Introduction
After heated discussions during the drafting of the United Nations (UN) Charter, Article 27 implicitly granted a veto to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), commonly known as the P5: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Whilst France and the UK have not used their veto since 1989, China, Russia, and the United States have regularly done so and are therefore referred as ‘veto users’ in this article.
Since the end of the 1990s, proposals have been put forward to restrain the veto in mass atrocity situations – namely, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing – and are now commonly referred to as ‘the responsibility not to veto’ or RNTV.Footnote 1 The RNTV refers to the voluntary abstention from voting against a UNSC draft resolution that aims to prevent the emergence or escalation of mass atrocities by building on accepted understandings of what it entails to be a responsible veto power and member of the international community. So far, the existing literature has focused on the history of the RNTV and the strengths and weaknesses of specific proposals.Footnote 2 However, instead of asking how these proposals have emerged and whether they should be adopted, this article is interested in a different question: has the RNTV progressively become an emerging norm that has led to a degree of behavioural change from the veto users and other members of the international community?
An emerging norm is defined here as a proposal that has gathered a substantive level of international support and consensus, but is not yet consistently and collectively adopted by a critical mass as a standard of appropriate behaviour. Not all emerging norms will become established yet ongoingly contested norms: some will be abandoned before they even reach the status of weak norm. However, as this article shows, emerging norms can still have an impact, and understanding this impact, and how to trace it, is key to fully understanding ongoing change in international relations.
The article builds on norm research to pinpoint the kind of impact that can be expected from emerging norms and concrete criteria to trace it. It argues that the impact of emerging norms can be determined by looking at instances of both compliance and violation and contends that a proposed standard of appropriate behaviour can be deemed an emerging norm if we can see the following three indicators: 1) increasing discursive support of the proposed standard of appropriate behaviour by a growing number of members of the international community; 2) increasing justification or denial by actors violating it; and 3) increasing and regular criticism of its violation by the rest of the international community. In contrast to established yet ongoingly contested norms, a shift in implementation of the proposed standard of appropriate behaviour is not to be excepted with emerging norms, and if they occur, they are likely to be unrelated to the latter.
The article demonstrates that it would be misguided to consider the RNTV a norm, but that it is an emerging norm that has a growing impact on the UNSC. In order to do so, it draws on an analysis of how the veto has been used in the post–Cold War era, the efforts made to formalise the RNTV over the years, and an extensive discourse analysis of over 5,500 UNSC and General Assembly (UNGA) debates.
The article proceeds as follow. First, it introduces the RNTV. Secondly, it draws on norm research to discuss what constitutes an emerging norm, how it can lead to behavioural change, and how to trace the impact of a proposed standard of appropriate behaviour such as the RNTV in order to determine if it is an emerging norm. Thirdly, it analyses the progressive efforts made by the international community over the years to formalise and support the RNTV. Fourthly, it investigates how the veto users have increasingly justified and legitimised the use of the veto and the violation of the RNTV. Fifhtly, it focuses on the efforts made by the rest of the international community to resist and limit the use of the veto in atrocity situations. The article concludes by arguing that the RNTV has led the UNSC to be at a crossroad. Through this analysis, the article not only contributes to our understanding of the RNTV and UNSC reform debates but also deepens our understanding of emerging norms and the impact they can have on ongoing change in international relations.
Defining the responsibility not to veto
Ever since the 2005 World Summit, mass atrocities are commonly understood as encompassing four scenarios: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. The term ‘atrocity situation’ is preferred in this article to the term ‘atrocity crime’ to reflect the fact that unlike genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, ethnic cleansing has not been defined as a crime under international law. Despite this lack of legal status, the international community agreed in 2005 to incorporate ethnic cleansing under the ‘atrocity situation’ umbrella on the basis that it ‘includes acts that are serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law that may themselves amount to one of the recognized atrocity crimes, in particular crimes against humanity’.Footnote 3
Defining whether we are dealing with an atrocity situation can be challenging. For instance, there is no agreed threshold on how many crimes must be committed to amount to an atrocity situation. Similarly, it can take time to gather the necessary evidence required to make such a determination. This is particularly true for the case of genocide since intent needs to be established, and this process can take decades. For example, what occurred in Srebrenica in 1995 was not officially recognised as amounting to a genocide until a ruling was made by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 2001.Footnote 4 Finally, some argue that such categorisation can be deeply politicised. This is perhaps best illustrated by the conflicting depictions by mainstream media of the atrocities committed in Gaza since the October 2023 attacks.
However, despite these limitations, whether a situation constitutes a mass atrocity situation is often determined by key UN actors. Six are particularly relevant: the UN Secretary-General, the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, the Special Rapporteur on a specific country/situation, the High Commissioner for human rights, and the Human Rights Council. Consequently, in most situations, this characterisation is less problematic than it may first appear.
The use of the veto in mass atrocity situations (imminent or ongoing) represents the grand majority of veto use.Footnote 5 Out of the fifty-eight draft resolutions vetoed between 1990 and 2023, fifty-one were indeed regarding mass atrocity situations.Footnote 6 Since the end of the Cold War, Russia, China, and the United States have used their veto sixty-five times in mass atrocity situations, while France and the UK have opted not to.
As Graph 1 shows, whereas Russia and China’s use of their veto used to be rare between 1990 and 2006, it has intensified between 2007 and 2023. An opposite trend can be seen regarding the United States. It is however important to not jump to conclusions based on this data. While it is clear that Russia and China have been unwilling to restrain their veto, it is worth noting that an increase in the number of Chinese and Russian vetoes can also partly be explained by the fact that other UNSC members have been increasingly willing to put forward draft resolutions for a vote – despite the fact that they knew they would get vetoed – in order to publicly force a justification from the veto user. Similarly, while the US representative argued on 26 April 2023 at the UNGA that the United States ‘will refrain from the use of the veto except in rare, extraordinary situations’,Footnote 7 it has not formally endorsed RNTV proposals and has recently used its veto on draft resolutions on Israel and Palestine.
Number of vetoes cast in mass atrocity situations by vetoes users (1990–2023).
While the veto is not the only reason why the UNSC has failed to act, its use has become increasingly criticised as a key factor of inaction that costs lives and enables mass atrocities. For instance, as Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, explained,
Time and again, there has been minimal action.… I wish to be blunt. Second to those who are criminally responsible – those who kill and those who maim – the responsibility for the continuation of so much pain lies with the five permanent members of the (UNSC). So long as the veto is used by them to block any unity of action,…it is they – the permanent members – who must answer before the victims.Footnote 8
As a result, proposals (discussed in the section entitled ‘Growing efforts to formalise and support the RNTV’) have been put forward to restrain the use of the veto in mass atrocity situations. They are now collectively and commonly referred to as the RNTV. The RNTV can be defined as promoting a negative duty – to restrain from voting against a draft resolution that aims to prevent the emergence or escalation of mass atrocities – by building on accepted understandings of what it entails to be a responsible veto power and member of the international community.
Before moving forward, it is important to situate these efforts to limit the veto in broader debates on UNSC reform. Calls for change are far from new,Footnote 9 but as Stewart Patrick explained, the UNSC’s ‘failure to act on Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has reignited long-smouldering global demands to overhaul the world’s premier body for international peace and security’.Footnote 10 These have only been reinforced by the UNSC’s inability to address the situation in Gaza, among others. Martin Binder and Monika Heupel usefully categorise the existing proposed reforms around three themes: representation, to better account for the world’s population and power distribution; participation, to improve existing practices in agenda setting and policy formulation; and decision-making, so that the UNSC is no longer restricted by the veto.Footnote 11 These proposed reforms aim to address what John Langmore and Ramesh Thakur have coined ‘a quadruple legitimacy deficit: performance, representation, procedure, and accountability’.Footnote 12
The various proposals to reform the UNSC are beyond the scope of this analysis, but it is important to note that two types of reforms exist: formal, which requires an amendment of the UN Charter; and informal, which does not. Considering that Article 108 of the UN Charter states that an affirmative vote – including of all the veto powers – and domestic ratification by two-thirds of UN member states are required for a proposed reform to pass, formal UNSC reforms are rare.Footnote 13 There are however a lot more opportunities when it comes to informal reforms. Examples of successful informal reforms include changes in regional representation of the non-permanent members and the working methods of the Council (including the practice of pen-holding). The use of the veto has been central in reform debates (both formal and informal).
As Langmore and Thakur explain, ‘there is an aura of futility around any UNSC reform proposal’,Footnote 14 since even though there seems to be a wide consensus that reform is necessary – Kai Schaefer even refers to it as a normFootnote 15 – extensive divisions persist on what they should look like, and the need for approval of the P5 considerably complicates the process. This is certainly the case of the RNTV: it is very unlikely that it will be endorsed by all the P5 in the near future, even as an informal reform, considering the positions of Russia, China, and the United States.
However, this article is interested in determining whether it has progressively become an emerging norm that has led to a degree of behavioural change from the veto users and other members of the international community. While this would still fall short of being an accepted informal reform, this shift would still have serious implications regarding how the UNSC functions.
Defining emerging norms and tracing their impact on behavioural change
Veto users still routinely use their vetoes, and none of them have endorsed proposals to restrain the use of the veto. Additionally, there have also only been rare instances since the RNTV began emerging where the veto users have unexpectedly abstained from using their veto and even when they did abstain, their decision was not linked to the RNTV. For instance, in 2011, Russia and China’s abstentions in the vote on Resolution 1973 on Libya surprised the international community. However, there is no evidence that the RNTV played any role in their decision.Footnote 16 Rather, authors like Luke Glanville have argued that the influence of other factors and norms such as the responsibility to protect (R2P) played a decisive role.Footnote 17 Similarly, in 2016, the United States abstained from vetoing Resolution S/RES/2334, which demanded that Israel cease Jewish settlement activity on Palestinian territory.Footnote 18 However, Samantha Power explained in depth the reasons behind the US’ vote, and the RNTV did not play a role. In fact, she reiterated that the United States ‘has consistently said that it would block any resolution that it thought would undermine Israel’s security or would seek to impose a resolution to the conflict’.Footnote 19 As a result, the RNTV cannot be deemed to constitute a norm. However, the article is interested in determining whether it is an emerging norm in order to better understand UNSC practices.
To do so, it draws on norm research. The latter has come a long way in the last four decades.Footnote 20 For instance, we better understand where norms come from and how they evolve. In particular, while the work of authors such as Finnemore and Sikkink was groundbreaking,Footnote 21 we know that norms are not simply universally internalised following a top-down diffusion model. The local indeed plays a central – and often generative – role.Footnote 22 We also know that norms do not have a fixed and universal meaning but are rather ‘complex ontological units that represent a range of “meanings-in-use”, which are enacted by agents in different places and at different times’.Footnote 23 Additionally, we have moved away from a static understanding of norms towards a stronger acknowledgement of their dynamic nature, acknowledging that norms are ‘processes’.Footnote 24 Norms will indeed face ongoing contestation, reinterpretation, and renegotiation.Footnote 25 Orchard and Wiener have defined three types of contestation: ‘reactive, whereby actors seek to object to norms…; proactive, whereby actors seek to engage with norms in order to improve them; and interpretive, whereby actors possess different understandings of norms from those that are held by the wider international community’.Footnote 26 We also know that contestation can be about a norm’s validity or its application.Footnote 27 This multifaceted process of contestation will at times lead to a strengthening of the norm but can also lead to its weakening and/or disappearance.Footnote 28
Similarly, in addition to acknowledging that norms not only constrain action but also influence the identity of states and contribute to constituting their interests,Footnote 29 norm research has explored the various types of normsFootnote 30 and the degrees of influence they can have over time.Footnote 31 We also know that norms do not exist in a vacuum and that the wider sets of structures in which they evolve matter. In particular, Lantis and Wunderlich have emphasised the importance of ‘norm clusters’, which are ‘collections of aligned, but distinct, norms or principles that relate to a common, overarching issue area’.Footnote 32 Staunton and Ralph have also shown that even though norms within a cluster might seem aligned in theory, they can clash in practice.Footnote 33
However, further attention deserves to be paid to the impact emerging norms specifically can have in order to better understand ongoing change in international relations. While a norm is commonly understood as ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour’,Footnote 34 or ‘collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity’,Footnote 35 an emerging norm is defined here as the proposal of a standard of appropriate behaviour that has gathered a substantive level of international support and consensus but is not yet consistently and collectively adopted by a critical mass as a standard of appropriate behaviour. In other words, it is more than a concept – understood as an ‘idea warranting further discussion and elaboration’Footnote 36 – and less than a norm.
As norm research has demonstrated, not all concepts will become norms (even weak ones) and even if they do, norms will keep being contested, renegotiated, and reinterpreted. However, there is a period where concepts emerge and become influential before either disappearing or becoming an ongoingly contested norm, and this initial transition from concept to norm is what this article is interested in exploring further in order to better understand – and trace – ongoing change in international relations. Consequently, emerging norms are not treated as simply being weak norms. A weak norm by definition entails that the status of norm has been reached at one point, whereas an emerging norm might never reach the status of ongoingly contested norm. In addition to this element of temporality (and status), this distinction matters because the expectations around the impact we can expect will differ between emerging and weak norms. In particular, as explained below, the impact of an emerging norm will mainly involve discursive changes whereas with a weak norm, a certain degree of implementation – even a weak one – can be expected.
To determine whether we are dealing with an emerging norm, the article builds on existing research on norm strength and robustness to provide concrete indicators. This article indeed contends that it is possible to determine whether we are dealing with a concept, emerging norm, or norm by looking at the degree of impact on state behaviour and, more specifically, the extent of behavioural change (understood as both discursive change and shift in practice) being generated. Whilst the literature on norm strength is not new,Footnote 37 two concrete – and competing – models to evaluate it have made valuable contributions in recent years and provide a good starting point to this analysis.
Hirsh and Dixon argue that two indicators should be used to assess a norm’s strength: ‘the level of international concordance with a principled idea, and the degree of international institutionalisation of a principled idea’.Footnote 38 This research is a welcome contribution since it provides concrete indicators to evaluate norm strength, and it rightly argues that such assessment should take place ‘over a period of time’.Footnote 39 However, some of the indicators chosen to evaluate norm strength are either inadequate or missing. While the indicators of concordance are helpful, a strong emphasis is put on legal institutionalisation since institutionalisation is defined as ‘the degree to which a principled idea is codified and ensconced in international law’.Footnote 40 This is problematic since as Sarah Percy explains, ‘legal institutionalization is not necessarily good for the further development of a norm’.Footnote 41 In some cases, like R2P,Footnote 42 the goal is even to create a strong norm without creating new legal obligations, so establishing such a strong link between legal institutionalisation and norm strength is counterproductive. Additionally, the model does not look at practice because it sees this indicator as ‘problematic’.Footnote 43 Whilst it is true that ‘full compliance is extremely rare’,Footnote 44 and that even norms that are constantly violated (such as killing) can still be a strong norm, looking at patterns and trends of violation tells us a lot about the state of a norm.
Some of these issues are addressed by a more holistic approach put forward by Deitelhoff and Zimmermann.Footnote 45 They look at both discourse and practice by putting forward four indicators of norm ‘robustness’: ‘concordance, third-party reactions to norm violations, compliance, and implementation’.Footnote 46 Whilst a welcome inclusion, the criterion of implementation is however not explored in enough depth. This is problematic because implementation will take very different shapes depending on the norm under scrutiny: Is it promoting a positive or negative duty? Is it prescriptive, procedural, or inspirational?
Beyond these strengths and weaknesses, neither model is fully adapted to the study of emerging norms. Even though Hirsch and Dixon claim their framework ‘offers a way to distinguish between principled ideas that are norms and those that are “emerging”’,Footnote 47 it mainly looks at the strength of established yet contested norms since criteria to concretely differentiate ‘non-norms’ from ‘weak norms’Footnote 48 are lacking, and the fact that not all emerging norms will become norms (even weak ones) is not explored in depth. Similarly, as Welsh explains, Deitelhoff and Zimmermann’s framework is not adapted to emerging or even relatively new norms.Footnote 49 In particular, while looking at changes in implementation is important in the case of established yet ongoingly contested norms (even weak ones), such impact should not be expected for emerging norms, and if it occurs, it is likely to be unrelated to the latter.
Consequently, as Table 1 shows, this article argues that in order to determine whether we are dealing with an emerging norm, we need to look at instances of both compliance and violation and that while we can expect a very limited and/or unrelated implementation, three indicators will be present in the case of an emerging norm: 1) the proposed standard of appropriate behaviour will be regularly and increasingly promoted and endorsed by a growing number of members of the international community; 2) the violators will regularly and increasingly feel compelled to justify or deny its violation. Here, it is important to not just look at whether states are justifying the violation, but also the robustness and degree of the justification and how these evolve over time; 3) the violation will generate regular and growing resistance and criticism from other members of the international community. The level of outrage, explicit shaming, and moral condemnation is indeed another central indicator.
Impact tracing.
The exact number of references to the proposed standard of appropriate behaviour or the number of required states that endorse it will vary depending on the emerging norm since ‘what constitutes a “critical state” will vary from issue to issue’.Footnote 50 However, this framework helps us achieve our main goal by setting guidelines on how to define emerging norms and distinguish them from concepts and norms by identifying parameters for their respective impact.
Based on these guidelines, the RNTV would be defined as an emerging norm if 1) it is being regularly and increasingly formalised and endorsed by a growing number of members of the international community; 2) the veto users regularly and increasingly feel compelled to justify or deny the use of their veto and the violation of the RNTV; 3) the use of the veto generates regular and growing resistance and criticism from other members of the international community and leads to further promotion of the RNTV.
To determine if this is the case, it is important for the analysis to take place over time. It is indeed impossible to trace change over time by just looking at one moment. Consequently, the article looks at the entire post–Cold War era (1990–2023) and divides it into three periods: 1) January 1990–September 2000: the period before the first call to restrain the veto in mass atrocity situations was made; 2) October 2000–August 2013: the period before a concrete proposal was put forward by France and Mexico, followed by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) group, yet the idea of a veto restraint in mass atrocity situations began emerging in various reports and forums; and 3) September 2013–December 2023:Footnote 51 the era when these proposals exist and are being advocated for by various members of the international community.
To analyse whether criterion 1 is fulfilled, the next section traces the growing efforts made by the international community over the years to formalise and endorse the RNTV. Criteria 2 and 3 are analysed in the sections entitled ‘The veto users’ legitimisation of the violation of the RNTV’ and ‘Contesting the violation of the RNTV’ through an extensive discourse analysis of UNSC and UNGA debates that amount to over 5,500 statements.Footnote 52 The aim is to shed light on how competing representations of the use of the veto have emerged, evolved, and become legitimised or delegitimised over time.
While discourse – understood as ‘a structure of meaning in use’Footnote 53 – can take many forms, the article focuses on language. More specifically, it analyses all the statements made by UNSC members during the vote of the fifty-one draft resolutions on mass atrocity situations where a veto was cast. Because this analysis is interested in not only how veto users justified their veto but also how such use was perceived, the analysis focuses on the declarations of both the veto users and the other members of the UNSC. The codebook (in Appendix 2) was developed inductively and deductively to help map the evolution of the discourses used over time, and contains three nodes and twenty-two child nodes for the statements made by veto users, and four nodes and twenty-six child nodes for the statements made by the other members of the UNSC.
It is important to acknowledge that UNSC declarations are deeply performative. They follow a set of formal and informal practices unique to the UNSC and are full of self-censorship. This performativity has a direct impact on what representations are included in the discourses used in the various declarations of UNSC members, and as a result, it is important for the analysis to reflect on the impact of this context and what has been left out because of it. Similarly, the analysis considers the changes in administrations since, for instance, differences between Barack Obama’s and Donald Trump’s eras are to be expected. Additionally, even though these discussions were also representative of ongoing debates about the wider normative agenda on human protection, the analysis also acknowledges that these discourses were often discussed in the context of only two cases: the situations in Syria, and Israel and Palestine. As Graph 2 shows, out of fifty-one draft resolutions on mass atrocity situations that were vetoed between 1990 and 2023, thirty-seven were indeed in relation to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and Syria (nineteen and eighteen respectively). Finally, because these declarations did not happen in a vacuum, the analysis considers the discursive context at the time.Footnote 54
Number of vetoed draft resolutions per mass atrocity situation (1990–2023).
To address some of the issues related to the nature of the UNSC debates, the article also analyses the statements made by member states during the UNGA annual debates between 1990 and 2023.Footnote 55 This is done for two reasons: first, in contrast to the UNSC, and as explained by Chelotti et al.,Footnote 56 states face a lot less constraints when preparing these speeches. As a result, this annual debate is ‘a unique forum’ because ‘it is the one place where states can speak their minds…it reflects the issues that countries consider to be most important’.Footnote 57 Consequently, any mention of the veto or the RNTV is revealing. Secondly, adding these speeches to the discourse analysis allows to look beyond specific situations and beyond the fifteen UNSC members since every UN member state can deliver a statement during this debate. As a result, all the UNGA debates between 1990 and 2023 were analysed (see Appendix 3 for the codebook, which is organised around four nodes and thirty-four child nodes) with a particular focus on the arguments put forward to justify, criticise the veto, or call for its restraint. The article now turns to the research findings reached from this analysis.
Growing efforts to formalise and support the RNTV
First, we can see an increasing effort to formalise the RNTV and to promote it. As mentioned previously, efforts to restrain the veto go as far as the negotiations of the UN Charter. But proposals to restrain the veto specifically to address mass atrocity situations have become increasingly predominant following NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo argued in its report that ‘the current system allowing any permanent member to paralyse UN action through the use of the veto must be adjusted in a judicious manner to deal effectively with cases of extreme humanitarian crisis’.Footnote 58 Similarly, the 2001 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty argued in its report The Responsibility to Protect that the P5 should not use their veto ‘in matters where their vital state interests are not involved, to obstruct the passage of resolutions authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes for which there is otherwise majority support’.Footnote 59 The 2004 report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change also argued that ‘the veto has an anachronistic character that is unsuitable for the (UN)’.Footnote 60 However, when the international community had an opportunity to limit the use of the veto at the 2005 World Summit when it officially endorsed the R2P, any reference to a veto restraint was deleted from the final version of the Outcome Document.
Efforts to restrain the veto nevertheless continued. In particular, in 2006 (and then again in 2012), the S5 (Costa Rica, Jordan, Lichtenstein, Singapore, and Switzerland) included veto restraint measures as part of a UNGA draft resolution on the UNSC’s working methods.Footnote 61 Similarly, in 2008, the report of the US genocide prevention taskforce not only supported the idea of a veto restraint unless three P5 are in favour of a veto (therefore implicitly sidelining Russia and China), but also argued that doing more to prevent atrocity crimes was part of the US’ national interests.Footnote 62 Likewise, in 2009, in its first annual report on the R2P, the Secretary-General urged the P5 ‘to refrain from employing or threatening to employ the veto’.Footnote 63
Support grew considerably when two proposals were officially put forward for endorsement: the Franco-Mexican political statement and the code of conduct of the ACT group. On 24 September 2013, following years of declarations by various French diplomats,Footnote 64 French President François Hollande proposed at the annual debate of the UNGA ‘that a code of good conduct be defined by the permanent members of the (UNSC), and that in the event of a mass crime they can decide to collectively renounce their veto powers’.Footnote 65 Two years later, France and Mexico officially put forward a ‘Political statement on the suspension of the veto in case of mass atrocities’ that was open to signature by other states. This statement proposed ‘a collective and voluntary agreement among the permanent members’ on the basis that ‘the veto is not a privilege, but an international responsibility’.Footnote 66 This proposal was particularly significant considering that it was co-led by a veto power. Similarly, the ‘code of conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes’ was put forward by the ACT group on 23 October 2015 before being submitted to the UN Secretary-General on 14 December 2015. It is aimed at the entire UNSC, not just the P5, and asks its signatories to ‘pledge to support timely and decisive action by the (UNSC) aimed at preventing or ending’ atrocity crimes.Footnote 67
A lot could be said about the similarities and differences between the two proposals, along with their strengths and weaknesses. But what matters for this analysis is that even though Russia, China, and the United States have expressed their reluctance to endorse these proposals, both initiatives have gained considerable traction over the years. The Franco-Mexican proposal has gathered 104 signatures by member states,Footnote 68 while 121 member states (including France and the UK) have signed the ACT code of conduct.Footnote 69 Consequently, it is clear that efforts to support but also formalise the RNTV – which is criterion 1 of the analysis – have considerably and successfully grown over time.
The veto users’ legitimisation of the violation of the RNTV
As previously explained, justification from veto users is a central factor in determining whether the RNTV is an emerging norm. If it is the case, veto users would progressively be seen to feel compelled to justify or shift blame for the use of their veto, and we would see shifts in the way they have done so, such as a strengthening of the robustness and degree of the justification provided. The presence of these indicators would demonstrate that the veto users feel pressured by the proposed standard of appropriate behaviour. As the analysis shows, these indicators are present since veto users have increasingly attempted to legitimise the use of the veto on two grounds: the content of the draft resolution and the process of the deliberations of the UNSC.
Legitimising the veto before the emergence of RNTV
During the period before the RNTV began emerging (January 1990–September 2000), seven vetoes were cast over seven debates: the United States vetoed four draft resolutions on Israel and Palestine; Russia vetoed one draft on Cyprus and one on Bosnia and Herzegovina; and China vetoed one on Guatemala.Footnote 70 The amount of justification provided by the veto users was relatively limited. On one occasion, in 1997, China even felt comfortable stating that their veto had nothing to do with the draft resolution, but was rather about Guatemala’s invitation of Taiwan at their peace ceremony.Footnote 71
When a justification was provided, it was mainly focused on the content of the draft resolution. The veto users indeed argued in 71 per cent of the debatesFootnote 72 that the draft resolution was not helpful.Footnote 73 The United States took that claim even further by arguing in 43 per cent of the debates that the draft resolution would be detrimental to the situation.Footnote 74 For example, in 1997, the United States argued that if the draft resolution on Israel and Palestine was adopted, the UNSC ‘would add to existing tensions in the region, (and) complicate the efforts of all parties to get the negotiations back on a productive track’.Footnote 75
In 57 per cent of the debates, the United States also condemned the fact that the draft resolution would get in the way of local or regional initiatives.Footnote 76 For example, in the context of a draft resolution on Israel and Palestine, it argued that ‘this council is not able – and should not seek – to try to resolve sensitive issues in the Middle East peace process: that is for the parties’.Footnote 77
Legitimising the veto during the emergence of the RNTV
During the emergence of the RNTV (October 2000–August 2013), twenty-one vetoes were cast over sixteen debates: the United States vetoed ten drafts on Israel and Palestine; Russia vetoed three times on Syria, and one time each on Georgia, Zimbabwe, and Myanmar; and China vetoed three times on Syria and one time each on Zimbabwe and Myanmar.Footnote 78 Some of the claims put forward in the previous era persisted. In particular, the idea that the draft resolution would be detrimental to the situation was raised by all veto users in 63 per cent of the UNSC debates where a veto occurred.Footnote 79 For example, Russia argued in 2012 that if the draft resolution on Syria was adopted, ‘it would not only further aggravate the turmoil, but also cause it to spread to other countries of the region’.Footnote 80 Similarly, the United States argued that the draft resolution was not helpful or not the solution to the problem in 44 per cent of debates,Footnote 81 while all veto users argued that the draft resolution would get in the way of local or regional initiatives in 25 per cent of debates.Footnote 82
However, these claims also went in more depth as the veto users took the time to detail the elements that were either missing or inadequate in what became longer statements and debates. For instance, on Israel and Palestine, the United States argued in 2003 that ‘the draft resolution put forward today was flawed in that it failed to include the following three elements: a robust condemnation of acts of terrorism; an explicit condemnation of Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade as organizations responsible for acts of terrorism; and a call for the dismantlement of infrastructure that supports these terror operations wherever located, consistent with resolution 1373’.Footnote 83
Additionally, veto users began making new claims on the content of the draft resolution in order to justify the veto. One that was particularly predominant – especially from the United States – was the idea that the draft resolution is one-sided or lacked balance.Footnote 84 It appeared in 69 per cent of the UNSC debates where a veto was cast. For example, the United States argued in the context of the situation in Israel and Palestine that ‘one-sided, unbalanced draft resolutions by the (UNSC) such as the one before the Council today would only detract from the efforts of the Quartet and the international community to resume progress on the path towards peace’.Footnote 85 Similarly, China argued in the context of Syria that ‘the draft resolution is seriously flawed, and its unbalanced content seeks to put pressure on only one party’.Footnote 86
Another new claim made in 38 per cent of debates mainly by China and Russia was that the draft resolution does not respect a state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity or its right to self-defence.Footnote 87 For example, China reminded the UNSC in 2012 that ‘sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries are the basic norms governing inter-State relations enshrined in the Charter of the (UN)’.Footnote 88 In 19 per cent of debates, Russia took that claim even further by arguing that the draft resolution promotes interventionism or regime change.Footnote 89 In the context of the situations in Myanmar and Zimbabwe, Russia and China also argued that the draft resolution was unwarranted because the situations fell outside of the UNSC’s authority.Footnote 90 Finally, the United States and China also claimed that a draft should not be supported because it undermines UNSC’s credibility or unity (19 per cent of debates).Footnote 91
In addition to these new claims on the content of the draft resolution, the veto users criticised the process of the deliberations. In 44 per cent of the debates, all veto users argued that their feedback was not considered enough in an attempt to shift the blame on the sponsors of the draft resolution.Footnote 92 They even argued in 25 per cent of cases that the draft should not have been put to a vote. For instance, China argued that ‘to put through a vote when parties are still seriously divided over the issue does not help maintain the unity and authority of the (UNSC) nor help to properly resolve the issue’.Footnote 93 In contrast, the veto users emphasised all the ways they remained committed to a positive outcome (claim explicitly made in 63 per cent of the debates). For instance, the United States argued in 2001 that ‘no one is working harder than we are to end the terror, violence and suffering that has afflicted the Israeli and Palestinian people for far too long’.Footnote 94 Similarly, China claimed that ‘we have participated in all of the Council’s consultations on resolutions concerning Syria in a positive, responsible and constructive manner, with a view to pushing for a ceasefire and a halt to all violence in Syria’.Footnote 95
Legitimising the violation of the RNTV
Since the emergence of concrete RNTV proposals that can be endorsed (September 2013–December 2023), thirty-seven vetoes occurred across twenty-eight debates: Russia used its veto fifteen times on Syria, four times on Ukraine, and one time each on Venezuela, Mali, Israel and Palestine, Yemen, and Bosnia and Herzegovina; China vetoed seven drafts on Syria, one time each on Venezuela, and Israel and Palestine; and the United States vetoed four drafts on Israel and Palestine.Footnote 96
Some continuities can be seen. Regarding the content of the draft resolution, two claims remained fairly stable in terms of occurrence: the idea that the draft resolution is one-sided or unbalancedFootnote 97 (mentioned in 61 per cent of the debates where a veto was cast compared to 69 per cent in the previous period); and that it promotes interventionism or regime changeFootnote 98 (14 per cent compared to 19 per cent previously). In comparison to the previous era, the former claim was mainly made by Russia in the context of Syria rather than the United States in the context of Israel and Palestine.
We however saw a decrease in the claims that the draft resolution would not be helpful or necessaryFootnote 99 (21 per cent instead of 44 per cent); or worse, that it would be detrimental to the situationFootnote 100 (36 per cent instead of 63 per cent). In contrast, we saw an increase in the claim made by all veto users that the draft resolution does not respect sovereignty and territorial integrity or the right to self-defence (46 per cent instead of 38 per cent).Footnote 101 Russia also increasingly argued that the draft resolution undermines the UNSC’s authority, credibility, or unity (43 per cent instead of 19 per cent).Footnote 102 In terms of process, veto users kept emphasising that their concerns and feedback were ignoredFootnote 103 (54 per cent, up from 44 per cent), and that the draft resolution should not have been put to a voteFootnote 104 (40 per cent, up from 25 per cent).
Beyond these continuities, it is important to note that the debates lengthened and intensified. As a result, in 68 per centFootnote 105 of the debates where a veto was used, Russia – and occasionally China – began making more than one intervention during a debate, which used to be extremely rare. Russia indeed regularly made two to three interventions and even made five,Footnote 106 eight,Footnote 107 and nineFootnote 108 during some debates on Syria and Mali.
Additionally, new claims in terms of content of the draft resolutions were made. In particular, from 2017 onwards, Russia argued in 32 per cent of the debates that the draft resolution was based on lies (or at the very least lacked evidence) and put forward alternative facts. For example, in the context of the use of chemical weapons by the al-Assad regime, it referred to ‘the feeble evidence presented to us or the obvious signs that the video they showed us of the scene of the incident was staged’.Footnote 109 Similarly, in 2023, Russia referred to ‘Ukrainian Nazis’ in an attempt to justify the invasion of Ukraine.Footnote 110 It is worth noting that Russia went to great lengths to support these alternative facts and shift blame. For instance, regarding Syria, it drew parallels with the US invasion of Iraq and claimed that ‘the version according to which a Syrian military aircraft dropped a sarin bomb on Khan Shaykhun is completely unrealistic, going as it does against the laws of physics and ballistics’.Footnote 111
Additionally, in 57 per cent of the debates where a veto was used, Russia and China attempted to shift blame by arguing that other states were hypocritical, responsible of the situation, politically motivated, and relying on double standards. They even regularly ‘named and shamed’ others. For example, in the context of Syria, Russia explained that, ‘we have a different view as to who was hypocritical in this situation… One could say that what we really observed today were the double standards of the self-styled humanitarian stewards of the welfare of the Syrian people… (S)ome of our partners pursue not humanitarian but other goals while endlessly politicizing the humanitarian arena, again and again.’Footnote 112 In 32 per cent of the debates, Russia even argued that the aim of putting forward the draft resolution was to embarrass or blame Russia, portraying the country as the victim of political games.
In contrast, Russia and China argued that they were acting responsibly or did not have any choice when they used their veto. For instance, Russia argued in the case of Syria that ‘we are using the veto to protect international law, peace and security’.Footnote 113 Similarly, when it came to Venezuela, they explained that ‘today’s vote is a glaring example of why the veto is necessary. It is needed to defend peace and the right of peoples to decide their own destiny. It was clear today that, had that right not been conscientiously exercised, the Council would have risked transforming itself into a threat to peace and security.’Footnote 114
As a way to claim that it is the responsible actor and that it is determined to find an outcome whilst others are to blame for the UNSC’s stalemate, Russia began submitting from 2016 an alternative draft resolution at 60 per cent of the meetings where it used its veto (ChinaFootnote 115 and the United StatesFootnote 116 only did this once each). On one occasion, during a debate on the situation in Syria,Footnote 117 Russia even submitted two alternative resolutions. Most of the time, this practice was made in the context of Syria. Apart from one resolution on Yemen put forward by Russia in 2018,Footnote 118 all these draft resolutions did not carry enough votes to pass. However, this practice of immediately submitting an alternative resolution for a vote is a considerable shift in how the UNSC operates. Additionally, this new practice is somewhat surprising since in 2012, Russia had specifically explained that it ‘believe(s) that continued confrontation in the (UNSC) is useless and counter-productive, and for that reason, we will not submit our draft resolution to a vote’.Footnote 119
Through these claims and practices, the veto users have dedicated considerable efforts to portraying themselves as responsible actors in the field of human protection. They have indeed not argued that human protection is a lesser objective than sovereignty or international order. Rather, they have claimed that they were promoting a different, more effective way to undertake human protection and that fulfilling the P5’s special responsibility when it comes to atrocity prevention did not necessarily equate to not using the veto. As the next section shows, many members of the international community have pushed back on this claim, but what matters here is that the level of justification provided by veto users has only increased since the RNTV proposals emerged and developed in order to justify the use of the veto and shift blame.
Contesting the violation of the RNTV
In addition to the formalisation of the RNTV and its endorsement by the majority of the international community, the amount of resistance to the use of the veto has considerably increased over the years, within both the UNSC and the UNGA.
At the UNSC
At the UNSC, both the scope and depth of the arguments used to critique the veto have amplified over time. Since the existence of RNTV proposals, members of the UNSC have regularly attempted to provide legitimacy to the draft resolution by emphasising that it falls under the Council’s mandate,Footnote 120 and that the Council has a responsibility to address the situation.Footnote 121 For instance, in the context of the US veto on the situation in Israel and Palestine in 2018, France explained ‘we are touching on the heart of the Council’s responsibility – both its role as recognized by the Charter of the (UN) with regard to peace and security and its historic role in the conflict between Israel and Palestine’.Footnote 122 States have also argued that a draft resolution should not be vetoed because it would promote peace in the country and the region,Footnote 123 is in response to illegal actions or violations of previous UNSC resolutions,Footnote 124 is needed to protect civilians,Footnote 125 and supports accountability.Footnote 126 They have warned that the failure to pass the draft resolution would not only complicate the peace process and the situation on the ground,Footnote 127 it would also lead to the UNSC’s failure to fulfil its responsibility,Footnote 128 and to the questioning of its authority and credibility.Footnote 129 For example, in the context of the use of chemical weapons in Syria, France explained that ‘if there is one domain for which the credibility of the Council is at stake, where tactical games have no place, it is this one’.Footnote 130
States have also claimed that a draft resolution should be endorsed because it is balanced and makes reasonable requests,Footnote 131 and that it takes into account the feedback put forward by Council members during the negotiations.Footnote 132 For instance, Belgium argued with regard to draft resolution S/2019/961 on Syria that ‘as co-penholder of the Syrian humanitarian dossier, we conducted an inclusive and transparent drafting process for over a month. We arrived at a compromise text that is balanced, clean and strictly humanitarian and reflects the various points of view expressed in the Council.’Footnote 133 Finally, states have questioned the arguments put forward by the veto usersFootnote 134 and have argued that the alternative draft resolutions put forward were simply attempts to distract the Council.Footnote 135 For example, in the context of Syria, the UK explained that Russia’s proposal does not ‘help the millions of ordinary citizens in Syria whose lives are now in jeopardy’, and ‘certainly do(es) not help the (UN) or the cause of multilateralism’.Footnote 136
As well as the widening of the scope and depth of the arguments put forward, another trend is worth noticing at the UNSC. In addition to expressing regret over the outcome of the vote and the use of the veto, the naming and shaming of the veto user (implicitly but also explicitly) has also considerably increased over time and can now be considered common.Footnote 137 This naming and shaming has been accompanied by increasing claims of abuse of the status of permanent member and the use of the veto. These trends are well captured by a statement made by France in response to a veto by Russia and China on Syria: ‘France deeply regrets the fact that the draft resolution set out by the humanitarian co-penholders and supported by 13 of the 15 members of the UNSC was not adopted because Russia, followed by China, decided to exercise its veto and to jeopardize the delivery of international humanitarian aid to Syria and the survival of millions of people. It is irresponsible and sinister.’Footnote 138
At the UNGA
Members of the international community have also been very critical of the veto during the UNGA annual debates. As explained previously, it is significant that states have chosen to discuss this issue in their speeches. It is important to note that even before the proposals to restrain the veto were put forward by France and Mexico, and the ACT group, the UNGA annual debates had always been used as a platform to criticise the veto and to call for its restraint or abolition. Indeed, throughout the 1990s, one of the recurring arguments was that it was undemocratic by putting the minority’s will ahead of the majority’s.Footnote 139 Additionally, several states argued that it was anachronistic and no longer had a justification.Footnote 140 States also criticised the use of the veto to promote the veto users’ own interests and the impact it had had on the UNSC’s ability to fulfil its role.Footnote 141 These three concerns are well captured by the statement made by Lebanon in 1995: ‘the veto power has outlived its usefulness. It should be abolished, since it is a negation of democratic principles to empower any one member, or group of members, to decide on the vital issues of peace and security without due regard to the sensitivity and wishes of the majority’.Footnote 142
However, criticisms of the veto and calls to abolish it, or at the very least restrain its use, have become more targeted over the years. The calls are increasingly made in the context of atrocity prevention and there is a growing – at least, implicitlyFootnote 143 – naming and shaming of the veto users. This shift began in 1999 in the context of the situation in Kosovo. For instance, New Zealand explained that ‘collective action to try to put a stop to a humanitarian disaster involving genocide and the most serious crimes against humanity should never be held hostage to the veto’.Footnote 144 This kind of claim continued over the years and was particularly reignited by the situation in Syria. However, these critiques were not restricted to these two cases. As Lithuania argued in 2018, ‘in almost every major crisis of the past decade, from Syria to Ukraine and from Myanmar to Yemen, the UNSC has been unable to play a meaningful role because of the inability of States to rise above their national interests and because of the obstructive use of the veto power’.Footnote 145 These debates were once again predominant with the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the situation in Israel and Palestine since 2023.
In addition to these criticisms, from 2013, we can also see two trends consolidating in the UNGA annual debates. The first is a call for more accountability from veto users and a growing consensus that they need to justify the use of the veto. Secondly, there have been increasing calls to look beyond the UNSC in case of stalemate caused by the veto (or the pocket veto). These calls were not new since after all, the Uniting for Peace (U4P) resolution had already been used to circumvent the UNSC.Footnote 146 However, they became common and were made in the specific context of atrocity prevention. For instance, in 2020, Liechtenstein argued that ‘as a function of the UNSC’s failures to deliver, often due to the veto power, the responsibility of the (UNGA) to step up and address these matters increases’.Footnote 147
As a result of both this call for increasing accountability and for a solution to the stalemate in the UNSC to be found, a groundbreaking initiative – commonly known as the ‘veto initiative’ – was passed by the UNGA in April 2022. Resolution 76/262 states that the UNGA should meet ‘within 10 working days of the casting of a veto’ and that the UNSC must provide a report on the use of the veto(es) at least seventy-two hours prior the meeting.Footnote 148 It is worth pointing out that three veto powers – France, the UK, and the United States – were amongst the eighty-three states that co-sponsored the resolution.Footnote 149 The debates that followed the vetoes on Syria, Ukraine, and Israel and Palestine are particularly relevant to this analysis and led to renewed criticisms of the veto and calls to restrain its use. For instance, regarding the 2022 veto on Syria, Denmark explained that ‘this meeting is another opportunity to convey the urgent need for increased restraint in the use of the veto and for more transparency and accountability when the veto power is used’, while Mexico argued ‘that it is important for the (UNGA), not the (UNSC), to have the final word on the use of the veto’.Footnote 150 As Rebecca Barber argues, the veto initiative has therefore ‘arguably shifted powers and responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security a little more toward the (UNGA), as did the U4P Resolution in 1950’.Footnote 151 Additionally, in 2022 and 2023, the U4P resolution was used to address the UNSC stalemate on Ukraine and Israel and Palestine.
Resolution 76/262 and the use of the U4P resolution have led to the passing of key UNGA resolutions. On 12 December 2023, after the UNSC’s failure to pass a draft resolution on a ceasefire in Gaza due to an American veto,Footnote 152 the UNGA adopted a resolution calling for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire. Similarly, regarding Ukraine, multiple UNGA resolutions were passed in 2022 and 2023.Footnote 153 In particular, A/RES/ES-11/2 passed on 28 March 2022 detailed the humanitarian consequences of the conflict and the measures that should be taken. Whilst it is important to remember that UNGA resolutions are not legally binding (unlike UNSC ones), these initiatives show the increased willingness of the international community to follow through on its call to look beyond the UNSC when the latter is in a stalemate due to the veto.
Conclusion: The UNSC at a crossroad
This article has demonstrated that while the RNTV cannot be considered a norm, it can be deemed an emerging norm since the majority of the international community has endorsed it, the veto users have felt increasingly pressured to justify the use of their vetoes (as illustrated by the evolution of the level and extent of the justification put forward over time), and there has been growing and extensive resistance to the use of the veto and the violations of the RNTV.
The shifts taking place in the UNSC due to the RNTV might be of little consolation to the thousands of victims of atrocities around the world that are not receiving the support they need because of vetoed resolutions. However, it would be a mistake to undermine the changes associated with the RNTV. One of the most central ones is a renewed willingness by the international community to look beyond the UNSC and towards the UNGA in order to limit the impact of the veto. Even if the RNTV still falls short of being an accepted informal reform, it has indeed had a concrete impact on not only the behaviour of veto users but also other members of the international community by encouraging the latter to look elsewhere to address what Langmore and Thakur have coined the UNSC’s ‘quadruple legitimacy deficit’.Footnote 154
As a result, the UNSC can be deemed to be at a crossroad: serve your purpose (which is to maintain international peace and security broadly defined since the end of the Cold War), or risk becoming obsolete and marginalised. In 2015, Samantha Power, then US permanent representative to the UN, argued that ‘it’s a Darwinian universe here. If a particular body reveals itself to be dysfunctional, then people are going to go elsewhere.’Footnote 155 It appears that this prediction has begun to come true, as seen with the growing pressure put on veto powers to refrain from using their veto and an increasing willingness from the international community to look beyond the UNSC in instances of stalemate. This has led to an increasing rebalancing of power between two key organs of the UN: the UNSC and the UNGA. So far, the UNGA has only occasionally and partially used the tools available to its arsenal to restore peace and security. However, if the veto users do not want to see a growing influence of the UNGA to the detriment of the UNSC, then they must adapt their veto practices.
Through this analysis, this article has not only made key empirical contributions on the UNSC and reform debates, it has also shown how essential it is to study the impact of emerging norms to better understand ongoing change in international relations as it occurs, such as the evolving dynamics we are witnessing within the main body in charge of international peace and security. This article has indeed deepened our understanding of emerging norms by emphasising the impact they can have, along with the ways to trace it. This framework can be used to analyse other potential emerging norms beyond the field of human protection such as the responsible and ethical use of AI; global health solidarity (which reemerged during the COVID-19 pandemic); climate responsibility; or even disinformation accountability.
Supplementary material
The supplementary material for this article can be found at https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210525101447.
Video Abstract
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Acknowledgements
I am very grateful to the editors and reviewers of the Review of International Studies for their constructive and invaluable feedback. I would also like to thank Nicolas Lemay-Hébert and Luke Glanville for their thoughts and suggestions, which have considerably helped strengthen the piece.
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