Background: The Manuscript and the Wu–Yue saga

Yue gong qi shi is written on 75 slips of 41.6 cm length; each slip contains 31 to 33 characters. The text is divided into eleven sections (commonly identified as zhang 章) separated by blank spaces on the slips. The title derives from the last four characters of the text, which are not visually separated from the preceding text. The editors considered these characters as the manuscript's title because in their eyes they were not logically connected to the preceding sentence; but as the discovery of Wu wang manuscript has shown, this conclusion was premature.Footnote ² Judging from the handwriting, the manuscript was written by a single hand, probably the same that wrote several other historical anecdotes from the Tsinghua University collection.Footnote ³ The text is relatively well preserved; only the first and the last sections are considerably damaged, and the missing characters can be tentatively reconstructed thanks to parallels in transmitted texts and in Wu wang manuscript. Only in a very few cases have scholars pointed at minor inaccuracies in the slips’ arrangement by the Tsinghua editorial team (see below). Overall, the manuscript's contents are relatively clear.

The manuscript can be conveniently divided into three parts. The first three sections (slips 1–25) deal with Goujian's defeat by Wu in 494 b.c.e. and the subsequent negotiations that allowed Goujian to preserve his polity, even if in a crippled state. The second part comprises sections 4 to 9 (slips 26–59) and deals with the policies adopted by Goujian in the aftermath of his defeat. The third part (sections 10–11, slips 59–75) deals with the renewed Yue war against Wu and Wu's ultimate defeat. Of the three parts, the second has no observable parallels in transmitted texts, and will be the focus of the current study. Parts 1 and 3 will be addressed only when their information departs radically from that in the transmitted texts.

Yue gong belongs to a large cache of unprovenanced manuscripts that were allegedly looted from a Chu 楚 tomb, smuggled to Hong Kong, and acquired there by the Tsinghua University donor in 2008.Footnote ⁴ Dealing with looted materials poses a series of ethical and practical problems. Elsewhere, I have explained why, despite ethical objections of colleagues such as Paul R. Goldin, I consider working with these materials legitimate.Footnote ⁵ Yet ethics aside, serious questions can be raised about the authenticity of the illicitly obtained documents. Is it possible that some of the recently acquired manuscripts—the acquisition and authentication of which is insufficiently transparent—come from the hands of forgers?

Luckily, in the case of Yue gong, this problem can be resolved by the 2020 discovery of the Wu wang manuscript, the content of which parallels that of Yue gong. Yet even before this discovery, there were two strong indicators in favor of its authenticity. First is the existence of continuous lines cut by a knife on the verso of the slips to indicate their original position as part of the bamboo culm segment from which the manuscript was produced. Yue gong is divided into two sets of slips as indicated by those lines (a few slips, most notably those of the last section, do not have the verso lines, and may have been brought by a scribe from a different set). Since the verso lines phenomenon was noticed by paleographers only in 2011, it could not have been known to a forger back in c. 2007 (the date when the Tsinghua slips transpired in Hong Kong); hence it strongly indicates that Yue gong is not a forgery.Footnote ⁶ Second, as noted by Kim Tak 金卓 (Jin Zhuo), there is marked difference between part 2 of the text and the two other parts in their use of locative yu 于/於 particles: whereas the more “colloquial” 於 dominates parts 1 and 3 (17 於 to 7 于 in part 1, 9 於 to 1 于 in part 3), the second part is dominated by the “solemn” 于 (20 于 to 1 於). I shall address this distribution later; here suffice it to say that although I disagree with Kim's identification of the second part of Yue gong as related to original Yue records, I do accept his conclusion that this part must have originated from a different source from the other two, and this cannot be reasonably assumed to be the forger's design.Footnote ⁷ In light of this, even before the Wu wang discovery, I came to the conclusion that much like another Tsinghua University manuscript, Xinian 繫年 (String of years or Linked years), which was the focus of my previous study, Yue gong should be considered an authentic manuscript.Footnote ⁸

The story of the Wu–Yue conflict, which is the focus of Yue gong manuscript, is one of the most famous episodes in China's pre-imperial history. Its earliest version is outlined in Zuo zhuan 左傳. In 494 b.c.e., King Fuchai of Wu 吳王夫差 (r. 495–473 b.c.e.) inflicted a crushing defeat on King Goujian of Yue, thereby avenging Yue's defeat of Wu two years earlier. However, Fuchai did not heed the loyal advice of his major aide, Wu Zixu 伍子胥 (d. 484 b.c.e.), and did not extinguish Yue. Thereafter, Wu became absorbed in expansion northward, allowing Yue to recover and eventually to assault Wu from behind. After a series of attacks starting in 482 b.c.e., Yue defeated Wu in 473 b.c.e., with Goujian refusing to spare Fuchai.Footnote ⁹

The story as narrated in Zuo zhuan represents a blend of informative and interpretive history that I have identified elsewhere as the hallmark of the Zuo zhuan style.Footnote ¹⁰ It provides a lot of minute details, including dates, locations of the battles, names of military and civilian leaders, and the like. It also contains several important predictions and analytical speeches that integrate the narrative and allow the reader to glean proper historical lessons. Of particular importance are the speeches by Wu Zixu that highlight Fuchai's strategic folly and predict the resurrection of Yue's power. One prediction, attributed to Wu Zixu, is specifically noteworthy in the context of the current study. Back in 494 b.c.e., Wu Zixu allegedly said, “For ten years Yue will multiply its masses, and for ten years it will indoctrinate them,” after which it will turn Wu into “a bog” (越十年生聚，而十年教訓，二十年之外，吳其為沼乎!).Footnote ¹¹ It may be plausibly assumed that whoever put this prediction in Wu Zixu's mouth knew something about Yue's domestic policies under Goujian. Yet oddly, these policies are never discussed in Zuo zhuan, which focuses exclusively on Yue's military and diplomatic activities and does not address its ways of self-strengthening. Overall, the interpretative layer of Zuo zhuan's story—how exactly Goujian effected his unbelievable comeback from an utterly defeated leader to the new hegemon of the eastern part of the Zhou world—remains wanting. This may explain proliferation of manifold later narratives that tried to fill in the gap.

The Discourses of the States (Guo yu 國語) presents three radically different versions of the Wu–Yue conflict, each of which provides an alternative explanation of Yue's success. The “Discourses of Wu” (“Wu yu” 吳語) chapter squarely blames Fuchai for his hubris, intemperance, and silencing of the loyal remonstrator, Wu Zixu. Goujian, in contrast, is hailed precisely for his ability to heed loyal advice and delegate tasks to meritorious aides. He is furthermore credited with manifest concern for his people. His thrift, proximity to his subjects and awareness of their economic needs, skillful diplomacy, and the combination of lenient treatment of conscripts with strict military discipline—all contributed to his success. Some of these policies are outlined in greater detail in the “Discourses of Yue A” (“Yue yu shang” 越語上) chapter. Here Goujian is the real hero. Having heeded the loyal advice of Grandee Zhong 大夫種, the king mended his ways and focused on attaining the people's support. His manifest care for the people won their hearts and led Yue to an easy victory over Wu. By contrast, the “Discourses of Yue B” (“Yue yu xia” 越語下) chapter argues that the architect of Yue's victory was not Goujian but rather his sagacious minister, Fan Li 范蠡, whose military cum diplomatic acumen allowed him to restore Yue's fortunes and defeat Wu. Whereas all three versions share the common factual framework starting with Yue's defeat by Wu and ending with the elimination of Wu by Yue, their views of the reasons for Yue's success differ dramatically.

Narratives from Zuo zhuan and Discourses of the States were integrated by Sima Qian 司馬遷 (c. 145–90 b.c.e.) in the chapters “The Hereditary House of Wu Taibo” (“Wu Taibo shijia” 吳太伯世家) and “The Hereditary House of King Goujian of Yue” (“Yue wang Guojian shijia” 越王勾踐世家). The latter borrows considerably from the “Discourses of Yue B” version, which makes it one of the most literarily engaging pieces in the “Hereditary Houses” section of Sima Qian's Records of the Historian (Shi ji 史記).Footnote ¹² The literary appeal of the Wu–Yue drama inspired proliferation of other narratives, starting from short vignettes in the Warring States-period texts and ending with longer and largely fanciful accounts in the Han 漢 (206/202 b.c.e.–220 c.e.) literary works, the Springs and Autumns of Wu and Yue (Wu Yue chunqiu 吳越春秋) and the Glory of Yue (Yue jue shu 越絕書).Footnote ¹³ Interestingly, though, none of the transmitted texts seems to share the perspective of Yue gong. The latter's version of the events—focused as it is on systematic policies of self-strengthening allegedly adopted by Goujian—is not paralleled elsewhere, except for the newly discovered “sister manuscript,” Wu wang. This novel interpretation of the backdrop for Yue's victory is fascinating both in terms of its political message and in terms of the light it sheds on the art of didactic narrative in the Warring States-period China.

Fuchai Spares Yue

The first few slips of the text are among the most damaged, but parallels with other variants of the story and with Wu wang manuscript allow relatively easy reconstruction of their content. The story starts with its standard beginning: King Fuchai of Wu assaults Yue; King Goujian is defeated, retreats with eight thousand armored soldiers to Mt. Kuaiji (or Guiji) 會稽山 and dispatches Grandee Zhong to sue for peace. Zhong suggests to victorious Fuchai that Yue become a faithful servant of Wu; if the request is not granted, though, “then, my lord, please, arrange the armored soldiers of Wu, {prepare bells and drums, set} flags and banners, and personally sound the drum [to attack]. Thus you will see Goujian leading these eight thousand men to death.” (君乃陳吳甲，〖備鐘鼓，建〗【7】旆旌，王親鼓之，以觀句踐之以此八千人者死也。 【8】).Footnote ¹⁴

This beginning closely parallels Zhong's speech in the “Discourses of Yue A” narrative. Zhong was polite and submissive, but also warned that if Fuchai should persist in his desire to eliminate Yue altogether, he would face decisive battle by Yue soldiers. In most accounts of the Wu–Yue conflict, Fuchai is portrayed as ready to accept this offer, which aroused strong opposition from Wu Zixu. In Yue gong this line is followed, but the content of Fuchai's dialogue with Wu Zixu differs dramatically from other versions of the story. Once Fuchai informs Wu Zixu (who is named Shen Xu 申胥 in the manuscript)Footnote ¹⁵ of his decision to spare Yue, the latter remonstrates:

Wu Zixu's arguments are much weaker than those attributed to him in Zuo zhuan, “Discourses of Wu,” and “Discourses of Yue A” versions. There, Wu Zixu invariably reminds Fuchai that Wu and Yue cannot coexist peacefully; one of them is bound to exterminate another. In light of this, seizing the opportunity to exterminate the enemy is the only reasonable course of action. This crucial part of the argument is conspicuously absent from Wu Zixu's speech in Yue gong except for a hint that Heaven will not grant Wu another opportunity to exterminate Yue.Footnote ¹⁷ Instead Wu Zixu focuses on a minor issue, namely whether or not Grandee Zhong is bluffing when he promises tough resistance. This argument is duly countered by Fuchai:

In his counterarguments, Fuchai displays superior knowledge of both past and present. Yet whereas his depiction of the difficulties faced by the Wu armies in the Yue territory may well be accurate, the invocation of the past is flawed. When Fuchai discusses the major achievement of his father, Helu, who led the victorious Wu army to the momentous success against Chu, occupying Chu's capital in 506 b.c.e., he goes astray. If Ziju's interpretation on which I base my understanding of the text is correct, then Fuchai conflates two different Wu campaigns (of 519 and 506 b.c.e.) into one, so that his explanation of the reasons for Helu's victory is inaccurate. This inaccuracy would remain even if we accepted the editorial team's reading of the text.Footnote ¹⁹ In any case, it would be very odd for a historical Fuchai to lecture about the 506 b.c.e. campaign to Wu Zixu, who was, after all, that campaign's major architect. That the text's authors seem to be unaware of this indicates that Yue gong was composed generations after the depicted events (a point to which I shall return later). Fuchai's reply successfully quells Wu Zixu's opposition. The section ends with the statement: “Thereupon Shen Xu became scared and promised [to support Fuchai's plans]” (申胥乃【14】懼，許諾。【15上】).

This is a very surprising twist of the story. Any other version of these events invariably blames Fuchai's stubbornness and narrow-mindedness, which prevented him from heeding Wu Zixu's loyal remonstrance. In Yue gong, in contradistinction, Fuchai has the upper hand because his arguments, based on superior understanding of historical precedents and of current state of affairs, are more convincing than those of Wu Zixu. The latter becomes fearful not because he is intimidated by Fuchai (as in the “Discourses of Wu” version) but because he is convinced: an assault on Goujian may end disastrously. The reader knows well, of course, that ultimately Fuchai was wrong, but his choice of action appears to be justifiable in light of the situation on the ground. This presentation of the king's exchange with his aide effectively eliminates the trope of the benighted ruler and the wise advisor, which is the major bottom line of the Wu Zixu story from Zuo zhuan to Records of the Historian. In contrast, Yue gong restores the ruler's agency and his intellectual authority. As we shall see below, this is the consistent feature of Yue gong's markedly ruler-oriented stance.

Goujian's Self-Strengthening

I shall skip section three, which narrates the details of Fuchai's response to Goujian's plea for peace, and shall move to section four, which starts the narrative of Yue's resurrection:

The policies of relaxation, lenience, laissez faire, and peace outlined in this section resemble in the atmosphere they create—albeit not necessarily in details—those outlined in “Discourses of Yue A” section and hinted at in “Discourses of Wu.”Footnote ²⁹ Yet the Yue gong discussion is more detailed and systematic than the one preserved in the Discourses of the States. Goujian starts with restoring the ritual cum cultic centers of the state—the ancestral temple and the evil-averting shrine that allows him to “pray for the peace to the people.”Footnote ³⁰ The second set of policies focuses on judicial lenience, so that the people were “neither executed nor penalized”; as we shall see, this was designed as a temporary measure, to be abandoned later. Economic relaxation—discontinuing public works and letting the people focus on agricultural activities without distractions of warfare—comes third. After three years of relaxation, which allowed the battered populace to recover from the disastrous war, Goujian found it appropriate to initiate his “five policies,” which are the crux of the Yue gong narrative.

The Art of Self-Strengthening: The Ideological Context

Among the early versions of Goujian's struggle with Wu, the Yue gong account is the most systematic in its coverage of Yue's policies of self-strengthening. Recall that Zuo zhuan does not discuss Yue's domestic policies at all, whereas the “Discourses of Yue B” version focuses on proper timing of military action and is very cursory with regard to Goujian's domestic undertakings. The “Discourses of Wu” chapter cites Goujian's praise of his own thriftiness, lenience, care for the people and attention to their economic needs, but the text's authors are less impressed with these than with Goujian's ability to consult his grandees, to delegate them power, and to instill discipline in his armies. In the “Discourses of Yue A” chapter, there are several parallels with Yue gong (e.g., Goujian's demographic policies and, again, his ability to display humility so as to gain the people's trust), but the discussion there is sketchier.

More interesting parallels to Yue gong narrative come from the Warring States-period philosophical texts. Thus, Goujian's initial policy of relaxation, lenience, laissez faire, and maintaining peace as practiced in the first three years of recuperation from the defeat curiously resemble the course of action advocated in the “Jun zheng” 君正 chapter of the Yellow Thearch Documents (Huangdi shu 皇帝書) discovered in 1973 at Tomb 3, Mawangdui 馬王堆 (Hunan). That text advises the ruler to follow the people's customs during the first year of his rule, to use virtue (de 德, probably referring to mildness and kindness) in the second, to allow the people keep what they have obtained in the third, and only then to start disciplining the people until they become ready to be used in punitive attacks in the seventh year.Footnote ⁶⁷ The similarities (especially the three year recuperation period) are highly interesting indeed, but jumping to broader conclusions about the manuscript's relation to the so-called Huang-Lao 黃老 school would be premature.Footnote ⁶⁸ Suffice it to mention that Yue gong does not display any interest in correlation between natural phenomena and political actions, which is the hallmark of the “Huang-Lao” approach as seen from the Mawangdui texts.Footnote ⁶⁹ It is more likely that the idea of allowing the population to relax and recover before mobilizing it to war was advanced independently by different thinkers.

The “five policies” of Goujian—encouraging agriculture, ensuring trustworthiness, attracting immigrants, increasing the number of soldiers, and disciplining the populace through rewards and punishments—have the closest parallel in the Book of Lord Shang. Three of the “five policies”—turning the entire population into tillers cum soldiers and controlling it through rewards and punishments—are the hallmark of that text's approach. Attracting immigrants is less strongly pronounced in most of the book but becomes the crucial point in one of its latest (in terms of the date of composition) chapters, 15 (“Attracting the people” (“Lai min” 徠民)).Footnote ⁷⁰ Trustworthiness (in the meaning of the people's trust in the government) is specifically identified as one of the three pillars of good rule in section 14.1 of the Book of Lord Shang; but more generally it is present throughout the book insofar as fairness and transparency of laws and regulations are concerned.Footnote ⁷¹ Yet the ways to attain these goals in the Book of Lord Shang and Yue gong differ dramatically. In the former, the solution should come from meticulously designed impartial standards and laws (fa 法). The ruler's individual input is minuscule; once the new laws are adopted, he should faithfully follow these and avoid any whimsical intervention in policy making.Footnote ⁷² In Yue gong, in contrast, the ruler does not just initiate policies. It is his personal example and active intervention in and oversight of government affairs that create the desirable result.

The Yue gong insistence on the importance of the ruler's personal example strongly resembles the Mozi. In Mozi, the power of the ruler's example is absolute. A series of anecdotes scattered through the “Universal love” (or “Inclusive care,” jian'ai 兼愛) chapters show that the ruler can direct his subjects to any goal deemed desirable. It is in these chapters that we discover the aforementioned Goujian anecdote about testing the valor of his soldiers by ordering them to rescue the burning boat. Personal example aside, the Mozi's ruler also plays an important role in other respects, e.g., by being able to discover worthy aides among the lowliest subjects and elevate them to the position of supreme authority.Footnote ⁷³ Yet the latter point also exemplifies the major difference between Mozi and Yue gong. In the former, the ruler's ability to select meritorious aides is one of the crucial preconditions for his success. In Yue gong this topic is not present at all except for the idea that the official's performance should determine their position (section 7). Actually, the meritocratic idea of “elevating the worthy”—one of the cornerstones of the political thought of the Warring States period—is curiously absent from the text.Footnote ⁷⁴

The ruler-centered narrative of Yue gong distinguishes it critically from the majority of the Warring States-period political texts. Goujian is the sole creator of his success; his worthy ministers, such as Grandee Zhong and Fan Li, who are lionized elsewhere (most notably in the Discourses of the States as well as in a variety of Han texts, such as Records of the Historian, The Glory of Yue, and The Spring and Autumn Annals of Wu and Yue), are marginal actors in Yue gong. This emphasis on the ruler as an intellectual and not just political leader of the polity is even more strongly pronounced in the story of Fuchai's exchange with Wu Zixu, discussed above. Yue gong diverges from the common narrative, which contrasts the benighted ruler, Fuchai, and his loyal and prescient aide, Wu Zixu. By restoring Fuchai's prestige as a prudent, even if ultimately unsuccessful leader, the authors clearly position themselves on the ruler's side of the ruler–minister divide. This is a highly unusual stance, especially in Zhou historical and quasi-historical texts, which almost invariably laud the ministers’ acumen and lament the ruler's intellectual inadequacy.Footnote ⁷⁵ The contrast with the narrative in the “Discourses of Wu” chapter is so strong that one can consider these two narratives to be engaged in implicit controversy about the roles of ministers and rulers behind the state's success and failure.

Goujian's role in Yue gong has two somewhat contradictory aspects. On the one hand, he monitors and directs the well-developed bureaucratic apparatus that includes central government (courtiers, the ruler's entourage) and local administration (cities and border counties).Footnote ⁷⁶ In particular, Goujian's ability to mobilize this apparatus by subjecting promotion and demotion to objective criteria (e.g., population figures) is remarkable inasmuch as it anticipates one of the major means employed by China's leaders well into present in their quest to mobilize the bureaucracy for a variety of difficult goals—from eliminating tax arrears under the Ming to promoting childbirth control, enhancing environmental protection, or, most recently, attaining poverty eradication in our days.Footnote ⁷⁷ On the other hand, Goujian more frequently than not acts as a Big Man, personally attending to countless affairs, giving personal example to his subjects (e.g., by tilling), and personally feasting them. Even his personal supervision of bureaucracy, all the way down to market overseers, would be unfeasible in a large polity.Footnote ⁷⁸ Such a behavior is more appropriate to a chieftain, or possibly a city-state leader, but surely not to the ruler of a larger political unit that has two tiers of local administration. This curious mixture of entirely different government modes is observable in several chapters of the Canon of Documents, most notably the “Canon of Yao” (“Yao dian” 堯典) and “The Counsels of Gao Yao” (“Gao Yao mo” 皋陶謨). Yet in those cases, as well as (more equivocally) in “Lü's Punishments”(“Lü xing” 呂刑), the coexistence of the charismatic and bureaucratic modes of rule may reflect the composite nature of those texts.Footnote ⁷⁹ In Yue gong, in contrast, both modes appear in the same passages and are clearly promulgated by a single narrator, which is not attested to in other early texts of which am aware.

The above brief summary suffices to demonstrate the exceptionality of Yue gong in the general landscape of pre-imperial political thought. The text stands in between different intellectual currents. It bears some similarities with Mawangdui Yellow Thearch Documents, with the Book of Lord Shang, with Mozi, and with the “Discourses of Yue A” narrative, but it also differs markedly from each of these texts. It remains free of moralizing discourse, never employing such terms as de 德 (“virtue”), ren 仁 (“benevolence”), or yi 義 (“righteousness, dutifulness”). It downplays the role of the ministers as independent political actors, is indifferent to the topic of searching for the worthy aides, and shifts the emphasis to the ruler, albeit without excessively glorifying the sovereign. The richness of this text highlights the complexity of intellectual dynamics the Warring States period. It demonstrates—to those who still need this demonstration—the inadequacy of the “schools” yardstick in dealing with the ideological texts of that age. The political discourse of the Warring States period evolved through constant mutual enrichment, borrowing, and synthesis of different ideas and the vast majority of contemporaneous texts—unearthed and transmitted alike—cannot be squarely identified with a single “school of thought.”

We should be reminded here that Yue gong is not a regular Masters (zi 子) text. It does not present its recommendations straightforwardly, is not engaged in open polemics, and avoids theoretic elaborations to justify the policies adopted by Goujian. Rather than attributing their ideas to a Master or a worthy aide, the authors present these ideas more subtly by embedding them in the historical narrative. It is time now to turn to the art of didactic narrative that is exemplified in Yue gong and analyze its role in ideological debates in pre-imperial China.

The Art of Didactic Narrative

The publication of Yue gong attracted considerable interest from historians, some of whom opined that the manuscript may provide a more reliable interpretation of Yue history than those in the transmitted texts. Even those—like Li Shoukui—who correctly identified Yue gong as a polemical text disguised as a historical narrative still consider it a more reliable source for Yue history than alternative stories.Footnote ⁸⁰ I beg to disagree. First, the anachronisms in Yue gong are inconsistent with a text that derives from original Yue historical records (if such records existed at all). Second, the very genre of didactic narrative, of which Yue gong is representative, is predicated on promoting a particular political vision rather than on presenting reliable details of historical events. In my eyes, neither Yue gong nor the three chapters of the Discourses of the States were much concerned with historical exactitude.

Above I have demonstrated already several historical inaccuracies which undermine the assertion that Yue gong was based on original Yue (or Wu) records. Recall Fuchai's speech confusing two different Wu campaigns against Chu launched by Fuchai's father. Recall the contradictory depiction of Yue as being simultaneously a well-developed bureaucratic entity and a Big Man polity. Recall the odd identification of Yue's habit of tattooing the body with physical punishments. Or consider the implausibly speedy results of Goujian's “five policies.” The text does not discuss the chronological ramifications of these policies, but since they were allegedly adopted one after another following the three years of initial relaxation and ending before the elimination of Wu in 473 b.c.e., they could not have spanned more than seventeen years in total. Each of the policies then could not have lasted more than a few years. That such long-term steps as developing fallow lands or attracting immigrants could yield immediate and unambiguous results is surely not plausible. Perhaps this lack of plausibility was tacitly understood by the manuscripts’ authors, who dispensed with chronology altogether in their discussion of the “five policies.”

This observation causes me to dismiss Kim Tak's assertion that linguistic peculiarities of sections 4–9 of Yue gong, most notably the usage of solemn 于 rather than “colloquial” 於 particle, indicate the earliness of this segment and its relation to Yue's archives.Footnote ⁸¹ Whereas there is no doubt that this segment of the manuscript comes from a different source than the opening and the final sections, this source should not necessarily be identified as a Yue historical text. Recall that the replacement of solemn 于 with the more colloquial 於 particle had occurred already in the second half of the Springs-and-Autumns period, that is, long before Goujian's age.Footnote ⁸² The overwhelming usage of 于 in the discussion of the “five policies” more likely reflects not a resort to original Yue sources but rather an attempt to archaize or solemnify the language (although admittedly I have not found other examples of archaism in that segment of the text).

That sections 4–9 cannot derive from the original Yue historical records is clear from the very nature of their narrative, devoid as it is of any details such as chronology, names of places or persons, and the like. Aside from mentioning the statelet of Gumie as Yue's southern neighbor and invoking once the names of Yue's two most famous ministers—Fan Li and Grandee Zhong—the “five policies” section is devoid of any identifiable Yue features. This suffices to caution us against speculating that the section derives from Yue's original records. Besides, whether or not Yue maintained detailed historical records on a par with other major contemporaneous polities is a thorny question that requires further exploration.

There are several reasons to doubt the existence of Yue historical records. Recall, first, that Yue were an outsider of the Zhou cultural sphere. Their polysyllabic language differed considerably from that of the Central States, creating a perennial problem of transmitting native historical information to the Zhou audience. There is much confusion in our sources about even such an essential information as appellations of Yue kings; actually, Yue artisans themselves were not sure how to transcribe into Chinese characters the name of King Goujian.Footnote ⁸³ Whereas during Goujian's reign and in its aftermath, the Yue elites clearly began adapting themselves to the Zhou ritual culture—and is observable in particular in a few of the fifth century b.c.e. inscriptions—the linguistic gap was probably formidable enough to hinder adequate documentation or even extensive recording of native oral traditions into literary Chinese.Footnote ⁸⁴

The second point that should be considered in discussions of Yue historiography is that no reliable records of Yue history existed by the time of Sima Qian. “The Hereditary House of King Goujian of Yue” chapter in the Records of the Historian is the weakest in the entire “Hereditary Houses” section in terms of its historical information. This is true not only with regard to early Yue history of which neither Sima Qian nor the authors of Han compilations such as The Glory of Yue had any reliable knowledge, but also with regard to Goujian's section, the literary qualities of which clearly outweigh its historical exactitude.Footnote ⁸⁵ What is more surprising is Sima Qian's confusion about the Yue history after Goujian, the so-called “Shandong period,” when Yue, acting from its new capital of Langye 琅琊 (or Langya) in southern Shandong, became one of the four leading powers of Chinese world.Footnote ⁸⁶ It is only thanks to the Bamboo Annals (Zhushu jinian 竹書紀年), abundantly cited in Sima Zhen's 司馬貞 (679–732) Suoyin 索引 glosses on Records of the Historian, and, more later, thanks to the discovery of Xinian that many details of Yue's post-Goujian's history became clearer.Footnote ⁸⁷ That such an important period was not known either to Sima Qian or to the authors of other Yue-related compilations from the Han dynasty, suggests that either Yue did not maintain systematic accounts of its history at all, or that these accounts were lost soon after this polity's decline in the early fourth century b.c.e.

Putting aside the thorny question of Yue's original records, the dearth of reliable historical information in Yue gong is not surprising. Rather, like the Wu–Yue chapters of the Discourses of the States, this text was devoted not to narrating “who, when, where, and what,” but rather to answering the single question of “why.” What matters to the authors of all these stories of the Wu–Yue conflict is not necessarily how the events unfolded but rather the proper historical lessons that could be gleaned from them. They belong to a broad array of historical and quasi-historical works that dealt with success and failure of the former rulers—arguably the major focus of interest of Warring States period readers.Footnote ⁸⁸ In the age of intense ideological struggles, these works stood at the nexus of history and philosophy and should be understood in this context rather than treated as purely historical texts.

The major medium for disseminating edifying historical knowledge in the Warring States period was the didactic anecdote—a short vignette usually centered on a moralizing speech by a prescient advisor or a later wise observer. These anecdotes, whose features have been analyzed in an excellent study by David Schaberg, have attracted considerable scholarly interest.Footnote ⁸⁹ My own work on Yue gong has led me to infer that it belongs to a different genre of edifying historical texts, which I dub didactic narratives. These narratives differ from didactic anecdotes both in their length and their means of conveying the message. I believe that didactic narratives were particularly fitting for analyzing long-term factors influencing the outcomes of political struggles and also for putting forward relatively controversial ideas.

The major difference between didactic narratives and anecdotes is the role of speeches. In the latter, the speech is the heart of the didactic message. It permits the most straightforward presentation of the authors’ views, in a manner reminiscent of the Masters’ texts. In didactic narratives, such as Yue gong, speeches play an auxiliary role in the development of the narrative, whereas messages are conveyed more subtly. It is the tendentious depiction of the outcomes that leads the reader to identify a certain course of action as either beneficial or disastrous. The discussion preserves an aura of objectivity associated with larger historical works, such as the local histories of competing states, which served the primary source materials of Zuo zhuan.Footnote ⁹⁰ Yet unlike the latter, didactic narratives were less concerned with the details of the narrated events, dispensing with information that did not fit the edifying design.

Didactic narratives were a particularly convenient means of promoting controversial ideas that could not be readily addressed in a moralizing speech. Take, for instance, the Rong Cheng shi 容成氏 text from the Shanghai Museum collection of bamboo manuscripts. The text deals with the sensitive issue of abdication as the ideal means of transferring power. Without openly promulgating this ideal, the authors skillfully weave it into their depiction of an idyllic situation in the times of paragon rulers who practiced abdication, which is contrasted with woeful outcomes of power transfer once the dynastic principle was adopted.Footnote ⁹¹ Or take, for instance, the issue of radical reforms. Rather than openly advocating such reforms, the authors of the “Discourses of Qi” 齊語 chapter of the Discourses of the States attribute these to the model Qi minister, Guan Zhong 管仲 (d. 645 b.c.e.). The narrative is built so as to convince the reader that these reforms were the major reason for the success of Guan Zhong's patron, Lord Huan of Qi 齊桓公 (r. 685–643 b.c.e.), the first and the most illustrious of the hegemons (ba 霸) of the Springs-and-Autumns period. This is precisely the technique adopted by the Yue gong authors in their story of Goujian's success.

In my eyes, the three Wu–Yue chapters of the Discourses of the States, as well as Yue gong (and, insofar as we can judge from the preliminary publication, its sister manuscript, Wu wang), all exemplify the art of the didactic narrative. A comparison of the four narratives may shed light on the evolution of this genre. Of the four, the “Discourses of Wu” story is probably the earliest, insofar as parts of it appear on the badly damaged (and still not fully published) slips from the early Warring States-period Tomb 36 at Shibancun 石板村, Cili 慈利 County (Hunan).Footnote ⁹² It is also the closest to informative history. Aside from the basic factual setting, this narrative provides many other details. It mentions historically verifiable events, such as Wu's victory over Qi in 484 b.c.e. and the Huangchi 黃池 interstate assembly of 482 b.c.e. It provides rudimentary chronology and mentions a variety of personal names, most of which undoubtedly come from scribal records. And yet, this is clearly not an informative history as such. Its goal is to show that Fuchai lost his state and his life because of the king's excessive self-confidence and dismissal of Wu Zixu's loyal remonstrance, whereas Goujian won precisely because he was able to heed his aides and even foreign advisors, such as Shen Baoxu 申包胥 from Chu. To strengthen this message, the text at times departs from historical accuracy, adds imagined speeches and narrative details, and tolerates minor anachronisms.Footnote ⁹³ Its depiction of events should not be dismissed outright, but must be read cum grano salis.

It would not be too far-fetched to hypothesize that both the “Discourse of Yue A” and Yue gong were designed as a counter-narrative to the “Discourses of Wu.” Both texts share not just common textual segments (especially in the depiction of the final campaign of Yue against Wu), but, most notably, the common ruler-oriented perspective. In both cases it was Goujian who had navigated his country toward resurrection and the ultimate victory over Wu, and in both cases his populist policies aimed at attaining the subjects’ affection occupy pride of place. The two versions differ in certain aspects, e.g., the precise content of Goujian's policies. They diverge, even if subtly, also on the topic ruler-minister relations. Thus, the “Discourse of Yue A” starts with Goujian's intercourse with Grandee Zhong, which reaffirms the minister's primary importance for the state, a topos that is notably absent from Yue gong. Nonetheless, the similarities are substantial enough to permit the guess that both texts derived from the same group of thinkers. Speaking of their historical reliability, it is notable that both preserve incomparably fewer details than the “Discourses of Wu” chapter. Even the chronology is reduced to the absolute minimum: we are informed only about the length of the policy of recovery (three years in Yue gong, ten years in the “Discourses of Yue A”), but no other chronological details are provided. I do not have an unequivocal indicator of these texts’ dates of composition, but both appear to me to be more removed in time from the depicted events than the “Discourses of Wu.”

The fourth narrative, the “Discourses of Yue B,” fully restores the pro-ministerial focus. As mentioned above, Yue's success there is squarely attributed to Fan Li, with Grandee Zhong acting as the second in command, whereas Goujian is reduced through most of the narrative to Fan Li's obedient disciple. Once again, dating this text is not easy, but my guess is that it is the latest in terms of the dates of its composition. The story does provide rudimentary chronology, but this chronology is patently wrong, as the text reduces the period of Yue's resurrection from twenty to ten years. Yet more broadly, the narrative does not seem to be much concerned with historical reliability. Suffice it to mention the narration of Yue's major campaign against Wu, in which Yue forces simply motionlessly preserve their ground for three years and cause Wu's armies to melt down. I doubt that this fanciful story was ever intended to convince the audience of its factual accuracy.

This comparison, sketchy and speculative as it is, may indicate a trend in the didactic narratives’ evolution. Initially, these narratives derived from local histories, which combined informative and didactic aspects. As time passed and memories of the depicted events faded, informative details mattered less, whereas didactic messages became more strongly pronounced. By inventing outright fallacious details—such as depicting non-existent reforms, lionizing minor personalities such as Fan Li,Footnote ⁹⁴ or altering the story of military campaigns—the authors strengthened their ideological message, paying less attention to historical reliability. The increasingly manipulative nature of these historical accounts was duly noted by not a few Warring States-period thinkers who overtly ridiculed it (Zhuangzi 莊子 and Han Feizi come immediately to one's mind),Footnote ⁹⁵ but in the absence of authoritative version of the past, fake histories proliferated as freely as fake news proliferates today.

This proliferation of the art of didactic narrative, just like the proliferation of didactic anecdotes, marks what I have identified elsewhere as the turn away from informative histories in the Warring States period. That age which prized ideologically powerful argument over historical veracity was conducive to the dissemination of imagined accounts of the past or habitual modification of existing accounts so as to suit the authors’ ideological requirements.Footnote ⁹⁶ The Wu–Yue story, with its twists and turns, was an ideal playground for competing thinkers with different explanations of the states’ success and failure. It may even be hypothesized that the absence of detailed historical records from both states was a boon for the authors of didactic narratives. Without the need to bother themselves with anything except the basic factual framework, being unburdened by “unnecessary details,”Footnote ⁹⁷ competing thinkers were free to improvise. The result, even if historically unreliable, is fascinating for the light it sheds on ideological debates during the formative age of China's political tradition.