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The Political Consequences of Green Policies: Evidence from Italy—CORRIGENDUM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 October 2023

ITALO COLANTONE ,
LIVIO DI LONARDO ,
YOTAM MARGALIT  and
MARCO PERCOCO
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Type
Corrigendum
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 118 , Issue 1 , February 2024 , pp. 545 - 548
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Political Science Association

After publication, we noticed a mistake in the R script generating the coefficient plots in Colantone et al. (Reference Colantone, Di Lonardo, Margalit and Percoco2023). Specifically, the bars in the figures represented 90% instead of 95% confidence intervals and were based on non-robust standard errors. The corrected figures are reported below (i.e., with 95% CIs, based on robust SEs), and the R script in the replication materials has been updated accordingly.

We note that the discussion in the text concerning these coefficient plots referred to the correct results, as reported in the Supplementary Tables, so no changes are required in the text itself. The mistake was made solely in the generation of the figures during the copy edits.

Figure 4.

Switching to Lega in 2019

Notes: Coefficient estimates refer to regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator for vote switching to Lega in 2019. Each panel refers to a different earlier election, and reports three different specifications, as in columns 1-3 of Table 2. The bars are 95% CIs. Full results in Table SI-2.

Figure 6.

Vote Switching Before Area B

Notes: Treatment effect estimates from regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator for vote switching to Lega before Area B. Each panel considers switching between different elections and reports results from three different specifications, as in columns 1-3 of Table 2. The bars are 95% CIs. Full results are in Supplementary Table SI-3.

Figure 7.

Environmentalism

Notes: All panels of this figure report estimated treatment effects according to the benchmark specification of column 2 in Table 2. Dependent variables are indicated on the left of each panel, in correspondence of each coefficient. The bars are 95% CIs. Full results are in Supplementary Tables SI-4–SI-6.

Figure 8.

Prices, Taxes, and Responsibility

Notes: Treatment effect estimates according to the benchmark specification of column 2 in Table 2. Dependent variables are indicated on the left of the figure, in correspondence of each coefficient. The bars are 95% CIs. Full results are in Supplementary Table SI-7.

References

REFERENCES

Colantone, Italo, Di Lonardo, Livio, Margalit, Yotam, and Percoco, Marco. 2023. “The Political Consequences of Green Policies: Evidence from Italy.” American Political Science Review, 1–19. doi:10.1017/S0003055423000308.Google Scholar
Figure 0

Figure 4. Switching to Lega in 2019Notes: Coefficient estimates refer to regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator for vote switching to Lega in 2019. Each panel refers to a different earlier election, and reports three different specifications, as in columns 1-3 of Table 2. The bars are 95% CIs. Full results in Table SI-2.

Figure 1

Figure 6. Vote Switching Before Area BNotes: Treatment effect estimates from regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator for vote switching to Lega before Area B. Each panel considers switching between different elections and reports results from three different specifications, as in columns 1-3 of Table 2. The bars are 95% CIs. Full results are in Supplementary Table SI-3.

Figure 2

Figure 7. EnvironmentalismNotes: All panels of this figure report estimated treatment effects according to the benchmark specification of column 2 in Table 2. Dependent variables are indicated on the left of each panel, in correspondence of each coefficient. The bars are 95% CIs. Full results are in Supplementary Tables SI-4–SI-6.

Figure 3

Figure 8. Prices, Taxes, and ResponsibilityNotes: Treatment effect estimates according to the benchmark specification of column 2 in Table 2. Dependent variables are indicated on the left of the figure, in correspondence of each coefficient. The bars are 95% CIs. Full results are in Supplementary Table SI-7.

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