Foreign policy and diplomacy

Unlike the foreign policy of nation-states, the Church's foreign policy speaks broadly, dialectically, and promotes a shared global responsibility. While the Church is not immune to the notion of self-interestFootnote ⁷ that mainly guides nation-states, it nonetheless publicly leads, prioritizes, and consistently promotes this idea of an integral ecology. Because of its religious character, furthermore, its mission and goals are inextricably tied to a spiritual salvation that transcends the temporal world.Footnote ⁸ In doing so, it ensures the presence of a moral voice within and on behalf of the international community.

Even though it is not formally stated as a foreign policy, it should be of no surprise that the Church has one.Footnote ⁹ Grounded in a long tradition of Catholic Social Teaching, it was with the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II: 1962–1965), that the Church further entrenched its diplomatic position by adopting language for broader engagement with the international community. As a result of these Vatican II proceedings, the Church more consciously linked its messages of faith with a call to political leaders to consider people and their world more holistically. The Church found itself speaking more forcefully and broadly about human rights—that is, human rights that were socially, politically, and economically oriented.

These rights, bound together by the respect for human dignity is what provided the Church with the basis to be more politically vocal during the third wave of democratization and is what brings it into the current international conversations on the environment and climate change. The Church was able to do this because, enduring far longer than any other institution, its doctrinal and institutional resources have made it a long-standing influential player in international relations (Byrnes Reference Byrnes2017). Although not a nation-state (in fact, it operates out of the Vatican City State—the smallest country in the world), it has had a disproportionate effect on the international community. Furthermore, it is the Holy See, the governing body of the Church which, unlike any other religious organization, has international legal recognition and diplomatic missions in nearly every country of the world (Troy Reference Troy2008, 67).

More recently, some scholars have examined Pope Francis' role in the Church's foreign policy (see Lyon Reference Lyon2018; McCormick Reference McCormick2021). They identified his promotion of the Church's “political theology of the people,” which included shifting the Church's gaze from the Global North to the Global South and urging the international community to be more people-oriented (McCormick Reference McCormick2021, 165). Crespo and Gregory present Pope Francis' foreign policy as being ideologically grounded by what they refer to as a “Doctrine of Mercy,” which influences how he approaches global issues such as the environment (Crespo and Gregory Reference Crespo and Gregory2020, 117). They note, “this ideology is what motivates his use of soft power to influence the action, behaviors, and beliefs, of individuals,” particularly that of political leaders (Ibid., 121–22). An examination of the Church's participation at COP26 will demonstrate the Church's practice of this political theology at the global level.

Constructivism and the Catholic Church as norm entrepreneur

In an effort to incorporate religion into theories of international relations, some scholars found constructivism to be the most amenable (e.g., Hasenclever and Rittberger Reference Hasenclever and Rittberger2000; Snyder Reference Snyder2011; Haynes Reference Haynes2013). This was because constructivism recognized how identity, ideational factors, norms, and culture can have a significant impact on global politics (e.g. Adler Reference Adler1997; Finnemore and Sikkink Reference Finnemore and Sikkink2001; Snyder Reference Snyder2011; Maoz and Henderson Reference Maoz and Henderson2020). Jack Snyder noted that while Alexander Wendt's canonical text on constructivism (Reference Wendt1999) did not once mention religion, its categories provided a way for religion to be considered in international politics (Snyder Reference Snyder2011, 14). In effect, “[m]any constructivist studies have emphasized the ways in which ideas and norms run counter to or undermine conventional conceptions of strong state interests. Human rights norms, the preference of the weak, has been shown to triumph over strong actors and strong states; environmental norms prevail over powerful corporate business preferences” (Finnemore and Sikkink Reference Finnemore and Sikkink2001, 398). This paper examines how the Church as a norm entrepreneur, utilizing the preferential option for the poor, has challenged states to think more carefully about the environment.

Finnemore and Sikkink also have noted

To address this concern, political philosopher Jurgen Habermas' concept of institutional translation helps explain how the Church, as a norm entrepreneur, attempts to socialize states to follow the norm of a global human ecology. Institutional translation also serves as a mechanism by which the Church can participate in other political discussions of international importance (i.e., conflict, migration). Framing this normative process alongside Habermas' work will help further highlight the Church's role in international discussions on the environment and climate change, and addresses a point not covered in Crespo and Gregory's work on the foreign policy of Pope Francis.Footnote ¹⁰

While Finnemore and Sikkink emphasized the significance of norms and the normative process, they did not specifically identify any religious organizations in their works. When considering constructivism's norm life cycle (norm emergence, acceptance/cascade, and internalization), however, the Church fits within this framework. Furthermore, the Church's sensitivity to the “signs of the times”Footnote ¹¹ and its ability to draw from its own doctrinal resources facilitates its recognition as a norm entrepreneur. The Church's practice of subsidiarity (to be explained later) allows for its effortless integration into the norm acceptance/cascade and internalization phases. Whether leading or complementing the work of state and other non-state actors, the Church is an integral part of this normative process. Finally, when considering the concept of norm entrepreneurs, it becomes more evident that Habermas' approach fits with constructivism since, “Norm entrepreneurs must speak to aspects of belief systems or lifeworlds that transcend a specific cultural or political context” (Finnemore and Sikkink Reference Finnemore and Sikkink1998, 907).

The Church's ability to draw from belief systems or such lifeworlds that go beyond specific cultural and political context has occurred before; it has had a long history of attempting to promote various norms. In the case of the third wave of democratization movements of the 1990s, one can see how the Church was able to help effect a norm tipping point and norm cascade. At that time, the Church positioned itself to more forcefully speak against human rights violations committed by non-democratic societies. The last major discussion of and support of such values occurred during Vatican II, which was convened by Pope John XXIII to discuss the Church's relationship to the modern world. Thus, the promotion of such values during the third wave was not new as they had long been a part of the Church's social teachings. Yet, it was during the third wave that scholars such as Samuel Huntington recognized the Church as one of the five variables that helped usher the collapse of communism throughout Central and Eastern Europe (Huntington Reference Huntington2011). It was perhaps even more symbolic that during that time, the Church was helmed by Pope John Paul II, the first Polish pope who had personal experience with both fascism and communism.

Similarly, Pope Francis' personal experiences would play a role in his papacy. His first single authoredFootnote ¹² papal encyclical, Laudato Si’, set the tone and agenda for the Church's relationship to and role in the international community. Issued on May 24, 2015, Laudato Si’, meaning “praise to you,” was taken from the work of Pope Francis' namesake, St. Francis of Assisi, who also is the patron saint of ecology. Laudato Si’ was recognized because it recast the mainly scientific discussion of the environment and climate change with a moral narrative, and was aimed at universal reach (believers and non-believers). It also did not go unnoticed that the release of the encyclical dovetailed with the release of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Climate Change Conference (Lyon Reference Lyon2018, 130). The effect of different actors, motives, and mechanisms of influence that Finnemore and Sikkink discuss, therefore, is evident.

While the norm of highlighting the relationship between climate change and its harmful effects on society is not new, the moral framework the Church uses for analyzing these effects seems to have been largely ignored. However, the symbolism surrounding the election Pope Francis has brought greater attention to the broader issues affected by climate change. In her piece titled, “The Emergence and Cascading of Pope Francis’ Norm of Social Justice” Marianne Rozario discussed how Catholic Social Teaching has contributed to the development of global norms. Using constructivism as her framework as well, Rozario explained how Pope Francis could be identified as a norm entrepreneur or norm enabler because of the manner in which he is promoting social justice.Footnote ¹³ Rather than identify a single representative of the Church, I argue it is the institutional Church, with its practice of a foreign policy grounded on the key themes of Catholic Social Teaching, which allows us to conceptually identify it as a norm entrepreneur. Reframing the Church as a norm entrepreneur rather than just a civil society actor helps scholars to more rigorously incorporate the Church into studies of political development, change, and global agenda setting.

Institutional translation: theory and practice

With the existence of many thought traditions, both religious and non-religious, Habermas believed a political discussion regarding the public good could not be devoid of values springing from religious and secular thought. Furthermore, he recognized the significant role religion plays in a person's world view. In a 2004 debate titled “Pre-political moral foundations of the liberal state,” between Habermas and then Cardinal Josef Ratzinger (later, Pope Benedict XVI), the two found common ground in their views regarding religion and public life.

Habermas respected the work of religious communities claiming that they have “preserved intact something which has elsewhere been lost” while Ratzinger granted a central role to the “divine light of reason” in controlling the “pathologies of religion” (Skidelsky Reference Skidelsky2005). In his 2006 titled, “Religion in Public Life,” Habermas recognized that “A devout person pursues her daily rounds by drawing on belief. Put differently, true belief is not only a doctrine, believed content, but a source of energy that the person who has a faith taps performatively and thus nurtures his or her entire life” (Habermas Reference Habermas2006, 8). Habermas' approach, therefore, parallels the Church's view of an integral ecology and underscores the significance of religion's presence in political life. Religion, he maintains, is a “key [resource] for the creation of meaning and identity” and in public dialogue, it is possible that secular individuals and groups will recognize their ideas and values overlap with those of the religious group. That is, they may “recognize in the normative truth content of a religious utterance hidden intuitions of their own” (Habermas Reference Habermas2006, 10). Separating religion into distinct spheres of public and private, therefore, would be unreasonable and unjust (Calhoun Reference Calhoun2008, 16).

To bridge this conceptual and practical divide, Habermas uses the “institutional translation proviso,” which is a cooperative process of translation that occurs between the religious and non-religious groups. He states:

Although Habermas is referring to a liberal state, which is not reflective of the entire international community, his point regarding the risk of ignoring alternative resources of meaning and identity is valid. This is because:

Habermas' institutional translation places a responsibility on secular state actors as well. As noted by Craig Calhoun, non-religious actors must translate religious arguments into ways that make sense to them. “In this way, [nonreligious actors] will help to make ideas, norms, and insights to deriving from religious sources accessible to all, and to the more rigorously secular internal discursive processes of the state itself” (Calhoun Reference Calhoun2008, 16).

Habermas' allowance of religious language in the public sphere in order to enrichen public life complements the aims articulated during Vatican II. The 16 documents drafted during the Council commented on the value of human dignity, the relationship between reason and responsibility, the role of the Church in a modern, plural society, the significance of dialogue, and the duty of civility. It was in its Pastoral Constitution for the Modern World (Gaudium et spes) that the Church encouraged “all men, believers and unbelievers alike, ought to work for the rightful betterment of this world in which all alike live. Such an ideal cannot be realized, however, apart from sincere and prudent dialogue” (Gaudium et spes, 219). Articles 75 (“Political Participation”) and 76 (“Politics and the Church”) of Gaudium et spes further went on to instruct readers to recognize and respect difference.

Both Habermas and the Church, therefore, recognize that dialogue and engagement, rather than a separation between religion and secular, are needed in today's world. In Dignitatis Humanae, the Council upheld the right to religious freedom because it is founded, “not in the subjective disposition of the person, but in his very nature. In consequence, the right to this immunity continues to exist even in those who do not live up to their obligation of seeking the truth and adhering to it” (emphasis added, Second Vatican Council 1965a). The recognition that all have the right to be free from state coercion regarding religious beliefs is evidence of the Church doing its part to make an institutional translation possible. Furthermore, the statement reflects the Church's recognition of human dignity in Catholics and non-Catholics. While expressing this openness, the Church also instructs its own adherents: “[The] doctrine of religious freedom has roots in divine revelation, and for this reason Christians are bound to respect it all the more conscientiously” (Second Vatican Council 1965a). As will be shown, the Church has translated its concerns into reasonably accessible language resulting in a strong overlap between its values and those of the international community.

Yet, institutional translation may not work for all institutions. Sociologist Kristina Stoeckl has previously written on norm entrepreneurship, Habermas, and the Russian Orthodox Church (Stoeckl Reference Stoeckl2016). In her examination of the Russian Orthodox Church, she found that it acted as a “moral conservative norm promoter” in its promotion of “traditional values” in the arena of human rights.Footnote ¹⁴ While the Russian Orthodox used conservative traditional values as the basis for its relationship with the global community (i.e., international organizations, state actors, and non-governmental organizations), there were limits to its ability to affect a norm cascade. It was their promotion of specific values that placed this particular institution at odds with other global actors. The Russian Orthodox Church failed to gain international support because its particularist normative agenda was at odds with the universalism of the international community (in this case, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights supported by the United Nations Human Rights Council). While Stoeckl persuasively argues that religious institutions can contribute to public discussions of the common good and thereby serve as moral norm entrepreneurs, she concludes that there are limits to which types of institutions can use Habermas' conceptual framework (Stoeckl Reference Stoeckl2016, Reference Stoeckl2017).

To the contrary, George Tyler argued that institutional translation did not push secular actors far enough and proposed instead “the reciprocal translation proviso” (RTP) (Tyler Reference Tyler2018). This approach would have secular officials, i.e., those responsible for creating policy, “translate their public reasons into non-public reason.” In effect, barriers to participation and the asymmetric burden usually placed on the religious groups would be reduced. “Thus, religious citizens should be willing to translate their reasons into public reasons with the knowledge that their secular fellows will simultaneously undertake a similar task” (Tyler Reference Tyler2018, 734–35). Thus, paired with the Church's diplomatic efforts on the international stage, Tyler's recommendation would make the Church's political theology and Habermasian institutional translation a practical possibility.Footnote ¹⁵

In a similar vein, Gregorio Bettiza and Filippo Dionigi argued that scholarship on norms and constructivism has focused heavily on Western actors leading them to focus on ways in which norm diffusion can occur from non-Western norm-makers to Western norm-takers (Bettiza and Dionigi Reference Bettiza and Dionigi2015). Unlike Stoeckl, however, they argue that Habermas' concept of institutional translation can be useful in demonstrating how this norm diffusion can occur. They treat the concept both as a normative requirement and an analytical causal mechanism (Bettiza and Dionigi Reference Bettiza and Dionigi2015, 3). In doing so,

While Bettiza and Dionigi's work focuses mainly on the effect of non-Western norm makers (i.e., the Organization of Islamic Conference), their explanation for why institutional translation is the mechanism by which religion can bring together actors with differing interests is important.

Subsidiarity as a function of institutional translation

As noted earlier, norm entrepreneurs focus on offering new cognitive frames in order to promote innovative ways of approaching and understanding an issue. What then, is the new cognitive frame offered by the Church and how does it propagate this new frame? Guided by the “signs of the times” and subsidiarity, the Church's position on issues takes into account changing social circumstances and recognizes the freedom and responsibility accorded to individuals and groups to handle such circumstances. Thus, to overcome the geographical and analytical divide between the Holy See and the national Catholic Churches worldwide, the Church's principle of subsidiarity mediates the dialogical dynamics referred to by Bettiza and Dionigi. Subsidiarity attempts to achieve this on two levels: between the national Churches and the Holy See (which represents the universal church) and between the Holy See and the international community.

Subsidiarity recognizes decision making involves all of society and the consequences of those decisions are interrelated. So as international conferences and organizations bring together political leaders, environmental experts, and specialized civil society groups, the Church's use of subsidiarity does not “absolve individuals, families, and local associations of their responsibilities for decisions they can make and actions they can take to mitigate the effects of human-forced changes in the global climate” (Schaefer Reference Schaefer2011, 412–18). According to Finnemore and Sikkink, norms promoted by global norm entrepreneurs are then filtered by the domestic levels (Finnemore and Sikkink Reference Finnemore and Sikkink1998, 893).

Laudato Si’: a foreign policy statement

Over the course of its long institutional life, the Church's effect on politics has evolved from direct influence to recognizing that its moral essence and obligations limit its political role, particularly in the realm of policy making. This limited political role has not hindered the Church in speaking in favor of moral values associated with social, political, and economic issues.

While Laudato Si’ is regarded as the Church's most significant contribution to the discussion on climate change, it has not been its first and certainly will not be its last. Similar to Pope Francis, prior popes have built on the ecological teachings of St. Francis of Assisi (1225). Major works include Pope Paul VI's Octogesima Adveniens (1971), Pope John Paul II's Redemptor Hominis (1979), Centesimus Annus (1991), Evangelium Vitae (1995), “Common Declaration on Environmental Ethics [with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I],” and Pope Benedict XVI's Caritas In Veritate (2009). In his encyclical Centesimus Annus, Pope John Paull II wrote:

This holistic attitude and commitment translates easily into other normative structures and policy concerns.

Where Laudato Si’ differs from prior statements, however, is that it directly engages with science and assesses the effects of today's political and economic culture on the environment. Yet, Pope Francis' humanistic approach to understanding and tackling climate change has been dismissed or even met with contempt. In his work The Age of the Crisis of Man (2015), cultural critic Mark Grief stated: “Anytime your inquiries lead you to say, ‘At this moment we must ask and decide who we fundamentally are …’ just stop. You have begun asking the wrong analytic questions for your moment …. Answer, rather, the practical matters … and find the immediate actions necessary to achieve an aim” (quoted in McKibben Reference McKibben2015). Such a sentiment would indicate that the Church's approach is perhaps too abstract to have any practical value or widespread appeal. A similar critique was echoed by 2015 presidential hopeful Jeb Bush who stated this in response to the release of Laudato Si’:

Grief and Bush's views clearly miss the significance of taking the vantage point of a human/integral ecology, which results in religion being pushed back into the private sphere and thereby limiting the contributions Habermas recognized to be integral to political life.

The lead line of Laudato Si’ set the tone of the encyclical by pointing out how the environment is just one part that affects human ecology. Thus, Pope Francis' goal with Laudato Si’ was to

Taking an interdisciplinary approach, Pope Francis outlined the broader problems of which climate change is only a part. He pointed out how today's culture has mainly served to reinforce the irresponsible manner in which individuals treat each other, how states treat their citizens, and how the international community has become less and less communal. Rather than globalization ushering in a multicultural community, we are faced instead with a “globalization of indifference,” “excessive anthropocentrism,” and a “culture of relativism” (Pope Francis 2015).

Pope Francis further points out the lack of political will and the near-sighted politics that hinders us from recognizing intergenerational solidarity, which must be considered as “a basic question of justice, since the world we have received also belongs to those who follow us” (Pope Francis 2015). Rather than focus only on politics and policymaking, he promotes instead environmental education aimed at creating an “ecological citizenship,” which leads to the cultivation of specific values that contribute to long-lasting rather than short-term political, social, and economic gains. Such language is exactly what Finnemore and Sikkink identify with norm entrepreneurs.

Alynna Lyon's work, on the other hand, focuses specifically on the symbolic moral role of Pope Francis, referring to him as an example of an “unusual case of moral authority” because he “framed the global climate change debate in a new way – creating a moral narrative surrounding environmental neglect and the need for human stewardship” (Lyon Reference Lyon2018, 120). In political science terms, she argues, Pope Francis would qualify as a “global policy entrepreneur” because of his ability to bring to the fore new ways of thinking about climate change, advocate for certain actions, and interact with relevant stakeholders and political leaders to move forward a policy that is not limited to self-interest (Lyon Reference Lyon2018, 122–23). Lyon uses this concept of global policy entrepreneur to underscore the significance of Francis' contributions to conversations surrounding climate change policy. This, however, is incomplete; Francis' papacy is an aspect of his institution and so the Church is better conceived as a norm entrepreneur rather than a policy one. From the ontological basis in eternal law to the ethics of the institution put into practice, a foreign policy emerges that places care for human beings and their world at the center of the Church's mission. The pope may be an agent, but this agency issues from firm institutional directives to eschew mere anthropocentrism in favor of a holistic concern for a harmonious and just ecologism, understood expansively.

Yet, a significant distinction should be reiterated. While Pope Francis' contributions in the realm of climate change policy are visionary, framing his role as a policy entrepreneur leaves room for a possible overstatement of the Church's effects and intentions on formal policy making. When postulating that Francis was influential in policy making, Lyon notes that she draws mostly from anecdotal evidence (Lyon Reference Lyon2018, 134). When examining the relationship between religion and politics, we should be cautious about what we attribute to whom—sometimes it is appropriate to draw finer lines and subtler distinctions. Conceptualized as a norm rather than policy entrepreneur more appropriately captures the Church's efforts to alter the culture and perceptions on climate change rather than advocating for a specific global policy. The latter of which, it is hardly in a position to formally execute. In the capacity of normative entrepreneurship, however, the Church can symbolically lead, inspiring states to communicate about issues of poverty and climate through the medium of this normative language. Thus, Lyon correctly points out that “the issue is not about reduction of hard commerce, shipping channels, and animal habitats, but instead about the reduction of great human suffering” (Lyon Reference Lyon2018, 136). She merely focused too closely on the agent, somewhat negating the supportive structure.

As a norm entrepreneur, there is evidence to suggest that the Church's framing of climate change is having some effect at both the global and domestic levels. In two separate studies of U.S. public opinion, scholars found a positive relationship between the Pope's global presence, his encyclical Laudato Si’, and respondents' views on the environment. Respondents reported they were more likely to view the environment as a moral issue and felt an increase in public engagement and personal responsibility (Maibach et al. Reference Maibach2015; Schuldt et al. Reference Schuldt, Pearson, Romero-Canyas and Larson-Konar2017). Maibach et al. outlined the various actions taken by the Church following the release of Laudato Si’, which demonstrates how as a norm entrepreneur, the Church's structure aids in the dissemination of its spiritual message to cultivate discussion and reflection.Footnote ¹⁶ Schuldt et al. found that even brief exposure to Pope Francis' message had an effect, particularly among those who had prior awareness of the pope's message.

Paired with its role as a moral authority, the Church's messages of human/integral ecology are influencing how the domestic levels think about the environment. In its role as a diplomatic actor, the Church delivers its moral message and influence to states and the global community at venues such as COP26.

COP26: re-imagining environmental norms

In recent years, the connections between the condition of the environment and the conditions of the poor have been gaining salience. In July 2021, Germany experienced the worst flooding it has had in possibly 1,000 years; as noted by physicist Friederike Otto, “I say this as a German: The idea that you could possibly die from weather is completely alien” (McKinley et al. Reference McKinley, Mueller, Ewing and Bilefsky2021; Sengupta Reference Sengupta2021). This was but one instance of irregularly extreme weather conditions occurring globally. Given recent dramatic climate changes, activists on the ground have already engaged in new approaches to reinvigorate the discussion on climate. As reported by Time magazine climate correspondent Justin Worland, “[A]ctivists think they've figured out how best to talk about climate in tangible terms…[one activist group has] embraced political messaging that links a warming planet to unemployment and poverty and that frames climate solutions as a way to create jobs and clean up communities.”⁴ There are, however, antecedents to this line of thinking when one considers the Church.

Nearly a year before COP26, the Holy See was one among 75 leaders in government, business, and civil society who participated in the December 2020 Climate Ambition Summit hosted by the United Nations, the United Kingdom, and France. There, as Pope Francis would later reiterate in his COP26 opening message, the Holy See “adopted a strategy of net-zero emissions operating on two levels: 1) the commitment of Vatican City State to achieve this goal by 2050 and 2) the commitment of the Holy See promote education in integral ecology…These commitments have given rise to thousands of initiatives worldwide” (italics added, Pope Francis 2021b).Footnote ¹⁷ By differentiating between the Vatican City State (the Holy See's territorial property) and the Holy See (which oversees that territorial property and the entire Catholic Church as a religious organization), the Church was highlighting its dual role. As a precursor to COP26, the Church was building on the momentum of Laudato Si’, whose words had already moved people to reorient their approach to the environment, to now inspire states on the global level with its deeds.

In another high level meeting months prior to COP26, the Holy See once again used its global diplomatic position to support the environment. On April 10, 2021, the Holy See, the embassies of Great Britain and Italy to the Holy See, and 40 participants representing various religious faiths and scientists convened at the Vatican for a meeting on “Faith and Science: Towards COP26.” There, Pope Francis urged that change was possible by “example and action, and education.” Informed by one's religious and spiritual traditions, he argued that disparate groups can collaborate in order to “change the narrative of development” since “governments cannot handle such ambitious change alone … This is where we, religious leaders an institutions can make an important contribution…Raising public awareness is indispensable to the change of course that is needed” (Pope Francis 2021a).

In terms of action, Pope Francis called upon participants to advance an educational and cultural transformation, which involves a more conscious practice of ecological sensitivity, strengthening integral ecological education in educational and cultural institutions, and “participating actively and appropriately in the public and political discourse on environmental issues” to raise the voices of “those too often ignored, such as Indigenous Peoples” (Ibid.). The second tier of action would be to lead by example and to take “far-reaching environmental action within our own institutions and communities, informed by science and based on religious wisdom.” Such action includes partnering with local communities, achieving full sustainability in all of their operations, and aligning their financial investments, goods purchased, and services hired “with the same ethical lens being applied to the business sector and to the rest of social life” (Ibid.). Guided by its principle of subsidiarity, the Church is encouraging action that has consequences across all levels of society.

Five months after this April 2021 meeting, Europe announced its ambitious plans to reduce emissions 55% by 2030 and become the first carbon neutral continent by 2050 (Erlanger and Sengupta Reference Erlanger and Sengupta2021). In its announcement, the EU made it clear that by tackling climate change, it would be given the opportunity to adopt a new economic model, one that would simultaneously address the environment, economic growth, inequality, and overall public health. Perhaps yet another outcome of these earlier meetings was the symbolic announcement made by the Church and 70+ other faith institutions, just five days before COP26. Uniting “for the largest-ever joint divestment announcement…72 faith institutions from six continents with more than $4.2 billion of combined assets under management announced their commitment to divest from fossil fuels” (Braden Reference Braden2021).

As COP26 began its proceedings in late October 2021, Pope Francis used his opening message challenge the political will of states to do their part for the environment on behalf of the international community. Specifically, he referred to the “ecological debt” owed by the developed countries to the developing ones, which could come in the form of debt forgiveness and assistance (Pope Francis 2021b). He reminded delegates of how the Church—through its dual role as a global diplomatic actor and a religious transnational institution—is doing its part in terms of care for the common home. As a global, diplomatic actor, the Church was present in COP26's UN managed “Blue Zone”; there it engaged with participants accredited by the UNFCCC (the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), which includes delegations from observer organizations and official representatives from more than 190 countries. In the “Green Zone,” it engaged with non-state actors such as civil society organizations and business leaders to encourage dialogue and education.

There is some indication that a norm cascade leading to norm internalization is perhaps on the horizon. Finalized as the Glasgow Climate Pact, the participants agreed to four action areas: mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage, finance, and collaboration. Briefly summarized, this included an aim to mitigate the effects of climate change with new 2030 emission targets, increase preparedness to climate risks by improving access (including to Indigenous Peoples) to finance for adaptation, commitments by developed and developing countries to fund or realign their finance goals in order to achieve global net-zero, and a commitment to accelerate collaboration between governments and non-state actors (2021 UN Climate Change Conference 2021, 5). Of the four action areas, the issue of loss and damage is particularly important to the Global South as it is meant to provide them with funding and compensation for land affected by climate change. According to Alistair Dutton, a Holy See COP26 delegate, most funding to protect the environment has focused on “mitigation and technologies aimed at reducing emissions,” which translates mainly into new technology for the rich while the poor remain as they are (Catholic News Service 2021).

The developed countries also renewed their commitment to raise $100 billion annually in climate finance and to have their progress toward such a goal reported under the UNFCCC . Per the Pact, this would ensure “developing countries have a voice and further cementing trust,” which is particularly important since that goal was not met in 2020 (2021 UN Climate Change Conference 2021, 19; Wambui Reference Wambui2021). Furthermore, with regard to adaptation, loss, and damage, the Glasgow Compact increased its financial commitment:

Over $350 million has been committed to the UNFCCC Adaptation Fund: nearly triple the previous highest collective mobilization. Over $600 million was pledged to the Least Developed Countries Fund, the highest collective mobilization the fund has seen. These record breaking contributions are building the resilience of vulnerable communities, safeguarding livelihoods and lives (2021 UN Climate Change Conference 2021, 17).

Paired with the efforts of the Church as expressed in its foreign policy, the global norm of politically, economically, and socially treating the environment not in isolation but in relation to an integral ecology will have a better chance of achieving global norm internalization.