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Consolidating Product Lines via Mergers and Acquisitions: Evidence From the USPTO Trademark Data

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 March 2022

Po-Hsuan Hsu
Affiliation:
National Tsing Hua University College of Technology Management pohsuanhsu@mx.nthu.edu.tw
Kai Li*
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia Sauder School of Business
Xing Liu
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia Sauder School of Business xing.liu@sauder.ubc.ca
Hong Wu
Affiliation:
Fudan University School of Economics hong.wu.pitt@gmail.com
*
kai.li@sauder.ubc.ca (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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Using a new trademark-based product market competition measure and a novel trademark-merger data set over the period 1983–2016, we show that companies facing greater product market competition are more likely to be acquirers. We further show that postmerger, compared to their nonacquiring peers, acquirers consolidate their product offerings by discontinuing more existing product lines and developing fewer new product lines. Using a quasi-experiment based on bids withdrawn due to exogenous reasons helps us establish the causal effect of deal completion on product-market consolidation. We conclude that acquisitions create product market synergies by cutting overlapping product offerings to achieve cost efficiency.

Information

Type
Research Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
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