An original family of labelled sequent calculi $\mathsf {G3IL}^{\star }$ for classical interpretability logics is presented, modularly designed on the basis of Verbrugge semantics (a.k.a. generalised Veltman semantics) for those logics. We prove that each of our calculi enjoys excellent structural properties, namely, admissibility of weakening, contraction and, more relevantly, cut. A complexity measure of the cut is defined by extending the notion of range previously introduced by Negri w.r.t. a labelled sequent calculus for Gödel–Löb provability logic, and a cut-elimination algorithm is discussed in detail. To our knowledge, this is the most extensive and structurally well-behaving class of analytic proof systems for modal logics of interpretability currently available in the literature.

Answering a question of Kaye, we show that the compositional truth theory with the full collection scheme is conservative over Peano Arithmetic. We demonstrate it by showing that countable models of compositional truth which satisfy the internal induction or collection axioms can be end-extended to models of the respective theory.

For which choices of $X,Y,Z\in \{\Sigma ^1_1,\Pi ^1_1\}$ does no sufficiently strong X-sound and Y-definable extension theory prove its own Z-soundness? We give a complete answer, thereby delimiting the generalizations of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem that hold within second-order arithmetic.

In a recent proof mining application, the proof-theoretical analysis of Dykstra’s cyclic projections algorithm resulted in quantitative information expressed via primitive recursive functionals in the sense of Gödel. This was surprising as the proof relies on several compactness principles and its quantitative analysis would require the functional interpretation of arithmetical comprehension. Therefore, a priori one would expect the need of Spector’s bar-recursive functionals. In this paper, we explain how the use of bounded collection principles allows for a modified intermediate proof justifying the finitary results obtained, and discuss the approach in the context of previous eliminations of weak compactness arguments in proof mining.

We present a family of minimal modal logics (namely, modal logics based on minimal propositional logic) corresponding each to a different classical modal logic. The minimal modal logics are defined based on their classical counterparts in two distinct ways: (1) via embedding into fusions of classical modal logics through a natural extension of the Gödel–Johansson translation of minimal logic into modal logic S4; (2) via extension to modal logics of the multi- vs. single-succedent correspondence of sequent calculi for classical and minimal logic. We show that, despite being mutually independent, the two methods turn out to be equivalent for a wide class of modal systems. Moreover, we compare the resulting minimal version of K with the constructive modal logic CK studied in the literature, displaying tight relations among the two systems. Based on these relations, we also define a constructive correspondent for each minimal system, thus obtaining a family of constructive modal logics which includes CK as well as other constructive modal logics studied in the literature.

The distinction of the semantic spaces of elements and types is common practice in practically all type systems. A few type systems, including some early ones, have been proposed whose semantic space has functions only, i.e., depending on the context functions may play element roles as well as type roles. All of these systems are either lacking expressive power, in particular, polymorphism, or they violate uniqueness of types. This work presents for the first time a function-based type system in which typing is a relation between functions and which is using an ordering of functions to introduce bounded polymorphism. The ordering is based on an infinite set of top objects, itself strictly linearly ordered, each of which characterizes a certain function space. These top objects are predicative in the sense that a function using some top object cannot be smaller than this object. The interpretation of proposition as types and elements as proofs remains valid and is extended by viewing the ordering between types as logical implication. The proposed system can be shown to satisfy confluence and subject reduction. Furthermore one can show that the ordering is a partial order, every set of expressions has a maximal element, and there is a (unique) minimal, logically strongest, type among all types of an element. The latter result implies an alternative notion of uniqueness of types. Strong normalisation is the deepest property and its proof is based on a well-founded relation defined over a subsystem of expressions without eliminators. Semantic abstraction of the objects involved in typing, i.e., to use functions in element as well as type roles in a relational setting, is the major contribution of function-based type systems. This work shows that dependent products are not necessary for defining type systems with bounded polymorphism, rather it presents a consistent system with bounded polymorphism and minimal types where typing is a relation between partially ordered functions.

In this paper, we show that $\mathsf {ZFC}+\mathsf {WA}_{n+1}$ implies the consistency of $\mathsf {ZFC}+\mathsf {WA}_n$ for $n\ge 0$. We also prove that $\mathsf {ZFC}+\mathsf {WA}_n$ is finitely axiomatizable, and $\mathsf {ZFC}+\mathsf {WA}$ is not finitely axiomatizable unless it is inconsistent.

This paper presents a reverse mathematical analysis of several forms of the sorites paradox. We first illustrate how traditional discrete formulations are reliant on Hölder’s representation theorem for ordered Archimedean groups. While this is provable in $\mathsf {RCA}_0$, we also consider two forms of the sorites which rest on non-constructive principles: the continuous sorites of Weber & Colyvan [35] and a variant we refer to as the covering sorites. We show in the setting of second-order arithmetic that the former depends on the existence of suprema and thus on arithmetical comprehension ($\mathsf {ACA}_0$) while the latter depends on the Heine–Borel theorem and thus on Weak König’s lemma ($\mathsf {WKL}_0$). We finally illustrate how recursive counterexamples to these principles provide resolutions to the corresponding paradoxes which can be contrasted with supervaluationist, epistemicist, and constructivist approaches.

We investigate the end extendibility of models of arithmetic with restricted elementarity. By utilizing the restricted ultrapower construction in the second-order context, for each $n\in \mathbb {N}$ and any countable model of $\mathrm {B}\Sigma _{n+2}$, we construct a proper $\Sigma _{n+2}$-elementary end extension satisfying $\mathrm {B}\Sigma _{n+1}$, which answers a question by Clote positively. We also give a characterization of the countable models of $\mathrm {I}\Sigma _{n+2}$ in terms of their end extendibility, similar to the case of $\mathrm {B}\Sigma _{n+2}$. Along the proof, we introduce a new type of regularity principle in arithmetic called the weak regularity principle, which serves as a bridge between the model’s end extendibility and the amount of induction or collection it satisfies.

We argue that some of Brouwer’s assumptions, rejected by Bishop, should be considered and studied as possible axioms. We show that Brouwer’s Continuity Principle enables one to prove an intuitionistic Borel Hierarchy Theorem. We also explain that Brouwer’s Fan Theorem is useful for a development of the theory of measure and integral different from the one worked out by Bishop. We show that Brouwer’s bar theorem not only proves the Fan Theorem but also a stronger statement that we call the Almost-fan Theorem. The Almost-fan Theorem implies intuitionistic versions of Ramsey’s Theorem and the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem.

We say that a Kripke model is a GL-model (Gödel and Löb model) if the accessibility relation $\prec $ is transitive and converse well-founded. We say that a Kripke model is a D-model if it is obtained by attaching infinitely many worlds $t_1, t_2, \ldots $, and $t_\omega $ to a world $t_0$ of a GL-model so that $t_0 \succ t_1 \succ t_2 \succ \cdots \succ t_\omega $. A non-normal modal logic $\mathbf {D}$, which was studied by Beklemishev [3], is characterized as follows. A formula $\varphi $ is a theorem of $\mathbf {D}$ if and only if $\varphi $ is true at $t_\omega $ in any D-model. $\mathbf {D}$ is an intermediate logic between the provability logics $\mathbf {GL}$ and $\mathbf {S}$. A Hilbert-style proof system for $\mathbf {D}$ is known, but there has been no sequent calculus. In this paper, we establish two sequent calculi for $\mathbf {D}$, and show the cut-elimination theorem. We also introduce new Hilbert-style systems for $\mathbf {D}$ by interpreting the sequent calculi. Moreover, we show that D-models can be defined using an arbitrary limit ordinal as well as $\omega $. Finally, we show a general result as follows. Let X and $X^+$ be arbitrary modal logics. If the relationship between semantics of X and semantics of $X^+$ is equal to that of $\mathbf {GL}$ and $\mathbf {D}$, then $X^+$ can be axiomatized based on X in the same way as the new axiomatization of $\mathbf {D}$ based on $\mathbf {GL}$.

The class of all $\ast $-continuous Kleene algebras, whose description includes an infinitary condition on the iteration operator, plays an important role in computer science. The complexity of reasoning in such algebras—ranging from the equational theory to the Horn one, with restricted fragments of the latter in between—was analyzed by Kozen (2002). This paper deals with similar problems for $\ast $-continuous residuated Kleene lattices, also called $\ast $-continuous action lattices, where the product operation is augmented by residuals. We prove that, in the presence of residuals, the fragment of the corresponding Horn theory with $\ast $-free hypotheses has the same complexity as the $\omega ^\omega $ iteration of the halting problem, and hence is properly hyperarithmetical. We also prove that if only commutativity conditions are allowed as hypotheses, then the complexity drops down to $\Pi ^0_1$ (i.e., the complement of the halting problem), which is the same as that for $\ast $-continuous Kleene algebras. In fact, we get stronger upper bound results: the fragments under consideration are translated into suitable fragments of infinitary action logic with exponentiation, and our upper bounds are obtained for the latter ones.

A central topic in mathematical logic is the classification of theorems from mathematics in hierarchies according to their logical strength. Ideally, the place of a theorem in a hierarchy does not depend on the representation (aka coding) used. In this paper, we show that the standard representation of compact metric spaces in second-order arithmetic has a profound effect. To this end, we study basic theorems for such spaces like a continuous function has a supremum and a countable set has measure zero. We show that these and similar third-order statements imply at least Feferman’s highly non-constructive projection principle, and even full second-order arithmetic or countable choice in some cases. When formulated with representations (aka codes), the associated second-order theorems are provable in rather weak fragments of second-order arithmetic. Thus, we arrive at the slogan that

$$ \begin{align*} {coding\ compact\ metric\ spaces\ in\ the\ language\ of\ second\text{-}order\ arithmetic\ can\ be\ as\ hard }\\ {as\ second\text{-}order\ arithmetic\ or\ countable\ choice}. \end{align*} $$

We believe every mathematician should be aware of this slogan, as central foundational topics in mathematics make use of the standard second-order representation of compact metric spaces. In the process of collecting evidence for the above slogan, we establish a number of equivalences involving Feferman’s projection principle and countable choice. We also study generalisations to fourth-order arithmetic and beyond with similar-but-stronger results.

Glivenko’s theorem says that classical provability of a propositional formula entails intuitionistic provability of the double negation of that formula. This stood right at the beginning of the success story of negative translations, indeed mainly designed for converting classically derivable formulae into intuitionistically derivable ones. We now generalise this approach: simultaneously from double negation to an arbitrary nucleus; from provability in a calculus to an inductively generated abstract consequence relation; and from propositional logic to any set of objects whatsoever. In particular, we give sharp criteria for the generalisation of classical logic to be a conservative extension of the one of intuitionistic logic with double negation.

A left-variable word over an alphabet A is a word over $A \cup \{\star \}$ whose first letter is the distinguished symbol $\star $ standing for a placeholder. The ordered variable word theorem ($\mathsf {OVW}$), also known as Carlson–Simpson’s theorem, is a tree partition theorem, stating that for every finite alphabet A and every finite coloring of the words over A, there exists a word $c_0$ and an infinite sequence of left-variable words $w_1, w_2, \dots $ such that $\{ c_0 \cdot w_1[a_1] \cdot \dots \cdot w_k[a_k] : k \in \mathbb {N}, a_1, \dots , a_k \in A \}$ is monochromatic.

In this article, we prove that $\mathsf {OVW}$ is $\Pi ^0_4$-conservative over $\mathsf {RCA}_0 + \mathsf {B}\Sigma ^0_2$. This implies in particular that $\mathsf {OVW}$ does not imply $\mathsf {ACA}_0$ over $\mathsf {RCA}_0$. This is the first principle for which the only known separation from $\mathsf {ACA}_0$ involves non-standard models.

We consider equational theories based on axioms for recursively defining functions, with rules for equality and substitution, but no form of induction—we denote such equational theories as PETS for pure equational theories with substitution. An example is Cook’s system PV without its rule for induction. We show that the Bounded Arithmetic theory $\mathrm {S}^{1}_2$ proves the consistency of PETS. Our approach employs model-theoretic constructions for PETS based on approximate values resembling notions from domain theory in Bounded Arithmetic, which may be of independent interest.

We present a streamlined and simplified exponential lower bound on the length of proofs in intuitionistic implicational logic, adapted to Gordeev and Haeusler’s dag-like natural deduction.

The distinction between the proofs that only certify the truth of their conclusion and those that also display the reasons why their conclusion holds has a long philosophical history. In the contemporary literature, the grounding relation—an objective, explanatory relation which is tightly connected with the notion of reason—is receiving considerable attention in several fields of philosophy. While much work is being devoted to characterising logical grounding in terms of deduction rules, no in-depth study focusing on the difference between grounding rules and logical rules exists. In this work, we analyse the relation between logical grounding and classical logic by focusing on the technical and conceptual differences that distinguish grounding rules and logical rules. The calculus employed to conduct the analysis provides moreover a strong confirmation of the fact that grounding derivations are logical derivations of a certain kind, without trivialising the distinction between grounding and logical rules, explanatory and non-explanatory parts of a derivation. By a further formal analysis, we negatively answer the question concerning the possible correspondence between grounding rules and intuitionistic logical rules.

The seminal Krajewski–Kotlarski–Lachlan theorem (1981) states that every countable recursively saturated model of $\mathsf {PA}$ (Peano arithmetic) carries a full satisfaction class. This result implies that the compositional theory of truth over $\mathsf {PA}$ commonly known as $\mathsf {CT}^{-}[\mathsf {PA}]$ is conservative over $\mathsf {PA}$. In contrast, Pakhomov and Enayat (2019) showed that the addition of the so-called axiom of disjunctive correctness (that asserts that a finite disjunction is true iff one of its disjuncts is true) to $\mathsf {CT}^{-}[\mathsf {PA}]$ axiomatizes the theory of truth $\mathsf {CT}_{0}[\mathsf {PA}]$ that was shown by Wcisło and Łełyk (2017) to be nonconservative over $\mathsf {PA}$. The main result of this paper (Theorem 3.12) provides a foil to the Pakhomov–Enayat theorem by constructing full satisfaction classes over arbitrary countable recursively saturated models of $\mathsf {PA}$ that satisfy arbitrarily large approximations of disjunctive correctness. This shows that in the Pakhomov–Enayat theorem the assumption of disjunctive correctness cannot be replaced with any of its approximations.

In this paper, we study the employment of $\Sigma _1$-sentences with certificates, i.e., $\Sigma _1$-sentences where a number of principles is added to ensure that the witness is sufficiently number-like. We develop certificates in some detail and illustrate their use by reproving some classical results and proving some new ones. An example of such a classical result is Vaught’s theorem of the strong effective inseparability of $\mathsf {R}_0$.

We also develop the new idea of a theory being $\mathsf {R}_{0\mathsf {p}}$-sourced. Using this notion, we can transfer a number of salient results from $\mathsf {R}_0$ to a variety of other theories.