Milícias are mafia-style organizations, often composed of current and former state agents, that have rapidly expanded in areas with limited state presence and weak legal oversight. In Rio de Janeiro, their territorial control is not maintained by coercion alone, but also through strategic political alliances. This article theorizes and tests a mechanism linking milícia expansion to electoral politics: milícias deliver concentrated electoral support to specific politicians, who in return shield their operations by influencing bureaucratic appointments and law enforcement priorities. Using original geospatial and electoral data, we show that milícia entry into a new area increases electoral concentration and disproportionately benefits milícia-aligned candidates in adjacent territories. We further demonstrate that this electoral capital is converted into political power through key bureaucratic appointments that facilitate further expansion and institutional impunity. Our findings support a theoretical framework in which elections reinforce, rather than constrain, criminal governance in democratic settings.

Organized crime generates violence, economic instability, and institutional challenges, forcing millions of citizens worldwide to change their place of residence annually. While the experiences of those fleeing violence are well-documented, less attention has been given to frontline workers assisting them. This study addresses this gap by examining the types of coping mechanisms that frontline officials use to protect women escaping organized crime in Mexico. Drawing on 24 in-depth interviews with key actors from governmental and non-governmental organizations, we identify three types of coping mechanisms: individual, institutional, and social. These strategies demonstrate the resilience and ingenuity of workers navigating resource shortages, legal constraints, and personal safety risks. Our findings contribute to the literature on organized crime by illuminating how those working on the ground adapt to systemic deficiencies and protect victims. By understanding these strategies, we hope to inform more effective policies to support frontline officials and mitigate the societal harms of organized crime.

This study introduces a novel approach to measuring the evolution of union power in Latin America. Using an original dataset covering ten dimensions of union activity across 17 countries from 1990 to 2020, it addresses shortcomings in prior research based on overly broad indicators or narrow case studies. In line with the specialized literature, factor analysis identifies four distinct dimensions of union power—associational, structural, institutional, and societal—each showing unique variation across countries. Hierarchical cluster analysis reveals four ideal types: (1) strongly embedded unionism, with robust associational and institutional strength (Argentina, Uruguay); (2) social movement unionism, marked by strong societal alliances but limited institutional access (e.g., Bolivia, Ecuador); (3) bureaucratic and isolated unionism, with institutional integration but weak societal mobilization (Brazil, Chile, Mexico); and (4) low-intensity unionism, prevalent in Central America. Correlation analyses reveal complex interactions among these dimensions. The study provides new empirical and conceptual tools to advance comparative research on labor movements in the region.

This research examines whether women legislators represent more than their male counterparts the interests of disadvantaged groups in society, such as women themselves, the poor, migrants, LGBT groups, or indigenous peoples. Our main hypothesis is that women legislators are more active in promoting the interests of disadvantaged groups. Also, we expect to observe disparities in the representation of disadvantaged groups as a function of legislators’ ideology. To test our arguments, data are examined from parliamentary speeches and meetings with interest groups held in the Chilean Chamber of Deputies from 2014 to 2022. The inferences drawn from the data uphold the hypothesis that gender does affect the degree to which legislators represent the interests of disadvantaged groups. Moreover, ideology also explains variation: left-wing legislators embrace more often the representation of marginalized groups.

How can electoral competition remain stable despite a weak party system? We argue that ideological identification can stabilize electoral behavior, serving as a substitute for weak or delegitimized political parties. Focusing on Chile, we combine repeated cross-sectional surveys, a conjoint experiment, and text analysis. We find that while partisanship has declined sharply over the past three decades, ideological self-placement remains remarkably stable. Conjoint results show that ideological alignment outweighs issue alignment in shaping vote choice. Drawing on survey questions and topic modeling of open-ended responses, we uncover emotionally charged and moralized language tied to ideological groups, suggesting that ideology in Chile displays features of a social identity, including intergenerational transmission, symbolic boundaries, and in-group affect. We also examine how intense political events, such as a plebiscite to end a dictatorship, shape long-term ideological attachments. Our findings offer insight into how electoral competition can remain ideologically structured even in the absence of strong parties, a pattern increasingly relevant in contemporary democracies.

This response memo offers a critical reassessment of the claim that ideological self-placement in Chile reflects a form of social identity. While the article under discussion provides compelling evidence of ideological stability, it risks conflating political linkage with social identity formation. In contexts of partisan decline, such as Chile’s post-authoritarian landscape, ideological categories may persist not as thick communal identities but as affective rejection fields. Drawing on insights from political psychology and Latin American party system research, this memo proposes an alternative hypothesis: ideological stability is structured by negative partisan identities—emotionally charged, ideologically coherent rejections that shape voter behavior without requiring strong organizational anchors. A stylized conceptual map illustrates the geometry of rejection in Chile’s political space. These affective coordinates help explain voter alignment in the absence of coherent in-groups or traditional parties. While preliminary, this framework underscores the importance of moving beyond ideological self-placement as a proxy for social identity and calls for renewed attention to the emotional architecture of opposition. In doing so, it invites a broader research agenda on how negative partisanship operates across fragmented democracies in Latin America.

This rebuttal responds to the argument that negative partisan identities, such as opposition to past regimes or to specific political parties, provide the primary explanation for political stability in contexts of partisan decline. While rejection dynamics do shape some voting behavior, especially in second-round contests, we contend that they cannot account for the persistence of structured electoral competition over time. Our evidence shows that many voters are defined not only by whom they reject, but also by the ideological families they belong to. We provide survey evidence demonstrating that, when ideology and negative partisanship are measured on comparable terms, the apparent advantage of the latter in explaining vote choice disappears. Recent electoral cycles further illustrate that candidates with clear ideological identities consistently capture the majority of electoral support, whereas alternatives lacking a defined ideological anchor struggle to gain traction. We conclude that ideology, understood as a social identity, is the central force generating long-term stability in electoral competition, while negative partisanship intensifies conflict in short-term, high-stakes contests.