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Review of Jonathan Barnes’ Proof, Knowledge and Scepticism: Essays in Ancient Philosophy III

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 July 2015

Tamar Nawar
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Information

Type
Corrigendum
Information
Philosophy , Volume 94 , Issue 2 , April 2019 , pp. 363
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Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2015 

There are two errors in this review. On page 4, the quotation from Barnes should be corrected to read:

‘A Deduction is an ordered pair, <{α1, α2, …, αn}, σ > such that (1) σ follows necessarily from {α1, α2, …, αn}, and (2) σ holds (if it holds) because of each αi.’

The second error is in the third footnote, on page 5, wherein there is an extra word. The pertinent sentence, once revised, should read:

‘They offer us knowledge which we already had under a different mode of presentation but do not straightforwardly lead us to know new things.’

References

Nawar, Tamar. Proof, Knowledge and Scepticism: Essays in Ancient Philosophy III. Philosophy. Published by Cambridge University Press, 21 April 2015. doi:10.1017/S0031819115000042.Google Scholar