1. Introduction
Normative reasons (henceforth: reasons) are most naturally thought of as facts that count in favour of various ‘responses’ such as beliefs or actions – in the sense of providing (pro tanto) justification. Some authors claim that no non-circular analysis of reasons can be given (cf. e.g. Scanlon Reference Scanlon1998: 17). On the contrary, Kearns & Star defend
RaE. Necessarily, a fact F is a reason for an agent A to φ if and only if F is evidence that A ought to φ (where φ is either a belief or an action) (Kearns and Star Reference Kearns and Star2009: 216; cf. also Kearns and Star Reference Kearns and Star2008, Reference Kearns and Star2011, Reference Kearns and Star2013).
I assume that RaE leads to a similar claim about bodies (i.e. sets) of evidence and reasons. The rationale is that we can apply RaE to every single fact within a body of evidence (or reasons) in turn. Thereby, we get
RaE (Total). Necessarily, a set of facts S constitutes A’s total reason to φ if and only if S constitutes A’s total evidence that A ought to φ.
A’s total evidence that A ought to φ (A’s total reason to φ) is constituted by all individual pieces of evidence that A ought to φ (all individual reasons to φ) that are part of A’s whole body of evidence (reasons). There are two ways to understand ‘A’s whole body of evidence (reasons)’. First, for a fact F to be part of these bodies, A must have the relevant kind of epistemic access to F.Footnote 1 Second, for a fact to be counted as part of A’s body of evidence (reasons), it suffices that F is ‘out there’ – without the need for any epistemic relation between A and F. To make this distinction explicit (when needed), I will speak of ‘available’ and ‘unavailable’ evidence (reasons).
Kearns and Star (Reference Kearns and Star2008: 39ff; Reference Kearns and Star2009: 224ff) seem to think that deliberating with evidence for ought-propositions and with reasons fulfils the same function (see Section 3 for further details).
[A]ny fact used appropriately in deliberation that helps determine what one ought to do will count as a reason. This is because such a fact will help an agent determine what she ought to do by being evidence about what she ought to do (Kearns and Star Reference Kearns and Star2008: 41).
In any case, given the necessary equivalence of (bodies of) evidence for ought-propositions and reasons, the RaE view is, minimally, committed to
Interchangeable. If we spell out agent A’s deliberation processes in terms of reasons or terms of evidence for ought-propositions, respectively, the ‘results’ must be coextensional.
In deliberation processes, where A tries to determine what she ought to ‘do’ (understood, in this essay, broadly including action and belief), A arrives at certain deliberative conclusions. That is, A positions herself towards (e.g. affirms) certain ought-propositions such as ‘I ought to believe that p’ (i.e. ‘OB(p)’). Given RaE (and RaE (Total)), necessarily, the same set of facts constitutes one’s reasons to believe that p and one’s evidence that one ought to believe that p. Therefore, the same set of facts is invoked independently of whether A’s deliberation processes are in terms of reasons or evidence for ought-propositions. Thus, I assume, the results (i.e. the propositions ‘reached’ at the end) of these two deliberation processes must be coextensional. That is, ‘OB(p)’ is true given a reasons perspective if and only if ‘OB(p)’ is true given an evidence for ought-propositions perspective.Footnote 2 As I will argue in Section 3, however, given certain assumptions, Interchangeable does not hold. This asymmetry of ‘deliberative results’ between reasons and evidence for ought-propositions contradicts a (minimal) commitment of the RaE view.
My general objection against the RaE view proceeds by considering different views of ‘ought’ – something Kearns & Star do not discuss in relevant detail.Footnote 3 Before that, I introduce two principles that intuitively indicate the asymmetry between evidence for ought-propositions and reasons in the way they relate to (potential) ought-facts and figure in our deliberations (Section 2). Building on these principles, I show that combining the RaE view with perspectivism about the ought stemming from reasons (specified below) is inconsistent (Section 3). This is because a perspectivist RaE view either (i) cannot make sense of updating one’s evidence for ought-propositions or (ii) leads to a violation of Interchangeable. Section 4 considers how (pure) objectivism about ‘ought’ might avoid my asymmetry charge. I argue, however, that objectivism, for a different reason, is incompatible with the RaE view.
2. The asymmetry charge (intuitively)
This section establishes two principles – one applies to evidence and the other to reasons – which lead me to the asymmetry charge.
Regarding evidence, consider Anna’s body of available evidence regarding proposition q: there is no cat in Anna’s drawer. This evidence strongly indicates that q although q is, in fact, false. As this suggests and as I assume here, at least for a non-normative and contingent proposition p, the following holds:
Misleading Evidence. Some evidence that p, even if it strongly outweighs the evidence that not-p, could be misleading. That is, for some set of evidence e, p is strongly supported by e but still might be false.
Misleading Evidence applies if e does not entail that p and, hence, does not exclude the possibility that not-p. Nonetheless, we can say that the balance of evidence e strongly, or decisively, supports p – as in the case of Anna.Footnote 4
The default position is to assume, as I do, that Misleading Evidence also holds for some ought-propositions. Let me illustrate this assumption’s intuitive appeal. Suppose that Anna’s body of available evidence e contains just a few facts, which together strongly support the proposition OB(q): Anna ought to believe that q. Now we add facts to this initial evidence set e, which leads to the updated evidence set e*. Given the more extensive set e*, OB(q) is not or only weakly supported. What this shows is that we are certainly entitled to stipulate that OB(q), in fact, is false. Thus, given that the facts in e do not contradict the described update to e*, we get Misleading Evidence (see Section 3 for further discussion). It is possible that, despite being strongly supported by e, it is not the case that OB(q). Therefore, there is a potential gap between Anna’s strong, but potentially misleading, evidence e for OB(q) and the (potential) occurrence of the corresponding ought-fact.
Turning to reasons, as commonly agreed, reasons play a contributory, i.e. pro tanto, role in justifying answers to the deliberative question about what you ought to do.Footnote 5 These considerations suggest
Determinate Ought. Necessarily, if A has decisive total reason to φ, then A ought to φ.
Determinate Ought says that, if the strength of A’s total reason to φ is stronger, by some margin, than A’s total reason to do anything else (in the given situation), then A ought to φ (cf. e.g. Maguire and Lord, Reference Maguire, Lord, Lord and Maguire2016, 8ff). Hence, given the decisive strength of one’s reasons, there is no gap between what one has decisive reason to do and what one ought to do.Footnote 6
Consider the following rationale. Suppose Anna concludes that her reasons to believe that q (i.e. to B(q)) outweigh her reasons to not-B(q) decisively and judges ‘I ought to B(q)’. I assume, first, that Anna recognises correctly which facts constitute her (relevant) reasons. Second, she does not make any other mistake in her deliberative processes. Hence, she judges correctly that she has decisive reason to B(q). Given these assumptions, it is unclear what could undermine the fact that Anna ought to B(q) – without also undermining the claim that Anna has decisive total reason to B(q).Footnote 7 Thus, Determinate Ought holds (in the case of Anna at least).
Misleading Evidence and Determinate Ought already suggest the asymmetry of evidence and reasons in one’s deliberation and in their relation to (potential) ought-facts. Evidence for ought-propositions, even if strong, only indicates and, hence, can be misleading. Reasons, if sufficiently strong, are connected to a determinate ‘ought’ (which is not potentially misleading in the same way). In the next two sections, I consider this asymmetry in light of different views about ‘ought’.
3. Perspectivism about ought of reasons leads to the asymmetry charge
In this section, I assume perspectivism about the ought of (decisive) reasonhood – as it features in Determinate Ought. This, together with Misleading Evidence, leads to my asymmetry charge – a contradiction for the RaE view (Section 3.1). I discuss two potential ways to resolve the alleged asymmetry. The first way, I argue, fails to make sense of cases of reasoning with one’s evidence for ought-propositions, in particular cases of updating this kind of evidence (Section 3.2). The second potential response leads to a violation of Interchangeable and, thus, cannot avoid the asymmetry between reasons and evidence for oughts (Section 3.3).
3.1. The asymmetry charge given by perspectivism
Perspectivism holds that, when determining what an agent ought to do, only facts that are epistemically accessible (in a sense to be determined, see fn.1) are relevant. On the contrary, according to (pure) objectivism, epistemic circumstances of the agent are entirely irrelevant for the question of what she ought to do.Footnote 8 Thus, on a perspectivist view, the ought of reasonhood is only sensitive to and only depends on (epistemically) available reasons – unavailable reasons are irrelevant (cf. Lord Reference Lord2015) or epistemically inaccessible facts cannot constitute genuine reasons at all (only ‘potential reasons’) (cf. Kiesewetter Reference Kiesewetter2017, 199f). Hence, a perspectivist version of Determinate Ought amounts to
Determinate Perspectivist Ought. Necessarily, if A has decisive total available reason to φ, then A ought to φ.
Now, to spell out the asymmetry charge, I assume that Anna has decisive total available reason to B(q). That is, given Anna’s epistemic circumstances, Anna’s available reasons to B(q) strongly outweigh her available reasons against B(q).
Given Determinate Perspectivist Ought, we get
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(1) Anna ought to B(q).
What happens if we consider Anna’s case in terms of evidence (see Interchangeable)? We get that her total available evidence supports (strongly) that OB(q). Still, I can assume that Misleading Evidence applies. Anna’s total available evidence is potentially misleading. To see this, note that I can assume that the balance of Anna’s evidence changes (against OB(q)) if her total available evidence e were updated with new, so far unavailable evidence (see Section 2). Postulating that Anna’s evidence that OB(q) is, in fact, misleading, we get
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(2) It is not the case that Anna ought to B(q).
The seeming contradiction of (1) and (2) poses a problem for the RaE view. Reasons and evidence for ought-propositions cannot be (necessarily) equivalent – as RaE and RaE(Total) claim – if considering reasons and considering evidence for ought-propositions leads to contradicting results (see Interchangeable).
However, as the attentive reader will have noticed, it seems that the oughts in (1) and (2) are different. By assumption, ‘ought’ in (1) is the perspectivist ought constrained by Anna’s epistemic perspective. On the contrary, by arguing for (the application of) Misleading Evidence in deriving (2), I appealed to the case of updating Anna’s evidence that OB(q) with so far epistemically unavailable facts (evidence). Hence, the ‘ought’ in Anna’s evidence that OB(q) cannot be perspectivist as this ought is sensitive to the epistemically inaccessible. Given this observation, there are two (ultimately unsuccessful) responses available for the RaE proponent – still assuming perspectivism about the ought of reasonhood (this assumption is lifted in Section 4).
3.2. Updating one’s evidence for ought-propositions: against a perspectivist reading of ‘OB(q)’
First, the RaE proponent might demand a perspectivist reading of the ought that features in Anna’s available evidence that OB(q). This move could be used to deny the application of Misleading Evidence, which was necessary to derive (2). In this case, the perspectivist RaE proponent would deny the possibility that Anna’s decisive total evidence that she ought to B(q) could be misleading. However, this reply, I argue, is not available for the RaE view. Given RaE’s commitments, the nature of evidence is incompatible with perspectivism about the ought that figures in evidence for ought-propositions (i.e. in short, about the ought of evidence). That is, given that the RaE view identifies reasons with evidence for an ought-proposition, the ‘ought’ occurring in such evidence statements cannot be treated as shifting with the agent’s epistemic circumstances. Otherwise, it would undermine the idea that one is updating evidence for ought-propositions in analogous ways as one is updating one’s reasons to B(q). This, however, conflicts with Kearns & Star’s claim that reasons and evidence for ought-propositions function analogously in one’s deliberation processes – a claim central to their overall argument for RaE.
Let me expand on the updating-evidence case from Section 2. At time t 1 , Anna’s total available evidence for the statement ‘Anna ought to believe that q’ (i.e. ‘OB(q)’) is constituted by the body of evidence e. Given perspectivism, the ought in ‘OB(q)’ is only sensitive to those facts that are (in the relevant sense) epistemically available. That is, this ought is indexed to Anna’s epistemic circumstances C1 at t 1 . Hence, only facts available given C1 are relevant for assessing the truth of ‘OB(q)’. At time t 2 , Anna’s total available evidence for ‘OB(q)’ is now constituted by a larger body of evidence e*. Some facts within e*, the ‘new evidence’, were not available under C1. The ought in ‘OB(q)’ now, at t 2 , is indexed to new epistemic circumstances C2.
Therefore, the oughts that figure in ‘OB(q)’ at t 1 and t 2 are indexed to different epistemic circumstances. Different sets of facts are relevant for assessing the truth of the statement ‘OB(q)’ at t 1 and t 2 . Thus, the ought-propositions, for which Anna is supposed to have evidence and which are expressed by ‘OB(q)’, are different at t 1 and t 2 . That is, the ought-proposition, for which Anna has evidence, itself changes with what evidence is available for this very proposition.
This suggestion, however, can make no sense of the idea of updating Anna’s total available evidence that OB(q) – i.e. her evidence for one and the same ought-proposition – with new, so far unavailable, input. To be counted as a case of genuine updating, the new evidence, added at t 2 , must bear on the same ‘question’ or subject matter as the initial set e. That is, the initial set e and the updated set e* must be concerned with the same ought-proposition. Hence, the content of ‘OB(q)’ must remain fixed and the relevant ‘ought’ sensitive to the same set of facts across t 1 and t 2 . Thus, we must read the ought-proposition OB(q) in ‘Anna has evidence that OB(q)’ as being concerned with a (more) objectivist ought that is not constrained by Anna’s current limited epistemic perspective. Therefore, there is no perspectivist reading of the ought that figures in evidence for ought-propositions – as there is for the ought of reasonhood featuring in Determinate Perspectivist Ought.Footnote 9
A perspectivist defender of RaE might reply that there is no illicit change of subject between t1 and t2: throughout, Anna is concerned with the question whether q, and she updates her evidence for q as she acquires new information.Footnote 10 Before the update at t 1 , she considers her evidence for q and, based on it, concludes that ‘OB(q)’ – with the perspectivist ought being indexed to C1. During the update, she considers new facts that bear on the same question, namely whether q is the case. After the evidence-update, the more extensive evidence set e* only weakly supports the proposition q. Thus, at t 2 , after the update, Anna concludes that it is not the case that OB(q) – with the perspectivist ought being now indexed to C2. Given this framing, we can coherently describe the relevant evidence-updating process in terms of our evidence for q – while holding on to a perspectivist interpretation for our ought-statements at t 1 and t 2 , respectively.
This seems to be a sensible explanation of the described case of evidence-updating and corresponding intuitions about ought-statements.Footnote 11 Be that as it may. This position is not available to the RaE proponent (or at least comes at very high theoretical costs, see fn.12). Without a commitment to RaE and RaE (Total), we could just consider how a fact F or a set of facts S constitute evidence for p and also corresponding reason to believe that p (given relevant background assumptions, see fn.7). We could then consider how an agent A’s epistemically available body of evidence is updated (e.g. if fact F is added to the previously available evidence constituted by S). At any point in this updating process, we could consider what this means for relevant ought-statements regarding the proposition ‘A ought to B(p)’ – without considering how the evidence for ‘A ought to B(p)’ is itself updated.
However, for the RaE view, evidence for ought-propositions is not an afterthought. On the contrary, a fact F is a reason for B(p) if and only if it is evidence that OB(p). Moreover, reasons and evidence for ought-propositions fulfil the same deliberative function. As already indicated in Section 1, the normative deliberation of agent A must lead to the same results independently of whether they are spelt out in terms of reasons or evidence for the relevant ought-proposition (see Interchangeable). In fact, Kearns and Star explicitly discuss, as a deciding argument in favour of their view, the ‘phenomenology of deliberation’ (Reference Kearns and Star2008: 41) and, in particular, the analogous role that reasons and evidence for ought-propositions are supposed to play in practical (or epistemic) reasoning. They hold that such evidence is what the agent is looking for ‘[w]hen one is trying to work out what to do’ (Reference Kearns and Star2008: 41; see also quote in Section 1).
[T]hat [a] fact is evidence about what she ought to do […] is why such a fact plays the practical role of helping an agent determine what to do. An agent can use a fact to help her work out what she ought to do just when this fact is evidence about what she ought to do (ibid: 40; their emphasis).
Thus, given RaE, we must be able to describe an agent’s reasoning process, also in the case of updating and expanding their epistemic perspective, both in terms of reasons to B(p) and also in terms of evidence that OB(p). As shown above, the idea of updating Anna’s total available evidence that OB(q), however, doesn’t work if we assume that the relevant ought is the perspectivist ought.Footnote 12
Note that the case of updating one’s available reasons for A to φ does not raise an analogous problem for perspectivism about the ought of reasonhood. Logically speaking, new, previously unavailable reasons bear on the same subject matter (‘question’) because they are concerned with the same ‘response’ (φ-ing) for the same agent (A). Anna is considering reasons for (or against) B(q) when updating her reasons. Hence, the perspectivist assumption regarding the ought of reasons is not threatened by my argument.
Beyond my argument from evidence-updating, my anti-perspectivist conclusion about the ought of evidence for ought-propositions is also supported by more general considerations about the nature of evidence. According to Kelly (Reference Kelly and Zalta2016, Section 3), evidence is most naturally thought of as ‘reliable sign, symptom, or mark of that which it is evidence of’. Thus, evidence ‘points’ towards a fact of the matter, in our case an ought-fact, that is not constrained or influenced by what evidence for this fact is epistemically (un)available. Similarly, the fact that q is not influenced by what evidence is (un)available for it.
3.3. A hybrid view about ought?
A second way to resolve the seeming contradiction of (1) and (2) is to accept a hybrid view – reading ‘ought’ in (1) in a perspectivist and in (2) in an objectivist sense. This approach, although (arguably) generally plausible, is inconsistent with the RaE view. This is because it conflicts with an essential commitment of the RaE view, namely Interchangeable. As discussed in Section 1, the RaE view must hold that deliberation with reasons and evidence for the relevant ought-proposition must lead to coextensional deliberative results. However, on the hybrid view, reasons and evidence are used for different kinds of deliberation processes with different outcomes. Deliberating with one’s available reasons leads to a conclusion about a perspectivist ought. On the contrary, deliberating with one’s available (misleading) evidence is concerned with and, hence, leads to a conclusion about an objectivist ought. Thus, the ought-propositions ‘reached’ when relying on reasons and evidence for ought-propositions, respectively, are not coextensional. ‘Anna ought to B(q)’ is true if ‘ought’ is understood as the perspectivist ought of reasonhood (see (1)). ‘Anna ought to B(q)’ is false if ‘ought’ is understood as the objectivist ought of evidence (see (2)).
Therefore, a hybrid view (with its perspectivism about the ought of reasonhood) violates interchangeable. Given this section’s assumption of perspectivism about the ought of reasonhood, the RaE view cannot avoid my asymmetry charge. The only option left for the RaE view is to read the ought of reasonhood in the same objectivist way as the ought of evidence.
4. Against a pure objectivist way out of the asymmetry charge
This section shows, first, that the ‘objectivist’ response to prevent my asymmetry charge forces the RaE proponent to adopt a ‘pure objectivist’ view – a strong theoretical commitment. Second, I draw on Fox (Reference Fox2019) to argue that pure objectivism is committed to claiming that independent evidence for p cannot be a reason to B(p). This objectivist’s commitment, I show, is incompatible with the RaE view. Thus, given that Fox’s argument holds, the only way left to avoid my asymmetry charge, i.e. adopting pure objectivism, is not available to the RaE view.
According to McHugh and Way (Reference McHugh and Way2017: 123), the paradigmatic version of objectivism regarding the epistemic ought holds: for all p, an agent A may believe that p if and only if p is true. For current purposes, we only need a logical implication of this claim, namely
Pure Objectivism. For all p, A ought to believe that p only if p is true.Footnote 13
Let me first show why I consider this ‘pure’ objectivism about ought (and not some weaker version). Recall the case of updating evidence for ought-propositions. Suppose now, Anna’s total available evidence e+ contains all facts that bear on the question of whether OB(q) except q itself. It makes sense to say that her total available evidence that OB(q) would be updated if we added q to e+. As argued in Section 3, the idea of updating one’s evidence presupposes that the initial and the resulting set of evidence bear on the same ought-proposition. Hence, the ought that figures in Anna’s available evidence that OB(q) must be sensitive to all ‘potential updaters’ of that evidence. Thus, whether q is true or not must be taken into account by the ought that figures in the proposition OB(q), for which Anna has evidence. The same holds for the ought of reasonhood – to avoid a hybrid view (see Section 3).
Given this result, it would be very odd to deny Pure Objectivism. It would amount to the claim: Although ‘ought’ is sensitive to whether q is true or not, it is possible that Anna ought to believe that q even if not-q is the case.Footnote 14 Given the implausibility of this claim, assuming Pure Objectivism for the (central) ought of reasonhood and of evidence is the only option left for the RaE view.Footnote 15
A pure objectivist might now claim the following in Anna’s example: First, given suitable background conditions (see fn.13), the fact that q constitutes decisive reason to B(q). This decisive reason, whether available to Anna or not, leads to the fact that Anna ought to B(q). Thus, Determinate Ought (without any perspectivist constraint) holds. Analogously, the fact that q will be part of Anna’s total (available plus unavailable) evidence. This evidence entails (non-misleadingly) OB(q) – again, given the same (non-epistemic) background conditions. Second, if not-q (or without the relevant background conditions), both total reason and total evidence will not lead to OB(q). Therefore, there is no asymmetry between one’s reasons and one’s evidence for ought-propositions. The apparent contradiction of Section 3, based on (partly) perspectivist assumptions, does not arise. Thus, pure objectivism seems to allow the RaE view to avoid my asymmetry charge developed above.
However, as I’ll now argue, the RaE view is, for different reasons, incompatible with pure objectivism about ought. I show this by applying (a particular step in) recent general arguments against objectivism made by Fox (Reference Fox2019) to my current discussion of RaE.
Fox (Reference Fox2019: 239f) argues that pure objectivists are committed to
No Independent Evidence. Independent evidence cannot be a reason to believe that p.
Instead, only the fact that p (i.e. only p’s truth) can be a reason to believe that p, i.e. to B(p). Other facts that only indicate that p, i.e. independent evidence that p, cannot be such a reason. If independent evidence (such as the fact F that a normally reliable adviser told A that p) was a reason to B(p), Fox holds, this would conflict with two plausible principles.Footnote 16
First, we have
Impact Constraint. If R is a reason to ϕ, then R could make a difference, or contribute, to its being the case that one ought to ϕ (Fox Reference Fox2019: 242).
Suppose we hold the fact that not-p fixed. Now, given Pure Objectivism, independent evidence that p, no matter how strong, can never be a ‘difference maker’ regarding the epistemic ought claim ‘A ought to believe that p’ (i.e. ‘OB(p)’). Thus, given not-p, ‘there will not conceivably be a point at which enough independent evidence is added to make the belief that p permissible (or even required)’ (ibid.). Given this result, independent evidence does not fulfil Impact Constraint. Thus, on the objectivist view, we get No Independent Evidence.
The second principle that also leads us to No Independent Evidence is
Weighing Constraint. If R is a reason for or against φ-ing, then there is a conceivable situation where it makes sense to weigh up R and other reasons in deliberation about whether [one ought] to φ (ibid: 243).
The idea is that, for something to be a reason, it must at least be conceivable that it is weighted against other competing reasons in one’s ‘working towards an ought-conclusion’. Given Pure Objectivism, the fact that (not-)p is always relevant for ‘ought-conclusions’. If one holds (or even just stipulates) that p, however, it makes no sense to weigh the fact that p against independent evidence that not-p. As Kiesewetter (Reference Kiesewetter2017: 200) puts it in a similar context, ‘there is no single point of view from which those two facts can sensibly be weighed against each other’. Hence, the Weighing Constraint entails that the following:
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(3) The fact that p and independent evidence bearing on p could not both be reasons for (or against) believing that p.
Now, given Pure Objectivism, p is a necessary condition for OB(p) to be true. Therefore, it seems hard to deny that the fact that p is evidence that OB(p) – at least in some cases (while one case is enough for current purposes). This idea could, e.g., be spelled out in terms of a probability-raising account of evidence – which Kearns and Star (Reference Kearns and Star2009: 231f) endorse. Thus, given RaE, we get (at least for some p) that
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(4) The fact that p is a reason to B(p).Footnote 17
(3) and (4) together entail that independent evidence that p cannot be a reason to B(p). Thus, taken together, the Weighing Constraint, RaE and Pure Objectivism entail No Independent Evidence.
In general, pure objectivists might be able to accept No Independent Evidence. However, I do not have to engage in the debate about the general (im)plausibility of No Independent Evidence (cf. Whiting Reference Whiting, Flowerree and Reedforthcoming). For, in any case, No Independent Evidence is incompatible with the RaE view. As I have just argued, given Pure Objectivism, the fact that p is (at least sometimes) evidence that OB(p). Thus, independent evidence that p occurs is (at least sometimes) evidence that OB(p) as well. A probability-raising account of evidence would, again, explain this.Footnote 18 Hence, given RaE, this independent evidence that p also is a reason to B(p). This result, however, conflicts with No Independent Evidence – a commitment of pure objectivism.
Thus, given Fox’s arguments, the RaE view is incompatible with pure objectivism about the epistemic ought. Therefore, to the extent this incompatibility claim holds, the objectivist reply to the asymmetry charge is of no help to the RaE view.Footnote 19
5. Conclusion: reasons and evidence are different
The asymmetry charge raised in this essay states that evidence for ought-propositions and reasons behave differently in our deliberations and relate differently to (potential) ought-facts. Evidence, even if strong, only indicates the truth of an ought-statement and, hence, can be misleading. Reasons, if sufficiently strong, are connected to a determinate ought. Hence, reasons are not potentially misleading in the same way as evidence. The RaE view must explain away this alleged asymmetry (see Section 3). This is because a hybrid view, which accepts the asymmetry and, accordingly, reads the ‘ought’ of decisive reasonhood in perspectivist and the ‘ought’ of evidence in objectivist terms, violates Interchangeable – a minimal commitment of the RaE view.
Further, I argued that the ought that features in evidence for ought-propositions cannot be constrained by perspectivist considerations – as this violates RaE’s idea that reasons and evidence for ought-propositions function analogously in deliberation. At least, the necessary revisions to the RaE view that would allow for the ought of evidence to be perspectivist seem very implausible (see fn.12). Thus, to develop and defend them would require much further positive argument on the side of the RaE view – to the point of making this line of defence, I think, unpromising.
To the extent this holds, to unify the sense of ought used, the RaE view must opt for pure objectivism about the ought of reasonhood and of evidence for ought-propositions (see Section 4). Therefore, I have at least shown an additional, highly contentious commitment of the RaE view, namely pure objectivism about the (epistemic) ought.Footnote 20 Such a commitment already gives prima facie grounds to prefer other, less committal accounts of normative reasons. Further, if pure objectivism is false, the RaE view must be rejected. Moreover, drawing on Fox (Reference Fox2019), I argued that the RaE view is incompatible with pure objectivism. This incompatibility claim needs to be analysed further (see esp. fn.19). In any case, my argument puts additional pressure on RaE proponents to spell out and defend a coherent (pure objectivist) version of their RaE view. To the extent that that incompatibility claim holds, however, the RaE view has no option to defend itself against the asymmetry charge – it cannot accept it nor explain it away.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer and an associate editor of this journal, as well as two anonymous BPhil essay examiners and, most especially, Joe Cunningham, for very helpful comments and suggestions. While working on this article, I was funded by the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes (German Academic Scholarship Foundation), for which I am extremely grateful.
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