Prewar period and Italo-British relations

According to most historians of the Ethiopian War, including Del Boca, Mori, and Labanca, Mussolini decided to invade Ethiopia in the early 1930s, as evidenced by military plans drawn up by the Ministry of Colonies.Footnote ³ However, there is no consensus on how to interpret fascist foreign policy at that time.Footnote ⁴ Scholars such as De Felice, Quartararo and Sbacchi believe that, although preparations had begun, Mussolini was not aiming for total annexation, but rather control of the peripheral areas or a protectorate.Footnote ⁵ Other historians, including Labanca, Rochat, and Dominioni, see the memorandum of 30 December 1934 – just days after the Walwal incident – as proof of the intention to proceed with a complete military conquest.Footnote ⁶ However, it must be noted that even some scholars who do not align with De Felice and Quartararo nevertheless emphasize a certain ambiguity in Fascist foreign policy during that time. Mockler, for instance, notes that war plans against Ethiopia had already been prepared in 1906, 1915, and 1926, but that such detailed plans did not necessarily indicate an actual intention to resort to a full-scale invasion.Footnote ⁷

Many scholars agree on the importance of placing the Italian decision in the context of European diplomatic dynamics.Footnote ⁸ With the rise of Nazi Germany, France and Great Britain wanted to prevent Italy from moving closer to Berlin and initially tolerated the Italian colonial initiatives.Footnote ⁹ However, France’s recognition of Italy’s “free hand” in Ethiopia did not include the use of force, and relations with Britain remained tense.Footnote ¹⁰ In this sense, a key document is the memorandum of Deputy Foreign Minister Suvich (January 1935), which proposed two strategies: a protectorate with British economic guarantees or a “limited” territorial partition with London – which, however, is not further detailed by the diplomat.Footnote ¹¹ In fact, Rome was acutely aware of the threat Britain would perceive from an Italian conquest of Ethiopia and Mussolini had always considered an understanding with London essential to his expansionist aims in Africa.Footnote ¹²

Germany’s remilitarization of the Rhineland in April 1935 temporarily distracted European attention from the Ethiopian question, and the issue was not discussed at the Stresa Conference.Footnote ¹³ This was interpreted in Rome as tacit approval of Italy’s African initiative.Footnote ¹⁴ Mussolini, increasingly distrustful of British policy, rejected Eden’s proposals based on territorial exchanges with Ethiopia.Footnote ¹⁵ The hardening of the Italian position was also linked to the perception that London was increasingly against Italian expansion in Africa.Footnote ¹⁶

According to some members of the Italian government such as Lessona or Aloisi, at the time, only a mandate or protectorate over Ethiopia could have prevented war, as already discussed both through official diplomatic channels and in back-channel contacts with Ethiopian representatives.Footnote ¹⁷ From June to August 1935, Italy drew up several protectorate plans, including one with Haile Selassie as regent and Italian advisers, inspired by the models of Tunisia, Morocco, and Iraq.Footnote ¹⁸ Previously, it had also discussed them with Negus Haile Selassie through the embassy and intermediaries such as Dr. Borra. However, the Emperor refused.Footnote ¹⁹ International diplomacy also explored this option. The Greek Diplomat Politis – described by Mori and Quartararo as an influential figure at the Ethiopian court – informed French Foreign Ministry Secretary-General Léger that the Negus might accept the cession of Adwa and Ogaden; Mussolini discussed this with British and French representatives.Footnote ²⁰ Grandi, the Italian Ambassador to Great Britain, also discussed the matter with Vansittart, despite doubts about acceptance by the smaller states of the League.Footnote ²¹ Meanwhile, Enrico Cerulli’s secret mission was launched, seeking a direct agreement with the Negus through his adviser Zervos.Footnote ²² At the same time, as early as March 1935, the military secret services were exploring the possibility of a direct agreement between Mussolini and the Ethiopian Emperor.Footnote ²³ Despite military preparations, Mussolini sought to avoid a direct confrontation with the United Kingdom, partly because of the King’s opposition and his awareness of the military risks.Footnote ²⁴ In July, he instructed Grandi to seek a “definitive and legal” solution with Great Britain, referring to the Tripartite Treaty, which provided for the partition of Ethiopia in spheres of influence.Footnote ²⁵ French diplomacy, led by Minister for Foreign Affairs Laval, tried to mediate to avoid conflict, while the British government still harbored hopes for an agreement.Footnote ²⁶ On 31 August, Italy was informed that Ethiopia would ask the League of Nations for a joint mandate with Italy, France, and the United Kingdom for the modernization of the country.Footnote ²⁷ On 11 September, Hoare and Laval agreed on the imposition of economic but not military sanctions.Footnote ²⁸ Then, on 18 September, the League proposed an international protectorate, which Italy rejected as insufficient in terms of territorial and economic concessions.Footnote ²⁹ According to the Italian diplomat Guariglia, this plan would in fact have reduced Italy’s presence in Ethiopian administration, thereby nullifying the ongoing troop deployments – which, in his view, served both as instruments of conquest and as tools of diplomatic pressure.Footnote ³⁰

On 28 September, the “Duce” leaked to the press his willingness to negotiate with London, aware of the political and diplomatic risks of war.Footnote ³¹ Even after hostilities began, Mussolini thus maintained a dual strategy: on the one hand, rapid military action; on the other, openness to a back-channel solution. It was known that Haile Selassie was willing to make concessions in order to retain power in the center of the country.Footnote ³² However, these overtures were not enough to avoid armed conflict.

From the outbreak of hostilities to the proclamation of the Italian Empire

The beginning of Italian military operations in Ethiopia had no immediate impact on the ongoing diplomatic negotiations, either in Europe or in Ethiopia. As previously noted, Rome was fully aware of the potentially adverse consequences that a prolonged conflict could have on the country and on its relations with Great Britain. Moreover, only four days after the beginning of hostilities, General De Bono sent Mussolini a telegram in which he warned of the possibility that the Italian army might soon find itself in “serious difficulty” and in “critical condition,” urging caution in media communications and advising against any triumphalist rhetoric in the press.Footnote ³³

In order to avoid further escalation with Great Britain, the Italian government therefore made a proposal, on 3 October – the very day military operations began – to Minister Hoare, suggesting a “general demobilization to clear the atmosphere.” Then, Mussolini delivered a public speech on 5 October, in which he reaffirmed Italy’s intention to maintain strong relations with the nations committed to preserving peace in Europe. Nonetheless, alongside these conciliatory signals, the Fascist government continued to pursue a dual strategy. While formally seeking dialogue with the United Kingdom, it simultaneously intensified anti-British propaganda in the Middle East, relying on a coordinated network of agents directed by Enrico Cerulli.Footnote ³⁴ One of these agents who, as seen before, was sent to Ethiopia to meet Zervos, reported, the day after the invasion, that Haile Selassie had expressed willingness to initiate preliminary talks.Footnote ³⁵ In the days that followed, further communications confirmed the Emperor’s interest in clarifying the timing and modalities of such negotiations. Mussolini, promptly informed by Cerulli, authorized the agent’s return to Italy in the event that the Negus presented “serious” proposals.Footnote ³⁶ Subsequent documentation records the agent’s return from Africa in early November and a second journey at the end of the month, during which he carried a “confidential file.”Footnote ³⁷

A memorandum written by Cerulli during this period and addressed to Mussolini suggested the continuation, through the intermediary, of a “cautious” line of action in order to maintain an open channel for direct negotiation with the Ethiopian Emperor.Footnote ³⁸ Simultaneously, Italy submitted requests to the French government – as part of a potential mediation with London – including annexation of already conquered territories, controlled disarmament of Ethiopia, cession of Assab to the Negus, and the attribution to Italy of a mandate over the non-Amharic parts of the country, within the framework of the League of Nations.Footnote ³⁹ As Mori observes, they aimed to preserve, at least formally, the continuity of the Ethiopian state.Footnote ⁴⁰ However, the British government responded unfavorably to these overtures, partly due to the approaching general elections.Footnote ⁴¹ The British establishment was divided between a more uncompromising line (represented by Eden) and a conciliatory approach (embodied by Hoare and Vansittart). Another attempt at deescalation occurred in November when General Ezio Garibaldi was sent to London, tasked with presenting Italy’s proposals. These included the transfer to Italy of already conquered lands, the cession of the Danakil and Ogaden regions, and a mandate – with Italian participation – over the remaining Ethiopian territories. These proposals were not taken into consideration by London, which believed that the proposals for negotiation should be more limited.Footnote ⁴²

Meanwhile, military operations on the Ethiopian front had reached a stalemate. In late November, however, Italian intelligence discovered that Britain and France were drafting a mediation proposal, the Hoare-Laval Plan.Footnote ⁴³ This offered Italy Tigray, Ethiopian sea access, an Italian economic zone under Ethiopian sovereignty, and international oversight of Ethiopia.Footnote ⁴⁴ Although the proposal was promptly rejected by both Addis Ababa and the League of Nations, the Grand Council of Fascism approved it.Footnote ⁴⁵ Hoare’s subsequent resignation, however, derailed any further negotiation efforts. In this regard, opinions remain divided as to whether Mussolini approved the agreement or not.Footnote ⁴⁶ With the collapse of the Hoare-Laval initiative, Italy found itself facing increased diplomatic isolation.Footnote ⁴⁷

In this context, the regime increasingly relied on parallel initiatives led by intelligence services. On the initiative of the military intelligence, Mussolini tasked the businessman Jacir Bey with opening secret negotiations with the Negus, with the aim of ending the war by February 1936.Footnote ⁴⁸

In December, contacts between Zervos and the Italian agent in Ethiopia became more frequent. He reported that, despite Haile Selassie’s initial refusal to accept a protectorate, efforts were underway to find a formula “that would preserve mutual dignity.”Footnote ⁴⁹ Letters from the agent based in Djibouti also confirmed interest in economic compensations, mining and industrial concessions, as well as personal guarantees for the Ethiopian Emperor. Zervos asked if Italy would halt its offensive during negotiations, but Cerulli said Rome planned to continue its advance.Footnote ⁵⁰

By January 1936, the military deadlock and the absence of an effective diplomatic resolution had reactivated negotiation channels. Within the Italian government, Lessona admitted the possibility of an outcome involving the conquest of Tigray and economic agreements.Footnote ⁵¹ Italian diplomacy also sought to reengage with Britain through French mediation, aware of growing international hostility and reluctant to form a comprehensive alliance with Germany.Footnote ⁵² Mori and De Felice agree in noting that a large part of the Fascist leadership favored an understanding with London, driven by anxieties over Germany’s activities in Ethiopia and Austria. Hitler had in fact supplied Ethiopia with war material – and, according to an Italian government document, also biological weapons – and was preparing to annex Austria.Footnote ⁵³

Despite conciliatory overtures from the French, as Deputy Minister Suvich noted in a memorandum to Mussolini, the conditions for a new peace proposal had not yet matured.Footnote ⁵⁴ On that same day – 23 January 1936 – however, Suvich outlined to Mussolini two potential solutions: a negotiated one within the League of Nations – granting a mandate over Ethiopia’s peripheral zones – or a direct agreement with the Negus that, “even if reluctantly, would be accepted by the League.”Footnote ⁵⁵ It is probably in these terms that the continuation of talks between Zervos and Cerulli should be interpreted.

In a letter to Mussolini, Cerulli listed the Ethiopian proposals put forward by Zervos on behalf of the Emperor. These included the transfer to Italy of large portions of Ethiopia’s southern and eastern territory and a railway concession linking Eritrea and Somalia west of Addis Ababa. Ethiopia also proposed the assistance of the League of Nations (with Italy’s participation), the restoration of pre-occupation status in Tigray, and the transfer of the port of Assab to Addis Abeba. Faced with Cerulli’s intransigence, Zervos emphasized the internal political pressures weighing on the Emperor, who needed to secure some form of territorial or symbolic gain to justify a peace agreement. Zervos also asked whether Italy was willing to consider the Laval-Hoare plan as a framework for negotiations, the possible cession of Axum and the form of international assistance preferred by Italy, either under the aegis of the League of Nations or through a bilateral agreement. Cerulli replied by asking what kind of alliance (“I mentioned those that Great Britain maintains with Portugal, Iraq, Egypt, etc.”), suggesting a protectorate. According to the Italian envoy, Ethiopia’s distrust of Great Britain and France had resurfaced, making a renewed alignment with Italy desirable for the Ethiopian leadership.Footnote ⁵⁶

The interpretation of Italo-Ethiopian diplomatic dynamics in 1936 is further clarified by the fact that, by March of that year, negotiations had reached such an advanced stage that the possibility of establishing a protectorate was being considered excluding Britain, the League of Nations, and France from the negotiation process, despite France’s ongoing efforts to promote a peace agreement within the framework of the League.Footnote ⁵⁷

Indeed, diplomatic documents from the period confirm Italy’s desire for “direct conversations between Italy and Ethiopia … to proceed quickly … with a subsequent report to the League of Nations,” and for the cessation of hostilities to occur only upon the suspension of economic sanctions.Footnote ⁵⁸ The rationale for this bilateral negotiation strategy is explained by Suvich in relation to a remark made by the Soviet ambassador to Rome, Stein: “if we want to find a solution to the Italian-Abyssinian conflict, the League of Nations must give the impression that it is not interested in the Negus and that negotiations must take place directly between us and the Abyssinians.”Footnote ⁵⁹

Parallel negotiations were conducted through Afework.Footnote ⁶⁰ Italy’s proposals involved retaining the Emperor on the throne, granting him a formal role in a nominally independent state, though one effectively under Italian influence, provided that Italy became its sole bordering power. In exchange, Rome expressed willingness to cede Assab and Axum. Another proposal preserved Ethiopian territorial integrity while instituting a mandate modeled on the Moroccan precedent, whereby Italy would exercise direct administration over certain regions for twenty years, after which local populations would be allowed to decide whether to integrate into Italian sovereignty.Footnote ⁶¹

These contacts continued during the Italian offensive, even though they were officially denied at the diplomatic level.Footnote ⁶² This likely reflects Italy’s preference for direct negotiation with Ethiopia or may be explained by political considerations, as perhaps implied in a communication from Ambassador Cerruti in Paris to Mussolini: “it was evident that the Negus would have immediately initiated negotiations if a suggestion had come from London, or even a single word that removed any hope of further diplomatic support.”Footnote ⁶³

In the proposals being transmitted to Haile Selassie during this period, Italy expressed its willingness to recognize the Negus’s control over part of Ethiopian territory, effectively outlining a framework for a protectorate. This intention is confirmed not only by official documentation but also by statements from persons close to Mussolini, who indicated that the Duce considered preserving a position of prestige for the Negus.Footnote ⁶⁴ It is in this context that a letter sent by Cerulli to Zervos, dated after the decisive Italian victory at Lake Ashangi, should be interpreted. In it, Cerulli declared that Ethiopia had now fallen, yet added: “perhaps you could still salvage a few scraps [of Ethiopia]; but then they must immediately grant you full powers to negotiate and sign, without hesitating for a single minute,” suggesting the potential for a territorial concession under the Emperor’s nominal authority.Footnote ⁶⁵

On 16 April, following the occupation of Dessie, Badoglio invited Haile Selassie to cease hostilities and open peace negotiations, promising that, the Italian entry into Addis Ababa “would serve only to safeguard the Emperor’s life and restore public order.”Footnote ⁶⁶ Meanwhile, in Geneva, Rome was invited to make a gesture of détente ahead of the signing of an armistice. Yet Italy insisted on the necessity of direct negotiations with Ethiopia, excluding the League of Nations.Footnote ⁶⁷

As time passed and British intransigence toward a mediated solution appeared increasingly evident, the Italian government leaned toward the complete annexation of Ethiopia – despite French warnings to the contrary. Ambassador Chambrun urged the adoption of an international arrangement modeled on the Moroccan precedent.Footnote ⁶⁸ By contrast, Aloisi argued that Italy needed to present the international community with a clear and irrevocable position regarding the Ethiopian question. He advised Mussolini to announce simultaneously the cessation of hostilities and the annexation of Ethiopia or, preferably, the establishment of an Italo-Ethiopian empire modeled on the British Indian Empire. This arrangement could have been accompanied by a local plebiscite and an affirmation of the formal continuation of Ethiopia’s state identity. According to the Italian representative in Geneva, while it had once been possible to negotiate with Britain under a framework allowing for a “partial solution,” the only remaining course of action was an autonomous and immediate solution – albeit one that would predictably provoke international hostility.Footnote ⁶⁹ This sentiment was apparently shared by King Edward VIII, whom Grandi met secretly during this period of heightened tension between Italy and Britain. During their conversation, the monarch suggested that Italy should tone down its rhetoric concerning Britain’s “defeat,” noting that over time British public opinion would accept any agreement reached on Ethiopia.Footnote ⁷⁰ Churchill, who also conferred with Grandi, expressed a similar view, insisting that attention should instead be redirected toward Europe to prevent German domination of the continent.Footnote ⁷¹ In light of these considerations, Suvich’s perspective is particularly noteworthy. In a memorandum addressed to Mussolini, he weighed the pros and cons of full annexation while also emphasizing the need to pursue a “legally grounded solution.” After assessing various international scenarios, he recommended “working intensively on the ground to increase submissions, declarations of loyalty and allegiance from the chiefs, and proclamations from the local populations …; to restore a semblance of formal authority to the leaders who have turned to us or may do so.” However, he added, “nothing prevents, should the opportunity arise, the insertion into this program of either a peace offer to the Negus or to another more or less legitimate Ethiopian representative, or a formal declaration of annexation on our part.”Footnote ⁷² The French government similarly advised concluding peace “with any Abyssinian authority whatsoever, without even explicitly mentioning annexation, while considering the necessity of allowing the League of Nations to save face.” Paris also stressed Britain’s pivotal role in the matter, stating that “it would be desirable for the terms of such a peace to be communicated first and foremost to the British.”Footnote ⁷³ However, the flight of the Negus from Ethiopia on 2 May 1936, provided Italy with an argument that there was no longer a legitimate counterpart with whom to sign a peace treaty. For this reason, the British ambassador to Rome, Drummond, proposed that “form be preserved by giving the solution the appearance of a negotiated peace,” which would make “recognition by other Powers possible.”Footnote ⁷⁴

From the end of the war to the conclusion of negotiations via Cerulli and Zervos

A few months prior to the proclamation of the Italian Empire, Suvich had presented Mussolini with the opportunity to pursue a settlement concerning the Ethiopian issue, primarily with the aim of normalizing relations with the United Kingdom and avoiding a potentially dangerous international isolation.Footnote ⁷⁵ Following the Italian occupation of Addis Ababa, the Duce gave several interviews to the press in which he asserted that, notwithstanding sanctions, Italy sought rapprochement with Western powers in order to avert a European conflict. According to Quartararo and De Felice, Mussolini – after exploring shared solutions with London, the League of Nations, and even the Negus – ultimately concluded that annexation was inevitable, though he was aware it would threaten any rapprochement with the United Kingdom. Both Quartararo and De Felice argue that Mussolini viewed military operations primarily as tools of diplomatic leverage rather than as preludes to full conquest. However, in their reconstructions, the Emperor’s flight marked the point of no return, precipitating the decision to proclaim the Empire. In contrast, Mori contends that Mussolini never seriously intended to negotiate with Haile Selassie, while Rochat and Dominioni cite a telegram in which the Duce explicitly ruled out any form of “shared sovereignty,” thus rejecting indirect rule solutions proposed by Badoglio and Graziani.Footnote ⁷⁶

Contrary, therefore, to what De Felice and Quartararo claimed, namely that the Negus’s escape put an end to any possibility of negotiation, archival documents held at the Italian Central State Archive attest to continued contacts between the two parties through Zervos and Enrico Cerulli.Footnote ⁷⁷ Their correspondence reveals that even after 9 May 1936 – the date of Mussolini’s proclamation of the Empire – the Fascist government maintained a channel of communication with the Negus, who had taken refuge first in Jerusalem and then in London. In the immediate aftermath of the proclamation of the Italian Empire, Cerulli received a letter from Zervos, now in Palestine with Haile Selassie, stating that he had been summoned by the Emperor to “arrange … a definitive understanding.”Footnote ⁷⁸ On 3 June 1936, Zervos, on behalf of the Emperor, sent a letter to Cerulli requesting urgent updates on the status of the negotiations.Footnote ⁷⁹ The following day, Cerulli responded by reaffirming that the sole preliminary condition for any negotiation was the Negus’s recognition of the legal status resulting from the capture of Addis Ababa.Footnote ⁸⁰ In reply, Zervos inquired about the advantages and concessions Italy was prepared to offer in exchange for a final peace agreement.Footnote ⁸¹

A possible solution involving a sort of protectorate had already been discussed in European diplomatic circles after the end of the conflict. In April, Chambrun had warned Deputy Foreign Minister Suvich that relations with the United Kingdom could be compromised if Italy pursued the full annexation of Ethiopia.Footnote ⁸² Similarly, on 6 May, French diplomat Alexis Léger emphasized that a reduced Ethiopian state – limited to its central core – should nonetheless retain an international personality and remain a member of the League of Nations.Footnote ⁸³ Along the same lines, industrialist Alberto Pirelli – drawing on conversations with prominent British figures including Winston Churchill – suggested a solution analogous to that adopted in India: recognition of Italian authority by local leaders (ras), while preserving Ethiopian representation at international level. Archival documentation analyzed by Mori confirms that, in the months following the capture of the capital, both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Colonies developed plans for indirect rule over Ethiopia.Footnote ⁸⁴ Under French diplomatic pressure, Mussolini avoided using the term “annexation” in his speech of 9 May and did not clarify whether the new adopted legal order (the Italian Empire) formally encompassed Ethiopia.Footnote ⁸⁵

Indeed, Alessandro Lessona himself acknowledged in internal documents that a unilateral solution would have “decisive consequences” at the international level. As a maximal concession, he proposed the establishment of a residual Shoan state, entirely surrounded by Italian-controlled territory, formally placed under Italian protectorate, with the King of Italy recognized as Emperor of Ethiopia.Footnote ⁸⁶

On the diplomatic front, on 5 June Suvich informed Mussolini that in order to facilitate “the international resolution of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict,” it was necessary to offer “some formal satisfaction in the final settlement of the Ethiopian issue that would not excessively undermine the prestige of the League of Nations.”Footnote ⁸⁷ This could take the form of a commitment to “report to the Assembly of the League on Ethiopia’s progress and on matters relating to fair trade practices for all nations.”Footnote ⁸⁸

Meanwhile, the negotiations with the Negus not only continued but reached an advanced stage between June and September 1936. At the end of June, a personal meeting between Zervos and Cerulli took place.Footnote ⁸⁹ On 16 July, one day after the official lifting of sanctions by the League of Nations, the Greek physician informed Cerulli that Haile Selassie wished to resume negotiations “on new and definitive grounds.” Zervos further emphasized the urgency of reaching a solution, which he deemed to be in the interest of both parties.Footnote ⁹⁰

On 20 August 1936, Zervos, on behalf of the Negus, wrote with the aim of reaching a “decisive solution” that would guarantee lasting peace.Footnote ⁹¹

A subsequent letter dated 10 September confirmed Haile Selassie’s intention to meet with Cerulli in London.Footnote ⁹² According to Zewde, a meeting between Cerulli, Zervos, and the Ethiopian Foreign Minister Heruy Wolde Selassie took place in Amsterdam, although the precise date remains unknown.Footnote ⁹³

Meanwhile, Zervos continued to send encrypted communications from London and requested financial support from Cerulli to sustain his mediation efforts at the imperial court. He also reported Soviet attempts to establish contact with the Emperor.Footnote ⁹⁴ In a later letter, Cerulli appeared encouraged by the signs of openness from Haile Selassie, although he warned against the prolonged delays that had characterized earlier negotiations. At the heart of the negotiations, according to available sources, was the recognition of Italian sovereignty.Footnote ⁹⁵

On 18 September 1936, a telegram received from Djibouti via Piraeus announced “better offers,” without further elaboration.Footnote ⁹⁶ The following day, Zervos reported that only the Emperor would attend the Geneva meeting as an observer, at the insistence of his adviser.Footnote ⁹⁷ On 30 September, in an address to the League of Nations, Haile Selassie proposed the creation of a “national home” for the Ethiopian people as a mechanism for definitively resolving the conflict. Ethiopian delegate Ato Lawrence Taezaz further stated that the Emperor was prepared to make “considerable sacrifices.”Footnote ⁹⁸ In fact, the previous day, the Italian delegate Bova Scoppa had informed Mussolini of a conversation relayed by Cantilo, Argentina’s representative to the League of Nations: Ato Lawrence had approached Cantilo, stating that the Negus, “now convinced that he could no longer rely on support from France or England, was eager to reach an honorable agreement with the Italian government.” Bova Scoppa conveyed the proposals put forward by the Ethiopian delegate: the creation of a “small state” in western Ethiopia, in the Gore region, placed under Italian protectorate with Italian military occupation; recognition by the former Negus of the Ethiopian empire under the sovereignty of the King of Italy; upon the establishment of this small state, the Negus would abdicate in favor of the former crown prince, who would become the King of Gore. Taezaz added that, should the Italian government agree to negotiate on these terms, it would avoid a new military campaign in western Ethiopia, as Tafari would order Ras Desta and Ras Immirù to lay down their arms. Furthermore, the former Negus would immediately recognize the Italian Empire, thereby resolving the matter before the League of Nations.Footnote ⁹⁹

These proposals were leaked to the Giornale di Addis Abeba two days later; a copy of the article is held in Cerulli’s personal archive, at the Italian Central Archives.Footnote ¹⁰⁰ However, the Italian delegate believed that it was no longer possible to create a nominally independent state, especially in western Ethiopia, on the border with Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.Footnote ¹⁰¹

From November 1936 onward, the documentation becomes increasingly fragmented. It is nonetheless certain that contact with Zervos continued at least until 21 January 1937. In a letter dated 29 December 1936, Zervos wrote that he had received news from Cerulli through an intermediary. However, in a subsequent letter from January, the physician lamented the interruption of communications, despite his continued efforts.Footnote ¹⁰²

Although the existence of additional documents that are currently unavailable cannot be ruled out, existing sources suggest that the negotiation channel involving Zervos and Cerulli was definitively closed in January 1937.

While negotiations via Cerulli and Zervos likely ceased at that point, discussions involving the former Negus continued. Through the Archbishop of Westminster and the Vatican Secretary of State, Eugenio Pacelli, the former Negus submitted a set of proposals to the Italian government: Haile Selassie expressed his willingness to abdicate in favor of his son, on condition that the act be officially and publicly declared in Ethiopia. He would then undertake to encourage the Ethiopian people to accept Italian rule. In return, he asked for the release of some prisoners dear to him, clemency towards the abergnuoc and guarantees of financial security for himself and his family. In addition, the letter requested that his son be allowed to undertake some economic activities within Ethiopia under strict Italian supervision.Footnote ¹⁰³

Three days later, Italian ambassador to the Vatican Pignatti informed Pacelli that “Mr. Tafari’s proposals could serve as a basis for further examination of the issue” though he opposed the idea of the son’s return to Ethiopia. He also requested the designation of a representative, authorized by the former Negus, to travel to Rome for negotiations.Footnote ¹⁰⁴ The response came on 29 January: Haile Selassie – Pignatti wrote to Ciano – was “very pleased.”Footnote ¹⁰⁵ The Emperor then appointed the Count of Sibour as negotiator, tasking him with asking the Pope to mediate “so that the Italian government might allow the existence of an autonomous territorial refuge in which the [Ethiopian] people could continue to live according to their traditions.” Pignatti opposed this request, reiterating that such terms did not reflect the basis of the negotiations previously agreed upon. Pacelli also expressed surprise at the proposal, although he declared himself “optimistic,” and according to reports, the intermediary himself expressed doubts about the feasibility of continuing the talks.Footnote ¹⁰⁶ Negotiations were further interrupted the next day, on 19 February, when two Eritrean students attacked General Graziani, prompting a violent Italian crackdown. Nonetheless, on 8 March, Haile Selassie’s envoy once again approached the Vatican Secretary of State, conveying the former Emperor’s response: “the proposal,” it was stated, “was dictated by a sense of responsibility towards his people.” The former Negus further expressed hope that the “Cardinal Secretary of State might support him in persuading the Italian government to compromise.” Pacelli, however, informed Pignatti that he would exclude from negotiations with the count anything that could represent direct or indirect interference by Haile Selassie in Ethiopia.Footnote ¹⁰⁷

Several months later, on 2 June, Pignatti reported that Haile Selassie was “prepared to resume discussions through the Secretary of State.” The ambassador replied that he did not trust the former Emperor, believing him to be behind the attack on Graziani during the negotiations. Nevertheless, Pacelli observed that a possible abdication might still prove advantageous for the Italian government.Footnote ¹⁰⁸

According to documents, Haile Selassie attempted to reestablish contact with the Italian government and appointed Father Martindale for this purpose. The clergyman reported that the changed circumstances and financial conditions of the former emperor had forced him to attempt direct contact with the Italian government through the Italian embassy in London. The rationale for continuing negotiations was explained by Ambassador Grandi himself: in his opinion, a public declaration of submission to Italy by Haile Selassie would have weakened the position of those who used his status to contest Italian claims.Footnote ¹⁰⁹

There are no further references to this issue in Italian diplomatic sources, but there are in British sources. According to these, the British government was in favor of negotiations through the Archbishop of Canterbury, and even considered to mediate between the parties, but believed that granting Haile Selassie sovereignty over a territory was no longer feasible.Footnote ¹¹⁰ This was both because it would have meant Italy’s admission of defeat and would not have helped to end the guerrilla warfare, because it was believed that most of the country was no longer loyal to Haile Selassie. However, the British government was aware of Italy’s offers of money in exchange for his abdication in favor of his son Asfa Wossen.Footnote ¹¹¹

Another negotiation channel emerged in November 1938, when Ato Wolde Giyorgis Wolde Yohannes – Haile Selassie’s private secretary – wrote from London to Major Steffens, a former honorary Ethiopian consul in Berlin, asking whether he would be willing to mediate a peace proposal. The letter stated that only Haile Selassie could put an end to the bloody conflict still raging in Ethiopia – the Italians having failed to impose their rule in the whole country – and called for an agreement between the parties. The absence of follow-up doomed this effort to failure.Footnote ¹¹² Meanwhile, however, Haile Selassie continued to urge the Archbishop of Canterbury and the British government to intercede with the Italian government to grant him a territory under his sovereignty.Footnote ¹¹³

Another negotiation route was initiated in Switzerland during the same period, spearheaded by the Bientry family. Ferdinand Bientry had worked as an engineer in Ethiopia before the war, and his wife, Daragonie Beressie, had lived at the Ethiopian court in her youth, becoming friends with Haile Selassie’s son, Asfa Wossen.Footnote ¹¹⁴ Asfa Wossen had already been in contact with the Italians previously and, through Wolde-Giorgis, contacted Madame Bientry, declaring his willingness to submit to Italian clemency, while urging the utmost discretion.Footnote ¹¹⁵ According to sources, the prince was motivated by dynastic tensions and a desire to free himself from paternal and British influence. Asfa Wossen would use a trip to Switzerland or France to get special medical care and from there he would be hosted by the Bientry family, from whose residence he would start negotiations for his surrender to the Italian government.Footnote ¹¹⁶

The Italian government expressed its support for the continuation of negotiations, probably, as we shall see later, in order to create a rift between Haile Selassie and his son.Footnote ¹¹⁷ It was therefore proposed that the prince should reside in Italy, preferably in Turin, where his sister, Princess Romanework, already lived.Footnote ¹¹⁸ The Italians drafted a memorandum proposing the following arrangement for Haile Selassie’s son: a villa, a monthly stipend, a small entourage, freedom of movement and social relations, and audiences with the King and Head of government. However, this offer was subsequently reduced to a 15,000 lire stipend, with a smaller entourage and no audiences.Footnote ¹¹⁹ In May 1939, the Italian government accepted slightly larger terms, authorizing Madame Bientry to travel to England and inform Asfa Wossen that he would receive a stipend of 20,000 lire – possibly increased to 25,000.Footnote ¹²⁰ Despite being under close British surveillance, the prince confirmed his interest in continuing negotiations, suggesting a meeting in Switzerland after completing his studies at Cambridge. In a subsequent request, Asfa Wossen asked that upon his arrival in Switzerland there be an exchange of letters confirming submission, recognition of his rank in Ethiopia, and an advance payment of £10,000, part of a total £50,000 to be considered his personal estate. The Italians judged this sum excessive and rejected the recognition of any noble prerogative in Ethiopia, considering at most an honorary title, similar to what had been granted to Hassauna Pasha in Libya.Footnote ¹²¹

International developments eventually brought negotiations to a halt. Italian authorities considered offering financial support to facilitate Asfa Wossen’s departure, but only upon his arrival in Italy. The prince’s final letter confirmed the operational difficulties and the need for direct contact with Mr. Bientry in England. However, the deteriorating political situation and the looming world conflict brought the negotiations to a definitive end.Footnote ¹²² Curiously, one of the final documents in the folder held in the Italian archives reports that Asfa Wossen was later engaged, along with Zervos, in supplying arms to Ethiopian partisans.Footnote ¹²³

Negotiating empire: Interpreting the Italian-Ethiopian talks

A valuable interpretive key to understanding the negotiations can be found in a reflection by Renzo De Felice in Mussolini il Duce. According to his reconstruction, following the end of the war, the primary aim of the Italian government was “to reaffirm both its commitment to the reconstruction of the Stresa Front and its efforts, as long as circumstances allowed, to negotiate directly with the Negus.”Footnote ¹²⁴ Throughout this analysis, we have observed how historians from opposing interpretative schools converge, with regard to the Ethiopian campaign, on the centrality of the relationship between the Italian government and Great Britain. It has also been repeatedly demonstrated that the Fascist leadership was acutely aware of the risks of a conflict with London, of the importance the League of Nations held for the British, and consequently, of the need to reach an agreement that would allow Britain to “save face” – as Churchill himself highlighted.Footnote ¹²⁵ Moreover, it has been shown that, at least until shortly after the end of the war, Mussolini’s intention – confirmed by official documents – was to reach a “general agreement” with Britain. Such an agreement would have served to affirm Italy’s status as a power on equal footing with Britain, particularly in the Mediterranean, especially considering that Rome had no intention of fully aligning with Berlin.Footnote ¹²⁶ This strategic intent is clearly articulated in Guariglia’s Memoirs from June 1936: “We [must] stand once again alongside Britain, above the dispute, in the role of arbiter rather than participant in European conflicts.”Footnote ¹²⁷

The evolution of the negotiations should therefore be understood in this context. Fully aware of the practical and diplomatic complications that a conflict in Ethiopia might entail, Mussolini approached the Ethiopian issue with what Quartararo describes as an “open perspective.” The military mobilization in the Horn of Africa, the intensification of anti-British propaganda in British-administered territories, and the threat of alignment with Berlin can be interpreted as tactics to increase Italy’s negotiating leverage with London. Italy’s primary aim appears to have been the acquisition of either a mandate or protectorate over Ethiopia, or territorial concessions adjacent to its existing colonies. Evidence supporting this includes the drafting of plans for a protectorate over Ethiopia in the summer of 1935, rather than administrative programs alongside military preparations.Footnote ¹²⁸ Moreover, in Guariglia’s opinion, if Italy had left part of Ethiopia under the supervision of the League of Nations, Great Britain would have been willing to accommodate Italy’s interests.Footnote ¹²⁹

However, aware of the difficulties in reaching an agreement with Great Britain, the Italian government decided to follow two parallel paths: diplomatic negotiations on the one hand, military preparations on the other. In fact, although Mussolini’s memorandum declaring his intention to resolve the Ethiopian issue by force was dated 30 December 1934, the first negotiations with Ethiopia in which the idea of a protectorate was raised began around the same time (March 1935) and continued after the end of the war. Indeed, the use of armed force does not exclude the possibility that Italy was aiming for a protectorate rather than large-scale annexation. In this sense, as we have seen in Guariglia’s words, the threat of resorting to troops and their advance into Ethiopian territory can be considered a bargaining tool in the face of numerous deadlocks in diplomatic discussions and secret negotiations. On the other hand, Rome clearly understood that London would not accept an Italian protectorate or dominion over Ethiopia, particularly given Britain’s own interests in the region. Already in the abovementioned Tripartite Treaty of 1906, Great Britain envisaged the Nile basin as its zone of influence in Ethiopia in the event of an unspecified “disintegration of Ethiopia.”Footnote ¹³⁰ Furthermore, it feared the possibility that Italy might create a “Black Army” in the heart of the British Empire, which stretched from Cairo to Cape Town.Footnote ¹³¹ As a result, Italy sought to assert prior agreements by reaching an understanding with Britain regarding the partitioning of Ethiopia or establishing terms for peaceful coexistence, as various documents cited throughout this article suggest.

As regards secret talks, until now historiography had only acknowledged the existence of secret negotiations during the conflict itself – without analyzing them in detail – but documents kept in Italian archives show that these talks had begun before the invasion and continued even after the proclamation of the Italian Empire. The fact that the invasion worked as a means of exerting pressure is confirmed by the fact that throughout the war, negotiations remained open, even when Italian military operations were progressing favorably. The proposals varied according to the military situation but consistently revolved around territorial concessions near existing Italian colonies and the establishment of a protectorate over the Amhara regions.

The very proclamation of the Empire – often interpreted by historians as the definitive conclusion of the matter – was not perceived as such by the Fascist leadership. Evidence of this lies in the intentionally vague formulation of the concept of the Empire and in statements by Lessona and Aloisi, who were close to Mussolini. These ambiguities should likely be interpreted in light of a desire to mend relations with Britain, as contemporary documentation confirms. Reconciliation with London would have also entailed making some concessions to the League of Nations.Footnote ¹³² This, in turn, meant attributing a veneer of legitimacy to the conquest of Ethiopia – perhaps through a League-endorsed agreement with the Negus or an “Indian arrangement” as also confirmed by the British diplomatic documents.Footnote ¹³³ Negotiations mediated by Zervos – particularly advanced between May and October 1936 – also seem to confirm this hypothesis. However, the initial British opposition perceived by the Italian side – together with the advice of part of the British establishment to proceed with annexation – the flight of the Negus and the concomitant developments in the international context rendered further negotiations on territorial concessions useless and ultimately pushed the regime towards complete annexation. This interpretation is confirmed by a statement by Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano during a conversation with Yugoslav Prime Minister Stojadinović: “those, namely the French and the British, who now advise resistance against Hitler, are the very same who encouraged the Negus to resist Italy militarily. Without them, Haile Selassie would probably still be in Addis Ababa. Mussolini would have left him there, under his authority.”Footnote ¹³⁴

Another way to look at the negotiations, which is especially important for what happened after the takeover of Addis Ababa, is from a military point of view. The proclamation of the Empire did not correspond to actual control over Ethiopia. As late as December 1936, 250,000 Italian troops and 110,000 colonial ascari were still stationed in the territory.Footnote ¹³⁵ The conflict had devolved into a guerrilla war, necessitating the launch of extensive policing operations.Footnote ¹³⁶ In this context, an agreement with the Negus would have enabled the redeployment of troops to Europe, where tensions, particularly due to German expansionism, were escalating. As shown, the Italian leadership recognized the challenges of territorial control early in the campaign, with this understanding solidifying in subsequent months.Footnote ¹³⁷ Keeping communication open with the Negus was therefore instrumental in potentially securing an agreement that would legitimize Italian dominion – at least partially – and also end hostilities with segments of the resistance loyal to him. Notably, the negotiations between Zervos and Cerulli appear to have ended between January and February 1937, coinciding with the assassination attempt on Viceroy Graziani on 19 February. Graziani, who had worked to dismantle the power of the ras and suppress the guerrilla through large-scale police operations, was reportedly “caught off guard” by the attack, which was followed by an “unimaginable harshness.”Footnote ¹³⁸ In the ensuing days, former high-ranking officials were executed, and 400 notables were deported to Italy.Footnote ¹³⁹ This event likely solidified the Italian government’s belief that no agreement with the Ethiopian leadership was possible. While the Zervos channel had also been maintained in the hope of reaching an understanding to facilitate governance, from that moment onward, large-scale repression became the norm. Only later did Amedeo of Aosta – who admired the British system of indirect rule – pursue a policy in stark contrast to Graziani’s. The continuation of negotiations after the seize of Addis Ababa and the Graziani attack should therefore be understood less as an attempt to establish a protectorate or the concession of a reduced part under Haile Selassie’s sovereignty – which had by that time become politically unfeasible – and more as a means of keeping open lines of communication. Furthermore, the belief – shared by the British government – that most of Ethiopia did not support the former Negus but was continuing the fight on its own, thus making useless a possible return, may also have played a role.Footnote ¹⁴⁰ Moreover, while the initial negotiations appear to have been launched by the Italians, those following the attack on Graziani seem to have been initiated by the Negus, although the Italian government probably still viewed them favorably. In fact, obtaining the surrender of Haile Selassie or his heir, perhaps through a period of residence in Italy, could have been advantageous in the long term for controlling Ethiopia or securing a certain degree of international legitimacy.

From the Ethiopian perspective, no historiographical study has addressed the issue of negotiations, which, as we have seen, are only briefly mentioned by Zewde. A partial reconstruction has been provided by Sbacchi, who asserts that within the exiled court there were three main factions: one in favor of recognizing the Italian Empire – partly also due to financial interests; one advocating for the Emperor to lead the Ethiopian resistance; and a third more inclined to adopt a wait-and-see approach.Footnote ¹⁴¹

Therefore, as we have already noted, the Emperor’s submission would have undoubtedly benefited Italy on both the international stage and the military front in Ethiopia – and indeed, the Italian government attempted to secure this on multiple occasions even years after the end of the war – the theme of the former Negus’s viewpoint now becomes central. Unfortunately, this issue is not addressed in his autobiography, nor has it been thoroughly examined by British historiography, despite the fact that British intelligence was aware of the secret negotiations, even as the Italians denied their existence.Footnote ¹⁴² According to Sbacchi, the Negus – disappointed by Great Britain, France and the League of Nations – repeatedly considered the possibility of recognizing Italian sovereignty – as also suggested by the negotiations conducted through Zervos and Cerulli – especially in light of the various financial offers he received over the years.Footnote ¹⁴³ Nevertheless, the wait-and-see faction and the hope that the outbreak of a world war might alter the situation and lead to his return to Ethiopia ultimately prevailed – a hope that, in the end, materialized.

As for Asfa Wossen, it remains unclear whether he acted independently or under his father’s guidance, possibly as part of a strategy to return to Ethiopia and lead the resistance. This interpretation would appear to be supported by unconfirmed reports of the Crown Prince’s and Zervos’s involvement in supplying the Ethiopian patriots.Footnote ¹⁴⁴ Thus, the negotiations conducted by Zervos may also be interpreted as a tactic to gain time and keep diplomatic channels open, rather than a genuine attempt to reach an agreement. Furthermore, it should be noted that negotiations through the Bientry family were initiated by Asfa Wossen himself through his father’s private secretary. Therefore, although the intermediaries described Aswa Wossen as motivated by a desire to free himself from his father, it seems unlikely that the Emperor was unaware of this. Especially considering how much the Negus trusted Wolde Yohannes.Footnote ¹⁴⁵ Therefore, it might be hypothesized that Haile Selassie believed that the Italians would have viewed an agreement with his son more favorably. Hence, in conclusion, much like the Italian strategy, the Ethiopian approach might also be characterized as an “open perspective” – a cautious stance aimed at exploiting the most favorable circumstances as they arose. The fact that negotiations extended over several years supports this interpretation.