of the Fourth Period,” in Alberigo and Komonchak, History of Vatican II: The Council and the Transition, 67.

¹²⁴ Regan, Conflict and Consensus, 27–31.

¹²⁵ Thiel, Senses, 103–5.

¹²⁶ Noonan, A Church That Can and Cannot Change, 157.

¹²⁷ Davies cites a number of both progressives and traditionalists who argue that Dignitatis Humanae represents a dramatic departure from traditional teaching. Davies, The Second Vatican Council and Religious Liberty, 198–209. See also Brian Harrison, Religious Liberty and Contraception (Melbourne, Australia: John XXIII Fellowship Co-op, 1988), 7–8. Richard Regan argues that there are probably genuine contradictions between Dignitatis Humanae and previous magisterial teachings but that the Council Fathers, anxious to meet the concerns of conservative Fathers, downplayed them in favor of an emphasis on continuity (see Conflict and Consensus, 46 and 177). For a similar argument, see Dionne, The Papacy and the Church, 176–80. Considerations of space prevent me from considering the alternative position of conservative supporters of Dignitatis Humanae such as Avery Dulles, SJ, and Brian Harrison, who argue that it is a consistent development, conformable to Newman's norms, of traditional teaching. See Avery Cardinal Dulles, SJ, “Dignitatis Humanae and the Development of Catholic Doctrine,” in Catholicism and Religious Freedom, ed. Kenneth L. Grasso and Robert P. Hunt (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 43–67; and Harrison, Religious Liberty and Contraception. Essentially their argument is that a careful exegesis of both traditional magisterial documents and Dignitatis Humanae reveals no contradiction. Because Dignitatis Humanae admits that there are circumstances in which religious liberty may be legitimately restricted, and the traditional magisterium admits circumstances in which it ought to be tolerated, the two positions are consistent, and there is development, not reversal. Such arguments overlook the sea change between the two positions. According to the traditional magisterium the default position was that the public exercise of non-Catholic religions ought to be prohibited, though in some circumstances considerations of prudence might require that it be tolerated. According to Dignitatis Humanae the default position was quite different. It was that the rights of public expression of all religions ought to be respected, though in some circumstances considerations of prudence might require that those rights be restricted. It is worthy of note that, by implication, these considerations of prudence might impose similar restrictions on the Roman Catholic religion as well.

¹²⁸ Pope Paul VI, Declaration on Religious Freedom (Dignitatis Humanae), December 7, 1965, §12, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html; hereafter, DH.

¹²⁹ Cardinal Meyer in a council speech objected to this formulation as overlooking the fact that tradition can, and does, fall short by distorting what it hands on, and that it therefore needs to be appraised critically. All tradition is not progress. This objection is cited in Joseph Ratzinger, Alois Grillmeier, and Beda Rigaux, “Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation,” in Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 2:185–86. Ratzinger supports Meyer's position and notes that it was regrettable that the council did not take up his ideas. He later characterizes it as an “unfortunate omission” (2:192–93). It is interesting to note how close these positions are to the criteriological question raised by the Montreal World Faith and Order Conference's 1963 statement, “Scripture, Tradition, and Traditions,” §§48–49, http://www.andrews.edu/~fortind/Scripture-Tradition-traditions.htm. These comments reflect a critique of an alleged idealization of tradition in Roman Catholic theology proposed by both Protestants and some Roman Catholic theologians. For some representative discussions, see Gaillardetz, Teaching with Authority, 131–58; and André Naud, Le magistère incertain (Montreal: Fides, 1987), 22–74.

¹³⁰ Regan, Conflict and Consensus, 40, 121.

¹³¹ Miccoli, “Two Sensitive Issues,” 99–102; Regan, Conflict and Consensus, 119–20. Miccoli cites Congar's reservations about the historical analysis. Miccoli, “Two Sensitive Issues,” 127. Although he values the contribution of the historical analyses indicating continuities with previous papal teaching as a corrective to an oversimplified conservative reading, Regan admits that they were “ex parte readings of history” that did not admit that there were also very probably inconsistencies between it and previous papal teaching. Regan, Conflict and Consensus, 45–46. Routhier points out that supporters of the document were dissatisfied with the ability of their arguments to meet conservative objections. Routhier, “Finishing the Work Begun,” 79–81. Claude Soetens cites a report that the body of the Council Fathers did not accept De Smedt's historical analysis. Soetens, “The Ecumenical Commitment of the Catholic Church,” in History of Vatican II: The Mature Council; The Second Period and Intersession, September 1963–1964, ed. Giuseppe Alberigo and Joseph A. Komonchak (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2000), 285 n. 111. Jerome Hamer, OP, makes the same point and points out that the historical analysis “disappeared” from the fourth redaction of the document. Hamer, “Histoire du texte,” 86–87, 91.

¹³² Regan, Conflict and Consensus, 121. The same point is made often. See, for example, Murray, “Religious Freedom,” in Abbott, The Documents of Vatican II, 673; De Smedt's Relatio to the final draft of the Declaration, cited in Harrison, Religious Liberty, 75; and Noonan, A Church That Can and Cannot Change, 158.

¹³³ Noonan, A Church That Can and Cannot Change, 158 (my emphasis).

¹³⁴ Thiel, Senses, 127.

¹³⁵ Given the concordats in force between the Vatican and some Catholic countries and the fact that the traditional teaching concerning the duties of the confessional state remained in force in the Roman schools of theology, it seems to me that “Der gläubige Mensch,” whose religious liberties are guaranteed by natural law according to Mit Brennender Sorge, §36, is, pace Murray's and De Smedt's interpretation, best understood as referring to Roman Catholics. However, they are correct in seeing its argument as open to extension, even if that were to go beyond Pius XI's explicit intentions. For further arguments and analyses of other papal statements, see Dionne, The Papacy and the Church, 159–66.

¹³⁶ De Smedt, “Religious Liberty,” 244–53.

¹³⁷ Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom, 28–30; Murray, “Religious Freedom,” 678–79 n. 5.

¹³⁸ Murray, “Religious Freedom,” 676–77 n. 3 and 678–79 n. 5.

¹³⁹ The complex history of the drafting of this sentence illustrates how contentious and careful the debate on this topic was. For a discussion of this history, see Harrison, Religious Liberty and Contraception, 64–77; Harrison emphasizes what he thinks is the significance of the addition of the words “and societies.” Hamer, “Histoire du texte,” 99, mentions the verbal change but does not assign any particular polemical significance to it.

¹⁴⁰ The traditionalist minority wished to emphasize the common good in this context, effectively giving the state more latitude to restrain religious behavior, but its view was not accepted. For a discussion of the significance of this issue, see Davies, The Second Vatican Council and Religious Liberty, 186–87 and 191–96. Harrison claims that in the long run Dignitatis Humanae did not draw an important distinction between the public order and the common good. Harrison, Religious Liberty and Contraception, 91–93. Murray of course disagrees.

¹⁴¹ With reference to its own tradition, its claim to freedom is based on inner-theological as well as philosophical grounds. Its traditional view is that non-Catholic religions cannot make the same inner-theological claim of a divine founding and mandate.

¹⁴² Shea cites a wide range of standard theological manuals that represent in his view a common core of Catholic doctrine. Shea, “Catholic Doctrine,” 165. Dionne similarly notes that the traditional doctrine continued to be taught in the Roman schools right up until the council. Dionne, The Papacy and the Church, 162–66. Murray concedes that the doctrine of Vatican II is not to be found in the magisterial documents of the past, even though it may be said to be there implicitly. Murray, Religious Freedom, 100. Such is Dionne's thesis as well.

¹⁴³ Murray, “Vers une intelligence,” 118–19, 126–34.

¹⁴⁴ Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom, 76–77, 91.

¹⁴⁵ There is a certain ambivalence in Murray that reveals the difficulty that the Roman Catholic Church has in admitting that its traditional literal sense may have erred. On the one hand, Murray concedes that the traditional magisterium's failure to draw the relevant distinctions may be “regrettable” (“Vers une intelligence,” 113) and the confessional state may reflect even a pagan import into Christianity (142). On the other hand, he insists that the commitment to the confessional state was not doctrinal (121–22) and was “understandable,” and perhaps even prudent, in the context of the times (“Vers une intelligence,” 118, 127–34; The Problem of Religious Freedom, 52–53). This is by and large the strategy that Benedict adopts in his Christmas address. If by doctrinal commitment Murray means infallible, he is most likely correct. As his critics pointed out, however, even if not infallible, these teachings were presented in such a way as to enjoy considerable authoritative status. Ottaviani, in “The Church and the State,” argues that it is a mistake to distinguish between the permanent and the temporary in church teaching, and Davies, citing several traditionalist authors, contends that Leo's (and his successors') formulations of the duties of the Catholic state are based on permanent theological truths and not just on the need to combat liberalism. See Davies, The Second Vatican Council and Religious Liberty, 29–36 and 167–68. Furthermore, Davies argues (124) that Quanta Cura and other documents of the ordinary magisterium are binding on all Catholics even if they are not infallible.

¹⁴⁶ The debates around this topic mirror those surrounding Dignitatis Humanae, often with the same partisans arguing from similar presuppositions. A history of the attempts to balance these different understandings can be found throughout the Alberigo and Komonchak volumes. In particular see J. A. Komonchak, “The Struggle for the Council during the Preparation of Vatican II,” in History of Vatican II: Announcing and Preparing Vatican Council II; Toward a New Era in Catholicism, ed. Giuseppe Alberigo and Joseph Komonchak (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1995), 272–84; Giuseppe Ruggieri, “The First Doctrinal Clash,” in History of Vatican II: The Formation of the Council's Identity; First Period and Intersession, October 1962–September 1963, ed. Giuseppe Alberigo and Joseph Komonchak (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1997), 233–66; Hanjo Sauer, “The Doctrinal and the Pastoral: the Text on Divine Revelation,” in Alberigo and Komonchak, History of Vatican II: Church as Communion, 195–231; and Christophe Theobald, “The Church under the Word of God,” in Alberigo and Komonchak, History of Vatican II: The Council and the Transition, 275–362.

¹⁴⁷ Pope Paul VI, Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions (Nostra Aetate), October 28, 1965, §2, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en.html; Second Vatican Council, Decree on Ecumenism (Unitatis Redintegratio), November 21, 1964, §§3–4, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decree_19641121_unitatis-redintegratio_en.html.