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Biological safety in the context of backward planetary protection and Mars Sample Return: conclusions from the Sterilization Working Group

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2021

Emily Craven
Affiliation:
Mevex Corporation, 108 Willowlea Rd, Stittsville, ON K2S 1B4, Canada
Martell Winters
Affiliation:
Nelson Laboratories LLC, 6280 S Redwood Rd, Salt Lake City, UT 84123, USA
Alvin L. Smith*
Affiliation:
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, 4800 Oak Grove Dr, Pasadena, CA 91109, USA
Erin Lalime
Affiliation:
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, 8800 Greenbelt Rd, Greenbelt, MD 20771, USA
Rocco Mancinelli
Affiliation:
Bay Area Environmental Research Institute, Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA 94035, USA
Brian Shirey
Affiliation:
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, 4800 Oak Grove Dr, Pasadena, CA 91109, USA
Wayne Schubert
Affiliation:
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, 4800 Oak Grove Dr, Pasadena, CA 91109, USA
Andrew Schuerger
Affiliation:
University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611, USA
Mariko Burgin
Affiliation:
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, 4800 Oak Grove Dr, Pasadena, CA 91109, USA
Emily P. Seto
Affiliation:
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, 4800 Oak Grove Dr, Pasadena, CA 91109, USA
Morgan Hendry
Affiliation:
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, 4800 Oak Grove Dr, Pasadena, CA 91109, USA
Amruta Mehta
Affiliation:
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, 4800 Oak Grove Dr, Pasadena, CA 91109, USA
J. Nick Benardini
Affiliation:
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, 4800 Oak Grove Dr, Pasadena, CA 91109, USA
Gary Ruvkun
Affiliation:
Harvard University, Department of Molecular Biology Simches Research Center, Boston, MA 02114, USA
*
Author for correspondence: Alvin L. Smith, E-mail: alvin.l.smith.ii@jpl.nasa.gov
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Abstract

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the European Space Agency (ESA) are studying how samples might be brought back to Earth from Mars safely. Backward planetary protection is key in this complex endeavour, as it is required to prevent potential adverse effects from returning materials to Earth's biosphere. As the question of whether or not life exists on Mars today or whether it ever did in the past is still unanswered, the effort to return samples from Mars is expected to be categorized as a ‘Restricted Earth Return’ mission, for which NASA policy requires the containment of any unsterilized material returned to Earth. NASA is investigating several solutions to contain Mars samples and sterilize any uncontained Martian particles. This effort has significant implications for both NASA's scientific mission, and the Earth's environment; and so special care and vigilance are needed in planning and execution in order to assure acceptance of safety to Earth's biosphere. To generate a technically acceptable sterilization process across a wide array of scientific and other stakeholders, on 30–31 January 2019, 10–11 June 2019 and 19–20 February 2020, NASA informally convened a Sterilization Working Group (SWG) composed of experts from industry, academia and government to assess methods for sterilization and inactivation, to identify future work needed to verify these methods against biological challenges, and to determine their feasibility for implementation on robotic spacecraft in deep space. The goals of the SWG were:

  1. (1) Understand what it means to sterilize and/or inactivate Martian materials and how that understanding can be applied to the Mars Sample Return (MSR) mission.

  2. (2) Assess methods for sterilization and inactivation, and identify future work needed to verify these methods.

  3. (3) Provide an effective plan for communicating with other agencies and the public.

This paper provides a summary of the discussions and conclusions of the SWG over these three workshops. It reflects a consensus position based on qualitative discussion of how agencies might approach the problem of sterilization of Mars material. The SWG reached a consensus that sterilization options can be considered on the basis of biology as we know it, and that sterilization modalities that are effective on terrestrial materials and organisms should be part of the MSR planetary protection strategy. Conclusions pointed to several industry standards for sterilization to include heat, chemical, UV radiation and low-heat plasma. Technical trade-offs for each sterilization modality were discussed while simultaneously considering the engineering challenges and limitations for spaceflight. Future work includes more in-depth discussions on technical trade-offs of sterilization modalities, identifying and testing Earth analogue challenge organisms and proteinaceous molecules against chosen modalities, and executing collaborative agreements between NASA and external working group partners to help close data gaps, and to establish strong, scientifically grounded sterilization and inactivation standards for MSR.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press
Figure 0

Fig. 1. Notional Mars Sample Return Campaign Architecture and Roles – arrow colours indicate roles: red is NASA Mars 2020, orange is NASA SRL, blue is ESA ERO and green is NASA and international community (Lock et al.2019).

Figure 1

Fig. 2. The Mars material of concern – dust is depicted in each yellow highlighted area.

Figure 2

Table 1. Proposed biological challenge agent list

Figure 3

Fig. 3. UV inactivation of microbial species.

Figure 4

Fig. 4. Double-lid break-the-chain concept – utilizing a double-walled lid and heat to aseptically transfer from a Mars contaminated zone to an isolated (‘Earth clean’) zone within a spacecraft. Note that the container base forms a segment of the wall of the spacecraft. Presently, soldering or brazing is envisioned for this process. (Gershman et al.2018)

Figure 5

Fig. 5. Bacillus atrophaeus (ATCC 9372) spore inactivation heating profile – the industrial biological indicator spore for dry heat B. atrophaeus ATCC 9372 was exposed to rapid spike profiles. The exposures consisted of beginning at ambient temperature and rising to the designated temperatures in 60 s. Once the target temperature was reached, the heat input was stopped and the test silicon coupons began to cool. In these experiments, the time spent at temperatures where significant inactivation occurred was relatively short. For example, during the 200°C ramp, the time above 110°C was 40 s. Minor rates of spore inactivation are initially observed as low as 135°C with a 1 log population drop at 170°C. All spores were inactivated reaching target temperatures of 200°C or higher. No colony forming units were observed at 200°C or higher, but for purposes of this graph, the zero values were plotted as 1 (Schubert et al.2018).

Figure 6

Fig. 6. Bacillus spp. (ATCC 29669) spore inactivation heating profile – the heat-resistant spore ATCC 29669 was exposed to rapid spike profiles. The exposures consisted of beginning at ambient temperature and rising to the designated temperatures in 60 s. Once the target temperature was reached, the heat input was stopped and the test silicon coupons began to cool. Minor rates of spore inactivation were initially observed as low as 150°C with a 1 log population drop at 200°C. All spores were inactivated reaching target temperatures of 225°C or higher. No colony forming units were observed at 225°C or higher, but for purposes of this graph, the zero values were plotted as 1 (Schubert et al.2018).

Figure 7

Fig. 7. Bacillus atrophaeus (ATCC 9372) and Bacillus spp. (ATCC 29669) D-values – D-values are defined as the time at a given temperature that will inactivate 90% (one decimal reduction) of a population of microorganisms. For B. atrophaeus spores, each D-value point was determined from the slope of the line for 5 time points at each temperature, done in triplicate, for a sum of 75 independent determinations. The Bacillus sp. ATCC29669 D-value plot was fitted from 120 independent determinations. Errors are given at the 95% confidence limit. R2 is the coefficient of determination for a regression analysis. Error bars are smaller than most symbols in this chart (replotted from Kempf et al. (2008), and Schubert and Beaudet (2011).