Although sharing in the pattern of losing power to powerful executives, post-communist legislatures in Russia and Ukraine differ significantly in institutional strengths, specifically in their ability to provide checks on executive power. Russia had a weak—but not powerless—parliament after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Cichock Reference Cichock2002, 85; Remington Reference Remington2001). Research on modern Russia under Putin frequently refers to Russian society as “Putinism,” which rests on a one-man rule (Fish Reference Fish2017) in which a parliament is a “rubber stamp” to a president. Ukraine, however, is a rather puzzling case. The Ukrainian parliament is a strongly institutionalized legislature capable of performing independent policy roles; however, it struggles with performing basic functions, such as legislative oversight (Khmelko Reference Khmelko2015). At the same time, the Ukrainian president, although not as strong as the Russian president, also is gaining strength at the expense of parliament.
What explains the different degrees of power that presidents were able to consolidate at the expense of legislatures in these two countries? First, countries differ in their choices of governmental systems, which allows for varying levels of power concentrated in the hands of a president. Ukraine’s post-Soviet constitutional engineering resulted in a mixed governmental system in which power was distributed among the president, the prime minister, and a parliament. Russia established a strong presidential system in the early years of its post-Soviet history, with all power concentrated in the hands of a president.
Ukraine’s post-Soviet constitutional engineering resulted in a mixed governmental system in which power was distributed among the president, the prime minister, and a parliament. Russia established a strong presidential system in the early years of its post-Soviet history, with all power concentrated in the hands of a president.
A second factor is the Russian “militocracy,” which is the militarization of Russian elites under Putin (Kryshtanovskaya and White Reference Kryshtanovskaya and White2003; Rivera and Rivera Reference Rivera and Rivera2017). This began with Lieutenant Colonel Putin becoming the President of Russia and then methodically appointing “siloviki” (i.e., KGB and military staff) to governmental offices, which resulted in what is called the “neo-KGB state” (Economist 2007). His operatives from the ranks of the siloviki will follow orders, be loyal, and not hesitate to violate both the law and democratic practice, if necessary (Rivera and Rivera Reference Rivera and Rivera2017).
This trend of militarization in Russia and its absence in Ukraine can be associated with how presidents in these two countries resolve political conflicts. The first standoff between the Russian president and parliament, in 1993, was resolved by tanks shooting at the parliament building in Moscow. Ukraine had political crises as well, but no Ukrainian president used military force against the parliament. For example, in 1993, Ukrainian President Kravchuk resigned over conflict with Prime Minister Kuchma but did not apply military force to resolve the conflict. Instead, he signed the law “On Early Elections of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the President of Ukraine” and used the electoral process to resolve their partisan and ideological differences.
These two countries also differ in the degree to which election outcomes are manipulated. The lack of free and equal elections in Russia and the weakness of opposition parties are well documented in the literature (Ishiyama and Kennedy Reference Ishiyama and Kennedy2001; Korgunyuk, Ross, and Shpagin Reference Korgunyuk, Ross and Shpagin2018; White Reference White2017). In Ukraine, however, the most recent election brought to parliament a strong pro-presidential faction and many from majoritarian districts, what Ukrainians call “buckwheat” districts. They are named thus because something like a bag of buckwheat donated to an impoverished electorate can secure a vote in those districts. (The population reasons, “At least we can get this buckwheat now, because when elected, these politicians will not do anything else for us.”) In addition, a closed-list proportional system hurts the party system in Ukraine. Parties there are led by a strong leader and the rest are usually faithful followers, known as “button pushers” on behalf of party leaders.
In conclusion, Ukraine has been more successful than Russia in providing sufficient checks on the executive to prevent the country from descending into a full autocracy. The combination of governmental system, election laws, and degree of militarization appears to be important in explaining the differences in outcomes between Russia and Ukraine. Our findings are in line with Linz’s (1996a; 1996b) argument about the dangers of the presidential form of government for democratic consolidation. We add that a time lag between the collapse of the old soviet system and the development of a fully functional new system of government provides an opportunity for presidents to quickly deprive parliaments of important powers. The population indeed may obtain relief from the intense growing pains of any democratic transition, but the price in the long run is the failure of the democracy and a reversion to autocracy. The mixed governmental system divides power among multiple political institutions. This allows a parliament to maintain its institutional strength and prevent a president from assuming full power in a country. At the same time, a mixed governmental system coupled with a mixed election system allows a president to take on more power at the expense of a parliament. As a result, the parliament is weakened—but more slowly and to a lesser degree than in a presidential system.
