The history of Hong Kong is intertwined with British colonialism and China’s Hong Kong policies. This history offers unique and important lessons on the rise and fall of Hong Kong’s constitutional order. In accordance with the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, China declares 12 basic policies regarding Hong Kong and has translated these into the 1990 Hong Kong Basic Law. It is generally held that “One Country, Two Systems” will be the main constitutional architecture of Hong Kong for 50 years, and it will remain basically unchanged even after 2047. However, there are obvious difficulties and enormous differences on the interpretation of Article 5 of the Hong Kong Basic Law concerning the true meaning of “unchanged for 50 years.” Recent years have witnessed the great need for deciphering the time-code of the Basic Law because the question of 2047 draws closer and closer to the central stage for the determination of Hong Kong’s constitutional future. This Article aims to provide legal analysis on Article 5 of Hong Kong Basic Law and the constitutional fate of Hong Kong toward 2047. It distinguishes all sorts of Article 5 interpretations into three broad categories: “Unchanged for 50 years” as international promise, “unchanged for 50 years” as political commitment, and “unchanged for 50 years” as constitutional obligation. Different approaches have been utilized for various constitutional interpretations. But all in all, the constitutional puzzles regarding “unchanged for 50 years” must be addressed within the framework of the temporality of the Basic Law in a fast-paced world. In order to maintain the constitutional stability and endurance, to secure the unamendability of “One Country, Two Systems” in 2047 will be the best blessing for Hong Kong in every possible way.

Recent events in the United States have highlighted the fact that American police resort to force, including deadly force, much more often than in many other Western countries. This Article describes how the current regulatory regime may ignore or even facilitate these aggressive police actions. The law governing police use of force in the United States derives in large part from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. As construed by the United States Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment provides police wide leeway in using deadly force, making custodial arrests, and stopping and frisking individuals. While state and local police departments can develop more restrictive rules, they often do not. Additionally, the remedies for violations of these rules are weak. The predominant remedy is exclusion of evidence, the impact of which falls primarily on the prosecutor and in any event only has a deterrent effect when evidence is sought. Civil and criminal sanctions have been significantly limited by the Supreme Court, particularly through the doctrine of qualified immunity (applied to individual officers) and the policy or custom defense (applied to municipalities). This minimal regulatory regime is one reason police-citizen encounters in the United States so often result in death or serious bodily harm to citizens, in particular those who are Black. The Article ends with a number of reform proposals.

Through a literary-theatrical reading of international legality, this Article challenges the “settled script” produced by international legal scholars to frame and assess the legality of two historical events—the Grenada Revolution (1979–1983) and the U.S. Invasion of Grenada (1983). It does so by reading the Cold War as a sensibility performed by these scholars, one that recognized the operation of rival international legal orders and one that crafted a different script—Cold War Customary Law (“CWCL”)—to decide questions of international legality in a Cold War context. In addition to offering a new way to read the Cold War and international legality, this Article argues first that it is important to uncover this parallel and competing script of international legality operating at the time, and not dismiss it as unrelated political or ideological discourse, as it clearly influenced the interpretive logic and reasoning practices international lawyers deployed to frame what constituted legality in international law. Second, it argues that this Cold War sensibility in international legal scholarship on intervention and revolution predated the events in Grenada, and that if a different theatrical mise en scène is adopted—one which eschews “the short durée” or “evental history” of the settled script—this sensibility can be understood as being both continuous and discontinuous with rival imperial forms of international law operating in the Caribbean across time and place, where its discontinuities open up space to recover revolutionary Caribbean subjects of international law and a sensibility of shame in the present.

Constitutional courts play an essential role in authoritatively interpreting constitutions. Oftentimes they go beyond the constitutional text by inventing so-called judge-made law. Their authority to interpret the text covers not only substantive parts but also the clause authorizing their jurisdiction. Such power, namely the power to interpret the limits of their jurisdiction, is often used to intervene in the interpretation of the constitution more vigorously than explicitly authorized. One example is the invention, designation, and development of the advisory jurisdiction by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo. On that basis, the Court has, for almost ten years of its existence, pronounced on numerous fundamental issues relating to the governing system, power maps, and entitlements on political authority. The Court developed its advisory jurisdiction in a rather unpredictable and impulsive fashion; however, it steadily revealed its willingness to engage with interpretations that sought to resolve high-stakes issues. Such braveness also had a credibility cost for the Court. The year 2018 marked a major shift in the Court’s interpretation of its own jurisdiction to “advise.” In the Central Election Commission case, it abandoned its previous precedent and commenced a passive, restrained attitude in engaging with the constitutional interpretation on the basis of case or controversy. This Article analyzes the Court’s path and change of course in this cycle.

This Article examines changes in dissent patterns that occurred on the Polish Constitutional Tribunal during a period of intense constitutional and political change in Poland. An analysis of these dissents shows judges only rarely used this opportunity to express the traditional differences of opinion on law or policy. Instead, judges on the Tribunal increasingly used dissents in an altogether new form – as a way to broadcast allegations of legal and procedural violations that occurred within the court’s operation itself. More troublingly, some judges also used their dissents to advance distinctly political narratives and overtly attempt to de-legitimize the court’s announced decisions. Ultimately, these dissents show that constitutional judges may not be immune to participating in the larger social and constitutional battles within society. In fact, these dissent patterns suggest that, in a more fragmented and polarized era of politics, judges can and have made use of the dissent as a way to broadcast distinctly political messages.

This Article attempts to outline the optimal implementation of collective redress by using a comparative approach. After exploring the weaknesses of individual actions, which should be avoided, this Article presents the main forms of collective redress that exist in the various states. In particular, these forms include: Group action, representative action, and group settlement. The comparison of the various legal orders demonstrates the existence of several important parameters that need to be evaluated in order to design appropriate legislation. As a result, this Article supports alignment with the American class action and proposes specific modifications in order to eliminate several disadvantages of the original model.

Given the debate at the seventy-second Conference of the Association of German Jurists (Deutscher Juristentag) in September 2018 on whether German sentencing needs reform, this Article will explore this very question in greater detail. In this regard, this Article will present various empirical studies in order to demonstrate that notable inconsistencies in German sentencing practice exist. This Article will then point out that broad statutory sentencing ranges, along with fairly vague sentencing guidance, are among the main causes of these disparities. Subsequently, this Article will examine several mechanisms that selected foreign jurisdictions—namely the U.S., the U.K., and Australia—have put in place in order to enhance consistency in their sentencing practices. Three mechanisms of sentencing guidance will be distinguished here: First, formal sentencing guidelines; second, guideline judgments; and third, sentencing advisory bodies as they operate in some Australian states. This Article will compare these mechanisms and assess their merits and drawbacks. Based on this comparative study, this Article will look at how to improve consistency in German sentencing practice. In this respect, this Article will present three steps that German criminal law reform should follow, including a better sentencing framework, the strategic gathering of sentencing data, and the implementation of a flexible sentencing guidelines regime.