Introduction
On 4 September 1967, Poland acceded to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), an international treaty and a de facto organisation designed to foster international trade through the multilateral elimination of both tariff and non-tariff barriers. That was unprecedented. A country without a customs tariff, but instead with a centrally planned economy and a state monopoly in foreign trade, was admitted to an organisation where membership was granted based on mutual tariff concessions and guarantees of non-discriminatory access to national markets. While there were already two socialist countries in the Agreement, they both joined it under substantially different circumstances. Czechoslovakia, the first socialist member of GATT, signed the Agreement as a founding member before the socialist coup d’état in February 1948 and had never abolished its tariff system. Yugoslavia, on its way to GATT, implemented a series of economic reforms, including the introduction of a customs tariff, and remained non-aligned with the Soviet Union.
This specificity of Poland’s accession to GATT has drawn the attention of historians, who have rightfully analysed the Polish efforts to join the Agreement as a way to gain access to Western markets and a precautionary measure to secure the country’s economic interests threatened by rising regional protectionism, especially that of the newly established European Economic Community (EEC).Footnote 1 Moreover, Wanda Jarząbek extended these interpretations by framing Poland’s efforts in GATT as part of a broader opening to the West that anticipated détente and economic globalisation.Footnote 2 However, Poland’s early relations with these two organisations remain largely unexplored.Footnote 3 Filling this gap, this paper examines Poland’s evolving approach to GATT and the EEC as closely interrelated policy challenges – ones that policymakers themselves often treated as inseparable, both politically and economically.
While the literature cited above has focused primarily on the economic rationales behind Poland’s engagement with GATT and the EEC, this paper foregrounds the political dimension of its strategy towards these organisations. It argues that this involvement originated from a new way of thinking about the East–West conflict that emerged in the mid-1950s at the intersection of Polish foreign and foreign economic policies. Observations made in Warsaw of a diminishing Cold War climate translated into policy proposals aimed at reducing tensions between the two blocs, many of which began to take shape by the end of the decade. In this light, the paper interprets Poland’s accession to GATT and rapprochement with the EEC as initiatives advocated and carried out by a group of reformist or pragmatic state officials who viewed them as substantial steps towards embedding the country in a network of international interdependency. It demonstrates that in pursuing these goals, they deliberately attempted – and indeed consciously pioneered – East–West détente.
These officials were primarily drawn from two institutions: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MFT). The former was led by Adam Rapacki, who – like all his successors – was at the same time a member of the Politburo of the ruling Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP).Footnote 4 In turn, Witold Trąmpczyński, who headed the MFT, reached his highest post in the PUWP when elected as an alternate member of the Central Committee in 1964. However, for the most part, the main role in relations with international economic organisations was played by a tandem of two deputy ministers: Józef Winiewicz (MFA) and Franciszek Modrzewski (MFT). The former joined the Party only in 1964; the latter belonged to the Alliance of Democrats (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne), a satellite party of the PUWP.
Drawing on the evidence from governmental and Party archives,Footnote 5 the paper examines the strategic visions and policy initiatives of key Polish foreign policy officials and their advisors. In so doing, it contributes to current debates on the nature and dynamics of the Cold War in Europe. Most importantly, it adds to the concept of ‘long détente’, which perceives détente as an enduring mode of the East–West conflict that superseded the Cold War.Footnote 6 Scholars subscribing to this concept have usually dated détente back to the early 1960s or even the mid-1950s, and highlighted the processual nature of the East–West rapprochement. Even though they often focused on economic matters, they considered them primarily from the perspective of the political implications and conditions of the possibility of détente and paid much attention to the emergence of new political language and concepts that enabled cooperation between the two systems.Footnote 7
Other recent approaches to the European détente have focused primarily on the networks of economic interdependencies emerging on the continent in the second half of the 1960s. This strand of research has focused predominantly on the policy shifts of Western countries informed mainly by economic rationales.Footnote 8 Its significance consisted in highlighting the role of Europe in dismantling the Cold War status quo as defined by the logic of confrontation between the two superpowers.Footnote 9 This also included the recognition of the role of Western European integration in fostering European détente and in the broader Cold War context.Footnote 10 However, even if these studies acknowledged socialist initiatives, they often viewed them primarily as reactive to developments in the West.Footnote 11
The resulting picture has recently been nuanced by a remarkable attempt to bring in Eastern perspectives, by studying the strategies of socialist regimes towards the ‘commercial giant next door’, the EEC.Footnote 12 Most significantly, contributors to that edited volume provided compelling accounts of internal debates and conflicts on the desired policies towards the West, specific to each country, thus providing a much more complex depiction of socialist rule. However, they, too, have focused more on the economic rather than foreign policy considerations, which is perhaps justified to a large extent by the dynamics of East–West relations in the late 1960s and the 1970s. A chapter on Hungary explicitly stated that for Hungarian elites ‘détente was not a foreign policy goal per se but rather an advantageous environment in which to do business’.Footnote 13 While the Polish chapter by Komornicka acknowledges political ambitions of Warsaw in the late 1950s and the 1960s, it does not focus on them in detail.Footnote 14
However, this paper argues that Poland’s engagement with the West significantly diverged from that of the rest of the bloc, with respect to both its dynamics and the role it played in the overall foreign policy. For Polish foreign policymakers, economic cooperation with the West was instrumental in achieving fundamental political goals based on the principle of peaceful coexistence. Moreover, the growing politicisation of international trade,Footnote 15 combined with the deepening economic integration in Western Europe, made political engagement increasingly important for safeguarding commercial interests – particularly as Poland faced mounting difficulties in maintaining export performance, which had become ever more crucial to sustaining economic development.
Furthermore, this paper contributes to ongoing debates on the role of international organisations and multilateralism in the East–West conflict.Footnote 16 While some scholars view these institutions as mechanisms for bridging ideological divides,Footnote 17 others highlight their function in consolidating the West against the socialist bloc.Footnote 18 In turn, this study underscores the importance of such organisations in not only shaping foreign policy but also linking it to broader domestic agendas and reform proposals in socialist Poland. By focusing on policy-making and the expertise of foreign policy officials, it also adds to the literature on Cold War experts working with international economic institutions.Footnote 19 However, it does not approach these issues within the broader framework of global relations. Specifically, it does not engage with East–South relations, which remained less central to Polish foreign policy at the time.Footnote 20 Instead, the analysis highlights the Polish government’s broader effort to strengthen its ties with the West.Footnote 21
The paper first describes the revival of Polish diplomacy after Stalinism. It then analyses Poland’s early involvement with GATT that led to the country’s association with the organisation in 1960. Poland’s efforts in GATT are interpreted against the background of its reactions to Western European integration and the related overall change of the Polish attitude towards capitalist countries. Subsequently, the paper traces the attempts at creating and coordinating a consistent policy towards the EEC and GATT in the first half of the 1960s. Ultimately, it discusses Poland’s gradual intensification of contacts with the EEC on the road to its full accession to the Agreement in 1967.
The Revival of Polish Diplomacy after Stalinism
The existing scholarship has linked the revival of Polish diplomacy with the coming to power of Władysław Gomułka in October 1956, and rightfully considered the pre-1956 foreign service as virtually non-existent, even though some historians have noted earlier signs of a diplomatic thaw.Footnote 22 For the purposes of this paper, however, it is important that already from around 1955, the diplomatic leadership began to reassess the nature of the East–West conflict and Poland’s position therein. MFA officials came to regard the Cold War not as a fixed or permanent condition but rather as the sharpest phase in an ongoing confrontation between the two blocs – one that had, to some extent, already been overcome.Footnote 23 Understandably, the official socialist narrative defined the Cold War as a US-led effort to politically and economically isolate the socialist world.Footnote 24 At the same time, when encountering obstacles in relations with the West, they would attribute these difficulties to lingering remnants of a Cold War mindset.Footnote 25
From this perspective, early signs of international relaxation appeared particularly significant. In July 1955, at the Geneva Summit, the leaders of France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States met for the first time since Potsdam to discuss peace and international security.Footnote 26 Impressed by these developments, various state institutions in Poland began preparing for a possible reorientation of policy towards the West.Footnote 27 Within the MFA, the implications of the Geneva Summit were discussed in August by the Ministry’s Collegium, composed of the minister, his deputies and general directors. The diplomatic leadership acknowledged the need to overcome isolation and expand relations with capitalist countries. Among the ‘post-Geneva tasks’ was a more active engagement with international organisations, including the establishment of a permanent Polish representation to the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva – an initiative that, two years later, facilitated contact with the GATT Secretariat, also based at Lac Léman.Footnote 28
The conclusions drawn from the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and Khrushchev’s famous Secret Speech denouncing the crimes of Stalinism pushed these developments even further. Their implications for Polish foreign policy were discussed at the MFA during a conference of chiefs of diplomatic missions in April 1956, where several senior participants underlined the need to prepare for a new international situation. Przemysław Ogrodziński, Director General at the MFA, remarked that while the ministry’s personnel might have sufficed during the Cold War, the changed circumstances required an expanded and more highly qualified diplomatic corps. Similarly, Romuald Spasowski, Ambassador to the United States, argued that the new climate should be used to advance key priorities – most notably, the acquisition of modern technology and the lifting of the US-imposed strategic embargo.Footnote 29
The political developments of subsequent months rendered the reorientation of Polish foreign policy even more pressing an issue. Economic difficulties, factional struggle in the Party and widespread social unrest culminated in the political crisis of the so-called Polish October, which brought to power Władysław Gomułka.Footnote 30 The new leadership was able to secure for itself a significant degree of autonomy from the Soviet Party, which opened limited but meaningful space for Polish diplomatic activity, particularly in relations with the West.Footnote 31 This was in line with Gomułka’s vision of the international socialist movement and Poland’s place within it, which called for active diplomatic engagement to strengthen the country’s international position and secure the Polish–German border.Footnote 32
This required an efficient foreign service, and so in the post-October period the Party’s direct control over the MFA lessened, partially due to the abolition of the International Department of the PUWP’s Central Committee.Footnote 33 The new minister, Adam Rapacki, could therefore make better use of the ministry’s existing potential for strategic analysis and planning.Footnote 34 Moreover, some scholars have underscored that under Rapacki, there emerged a strong esprit de corps within the MFA, and that high-standing PUWP members would often identify more with the ministry than with the Party.Footnote 35 Considering, in addition, that the groundwork for a new diplomatic mindset had started to develop prior to Gomułka’s rise to power, it is not surprising that future political initiatives of the MFA diverged from the Party line – particularly in the realm of foreign economic policy, where the new leader remained more orthodox.Footnote 36
The degree of Poland’s autonomy at that time was high enough to cause considerable concern in other socialist capitals, with the PUWP facing a growing risk of isolation within the bloc.Footnote 37 However, the Soviet leadership realised that securing socialist rule in Poland required significant improvement of the country’s economic situation and thus became more receptive to Polish attempts at economic cooperation with the West.Footnote 38 Moreover, the Polish shift in power was met with positive reactions in capitalist countries and opened up prospects for economic aid, credit and more favourable conditions in international trade. Utilising these new opportunities became one of the first fundamental tasks of Polish post-October diplomacy.Footnote 39
Initially, the authorities in Warsaw focused primarily on Washington, where they hoped to secure credit, economic aid and support for Polish aspirations to join several international organisations. Poland’s potential accession to GATT was discussed within the US administration as early as November 1956, when the US Council for Foreign Economic Policy outlined a proposal for changes in policy towards selected socialist countries. The document advised that the United States should advocate membership for Poland and Hungary in several economic organisations, including GATT and the World Bank.Footnote 40 However, Poland was then more interested in its prospects for joining the International Monetary Fund (IMF).Footnote 41 Polish officials raised this issue repeatedly during the period under study, but it never progressed beyond preliminary consultations. At that point, however, in November, Winiewicz learned from the US ambassador that Washington was already consulting some international organisations and allied countries, as it was necessary to ‘prepare the ground’ for a potential shift in the US economic policy towards Poland, after years of heavy restrictions therein.Footnote 42 The window of opportunity was beginning to open for Polish diplomacy.
Preparing the Ground, 1957–60
Poland, too, was preparing the ground for the tightening of its relations with the West. Importantly, from 1957 the MFA was working on the so-called Rapacki Plan, which envisaged a gradual disarmament in Central Europe and the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the region. In the years that followed, this plan became an important area of Poland’s international contacts and constituted a starting point for Polish peace initiatives throughout the 1960s.Footnote 43 In the same year, Poland established its first official contact with the GATT Secretariat. On 10 September, Adam Meller-Conrad, Permanent Representative of Poland to the European Office of the UN in Geneva, issued a letter to the Executive Secretary of GATT, Wyndham White, in which he expressed Poland’s interest in establishing closer relations with the General Agreement.Footnote 44 In response, White launched informal consultations within GATT and invited a representative of Poland to attend the meetings of the Intersessional Committee between 19 and 23 September, and subsequently proposed that Poland send observers to the Twelfth Session of GATT in October–November 1957.Footnote 45
During the session, despite the supportive stance of the Secretariat and the session’s chairman, informal consultations with Western delegations did not yield results, as they lacked relevant instructions. Meanwhile, the Polish presence at the session attracted much attention among the socialist delegations. Reportedly, the Czechoslovak representatives were anxious that the potential accession of Poland would require certain concessions on behalf of the contracting parties, the negotiation of which might draw attention to the already questionable status of socialist Czechoslovakia within GATT. Hence their efforts to limit the discussion of Poland’s inquiry to informal talks, noted with dissatisfaction by the Poles.Footnote 46 Nevertheless, the overall result of the session was positive. Secretary White expressed in his letter to the Polish representative the willingness of the contracting parties to further explore the possible scenarios of relating Poland with the General Agreement and arranged a visit of his deputy, Jean Royer, to Warsaw to examine the attitudes of the Polish authorities to GATT.Footnote 47
The report from the Twelfth Session was presented at a meeting of the MFT’s Collegium on 24 January 1958.Footnote 48 The participants unanimously opted for a ‘maximum programme’, meaning full membership in GATT. To facilitate this, the establishment of a customs tariff was put forward, which also received the full support of the Collegium. The rationales set out by the two deputy ministers highlighted some of the political logic behind the proposed course of action. Winiewicz, representing the MFA, ‘pointed out that the efforts to join GATT are primarily of political significance and correspond to the principle of peaceful coexistence to which Poland subscribes’. Such reasoning would recur frequently in the following years, reflecting the MFA’s acknowledgement of the increasing importance of economic issues in the conduct of foreign policy. Modrzewski, in turn, advocated the introduction of a customs tariff, as it ‘not only should facilitate the negotiations but also becomes a necessity in light of the new model assumptions’.Footnote 49 The latter related to the so-called model discussion, in which leading Polish economists sought to reinvent the Polish economy through its decentralisation and democratisation, as well as objectivisation of the system of prices.Footnote 50 Introducing a meaningful customs tariff would certainly require a change of this system, indicating a desire among the MFT officials for far-reaching economic reforms.
The two ministries agreed that Poland’s case in GATT required robust diplomatic engagement, which was presented as beneficial in its own right. This position was set out in a memorandum on prospective membership in GATT, sent to Stefan Jędrychowski, then Head of the Planning Committee and a member of the Politburo. Drafted by the MFT with the MFA’s approval, the document noted that observer status had already allowed Polish officials to familiarise themselves with the power dynamics within the organisation. Moreover, it had created opportunities to establish contact with countries with which Poland maintained no diplomatic or trade relations. Most importantly, the memorandum argued that closer engagement with GATT aligned with Poland’s broader foreign policy objectives and was crucial to safeguarding its economic interests. Polish exports were expected to become progressively less competitive due to higher external tariff rates. This concern became particularly urgent with the establishment of the Common Market. Polish officials anticipated that GATT members would obtain some concessions from the EEC’s external tariff and argued that Poland could not afford to remain excluded from this process.Footnote 51
However, even though the MFT acknowledged the risks associated with the establishment of the EEC, its approach was often considered insufficient by the MFA. The diplomatic leadership, for their part, addressed the issue quickly and pragmatically. This was reflected in a memorandum by Mieczysław Blusztajn, Head of the Department of International Organisations, drafted just a week after the signing of the Treaties of Rome. While critical of Western European integration, it nevertheless described the process as inevitable and urged the adoption of a long-term policy to counter its negative consequences.Footnote 52
More concrete formulations were proposed a year later, when Blusztajn outlined a strategy for studying the consequences of Western integration. The analytical tasks were to be fulfilled primarily by the network of diplomatic and commercial missions abroad, but due to limited resources, the focus should, for the time being, be on the most important capitals: Paris, London, Rome, Brussels and Stockholm. Blusztajn saw the need to involve the MFT and complained about its short-sightedness and lack of interest in processes that do not yield immediate consequences. ‘Meanwhile’, wrote Blusztajn, ‘the course of events may develop in such a way that the organisational forms created for economic action aimed at geopolitical unification of the region will be used as an instrument of political and economic discrimination against our countries’. As a result, counteracting their negative consequence for Polish trade might require political rather than economic action.Footnote 53
Meanwhile, in February 1958, Royer indeed visited Warsaw and met with a group of officials from both ministries, including Modrzewski (MFT) and Blusztajn (MFA).Footnote 54 Royer’s report on his mission stated that the Polish authorities expected tangible benefits from the involvement with the Agreement. If that could not be achieved through association, the Polish leadership would be determined to seek full membership. The Poles confirmed that they were considering introduction of a customs tariff but admitted that it would require time and could not become the basis of accession at that time. Thus, Royer encouraged them to accept import commitments as an alternative ‘entrance fee’. Warsaw reacted unenthusiastically but agreed to further investigate the issue.Footnote 55 Soon, the negotiations gained momentum when, in April 1958, Modrzewski made a further case for the Polish application at a meeting with the heads of delegations in Geneva. He actually expressed the willingness of Poland to undertake the import commitments in the form of global quotas for certain goods traditionally exported by the contracting parties to Poland, adding that ongoing economic reforms might eventually enable changes in domestic pricing and the introduction of a full customs tariff.Footnote 56
In the following months, Polish diplomacy concentrated on bilateral talks with countries holding decisive influence within the Agreement. The greatest hopes were placed in the United States, whose support was considered essential not only for GATT but also in view of Poland’s possible future accession to other international economic organisations, particularly the IMF.Footnote 57 However, Polish diplomats received conflicting signals from Washington, likely reflecting divisions within the US administration.Footnote 58 According to Tadeusz Łychowski, economic minister in the Embassy in Washington, the issue was politically sensitive: although the United States wanted Poland to join GATT, ‘they want as little talk in the world as possible about the fact that they want it’.Footnote 59 Modrzewski reached similar conclusions following his meetings in Washington in November 1958.Footnote 60 The United Kingdom, by contrast, was seen as generally unsympathetic to Poland’s efforts, though unlikely to seek confrontation if a majority of the contracting parties supported Polish accession.Footnote 61
As the Thirteenth Session of GATT (16–22 October 1958) approached, the Politburo approved the plans for accession. The minutes of the meeting laconically note that ‘it was decided in principle to accept that Poland applies to GATT, but the entrance fee should be additionally clarified’.Footnote 62 This decision enabled Polish officials to advance the application process, and when the Session opened, they consulted their plans with the GATT Secretariat. White considered full membership a highly complicated matter due to resistance from the United States and the United Kingdom but recommended association and encouraged further talks with both countries. Royer expressed a similar view, explaining that Washington’s objections were primarily political – based on fears that Poland’s accession might set a precedent for other socialist states – whereas British concerns were mostly economic. Surprisingly, he also noted that the Common Market countries raised only technical issues related to commercial practices.Footnote 63 However, since the talks with US and British representatives produced no tangible progress, the Polish delegation ultimately decided not to submit a membership application.Footnote 64
In contrast, the EEC appeared even more favourable to Poland’s candidacy than earlier indications had suggested. In March, White reportedly mentioned that the Common Market countries were firmly in favour of Poland joining GATT – even as a full member.Footnote 65 Two months later, the Department of International Organisations (MFA) noted a significant shift in the attitudes of Western European economic circles and predicted further erosion of export restrictions. Representatives of various industries, affected by shrinking markets, had reportedly encouraged Polish diplomats to exert political pressure on Western governments to push for trade liberalisation.Footnote 66 Still, the contacts with the EEC had to remain unofficial due to the Soviet-imposed non-recognition policy towards the Community, which prevented socialist states from establishing formal diplomatic relations with the EEC’s authorities.Footnote 67 The first important such connection was established in May 1959, when Deputy Minister Modrzewski met in Brussels with the European Commissioner for External Relations, Jean Rey. As a sign of goodwill, Rey stressed the Community’s interest in expanding trade with Poland, welcomed the country’s existing ties with Italy and West Germany and expressed his readiness to maintain communication with the Polish authorities.Footnote 68
Meanwhile, Poland decided to take action in GATT and, on 31 March 1959, filed a formal application requesting full membership. This followed a deliberate tactic to ‘bid high’, in the hope that even if full accession failed, some tangible benefits for Polish trade could still be secured. However, with the upcoming Dillon Round (May 1959–July 1962) already complicated by the task of integrating the newly formed Common Market into the GATT framework, there was little appetite among Western governments to take on another complex issue. Moreover, while Poland’s initiative was appreciated for its political significance, its commercial offer was deemed insufficient.Footnote 69 As a result, the working party on relations with Poland concluded that full accession would be premature and recommended a form of association instead. In line with this recommendation, a ‘Declaration on Relations between Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Government of Poland’ was drafted in November, formalising Poland’s associate membership, which entered into force one year later.Footnote 70
Poland’s association with GATT marked a significant step in its political reintegration into the international system. The three years leading up to this moment saw the country emerge from relative isolation and pursue more active engagement with Western institutions. Although this form of membership fell short of advancing Poland’s economic interests, it helped lay the groundwork for future initiatives. In the period that followed, however, Polish diplomacy increasingly found itself constrained by external resistance and fundamental contradictions between its goals and the Party’s rigid economic line.
In Search of a New Policy Towards the West, 1961–4
Soon after the association, Poland faced the first major challenge in GATT, with the launch of agricultural consultations at the beginning of 1961. The lack of transparency in its economic system, based on a state monopoly in foreign trade and the administratively set prices, caused much distrust abroad. The Polish delegation was thus bracing itself against the anticipated accusation of dumping in agricultural exports.Footnote 71 The outcome, however, was reportedly positive: Poland successfully countered the charges of export subsidisation. Still, this modest diplomatic success offered little more than temporary reassurance, particularly in light of the deeper, structural challenges posed by accelerating Western European integration.Footnote 72
These challenges intensified further in 1962, when the EEC formally launched its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), a comprehensive framework of subsidies and import controls designed to protect agricultural producers within the Common Market. Even earlier, in 1960, the Community had introduced the so-called EEC clause, a provision required in new trade agreements with third countries that allowed for their revision in response to changes in EEC regulations. For socialist countries, these developments carried troubling implications: negotiating with the EEC as a unified bloc offered less flexibility and reduced bargaining power compared to dealing with individual member states.Footnote 73 Against this backdrop, Polish diplomats grew increasingly concerned. In their view, no other socialist country stood to lose as much from the CAP as Poland, due to the specific structure of its exports to EEC member states. By 1963, agricultural products accounted for nearly half of Poland’s earnings in the Common Market, much of which was already subject to new restrictions, with more exports likely to come under their scope. They thus hoped that participation in GATT could help alleviate the negative economic consequences of Western integration by allowing Poland to join the multilateral bargaining of the contracting parties with the Common Market while formally not violating the principle of non-recognition.Footnote 74
However, the principle itself did not go unquestioned, as some sources suggest that Poland was simultaneously exploring the possibilities of diplomatic recognition of the EEC. As early as in 1963, the MFA requested the Embassy in Brussels to provide detailed information on the formal procedure of establishing diplomatic relations with the Community.Footnote 75 Considerations of official recognitions were also included in the MFA’s work plan for the years 1964–5 but were soon met with strong Soviet opposition.Footnote 76 Thus the contacts with the EEC had to remain mediated by other international organisations, most importantly by GATT, whose new round of negotiations (the Kennedy Round, 1964–7) was fast approaching. At the conference of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) experts in October 1963, the Polish and Czechoslovak delegations announced the intentions of their governments to negotiate with the authorities of the Common Market within the Kennedy Round and later reiterated this during the Fourteenth Session of the Comecon’s Permanent Commission for Foreign Trade in May 1964.Footnote 77
With the upcoming Kennedy Round, the Polish plans regarding the Agreement had to be concretised. In May 1963, Modrzewski expressed Poland’s interest in participating and set out four points defining its proposed contribution. First, Poland agreed to ensure in its economic plans ‘a reasonable share in the growth of the Polish market’ for the contracting parties. Second, it committed to using the earnings from the liberalisation of its exports to GATT countries to increase its imports from these countries in a proportion to be agreed upon. It also expressed willingness to negotiate a list of specific goods imported from the interested contracting parties whose volume should increase more rapidly than the overall turnover. Lastly, Poland would commit to consulting its foreign trade practices with GATT, meaning ‘a discussion on the whole of its policies connected with the expansion of the mutual exchange of goods and services’.Footnote 78
The proposal was reiterated by Bohdan Łączkowski, Permanent Representative of Poland to GATT, during the meeting of the Sub-Committee on Non-Tariff Barriers on 14 November 1963.Footnote 79 On the very next day, Zdzisław Rurarz – his MFT colleague and frequent adversary – sent an emotional letter to Modrzewski, in which he attacked Łączkowski and his actions. At that time, Rurarz was serving as a representative of the Comecon at the First Session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva and could closely watch the developments in GATT.Footnote 80 In the letter, he advised strongly against undertaking any import commitments or proposing ‘self-limitation’ of exports, arguing that Poland might at some point want to export more and import less. Rurarz claimed that the Polish proposal caused serious confusion among both Western and Soviet experts and that it could not grant Poland provisional membership, because import quotas are ‘not what it is all about’.Footnote 81 While this controversy did raise some doubts about the desirable strategy in GATT, the negotiations would continue in the set direction.
Meanwhile, Western European integration reached yet another level with an agreement ending the so-called agricultural marathon, an intense round of negotiations of the common prices for agricultural goods. This agreement made a great impression on Polish diplomats, who immediately urged the leadership to intensify Polish actions towards the EEC, which opened up a nearly year-long debate on the directions of Poland’s foreign policy.Footnote 82 In July, in a joint memorandum for the highest Party and government leadership, Winiewicz and Modrzewski called for an active engagement strategy towards the EEC. They admitted that, despite all its internal contradictions, the Community was strengthening and could be expected to reach an agreement as to the common trade policy towards socialist countries. Thus, the deputy ministers proposed that Poland take immediate action independently from the Comecon and begin with exploring through semi-official and unofficial talks with the EEC authorities possible ways of securing Polish economic interests.Footnote 83
However, while the MFA persistently advocated engagement with the EEC and viewed it as a means of advancing ‘economic coexistence’ between East and West, its ambitions often ran counter to the Party’s rigid economic line.Footnote 84 The mid-1960s saw a renewed emphasis within the Party leadership on import substitution and other restrictive trade measures.Footnote 85 In line with the directions set by the Fourth Congress of the PUWP (15–20 June 1964), the Planning Commission outlined the guidelines for the new five-year plan (1966–70) and ordered the MFT to prepare a territorial plan for Polish foreign trade accordingly. The outcomes were met with strong criticism in the MFA, which dubbed the task completely unfeasible.Footnote 86
The territorial plan aimed at a radical improvement in Poland’s trade balance. While the 1965 target projected a deficit of 369 billion exchange zloty (złoty dewizowy),Footnote 87 planners hoped to achieve a surplus of 203 billion by 1970. The adjustment was to be unevenly distributed, with the trade balance vis-à-vis developed capitalist countries expected to rise from a surplus of 60 billion to 650 billion exchange zloty – primarily through cuts in purchases of industrial, investment and agricultural goods. A memorandum by Winiewicz and Blusztajn sharply criticised the plan, arguing that it threatened the foundations of Poland’s foreign and foreign economic policy and contradicted its long-standing interpretation of peaceful coexistence, ‘which had always emphasised the question of economic cooperation . . . as an indispensable condition of maintaining peace and friendly relations among nations’.Footnote 88
Most importantly for the authors, the plan’s implementation would have serious political consequences, as it risked undermining efforts to activate Polish diplomacy in Italy and France. The latter was not only the sole Western power guaranteeing the Polish–German border but also a vocal critic of West Germany’s European policy. Similarly, they noted that only substantial interest from major German firms in accessing the Polish market could gradually normalise relations with Bonn. Moreover, Winiewicz and Blusztajn warned that Poland was already facing accusations in Paris, Rome and London of restricting investment purchases in the West, and that the new policy would likely raise suspicions that ‘Poland questions the fundamental principles of economic coexistence between the two systems [emphasis original]’. Furthermore, such rigid limitations on Polish purchases in Western markets would seriously undermine Polish exports to those countries, which to a large extent relied on relative political favourability and sustained interest from major Western monopolies.Footnote 89
The diplomats further argued that the territorial plan contradicted entirely Polish efforts to join GATT, and this reason alone should be enough to revise it. It was telling, in their view, that the other socialist countries had already recognised the importance of imports, specifically of industrial goods, from developed capitalist countries for the entire political configuration at that time, and shifted their policies accordingly. Czechoslovakia, for instance, attempting to join the Kennedy Round, declared its willingness to increase industrial imports from those countries by 30 per cent, and Hungary pursued ‘maximum liberalisation’ of the imports from the West. Thus the authors ultimately called for maximisation of the elasticity of Polish foreign trade and insisted that the MFA be included in further development of the plan.Footnote 90
As the MFA pushed for greater flexibility in trade policy, the Ministry of Foreign Trade also intensified efforts to develop a more pragmatic strategy for engaging the EEC. This was reflected in an important memorandum on Poland’s economic relations with the Community, prepared in several variants between November and December 1964 for the highest leadership. The document emphasised the growing importance of trade with EEC members, which accounted for over 33 per cent of Poland’s hard currency earnings from developed capitalist countries. At the same time, however, it highlighted mounting difficulties for Polish trade stemming from introduction of the CAP – particularly disadvantageous given the structure of Poland’s exports to the Common Market. In 1963, agricultural products made up over 46 per cent of exports, with most of the remainder consisting of raw materials and semi-finished goods. By then, 40 per cent of Poland’s agricultural exports were already subject to CAP rules, with the share expected to rise to 70 per cent following the projected expansion of the policy’s scope.Footnote 91
Thus, MFT officials urged a revision of Poland’s policy towards the EEC. Most immediately, they judged existing technical contacts insufficient in light of the Community’s deepening integration and called for more active political engagement with EEC authorities, making use of Poland’s presence in GATT. Yet they also warned that, given the EEC’s growing agricultural self-sufficiency, no agreement could secure Poland’s traditional export interests in the long term. The fundamental task, therefore, lay in restructuring Poland’s export offer to the Common Market.
As an annotation by Minister Trąmpczyński indicates, the memorandum was discussed on 23 December at a meeting of the highest leadership, which accepted the outlined policy towards the EEC and greenlighted Poland’s accession to GATT. Interestingly, it was not a regular meeting of the Politburo, even though half of its members were present, including nearly all the most important stakeholders in foreign economic policy.Footnote 92 The practice of organising informal meetings of the Politburo is documented for 1970,Footnote 93 but it seems that they also occurred on occasion in the earlier period, perhaps for the discussion of specific urgent issues.
The years following Poland’s association with GATT revealed a fundamental tension between its foreign and economic policies. While the strategies pursued by the MFA increasingly relied on expanding cooperation with the West, the Party’s economic doctrine – much to the ministry’s frustration – turned towards a more restrictive approach to foreign trade. As a result, the ambitions of Polish diplomacy lacked the necessary support from the economic sphere. This divergence set Poland apart from most other socialist countries, where economic motives often led the way in opening towards the capitalist system. Yet, as the next section will show, the mid-1960s brought significant international developments that increasingly favoured a strategy of more active engagement with the West.
Poland’s Accession to GATT, 1965–7
The policy shift towards the EEC at the end of 1964 legitimised a broader intensification of contacts with the West. This was of particular importance to foreign policymakers, who were observing far-reaching transformations in the global order. Trade and development had moved to the highest political levels, and Cold War dynamics in Europe were also shifting, with growing interest in economic cooperation on both sides of the Iron Curtain. As this section demonstrates, for Polish diplomacy this translated into a strategic imperative: to step up engagement with the West to position Poland as a pioneer of the emerging détente.
In parallel with these diplomatic ambitions, multilateralisation of trade was also seen as a way to embed Poland in a more stable environment for economic cooperation with the West. While ad hoc trade agreements concluded through strictly technical negotiations could guarantee solid trade expansion, Łychowski, who in the meantime became the chief economic advisor to the minister of foreign affairs, warned that the lack of political regulations posed long-term risks to the structural development of Poland’s economy. He argued that the country’s industrial choices and cost structures risked remaining largely arbitrary unless confronted with external stimuli stemming from stabilised trade with capitalist countries. From this perspective, the GATT framework would create a more predictable external environment that could contribute to correcting the imbalances in Poland’s development strategy, particularly those resulting from the lack of reliable economic signals to guide investment and production decisions under central planning.Footnote 94
The path to GATT, however, was complicated by the shifting dynamics within the Agreement. The new round was projected to be broader in scope, but also increasingly defined by tensions within the Western alliance, especially as the EEC was now participating as a single entity.Footnote 95 The United States strongly supported Poland’s participation, viewing it as a way to weaken Soviet control over Poland and draw it closer to the West. At the same time, Washington hoped that Poland’s accession might provide leverage against the EEC by challenging its protectionist stance from within the GATT system. In contrast, the EEC – where much of Poland’s export potential lay – emphasised economic concerns. It cited the need to maintain protective mechanisms such as quantitative restrictions and other trade barriers and raised objections related to the risk of dumping and the non-market nature of Poland’s economy.Footnote 96 Overcoming this resistance became a central challenge for Poland on its way to the Agreement.
In some cases, progress in relations with the EEC was prompted by the immediate need to address trade restrictions it had imposed on specific goods. For instance, in autumn 1964, the Community imposed surcharges on shell egg imports, making this important item in Polish exports entirely unprofitable. The successful resolution of the issue demonstrated the effectiveness of direct talks with EEC authorities and encouraged their further development. According to Łychowski, these developments marked a more positive turn in Poland’s relations with the Community, which should be leveraged to support Poland’s GATT accession efforts and strengthen its position in the round.Footnote 97
An important role besides technical negotiations was played by personal contacts established by Polish officials with representatives of the EEC authorities. Roundtables and conferences became important venues for contacts with Western officials, business leaders and civil society. One of the most impactful such events was a conference organised at the University of Brussels on 31 March–1 April 1966, attended by Zbigniew Kamecki, economic advisor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Among the participants were scholars, politicians and diplomats, as well as representatives of banks and industry. In his report, Kamecki positively assessed the conference as yet another sign of a favourable atmosphere for expansion of East–West trade. The participation of a number of prominent individuals allowed for a rare exchange of opinions with representatives of important economic and political circles in the West.Footnote 98
Among them was Jean Rey, the aforementioned European Commissioner for External Relations, with whom Kamecki discussed the matters of the potential ‘common Eastern policy’ of the EEC.Footnote 99 This likely referred to the entire set of rules to regulate East–West trade under the Common Commercial Policy, including the requirement that all new trade agreements with external partners contain the so-called EEC clause, allowing for revisions if Community regulations changed or if common import quotas were introduced in place of national ones.Footnote 100 Rey appreciated Poland’s concerns and acknowledged the difficulties within the EEC but at the same time reassured Kamecki of his determination to introduce the policy no matter what. Asked about Polish efforts in GATT, Rey advised against putting too much pressure on the Community about regulating the exchange with the Common Market and added that should Poland want to influence the direction of the future Eastern policy of the Community, it would first need to establish contacts with the EEC authorities at an appropriately high level. He suggested that such contacts could take the form of a general review of Poland–EEC relations in Brussels or even in Warsaw.Footnote 101 Overall, however, the entire conversation highlighted the persistent difficulties of the East–West negotiations.
In contrast, Kamecki’s conversation with Max Kohnstamm, Vice President of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, outlined a much more positive vision of the possible East–West relations. The Committee was a civil society initiative founded by Jean Monnet after he resigned the Presidency of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community. It aimed at fostering further integration in Europe, and while not formally involved in policy-making, it possessed considerable influence, bringing together important politicians and trade union leaders of the EEC member countries. Kohnstamm strongly supported rapprochement with the socialist countries. He denounced the restrictive import quotas maintained by the EEC as a manifestation of arbitrariness in East–West relations that introduced uncertainty and strengthened intra-European divisions, and was, too, interested in visiting Warsaw. Thus Kamecki urged the ministry to approve the visit as soon as possible and to arrange for the guest a number of meetings with Polish experts.Footnote 102
The vice president arrived in Poland on 11 May and stayed there for ten days. It seems that the Polish side grasped quite well the nature of this visit, which, while private and not formally connected to the EEC, was seen as possibly impactful explorations on behalf of ‘the European movement’. During the talks, Kohnstamm expressed his view that East–West coexistence should be transformed into actual cooperation between the countries of different political systems. He argued that the West should recognise the right of socialist countries to follow their own political principles and not use cooperation as a means of undermining the unity of the socialist camp. Socialist integration, he added, was essential for Europe’s stable and predictable development. He also stressed the need for coordinated socialist policy towards the EEC and endorsed the view that Poland’s actions in GATT could serve as a model for East–West relations.Footnote 103
Overall, the contacts established in the spring of 1966 seem to have influenced to a considerable extent the standpoint of ministerial advisors and their superiors. On 8 June, Winiewicz sent to the MFT a memorandum drafted together by Kamecki and Łychowski on a desirable policy towards the EEC and requested it to become a subject of discussion at a joint meeting of the MFA and MFT leadership. The memorandum urged the leadership to intensify contacts with the EEC and endorsed Rey’s proposal to conduct a general review of relations between Poland and the EEC, which in order to mitigate any undesirable political repercussions should also take place within the GATT framework, preferably in Geneva.Footnote 104 Furthermore, as suggested by Kohnstamm, and perhaps with his help, Poland should send one or two experts to the EEC on an exploratory mission to establish unofficial contacts with the Community’s authorities and industrial circles.Footnote 105
Kamecki and Łychowski expressed hope that such actions might benefit Poland far beyond solving the technical problems faced by its exports to the Common Market. Polish diplomacy could take advantage of the Community’s desire to review its relations with Poland to impact the creation of the Eastern policy and to weaken the EEC’s resistance to Poland’s accession to GATT. In their view, establishing contacts with European industrial associations might facilitate these negotiations. Importantly, it should provide better insight into the development of individual industrial sectors in the Common Market, the prospects of industrial cooperation with enterprises from EEC countries and the preferred structure of Poland’s export production. Finally, the advisors saw no reason to consult about this with other socialist countries, though they presumed that the Poland–EEC talks could ‘pave the way’ for them, should they want to follow the Polish example.Footnote 106
The timing was right, as signs of a broader reorientation in socialist countries’ attitudes towards the West were increasingly visible. This entailed changing attitudes towards international financial organisations, as evidenced by a memorandum on the relations of Poland with the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), sent to the MFA by the Ministry of Finance (MF) on 14 June 1966. The document interestingly outlined the shifting role of these institutions against the background of the UNCTAD activities. The emancipation of the Third World meant altering the balance of power relations in many international organisations and challenging their ideological profile. According to the MF, the representatives of Hungary and Romania had approached the delegates of the IMF during the first UNCTAD session in 1964 to explore the possibilities of their countries joining the Fund, and Poland should, too, take it into consideration.Footnote 107
The MFA agreed that the potential benefits of membership were significant but underlined that in contrast with Poland’s efforts to join GATT, accession to the IMF would involve far more serious political problems, as the Fund’s regulations in fact constituted ‘a sort of codification of the fundamental capitalist concepts related to the functioning of international economic relations’, and thus ‘the position of the Fund is much more doctrinal than the provisions of GATT, which apply only to certain aspects of international trade’. While the MF believed that accession to the IMF would facilitate Poland’s efforts in GATT, the MFA considered joining the Agreement much more feasible a task.Footnote 108
Importantly, while the Soviet Union had long expressed its negative stance towards GATT,Footnote 109 this paper has found no evidence of serious objections from Moscow to Poland’s participation in the Agreement – unlike in the cases of proposed accession to the IMF or official recognition of the EEC, where Soviet opposition was unequivocal. In fact, by the mid-1960s, Polish officials were noting signs of a gradual shift in attitudes towards GATT across the socialist bloc, including in the Soviet Union and the Comecon Secretariat.Footnote 110 At times, Polish diplomats even expressed concern that growing interest in GATT from other socialist states might create the impression that the bloc was storming the Agreement, thereby complicating Poland’s negotiating position.Footnote 111
Overall, however, the prospect of other countries following in Poland’s footsteps was viewed positively – all the more so because it aligned with the image Polish officials sought to promote of their country as a ‘pilot’ in East–West relations. Łychowski had already in 1964 been impressed by the concepts of pan-Europeanism propagated by some political circles in France.Footnote 112 In 1966, he claimed that France, too, had taken the role of a ‘pilot’ in Western Europe, fostering East–West cooperation and attempting to influence other countries against the United States.Footnote 113 This was in line with the Gaullist ‘Politics of Grandeur’ envisioning a strong position of France in independent Europe that could become a counterweight to the two superpowers.Footnote 114 This vision entailed also a certain relaxation in the relations with the socialist bloc. For instance, Paris decided at that time to liberalise its trade with Comecon countries and looked more sympathetically at Polish efforts in GATT.Footnote 115
The broader landscape, too, was shifting in favour of Poland’s accession. By the mid-1960s, GATT had already been under much pressure. with its universality being questioned by many countries kept away from the Agreement. In 1966, Yugoslavia had been granted provisional membership, which raised hopes in Warsaw for a positive outcome of its application. At that point, Poland enjoyed the support of the GATT Secretariat and – most importantly – the US administration, and the outlooks of the majority of the contracting parties were leaning towards admission due to the perceived geopolitical benefits of weakening Poland’s ties with Moscow.Footnote 116 Eventually, Poland filed a formal application in December 1966. During the negotiations, the Polish government agreed to undertake import commitments as an entrance fee, thus increasing imports from the contracting parties by 7 per cent annually. At the same time, under pressure from the EEC, Poland had to withdraw from demanding the abolition of quantitative restrictions.Footnote 117 On 4 September 1967, Poland was officially granted provisional membership.Footnote 118
The accession to GATT came at the time of important shifts in the Polish economy. The new five-year plan (1966–70) envisaged further prioritisation of export production that was supposed to provide hard currencies indispensable for accelerated economic growth. The Polish leadership was well aware of the difficulty of this task. Membership in GATT was supposed to facilitate access to Western markets, but with the end of the Kennedy Round, the exact benefits to be expected remained unclear to policymakers. As predicted by the MFT in an evaluation of the round, the liberalisation of international trade would tighten market competition and thus Poland’s gains therein would depend on the adaptation of its economy to the new circumstances.Footnote 119 The document further highlighted the potentially positive impact of the ‘dynamic stabilisation’ of international trade on Polish industry, as the liberalisation of international trade should provide external stimuli for the restructuring of the Polish economy and more incentives for increased specialisation in the global division of labour. In this sense, Poland’s accession to GATT was thought to be in line with the attempts at greater predictability and objectivity of socialist economic planning.Footnote 120
Conclusions
This paper has argued that Poland’s accession to GATT was driven by both economic and political rationales. The former have been widely acknowledged in the existing scholarship, aligning with the broader view of Western European integration as a process that contributed to softening the rigidity of the East–West confrontation in Europe. From this perspective, the accession of socialist countries to the Agreement was primarily a means of mitigating the adverse effects of the EEC’s policies and securing opportunities for export to the Common Market. However, this paper has emphasised that in the case of Poland, the engagement with GATT was also grounded on political reasons, relatively autonomous from, though supportive of, the immediate economic rationales.
Most importantly, for the progressive or pragmatic officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accession to GATT constituted an important step in building the economic dimension of peaceful coexistence and aligned with their vision of Poland as a pioneer of the East–West rapprochement. They conceived economic integration with the West as instrumental in improving the country’s international standing and hoped that as a forerunner in this process, their country could enjoy political and economic benefits. Furthermore, participating in GATT allowed the foreign service to intensify its contacts with countries and organisations with which Poland did not maintain formal diplomatic relations, most significantly with the EEC. This alone was positively assessed by the policymakers.
At the same time, Poland’s pursuit of GATT membership was supported by evolving domestic policy considerations. In the late 1950s, during a brief period of enthusiasm for economic reforms, accession appeared consistent with projects of changes in the domestic pricing system and aligning it with world prices. Although these plans, along with the considered introduction of a meaningful customs tariff, were quickly abandoned, further economic integration with the West remained a recurring theme in addressing the systemic problems of the socialist economy. In this vein, Poland’s participation in GATT was also intended to allow privileged insight into economic and political developments in the West, as well as to contribute to stabilisation of trade with capitalist countries and, in turn, provide necessary stimuli for restructuring of the domestic economy.
Ultimately, the policy considerations underlying Poland’s accession to GATT demonstrate a substantial shift in political thinking within the Polish foreign service. In the view of the MFA and MFT officials, the growing interdependence in the world economy, together with politico-economic processes such as Western European integration, was increasing the political significance of international trade. They were well aware that securing access to Western markets was to some extent dependent on the normalisation of political relations between countries of the two blocs, and, in turn, that economic interests of Western firms might serve Polish foreign policy goals. However, these insights did not immediately translate into Poland’s economic policy, which remained under strict control of the Party leaders, who until the late 1960s pursued a development model based on import substitution and maximisation of positive trade balance with the West.
Acknowledgements
I am deeply grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful and constructive feedback, which significantly contributed to improving the manuscript. Any remaining shortcomings are solely my responsibility.
Funding Statement
This research was funded by the National Science Centre, Poland (grant no. 2021/41/N/HS6/01513).
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