Impact statement
Little is known about the politics of why states have pledged support for a high-ambition global plastics treaty. This case study of South Korea is the first analysis of this politics, with the dual aim of deepening the understanding of the role of South Korea in the plastics treaty talks and offering a model for future country case studies. The article develops the concept of “ambiguous ambition” to analyze cases such as South Korea, where states rhetorically call for high ambition, but fail to act forcefully, clearly or consistently to advance strong, binding treaty obligations. The extent of a state’s ambition can fluctuate over time, and can range from genuine to partial to entirely false. Identifying the politics shaping state ambition is vital to negotiating – and ultimately implementing – a treaty robust and comprehensive enough to end plastic pollution.
Introduction
Negotiations for a global plastics treaty began in 2022. Since then, increasing numbers of states have backed calls for a “high-ambition” treaty to meet the United Nations (UN) Environment Assembly’s mandate to “end plastic pollution.” What this exactly means varies across these states. Broadly, however, states calling for a high-ambition treaty support governing the full life cycle of plastics, regulating global plastics production, phasing out hazardous plastics, eliminating toxic chemicals in plastics and ensuring fair and adequate financing for implementation in low-income countries.
In 2022, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) was positioning itself as a leader among states calling for a high-ambition treaty. South Korea is a major producer and exporter of petrochemicals. Yet, it was one of the 54 states to cosponsor the 2022 UN Environment Assembly Resolution to negotiate a treaty to govern the life cycle of plastics, from upstream production to downstream waste (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, 2022; United Nations, 2022). That year, South Korea was a founding member of the High Ambition Coalition to End Plastic Pollution (2025), which calls for a treaty to “restrain” global production and consumption of plastics. At the first Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC-1) meeting in late 2022 in Punta del Este, Uruguay, South Korea said it was “deeply committed” to strong international and domestic obligations to end plastic pollution. Four core principles, the government added, should anchor the treaty: “to reduce, to reuse, to recycle and to replace [plastics] with cleaner alternatives or substitutes” (Republic of Korea, 2022).
In recognition of this commitment, South Korea was awarded the honor of hosting the fifth and “final” INC negotiating session with a mandate to reach an agreement on a legally binding treaty to end plastic pollution. This session was held in the port city of Busan at the end of 2024. However, states failed to agree on the text for a plastics treaty. South Korea’s leadership in Busan was timid, hesitant and vacillating. The government professed support for a binding instrument to regulate plastics across their life cycle. Yet, notably, it did not back concrete measures to regulate production or consumption and withheld support from the majority of states calling for a high-ambition treaty at the closing plenary. Nor did South Korea “reaffirm” its commitment to “an ambitious plastics treaty” at the UN Ocean Conference in June 2025, even though 95 countries signed the so-called “Nice wake-up call” (United Nations Ocean Conference, 2025).
It may appear as if South Korea “lost” ambition sometime after 2022. Yet, we argue, its early signaling is better understood as a case of “ambiguous ambition” from the very beginning, with the rhetorical support for ambition motivated primarily by strategic efforts to shape treaty design and enhance the country’s global standing. This approach reflected a broader foreign policy goal of becoming a “global pivotal state,” brokering deals, asserting diplomatic independence and serving as a bridge between the “West and the Rest.” There were South Korean policymakers in 2022 who did support global measures to improve product designs, enhance resource efficiency and support circular-economy approaches to increase recycling and reduce waste. Yet, as demands have intensified since 2022 for strong, binding controls on plastics production, problematic products and hazardous chemicals – measures that directly threaten the country’s petrochemical industry – support for a high-ambition treaty has become increasingly challenging for South Korea. Leadership turnover, industry pressure and competing policy priorities have further complicated the government’s ability to translate high-ambition rhetoric into concrete commitments.
Employing high-ambition rhetoric in the early stages of negotiations for the plastics treaty, we further argue, failed to build soft power and diplomatic respect for South Korea. By the time of the Busan talks, South Korea’s wavering stance and lack of substantive ambition had become a liability, and industry criticism, bureaucratic wrangling and political instability had weakened its leadership capacity. Power struggles and clashing agendas between South Korea’s Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Foreign Affairs added to the diplomatic challenges in Busan. Political fissures and a deep political crisis in 2024 further undermined the country’s capacity to host the Busan talks. In the end, South Korea was widely criticized for its weak leadership in Busan, with some even blaming the country for the failure to reach an agreement (Eom and Hong, Reference Eom and Hong2025). During follow-up negotiations in Geneva in 2025, where states again failed to agree on treaty text, South Korea maintained a strategically ambiguous posture – projecting ambition by endorsing obligations on product design, recycling and circularity, yet keeping a low profile, avoiding conflict and withholding support for global controls on upstream petrochemical and plastics production (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2025, p. 9; Lee J-j, Reference Lee2025; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, 2025).
Our analysis aims to extend the growing literature on the politics of global plastics governance (Mah, Reference Mah2021, Reference Mah2022, Reference Mah2023; Ralston et al., Reference Ralston, Carlini, Johns, Lencucha, Radvany, Shah and Collin2023; Dauvergne, Reference Dauvergne2025; Gonçalves et al., Reference Gonçalves, Webster, Grilli, Elliff, Scrich, Lopes and Turra2024; Peryman et al., Reference Peryman, Cumming, Ngata, Farrelly, Fuller and Borrelle2024; Stoett et al., Reference Stoett, Scrich, Elliff, Andrade, Grilli and Turra2024; Vandenberg, Reference Vandenberg2024; Vince et al., Reference Vince, Almroth, de Miranda Grilli, Dwivedi, Stöfen-O’Brien and Beyer2024; Cowan, Reference Cowan2025; Dauvergne et al., Reference Dauvergne, Allan, Beaudoin, Carney Almroth, Clapp, Cowan, de Groot, Farrelly, Grilli, Mah, Mendenhall, Paik, Ralston, Stoett, Stöfen-O’Brien, Taggart, Tiller, Villarrubia-Gómez and Vince2025a, Reference Dauvergne, Ralston, Clapp and Taggart2025b; Deeney et al., Reference Deeney, Yates, Kadiyala, Cousin, Dignac, Wang, Farrelly and Green2025; Gündoğdu et al., Reference Gündoğdu, Puckett, Gedik, Terzi and Öztürk2025; MacNeil, Reference de Groot and MacNeil2025; March and Evans, Reference March and Evans2025; Moon et al., Reference Moon, Tangri, Bonisoli-Alquati, Ralston, Bergmann, Syberg, Olsen, Wang, Castillo, Colombini and Alegado2025; Ralston and Taggart, Reference Ralston and Taggart2025; Spring et al., Reference Spring, Schröder, Popovici, O’Meara, Corsi, Aliani, Boodhoo, Gobin, Godoy-Faúndez, Kahru, Luscombe, Praveena, Mustapha Olaitan, Wang, al Bakain and Sakellariadou2025). We begin by explaining our methodology and elaborating upon our concept of ambiguous ambition. Next, we analyze the politics underlying South Korea’s ambiguous ambition for a global plastics treaty. We then turn to analyze the consequences of this ambiguous ambition – along with escalating political turmoil and bureaucratic infighting in South Korea – for the outcome of the Busan talks. We conclude by recommending additional case studies to expose the politics of variable ambition shaping global plastics governance.
Methodology
Evaluating the “truth” of a state’s claim of “ambition” in policymaking is challenging. Governments routinely exaggerate international commitments and aspire to far-off goals and targets. Half-truths and outright lies are common. One unit within a state may truly want strong regulation, while others strive to sabotage it. State motivation is always a mixture of contradictory, shifting and clashing intentions. Fieldwork and interviews can help uncover ambiguous or false ambition, but great care is necessary in conducting and selecting interviewees. Those in power tend to confirm rhetoric, while those not in power are inclined to be skeptical. Achieving a balanced sampling is exceptionally difficult because those in power – except for public relations staff – commonly ignore or decline interview requests.
In light of these challenges, and because we were unable to conduct in-country fieldwork and interviews, we assessed the sincerity of South Korea’s rhetoric by analyzing the state’s follow-up actions and policies. This included whether the government continued to join high-ambition coalitions, endorse ambitious proposals, put forward strong commitments or help build consensus around binding obligations. To collect this information, we relied on three sets of sources: (i) government statements, policies, roundtable broadcasts and diplomatic communiqués; (ii) public and private sector commentaries and websites; and (iii) scholarly publications. To begin, we searched for English-language materials in databases (e.g., Scopus, Web of Science and Google Scholar), the internet and within advocacy organizations (e.g., Greenpeace and Break Free from Plastic) using the keywords “Korea,” “plastics” and “treaty.”
This search revealed a gap in English-language knowledge of South Korea’s role in the plastics treaty. Searching Scopus in 2025, for instance, revealed four articles, of which only two analyze South Korean plastics governance, and one of them is partially in Korean (Yi, Reference Yi2024; Yi and Go, Reference Yi and Go2024). To deepen our understanding, we searched for Korean-language materials on the topic, including governmental, nongovernmental and academic sources through Korean language-based databases (e.g., Naver Academic Information and Korea Studies Information Service System). This included an analysis of statements and materials published by the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As these reviews of the English and Korean language materials reveal, the South Korean state has consistently claimed to support a legally binding treaty to cover the full life cycle of plastics, but hardly any of its actions or policies support regulating petrochemical production, chemicals in plastics or the consumption of problematic plastics. In our judgment, our methodology provides convincing evidence that South Korea’s support for a high-ambition plastics treaty has always been vague, tenuous and ambiguous. Still, we recognize that in-country fieldwork and confidential interviews would be a logical – and potentially valuable – next step in deepening the analysis of the politics underlying South Korea’s shifting role in negotiating the global plastics treaty. In particular, our analysis would benefit from a further investigation of South Korea’s decision to join the High Ambition Coalition to End Plastic Pollution, and the role of the petrochemical, plastics, retail and waste management industries in shaping the nature and extent of ambition.
The politics of ambiguous ambition in environmental negotiations
The discourse of ambition has helped nudge up the targets, timelines and financing for some multilateral negotiations, such as climate change (Victor et al., Reference Victor, Lumkowsky and Dannenberg2022; Stankovic et al., Reference Stankovic, Hovi and Skodvin2023). Both states and civil society groups employ this discourse to build coalitions, foster consensus and pressure laggards. The UN has also embraced the discourse of ambition, as the sustainable development goals of “no poverty” and “zero hunger” by 2030 underscore. Yet, with the meaning of “ambition” often vague, continually shifting and variably defined across states, this discourse can open up easy opportunities for states to claim to support strong international rules, with little pressure to follow up with specific actions (Duvic-Paoli, Reference Duvic-Paoli2023). This can, in turn, lend legitimacy to distant, feel-good “aspirations,” such as ending plastic pollution by 2040. It can also create an “ambition trap,” where states ratchet up commitments without the capacity – or real intention – to implement the policies necessary to meet them (Tørstad et al., Reference Tørstad, Hovi, Milkoreit, Sælen and Tveit2025).
State claims to support “high ambition” are now common in international treaty-making (Falkner, Reference Falkner2016; Duvic-Paoli, Reference Duvic-Paoli2023). States do this for a range of reasons. Some are truly committed to strengthening procedures and obligations. Some do this to build alliances and the capacity to shape the structure and content of a treaty (Tørstad et al., Reference Tørstad, Hovi, Milkoreit, Sælen and Tveit2025). Some join high-ambition coalitions to monitor those working to strengthen a treaty. Others do this to delay, weaken or sabotage ambition (Duvic-Paoli, Reference Duvic-Paoli2023). Still others, such as South Korea in the case of the plastics treaty, are motivated primarily by larger, strategic foreign policy goals.
Ambiguous ambition arises when a state backs high-ambition obligations rhetorically, yet interprets this ambition selectively or narrowly to align with national interests. Ambition tends to be vague or aspirational, while concrete actions remain weak, inconsistent or contradictory. This can be a deliberate and tactical strategy. Or it may arise inadvertently, as when one unit in a state pursues strong commitments, and others later block or overturn these efforts. Ambiguous ambition is not static or alike across countries. A state may falsely declare ambition and stay firmly aligned with low-ambition interests. However, a false-ambition state may also later support some ambitious measures as political leadership changes or economic priorities shift. Conversely, a government may sincerely support some strong treaty obligations, but then become ambivalent following industry opposition, bureaucratic disputes or domestic political pushback (Anisimova and Patterson, Reference Anisimova and Patterson2025; Patterson et al., Reference Patterson, Anisimova, Logg-Scarvell and Kaiser2025).
Aspiring to be a global pivotal state
As a middle power, South Korea has long aimed to amplify its diplomatic reach and soft power in international affairs (Yeo, Reference Yeo2023). The country began asserting greater diplomatic independence under President Roh Tae-woo (1988–1993), whose Nordpolitik strategy sought to improve relations with Northern allies of North Korea, including the Soviet Union and China. Nordpolitik formalized South Korea’s role as a middle power capable of engaging foreign relations beyond the Cold War divides (Eom, Reference Eom2024). Competing pressures from the United States security alliance and economic ties with China, however, have complicated South Korea’s efforts to build soft power on the world stage (Sohn, Reference Sohn2019). President Moon Jae-in (2017–2022) employed a strategy of “strategic ambiguity” to navigate these shoals (Kim L, Reference Kim2025).
President Yoon Suk Yeol, who took office in May 2022, spoke of a bolder, more assertive foreign policy. He envisioned the country earning greater respect and influence on the world stage by acting as a global pivotal state. South Korea would abandon strategic ambiguity, he declared, and would align more explicitly with the United States, strengthen ties with Japan, deepen engagement in the Indo-Pacific and increase aid to developing countries. The country, he added, would advocate for human rights, democracy and a rules-based international order. Additionally, it would serve as a bridge between Western powers and developing countries of the Indo-Pacific, including in multilateral negotiations. South Korea is no longer “a rule-taker,” said Foreign Minister Park Jin in a speech in June 2022, and has taken “an important step toward emerging as a rule-maker” (quoted in Jin, Reference Jin2022).
This “new” foreign policy, however, primarily involved “lofty” and “grand” rhetoric (Kim L, Reference Kim2025). Relatively few concrete mechanisms or actions accompanied this policy. What set this policy apart from earlier versions of South Korea’s middle-power diplomacy was its shift toward prioritizing “like-minded states” and traditional allies, such as the United States and Japan (Snyder, Reference Snyder2023, p. 147). Complicating matters for South Korea’s goal of enhancing soft power in international affairs, however, this realignment narrowed South Korea’s diplomatic flexibility compared to older policies such as Nordpolitik (Eom, Reference Eom2024).
South Korea’s ambiguous ambition for the plastics treaty
South Korea’s ambiguous ambition in plastics treaty negotiations stems from its goal of becoming a global pivotal state. In March 2022, South Korea, under President Moon, voted in favor of the UN Environment Assembly’s resolution to negotiate a plastics treaty (United Nations, 2022). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs under President Yoon then decided to assume a central role in forming this treaty. In August 2022, South Korea joined the High Ambition Coalition. Later that year, at INC-1, South Korea offered to host the fifth and final negotiating session for the plastics treaty (United Nations Environment Programme, 2022). Shortly afterward, Ambassador and Deputy Minister for Climate Change at the Foreign Ministry, Hyoeun Jenny Kim, said South Korea would “actively” develop “an international legally binding instrument to end plastic pollution based on the principles of circular economy” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, 2022).
South Korea decided to engage energetically with the plastics treaty for a variety of reasons. Partly, this was seen as a way of forging stronger relations with Japan, as both countries were already cooperating bilaterally to address marine plastic pollution in the East Sea. Cooperating with Japan on environmental governance was seen as a way to build trust, reduce public antipathy and counterbalance China’s regional influence (Uji et al., Reference Uji, Lim and Song2023). South Korea was also seeking to improve diplomatic relations with China through environmental cooperation, including plastics governance. At the 2024 Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting, Japan, South Korea and China committed in a Joint Communiqué to “playing a constructive role” in shaping a global plastics treaty (Government of Japan, 2024).
During the early rounds of treaty negotiations, South Korea strove to position itself as a leader in efforts to combat plastic pollution. It emphasized its scientific and technical capabilities, claiming to be at the cutting edge of innovative technologies and environmental policy. At INC-2 in Paris in 2023, South Korea highlighted its work to advance recycling technologies and develop biodegradable plastics (Republic of Korea, 2023). At INC-4 in Ottawa in 2024, the government declared itself “the strongest ally and partner,” emphasizing the importance of science, technology and domestic capacity to implement the treaty (Republic of Korea, 2024). This strategic positioning culminated at INC-5, when South Korea, through Environment Minister Kim Wan-seop, offered to host a scientific and technical advisory body in Busan once the treaty is finalized (Kim A-y, Reference Kim2024).
South Korea repeatedly affirmed its support for a legally binding treaty to govern the full life cycle of plastics (Republic of Korea, 2023). Yet, during negotiations, the government focused on downstream waste management and avoided concrete obligations to regulate upstream oil and gas extraction, petrochemical production or plastics manufacturing. Nor did it commit to specific measures to reduce global plastics production and consumption. By 2023, it was becoming increasingly obvious that South Korea primarily joined the High Ambition Coalition and offered to host the final talks in Busan to strengthen its strategic position during negotiations rather than advocate for robust treaty obligations (Park Jihae TV, Reference Park Jihae2024). At a broader level, South Korea had also done this to strengthen ties with the West and developing countries, while engaging Beijing constructively and diplomatically. This balancing act mirrors the broader US-Japan-South Korea trilateral dynamics leading up to the Busan talks in 2024, and reflects an effort to forge new alliances with Indo-Pacific states traditionally considered within China’s sphere of influence.
South Korea’s diplomatic failure in Busan
This ambiguous ambition, inconsistencies in South Korea’s foreign policy and the constraints of geopolitical reality goals pulled South Korea in conflicting directions during the plastics treaty negotiations. Significantly, the United States and Japan did not join high-ambition pledges or coalitions during the Busan talks (Dauvergne et al., Reference Dauvergne, Allan, Beaudoin, Carney Almroth, Clapp, Cowan, de Groot, Farrelly, Grilli, Mah, Mendenhall, Paik, Ralston, Stoett, Stöfen-O’Brien, Taggart, Tiller, Villarrubia-Gómez and Vince2025a). Both countries were focusing on the need for downstream measures, such as improving recycling and waste management, and were wary of regulating or capping upstream production. South Korea had been cooperating on plastic pollution policy with the United States and Japan before the start of the Busan talks, and had no interest in alienating either country (United States and Republic of Korea, 2024; Government of Japan, 2024).
Donald Trump’s win in the November 2024 presidential election, given his support of the fossil-fuel industry, added to South Korea’s hesitancy to back any specific high-ambition treaty measures. The incoming Trump administration was clearly set to reverse the environmental policies of the Joe Biden administration, which further sidelined the United States during the negotiations. President Yoon was eager to demonstrate his personal admiration for Trump, even taking golf lessons in an effort to build rapport (Seo, Reference Seo2024). Reflecting this, at the G20 meeting in November 2024, President Yoon declared his support for concluding a plastics treaty in Busan, but was careful to avoid mentioning any specific policies.
India or China likewise did not back high-ambition coalitions in Busan – countries that South Korea was equally keen to avoid alienating (Dauvergne et al., Reference Dauvergne, Allan, Beaudoin, Carney Almroth, Clapp, Cowan, de Groot, Farrelly, Grilli, Mah, Mendenhall, Paik, Ralston, Stoett, Stöfen-O’Brien, Taggart, Tiller, Villarrubia-Gómez and Vince2025a). The petrochemical industry and petrostates, such as Russia and Iran, meanwhile, lobbied hard to thwart ambitious measures. South Korea’s own petrochemical industry also opposed production limits, bans on plastic products and supply-side regulations (Dauvergne et al., Reference Dauvergne, Ralston, Clapp and Taggart2025b). South Korea is the world’s fourth-largest producer of petrochemicals (Claight, 2024), and is a powerful lobby within South Korean politics. Petrochemical producers, such as Hanwha Solutions, Lotte Chemical and LG Chem, “carry enormous political weight,” explains Jeong Su-jong at Seoul National University. “As cornerstones of Korea’s economy, their influence runs deep in policymaking circles, making politicians hesitant to impose certain rules that could cut into their profits or exports” (quoted in Lee J-j, Reference Lee2025). South Korea’s petrochemical sector, executives warned, would not be able to bear the burden of international regulations amid Chinese competition, sluggish demand, volatile oil prices and pressure to restructure (Kim Ki-h, Reference Kim2025).
In the months before the Busan talks, South Korea continued to portray itself as committed to a high-ambition treaty spanning the full life cycle of plastics. However, the government did not back this up by proposing high-ambition obligations or processes during the Busan talks, and, if anything, leaned toward accommodating low-ambition states, such as Russia, Kuwait and Iran (Lee J-e, Reference Lee2024a; Lee H-g, Reference Lee2024). At the closing plenary, South Korea did not back calls by Rwanda (on behalf of 84 states) to reduce global plastics production, or by Mexico (on behalf of 94 states) to phase out the most hazardous plastics (Mexico, 2024; Rwanda, 2024).
Before the Busan talks had begun, nongovernmental environmental organizations – such as Greenpeace – were already criticizing South Korea for its waffling and weak commitment to reducing plastics production and problematic supply (Kim J-j, Reference Kim2024). Some domestic news outlets, however, remained cautiously optimistic about a potential diplomatic breakthrough in Busan – perhaps mirroring what France pulled off for the 2015 Paris Agreement. As the talks unfolded, reporting turned sharply critical, highlighting South Korea’s poor logistical planning, diplomatic missteps and “passive” leadership (Lee J-e, Reference Lee2024a, Reference Lee2024b). Further issues compounded the criticism. Room space and translation services were inadequate. Communications were slow and confusing. Key stakeholders were sidelined, including independent scientists, fenceline and frontline communities and Indigenous peoples and other rights holders. Industry, meanwhile, had disproportionate representation and input, including in closed-door negotiating sessions (Inglis, Reference Inglis2024; Dauvergne et al., Reference Dauvergne, Allan, Beaudoin, Carney Almroth, Clapp, Cowan, de Groot, Farrelly, Grilli, Mah, Mendenhall, Paik, Ralston, Stoett, Stöfen-O’Brien, Taggart, Tiller, Villarrubia-Gómez and Vince2025a, Reference Dauvergne, Ralston, Clapp and Taggart2025b).
Various factors undermined South Korea’s capacity for skilled diplomacy. South Korea’s unclear, shifting and ambiguous ambition became a liability as increasing numbers of states backed treaty obligations to regulate upstream production and supply. South Korea also alienated many developing countries after siding with a US proposal to finance the treaty through the Global Environment Facility rather than a dedicated financial mechanism (Lee J-e, Reference Lee2024a). Months before the start of the Busan talks, moreover, the government had begun saying it was “hosting,” not “leading,” the negotiations (Park Jihae TV, Reference Park Jihae2024). Notably, too, the Busan talks unfolded amid growing political chaos. Shortly after the conclusion of the Busan talks, President Yoon declared martial law, precipitating his impeachment and eventual ouster.
Disagreements and power struggles within the Yoon administration added to the woes of South Korean diplomats. Less than a week before the start of the Busan talks, Foreign Affairs Minister Cho Tae-yul was replaced as delegation head by Environment Minister Kim Wan-seop, who supported a more industry-oriented approach to governing plastics (Lee J-y, Reference Lee2024). Understandably, this abrupt switch raised concerns and doubts about South Korea’s negotiating stance and commitment to reaching an agreement in Busan.
Adding to the confusion, Minister Kim – already under fire for his lofty rhetoric and lack of a clear plan – left Busan for Seoul during the peak of negotiations from November 27 to 30 (Lee H-g, Reference Lee2024). As negotiations stalled, underlying tensions mounted between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Environment over how to best host the Busan talks. On December 1, Foreign Minister Cho returned to Busan to try to get negotiations back on track, focusing on high-ambition delegations, while Minister Kim concentrated on lower-ambition delegations. The Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took different tacks, and began meeting separately with different delegations (e.g., the Ministry of Environment with petrostates and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with UN staff and delegations from the EU and China) (Lee T-h, Reference Lee2024). This failed last-minute intervention underscores the disorganization and “strategic incoherence” arising from South Korea’s ambiguous ambition and competing foreign policy goals during the Busan negotiations.
Caution over ambition in Geneva
In June 2025, Lee Jae Myung of the Democratic Party of Korea became South Korea’s 14th president. During plastics treaty negotiations in Geneva two months later, South Korea concentrated on small-group discussions and bilateral consultations to foster consensus on product design and circularity (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, 2025). The government backed downstream measures to expand recycling, incentivize the use of recycled materials and curb the consumption of single-use plastics, but resisted global controls on upstream petrochemical and plastics production. It agreed to soften language, claiming it was working to “break the deadlock” (Lee J-j, Reference Lee2025), and prioritized caution over ambition, appearing more intent on avoiding conflict than on pressing for a stronger treaty. In the closing plenary, South Korea framed Busan as laying the groundwork for agreement and urged states to continue bridging differences (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2025, p. 9; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, 2025).
Following the Geneva negotiations, the South Korean Ministry of Environment announced it would release a “Plastic-Free Roadmap” by the end of 2025, fulfilling a pledge by President Lee (Park, Reference Park2025). The government claims this roadmap will provide a visionary, transformative plan to tackle plastic pollution in South Korea. Yet, it looks set to fall far short of what the majority of high-ambition states were demanding in Geneva, with the focus on redesign, recycling and circularity, and without any regulatory controls on plastics production or the petrochemical industry (Lee J-j, Reference Lee2025; Park, Reference Park2025).
Conclusion
Our case study of South Korea’s ambiguous ambition and weak leadership in global plastics treaty negotiations underscores the need for similar analyses of other countries’ political ambition, especially in light of the failed 2025 Geneva talks. The politics underlying the decision to join a high-ambition coalition or declaration differ widely, with complex and ever-shifting political forces at play. Some of these studies are likely to reveal fairly straightforward examples of false ambition. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), for instance, was one of the first 22 states to join the High Ambition Coalition to End Plastic Pollution. Yet, the UAE has consistently opposed ambition as a member of the Gulf Countries Council, and appears to have joined to monitor this coalition (Al Aridi, Reference Al Aridi2024).
Most cases are likely to involve a complex array of clashing political forces, some seeking and others undermining ambition. Countries such as Canada, for instance, have signed every high-ambition pledge. Yet, as a leading producer and exporter of oil and gas, Canada has been reserved and restrained during negotiations: a “wallflower,” according to Indigenous rights and science scholar Lynn Konwaia’tanón:we’s Jacobs (Reference Jacobs2024). A case study of Japan could offer intriguing insights, too, as the government joined the High Ambition Coalition in 2023, but then did not sign onto calls for a high-ambition treaty in Busan or during the June 2025 UN Ocean Conference, and advocated for nationally determined contributions during the Geneva talks.
Other state pledges of high ambition could well start off as credible, but shifting politics inside a country or political pressure from outside could then erode ambition. In Geneva, the United States aligned with the bloc of low-ambition petrostates – including Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Kuwait – opposing global controls on petrochemical production, problematic plastic products and chemicals in plastics. Some states may have lost ambition in the face of US pressure, including from veiled trade and tariff threats (Le Poidevin and Volcovici, Reference Le Poidevin and Volcovici2025; Schröder, Reference Schröder2025). A case study of Rwanda might be valuable here. Rwanda (with Peru) coauthored a key draft for the UN Environment Assembly resolution to negotiate a plastics treaty, cofounded (with Norway) the High Ambition Coalition and was a leading advocate of ambitious upstream regulation during the Busan talks. Yet, Rwanda was relatively quiet in Geneva and was not one of the 95 state signatories pledging support for a high-ambition treaty at the June 2025 Ocean Conference. The explanation for not signing this pledge may simply lie in Rwanda being landlocked and dealing with a volatile conflict with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, investigating the politics shaping Rwanda’s role in the plastics treaty negotiations seems worthwhile, given the country’s history of leadership in plastics governance (Behuria, Reference Behuria2021; Rwanda, 2024) and the possibility that shifting domestic priorities or outside pressures are eroding ambition.
In brief, a deeper understanding of the politics of ambition across countries – and how this politics is altering the nature and extent of ambition over time – is essential for understanding the prospects of states forming a high-ambition treaty. If a treaty is one day ratified, such knowledge will also be valuable – indeed, vital – for then understanding variation in the strength of implementation around the world.
Open peer review
To view the open peer review materials for this article, please visit http://doi.org/10.1017/plc.2025.10032.
Data availability statement
Nonconfidential data are available from the corresponding author upon request.
Author contribution
P.D. and R.P. conceptualized the study and designed the methodology. R.P. conducted the initial research (including in Korean) and wrote a first draft. P.D. reoriented the argument, restructured the analysis, rewrote the draft and revised following the review process. R.P. verified the data, Korean sources and analysis. P.D. and R.P. approved the final draft. P.D. acquired funding and supervised the project.
Financial support
P.D.’s funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (grant number 435–2022-0024) supported R.P.’s research assistantship for this article.
Competing interests
The authors declare none.
Ethics standard
This case study is part of a research project on the politics of global plastics governance, approved by the University of British Columbia’s Behavioral Research Ethics Board (certificate number H22–01361).
Open access
Comments
To: Professor Steve Fletcher, Editor-in-Chief, Cambridge Prisms: Plastics
Date: July 10, 2025
Dear Professor Fletcher,
I am submitting our article, “False ambition: The politics of South Korea and the global plastics treaty,” for consideration in Cambridge Prisms: Plastics. This article is the first analysis of the politics underlying why states pledge support for a high-ambition global plastics treaty, using South Korea as a case study. It deepens the understanding of South Korea’s role in the negotiations and offers a model for future country analyses. We develop the concept of “false ambition” to describe cases where states endorse high ambition rhetorically but fail to support strong, binding commitments.
The article, or parts of the article, have never been published or submitted for publication elsewhere.
We do not have any conflicts of interest.
Thank you very much for your assistance. As the past editor of the journal Global Environmental Politics, I have some understanding of your generous commitment to our profession.
Sincerely,
Peter Dauvergne
Professor of International Relations
University of British Columbia