If two men of similar talents, identical training, shared values, and common interests were to study the same phenomena it would not be at all remarkable if they approached the phenomena in the same way, described them in the same terms, employed the same logic in analyzing them, drew the same conclusions from them, and formulated the same theories about their causes.

If, however, two men of similar talents but of rather divergent training, professing differing objectives, and displaying varied (perhaps even conflicting) concerns were to pursue studies of phenomena each believed to be quite distinct from the other's field of inquiry, it would be most astounding if their findings and inferences should turn out to be closely parallel in many important respects, particularly if there were little evidence of communication between them.

“All philosophers, of every school, imagine that causation is one of the fundamental axioms of science, yet, oddly enough, in advanced science … the word ‘cause’ never occurs …. The Law of Causality, I believe, like much that passes among philosophers, is a relic of a by-gone age, surviving like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm.”—Bertrand Russell (1928)

Causality is an invention of the formal reason, a product of philosophers and scientists. As an idea, however, “cause” finds its basis in ordinary experience. Objects move. How? By being acted upon by other objects or by human agency; exert a pull here, create an effect there. In the world of experience unrefined by science or philosophy, it sometimes seems as if every thing is connected in some way with every other thing, all are parts in a cosmic puppet show. A simple string model appears natural and true and is a prototype of common-sense notions of causality. Even in science, at least until recently, such notions were given expression as well. The string model, for instance, was to be found equally in the simplest interpretations of Newtonian mechanics as in the implicit theories of the carpenter, the plumber, or the agriculturist. Particles exist and forces act between them as causes, producing change. The very idea of force introduces a feeling of compulsion and the causal connection between events seems a physical necessity, reinforcing the lessons taught by every-day experience.

The nuclear age has ushered in a novel period of history, as distinct from the age that preceded it as the modern age has been from the Middle Ages or the Middle Ages have been from antiquity. Yet while our conditions of life have drastically changed under the impact of the nuclear age, we still live in our thoughts and act through our institutions in an age that has passed. There exists, then, a gap between what we think about our social, political, and philosophic problems and the objective conditions which the nuclear age has created.

This contradiction between our modes of thought and action, belonging to an age that has passed, and the objective conditions of our existence has engendered four paradoxes in our nuclear strategy: the commitment to the use of force, nuclear or otherwise, paralyzed by the fear of having to use it; the search for a nuclear strategy which would avoid the predictable consequences of nuclear war; the pursuit of a nuclear armaments race joined with attempts to stop it; the pursuit of an alliance policy which the availability of nuclear weapons has rendered obsolete. All these paradoxes result from the contrast between traditional attitudes and the possibility of nuclear war and from the fruitless attempts to reconcile the two.

The legal or customary requirement that legislators reside in the districts they represent is one of the principal structural respects in which American legislatures differ from those of most other democracies. Our legislators and party leaders commonly defend the local residence rule by claiming that it ensures that each legislator will know the special problems and desires of his constituents and thus be equipped to represent them faithfully.

Some academic commentators, on the other hand, have argued that the rule is a prime cause of the parochialism which, they say, prevents Congress and state legislatures from formulating consistent and purposive general programs. These critics customarily contrast American practice unfavorably with that in Great Britain, where the last local residence rule for M.P.s was repealed in 1774. In Britain, the argument runs, the absence of the rule not only minimizes localism but, even more, it enables the national party leaders to allocate their personnel resources in the most effective way.

Useful studies of Canadian political parties are available, and doubtless others will be soon. I am not trying to add another specifically Canadian study nor even to contribute new information helpful in understanding Canada. Instead I want to use what is known about Canadian parties in order to change the comparative perspective in which we ordinarily view American parties. More particularly I am attempting to put in a new light the well-worn view of the uncohesive and nonresponsible character of American parties in contrast to British parties. The Canadian party system, itself so often described as an Anglo-American hybrid, may help explain why American parties differ from Britain's.

Pleas and programs for party responsibility are not new. It is remarkable, however, how little the discussion has advanced. I do not mean that I am surprised that the path of reform has been hard but that knowledge of the subject has not grown in proportion to the length of the discussion. Proponents believe party responsibility introduces desired qualities into the policy process and makes possible rational organization of the electorate in terms of policy. Not much has been done to provide adequate support for either of these propositions. In fact, it is hard to discover a serious effort to put these propositions in some form which would permit a partial but rigorous test. Opponents on the other hand conjure up visions of polarized parties, downtrodden minorities, and multipartyism as the fruits of party responsibility. They are able to make these improbable inferences by working with an exceedingly simple model, by ignoring the functions of party competition and the complex of factors which seem to shape party systems. Some observers less involved in the argument allow that the debate may have some value since it leads to notice of important realities. But, for them, proposed reforms are not to be taken seriously because they are Utopian in two senses: (1) sweeping and incalculable; and (2) out of reach. This view seems to overlook the fact that party responsibility is a matter of degree and that incremental reform is, at least, possible in principle. Finally, very little attention has been paid to factors which may promote or inhibit party responsibility.

On February 18, 1963, in the cases of Francisco Mendoza-Martinez and Joseph Henry Cort, the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a provision of the nationality code which said that “departing from or remaining outside of the jurisdiction of the United States” during wartime or a period of national emergency “for the purpose of evading or avoiding training and service in the land or naval forces of the United States” created in effect an irrebuttable presumption of a voluntary decision to expatriate, i.e., to extinguish one's American nationality. The reader who winces at this convoluted formulation should brace himself: worse is yet to come. Indeed, it would be hard to discover an area of American public law in which the premises and logic of action have been so absurdly attenuated, or in which the historical record has been so flagrantly distorted. (Unless it is in the similar area of denaturalization, which is excluded from discussion here.)

Central to the problem of obtaining intelligent and effective management and policy direction in the federal government are the sources and procedures used in the selection of federal political executives. These executives, occupying positions usually subject to presidential appointment and senatorial confirmation, constitute the “key group in making representative government work within the executive branch.” Through them the President directs and controls his administration, creates political support, and establishes lines of defense for his political program. Increasing attention has been paid to the selection process in recent years because of frequent reports of extreme difficulty in recruiting able people, inability to retain their services, and allegations that those who have served have proven less than adequate. The problem as broadly stated by the (Jackson) subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Senate Committee on Government Operations is: “how to make the quality of appointments of private citizens to national services keep pace with the spiraling complexity and difficulty of foreign policy and defense problems.”