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Economic Approaches to Understanding Scientific Norms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Michael Strevens
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Abstract

A theme of much work taking an “economic approach” to the study of science is the interaction between the norms of individual scientists and those of society at large. Though drawing from the same suite of formal methods, proponents of the economic approach offer what are in substantive terms profoundly different explanations of various aspects of the structure of science. The differences are illustrated by comparing Strevens's explanation of the scientific reward system (the “priority rule”) with Max Albert's explanation of the prevalence of “high methodological standards” in science. Some objections to the economic approach as a whole are then briefly considered.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 8 , Issue 2 , June 2011 , pp. 184 - 200
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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