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ON THE INVARIANCE OF GÖDEL’S SECOND THEOREM WITH REGARD TO NUMBERINGS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 July 2020

BALTHASAR GRABMAYR*
Affiliation:
HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UNTER DEN LINDEN 6, D-10099, BERLIN, GERMANY E-mail: grabmayb@hu-berlin.de
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Abstract

The prevalent interpretation of Gödel’s Second Theorem states that a sufficiently adequate and consistent theory does not prove its consistency. It is however not entirely clear how to justify this informal reading, as the formulation of the underlying mathematical theorem depends on several arbitrary formalisation choices. In this paper I examine the theorem’s dependency regarding Gödel numberings. I introduce deviant numberings, yielding provability predicates satisfying Löb’s conditions, which result in provable consistency sentences. According to the main result of this paper however, these “counterexamples” do not refute the theorem’s prevalent interpretation, since once a natural class of admissible numberings is singled out, invariance is maintained.

Information

Type
Research Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Association for Symbolic Logic