Wide-ranging moral disagreement is thought to exist within philosophy as well as outside it.Footnote 1 Such disagreement within moral philosophy has been marshaled as a basis for skepticism when coupled with some form of conciliationism regarding disagreement.Footnote 2 On the supposition that moral disagreement is widespread and relatively well-balanced, conciliationism purportedly implies that moral philosophers do not have moral knowledge or even that they must suspend judgment on moral issues.Footnote 3
This essay will offer empirical evidence that challenges this supposition – that is, that moral disagreement among philosophers is indeed widespread and relatively well-balanced.Footnote 4 The evidence I will present suggests that minorities within ethics likely give the impression of large-scale disagreement, when in fact an overwhelming majority agree on a broad array of issues – even those issues that possess a reputation for being highly contentious.Footnote 5 This evidence comes in the form of two studies on the moral views of philosophers. Both studies strongly suggest that philosophy is far closer to convergence at least in applied ethics than many appear to suspect.
The first study examines the views of 364 philosophers – 327 of whom are ethicists – concerning the morality and legality of a large number of purportedly contentious issues: capital punishment, abortion, physician-assisted dying, euthanasia, same-sex marriage, eating meat, and others. The results revealed convergence, and even in some cases consensus, on a wide range of these. In fact, a roughly balanced split on particular issues was unusual; on most, a clearly dominant position emerged. The second study sought to replicate the results of the first while employing a different data collection methodology – that is, soliciting the participation of ethicists from a random sample of ten Ph.D.-granting universities and eighteen colleges with philosophy departments. This method helped to ameliorate self-selection concerns with the first study.Footnote 6 The results of this second study replicated those of the first.
I begin in section 1 with an examination of the significance of disagreement in moral philosophy for skeptical arguments. In sections 2 and 3, I describe the methods and results of the aforementioned studies. In section 4, I address the objection that ethicists’ positions lack independence. Here, I provide evidence that ethicists’ positions do not neatly divide along the lines of political affiliation. In section 5, I consider the strength of the skepticism the conciliationist challenge might secure in light of the results of the studies and suggest that it would be somewhat misleading to refer to it as skepticism at all.
1. Disagreement as a basis for moral skepticism
Sarah McGrath has developed a version of the skeptical argument from disagreement that targets claims to moral expertise and knowledge among philosophical ethicists. She begins by maintaining that the views of ethicists are standardly controversial.
By this, I mean our beliefs about the correct answers to the kinds of questions that tend to be hotly contested in the applied ethics literature as well as in the broader culture: questions about the circumstances (if any) in which it is morally permissible to administer the death penalty, or to have an abortion, or to eat meat, or about how much money we are morally obligated to donate to those in dire need, and so on. It is clear that our beliefs about the answers to such questions are controversial ones.Footnote 7
She goes on to maintain that ethicists’ controversial moral beliefs are “CONTROVERSIAL”; this means that they are “denied by another person of whom it is true that: you have no more reason to think that he or she is in error than you are.”Footnote 8 Upon invoking the principle that, “If one’s belief that p is CONTROVERSIAL, then one does not know that p,”Footnote 9 McGrath constructs an argument against ethicists’ possession of knowledge on such matters.Footnote 10
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P1 Our controversial moral beliefs are CONTROVERSIAL.
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P2 CONTROVERSIAL beliefs do not amount to knowledge.
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C Therefore, our controversial moral beliefs do not amount to knowledge.Footnote 11
Owing to its crucial reliance on the idea that in cases of known disagreement, each individual should adjust their confidence in light of their epistemic peer’s attitude, this amounts to an instance of the conciliationist challenge.
Now, regarding P2, the details concerning the number of those who disagree matters.Footnote 12 Suppose I and nine peers are calculating the tip for a restaurant bill, and I and eight others get the same result – with only one getting a different result. Though my judgment qualifies as CONTROVERSIAL according to the letter of McGrath’s principle, the skeptical result does not seem to follow. I, along with the rest of the group, would reasonably judge that the dissenting party had simply made a mistake. In order for the conciliationist challenge to have purchase, then, it seems we must have at least comparable numbers on each side of the issue.
Perhaps in the case I’ve described, McGrath would point out that it is not true that I have “no more reason to think that [the dissenter] is in error than [I am]” precisely because the majority is on my side. But this, of course, would just be another way of conceding that the numbers of those who disagree play a crucial epistemic role. The pressing question, then, is whether the numbers in moral philosophy bear out McGrath’s version of the conciliationist challenge.Footnote 13
Kieran Setiya claims that an endorsement of the Equal Weight View (a version of conciliationism) implies that moral philosophy is subject to a more potent variety of skepticism. “The danger is that, in ethics, disagreement with peers is more or less routine; it is then the basis of a devastating skepticism.”Footnote 14 He, however, maintains that this consequence implies that we should reject the Equal Weight View, rather than accept the skeptical ramifications.
Though Setiya rejects this form of conciliationism, we might reasonably question whether accepting it would have the “devastating” implications he claims it does. Is the scope of disagreement in ethics actually such that accepting Equal Weight would have far-reaching skeptical consequences, where that means ethicists must suspend judgment on many or most moral issues?Footnote 15 Though we might find notable philosophers on opposing sides of some issues,Footnote 16 surely this does not neutralize the epistemic weight of the broader field? In order for Equal Weight to have the skeptical implications Setiya holds that it does, there would need to be balanced accompanying proportions of ethicists on opposing sides of the relevant issues. And furthermore, the way that Setiya puts the challenge suggests that the range of the issues in ethics that admit of such disagreement is expansive. For the skeptical threat to be “devastating,” the disagreement must not only be roughly balanced but it must also be widespread – extending to many (or most?) issues in ethics.
So, when speaking of moral disagreement as widespread, I mean that not only are abortion, capital punishment, eating meat, and physician-assisted dying the loci of division among ethicists, much (most?) of ethics is characterized by similar disagreement. When speaking of moral disagreement as balanced, I mean that the number of ethicists on opposing sides of such issues must possess some unspecified degree of symmetry, where the strength of the skepticism depends upon that degree. Suspension of judgment arguably requires (at least) roughly proportionate numbers on both sides. The claim that we do not possess moral knowledge may not require proportionate numbers, but it does require some non-negligible amount of dissent. For if there turned out to be vanishingly small factions that diverge from an overwhelming majority on most moral issues, it is far from clear that even this weaker form of the conciliationist challenge would possess much force. After all, conciliationists would likely be reluctant to allow that the miniscule minority dissent regarding anthropogenic climate change in the scientific community means that climate scientists do not know that anthropogenic climate change is afoot.Footnote 17 The same might be said regarding moral issues: that is, it is unclear that even this weaker form of the conciliationist challenge would have purchase if we found that 90–95% of ethicists agree about the morality of a particular issue.
These considerations suggest that, should one find some form of conciliationism plausible, the number of ethicists on either side of moral issues is of substantial importance to the epistemic status of claims in moral philosophy. Katia Vavova spells out the implications:
At some point, we have to go out in the world and count those peers [in moral philosophy]…. [T]he numbers matter. It matters whether your peers disagree with you, but it also matters what proportion of your peers disagree with you. For controversial issues, it is likely that for every peer I find who disagrees with me, there is some other peer who agrees with me. Perhaps there are one hundred of us: half believe that p and half believe that not-p. If that is all that we know about the distribution of belief on this issue, we should be pushed toward agnosticism, as Conciliationism counsels. If instead we survey our peers and discover that 70 agree with us that p while only 30 disagree, a higher level of confidence may be rational. In that case, the fact that there are two or three or even 30 peers that disagree with me should not push me to agnosticism – though it may rightly push me to become less confident in p.Footnote 18
Richard Rowland, likewise, acknowledges the epistemic significance of the numbers for the conciliationist challenge as it regards both the public and moral philosophy, and maintains that they bear it out:
There is a good prima facie case for the view that conciliationism will have important implications for the epistemic status of our moral beliefs. Surveys seem to show that U.S. opinion splits close to 50/50 on the morality of abortion, the death penalty, same-sex relationships, and physician-assisted suicide. And according to a recent philpapers survey, tenured political philosophers split exactly 50/50 on whether justice requires equality and tenured moral philosophers split 35%/23%/12%/30% on whether deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics, or some ‘other’ view is the right view about normative ethics. These surveys seem to show that for any controversial moral view that we hold we have reason to believe that there is a substantial division of opinion amongst our epistemic peers about this moral issue.Footnote 19
Rowland’s acknowledgement of the epistemic significance of the numbers as well as his attempt to present data in support of the conciliationist challenge is commendable. However, we will see that, rather than finding similar evidence in moral philosophy – supporting the claim that it is relatively equally divided – the present studies suggest that philosophers are close to convergence, and even in some cases consensus, on a wide range of issues that have a reputation for interminable disagreement. On purportedly paradigm matters of moral disagreement such as abortion, capital punishment, eating factory-raised meat, same-sex marriage, physician-assisted death, euthanasia, and others, the picture that emerges is in substantial tension with standard speculations about disagreement in ethics.
2. The scope of disagreement among ethicists: study 1
2.1. Method
This study investigated what philosophical ethicists believe about moral matters by surveying 409 philosophers, with a special invitation to ethicists. In the interest of gaining a broad cross-section of participants, these were recruited from several popular philosophy channels, Leiter Reports and Daily Nous. 60.6% of participants said that the U.S. was their primary residence; 37.1% selected “other”; 2.2% selected “prefer not to say.” Only those responses with some formal claim to expertise were taken into account: those with Ph.D.’s in philosophy (69% of participants) and those with M.A.’s in philosophy (21%) – 364 participants in total. Of these 92% (336) claimed some area of ethics as a specialization or competence.
Participants were asked about their positions on a wide array of issues in ethics. On a number of prompts we followed the methods of Bourget and Chalmers, giving participants 5 choices: to declare that they “accept [position X],” “lean toward [position X],” “lean toward [position opposed to X],” “accept [position opposed to X],” “unsure/no opinion.” Other prompts gave 4 choices. For example, when asked whether “performing physician-assisted death…is generally morally permissible?” participants could respond: “yes,” “no,” “it depends,” “unsure/no opinion.” Questions about the legality of issues gave 3 options for responses. For example, when asked, “In general, do you think abortion should be legal or illegal during the 2nd trimester?” participants could respond: “generally legal,” “generally illegal,” “unsure/no opinion.”
2.2. Theoretical results
Though we found a great deal of agreement concerning applied issues, participants’ positions on ethical theory were, as expected, considerably more mixed. Some theoretical matters showed no signs of convergence. Most notable among these were the responses concerning the best normative theory. See Figure 1.
Figure 1. Normative theory.
The disagreement could scarcely be more evenly balanced.Footnote 20 So, while the conciliationist challenge will be seen to have less bearing on applied issues, these results provide reason to think that it possesses significant purchase at the level of normative theory. Views concerning the central justification of punishment were, similarly, a matter of fairly well-balanced disagreement (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Central justification of punishment.
Metaethical positions, however, admitted of far more agreement.Footnote 21 See Figure 3 for the results concerning moral realism. Similarly, metaethical cognitivism was the dominant position; see Figure 4.Footnote 22 Regarding realism/antirealism and cognitivism/noncognitivism, then, it is less clear that stronger forms of the conciliationist challenge possess much force.
Figure 3. Moral realism.
Figure 4. Metaethical cognitivism.
2.3. Applied results
Of most interest to the literature on moral disagreement, however, are the results concerning participants’ views on purportedly paradigm issues of disagreement in applied ethics.
2.3.1. Capital punishment
One of the alleged paradigm examples is capital punishment. Yet, far from finding balanced division on the matter, we found that a strong majority of philosophers hold that capital punishment should be illegal. See Figure 5. Since those who are unsure or have no opinion are neutral when it comes to their epistemic bearing on matters of disagreement for the conciliationist, we ought to look specifically just at those who were in favor and those who were against (hereafter “pro/contra”). See Figure 6.
Figure 5. Capital punishment (Legality).
Figure 6. Capital punishment pro/contra (Legality).
Among those who claim punishment as an area of specialization or competence, 85% held that capital punishment should be illegal. So, while some disagreement exists concerning the issue, there are signs of a dominant position among ethicists.Footnote 23 (Ethicists’ views on the morality of capital punishment and other issues on which Study 1 only probed legality, are addressed in Study 2.)
2.3.2. Abortion
A second purported paradigm example of moral disagreement is abortion. Here too dominant trends emerged. See Figure 7 for total results and Figure 8 for pro/contra results.
Figure 7. Abortion.
Figure 8. Abortion pro/contra (Study 1).
The number in favor of abortion rights increased when asked about whether abortion should be legal in the first trimester of pregnancy (see Figure 9). Taking just pro/contra, 91% were in favor of the legality of abortion within the first trimester. Support for the legality of abortion in the second trimester decreased considerably (pro/contra: 82.5%), and then dropped precipitously for the third trimester (pro/contra: 51%).Footnote 24
Figure 9. Abortion across trimesters (Legality).
Study 1 also investigated what participants held about the legality of abortion within specific scenarios. Should abortion be legal when the child would be born with a life-threatening illness, or in cases of rape or incest? See Figure 10.
Figure 10. Abortion in specific scenarios (Legality).
Pro/contra, 91% were in favor of the legality of abortion when the child would be born with a life-threatening illness. Pro/contra, 93% were in favor of the legality of abortion in cases of rape or incest. So, while abortion remains a contentious issue in some respects, there are a range of significant points of convergence concerning it.
2.3.3. Physician-assisted dying and euthanasia
A third family of issues that is standardly identified as a locus of moral disagreement is physician-assisted dying and euthanasia. Yet, there was a considerable amount of agreement on these issues among ethicists. Concerning the morality of physician-assisted dying, see Figures 11 & 12. Those sympathetic to physician-assisted dying increased when it came to the question of whether it should be legal. See Figures 13 & 14.
Figure 11. Physician-assisted death (Morality).
Figure 12. Physician-assisted death pro/contra (Morality).
Figure 13. Physician-assisted death (Legalilty).
Figure 14. Physician-assisted death pro/contra (Legality).
The results concerning physician-assisted dying correlated tightly with those regarding voluntary active euthanasia. On the morality of euthanasia, see Figures 15 & 16. Those sympathetic to the permissibility of euthanasia, likewise, increased when it came to the question of whether it should be legal. See Figures 17 & 18.
Figure 15. Voluntary active euthanasia (Morality).
Figure 16. Voluntary active euthanasia pro/contra (Morality).
Figure 17. Voluntary active euthanasia (Legality).
Figure 18. Voluntary active euthanasia pro/contra (Legality).
As with abortion, however, the amount of agreement takes a slight dip in all four categories when we look at the responses of those who claim physician-assisted dying or euthanasia as an area of competence or specialization. Regarding the morality of physician-assisted dying, when taking into account just pro and contra, 78% of specialists said it was morally permissible; 81% said that it should be legal. Regarding euthanasia, when taking into account just pro and contra, 80% of specialists said it was morally permissible, and 81% said that it should be legal.
2.3.4. Same-sex marriage
Same-sex marriage has also been identified as a locus of moral disagreement.Footnote 25 However, there was, again, a remarkable amount of convergence among ethicists on the issue. See Figure 19 for pro/contra results concerning whether governments are justified in prohibiting same-sex marriage, and Figure 20 concerning whether governments are justified in allowing same-sex marriage. Though what exactly constitutes a consensus is controversial, this seems an excellent candidate, and in fact, outpaces some recent estimates of the scientific consensus concerning anthropogenic climate change.Footnote 26
Figure 19. Prohibiting same-sex marriage pro/contra.
Figure 20. Allowing same-sex marriage pro/contra.
2.3.5. Eating meat and experimenting on animals
Eating meat is commonly viewed as a locus of moral disagreement. Yet, we found that a dominant position is present among ethicists concerning eating, specifically, factory-raised meat. See Figures 21 & 22. The numbers dramatically change when it comes to the results concerning the permissibility of consuming humanely raised meat. See Figures 23 & 24. Though other uses of animals were controversial,Footnote 27 using animals for cosmetics research was generally held to be morally impermissible. See Figures 25 & 26.
Figure 21. Consuming factory-raised meat.
Figure 22. Consuming factory-raised meat (pro/contra).
Figure 23. Consuming humanely raised meat.
Figure 24. Consuming humanely raised meat pro/contra.
Figure 25. Testing cosmetics on animals.
Figure 26. Testing cosmetics on animals pro/contra.
2.3.6. Gun rights
Though issues surrounding gun rights are not a paradigm locus of moral disagreement, it is certainly an issue that divides the U.S. society. According to a 2021 Pew Research study, only half of Americans (53%) favor stricter firearm laws.Footnote 28 But yet again, there was large-scale agreement among ethicists on firearm-related issues. The overwhelming majority of participants held that firearm laws, in general, should be more strict. See Figure 27.
Figure 27. Firearm laws.
There were, furthermore, a family of issues concerning firearm laws where a dominant view – and even consensus – were indicated by the responses. For example: banning the sale or possession of high-capacity firearm magazines; permitting court-ordered confiscation of guns from those who have been determined to be a danger to themselves or others; requiring a 30-day waiting period; raising the legal age to purchase firearms to 21. See Figure 28 for pro/contra results.
Figure 28. Misc. firearm laws pro/contra.
2.3.7. Mask requirements
While mask requirements in public buildings during the Covid-19 pandemic were controversial in many parts of the world, among ethicists there appears to be large-scale agreement that they were morally justified. See Figures 29 & 30.
Figure 29. Covid-19 mask requirements.
Figure 30. Covid-19 mask requirements pro/contra.
2.3.8. Vaccination
Some vaccination requirements are apparently controversial among ethicists: for example, whether there is a moral requirement to get the annual flu vaccine. The majority of participants said there was not a moral obligation to do this – 173. Yet, a much larger majority said (in 2022) that there was a moral requirement to get the Covid-19 vaccine. See Figures 31 & 32. Numbers were even higher concerning whether there is a moral obligation to have one’s children receive the MMR vaccine (measles, mumps, and rubella). See Figures 33 & 34.
Figure 31. Covid-19 vaccine.
Figure 32. Covid-19 vaccine pro/contra.
Figure 33. MMR vaccine.
Figure 34. MMR vaccine pro/contra.
2.3.9. CO2 emissions and carbon tax
Among the public, responses to climate change have been controversial – at least in certain nations. Rather than reducing emissions, some maintain that we should focus on adaptation; others maintain that we should hold out hope for geoengineering strategies. Yet, ethicists largely agree on what the international community’s primary response should be: namely, to reduce emissions. See Figure 35. These responses from the broader field reflect what those who claimed environmental ethics as an area of specialization held: among specialists 71% said emission reduction should be our primary response; 11% said we should explore geoengineering solutions; 8% said other; 6% said we should focus on adapting; 5% selected “unsure/no opinion.” Taking just reduction, geoengineering, adaptation, and other, that’s 75% in favor of emission reduction. Likewise, a decisive majority also held that we possess a moral obligation to lower our personal emissions. See Figures 36 & 37.
Figure 35. Response to climate change.
Figure 36. Reducing personal emissions.
Figure 37. Reducing personal emissions pro/contra.
3. The scope of disagreement among ethicists: study 2
3.1. Method
As the first study’s method of garnering participation was not ideal for attaining a random sample, I employed a more controlled and targeted sampling methodology in the second study. Rather than advertising the survey in philosophy fora, we solicited the participation of ethicists from a random sampling of 10 universities that grant Ph.D.’s in philosophy as well as a random sample of 18 colleges with philosophy departments. All institutions were in the United States. Of the 136 ethicists invited, 35% (48) participated.
The survey in this second study closely mirrored that of the first. However, a number of prompts in the first study were confined either to the legality or morality of certain issues. This may have raised the concern that the study did not always track moral judgments; rather, it sometimes tracked amoral judgments about the law. To address this, the second study used the same format of prompts as the first, but asked about both the morality and legality of every issue raised where this was appropriate. Some additional prompts were added, and others – e.g., concerning vaccination and mask requirements – were omitted.
3.2. Theoretical results
Each basic trend in ethical theory suggested by the first study replicated – though results differed to varying degrees when it came to the details. First, while we again found relatively balanced disagreement concerning normative theory, there were some mildly surprising results. Virtue theory received strong support with 10.6% of participants accepting it and an impressive 31.9% leaning toward it – 42.5% of total participants. When the 6% of participants who entered “unsure/no opinion” are removed, the endorsement of virtue theory rises to 44%. See Figure 38 for the rest of the results. See Figures 39 & 40 for results concerning moral realism and cognitivism – which replicated more closely. Throughout this section results from Study 1 will be set alongside results of Study 2 for ease of comparison.
Figure 38. Normative theory (Study 2).
Figure 39. Moral realism (Study 2).
Figure 40. Metaethical cognitivism (Study 2).
3.3. Applied results
Trends regarding applied results generally replicated even more closely than those regarding theory. The following consist largely in pro/contra results, as these are most relevant to the conciliationist challenge.
3.3.1. Capital punishment (Figure 41)
Figure 41. Capital punishment pro/contra (Legality) (Study 2).
3.3.2. Abortion
Participants were, again, largely pro-choice in their general stance toward abortion. See Figures 42 & 43. The number in favor of abortion rights, again, increased when the prompt concerned whether, in general, abortion should be legal in the first trimester of pregnancy. Trends concerning the legality of abortion across subsequent trimesters also replicated. Support for the legality of abortion in the second trimester decreased, then dropped substantially for the third trimester. See Figure 44. Trends concerning the morality of abortion closely reflected perspectives on its legality. See Figures 45 & 46.
Figure 42. Abortion (Study 2).
Figure 43. Abortion pro/contra (Study 2).
Figure 44. Abortion across trimesters (Legality) (Study 2).
Figure 45. Abortion in specific scenarios (Study 2).
Figure 46. Abortion (Morality; across Trimesters) (Study 2).
3.3.3. Physician-assisted death and euthanasia
Trends also replicated concerning physician-assisted death and euthanasia (Figures 47–50).
Figure 47. Physician-assisted death pro/contra (Morality) (Study 2).
Figure 48. Physician-assisted death pro/contra (Legality) (Study 2).
Figure 49. Voluntary active euthanasia pro/contra (legality) (Study 2).
Figure 50. Voluntary active euthanasia pro/contra (morality) (Study 2).
3.3.4. Same-sex marriage
In addition to prompts concerning the (un)justifiedness of governmental restrictions on same-sex marriage (see Figures 51 & 52), Study 2 included prompts concerning the morality of same-sex marriage and gay sex – neither of which were addressed in the first study. Though these issues are often regarded as a matter of substantial moral disagreement, there was consensus among ethicists concerning them. 98% of ethicists held that governments are justified in allowing same-sex marriage and that governments were not justified in prohibiting it. On the moral permissibility of same-sex marriage, see Figure 53. 100% of participants said governments were justified in allowing gay sex and that governments were not justified in prohibiting it. 93% held that it was morally permissible (pro/contra).
Figure 51. Prohibiting same-sex marriage (Study 2).
Figure 52. Allowing same-sex marriage pro/contra (Study 2).
Figure 53. Moral permissibility of same-sex marriage pro/contra (Study 2).
3.3.5. Eating meat and experimenting on animals
Trends replicated regarding the moral permissibility of consuming factory-raised meat.Footnote 29 See Figure 54. Using animals for cosmetics research was likewise generally held to be morally impermissible. See Figure 55.
Figure 54. Consuming factory-raised meat pro/contra (Study 2).
Figure 55. Using animals for cosmetic research pro/contra (Study 2).
3.3.6. Gun rights
Concerning gun rights, there was, again, widespread agreement among ethicists. The vast majority of participants held that firearm laws, in general, should be more strict. See Figures 56 & 57. 100% of the total participants were in favor of requiring background checks for all gun sales. Pro and contra, 100% were in favor of banning the sale of guns to those who have been determined to be a danger to themselves or others (Study 1: 98%).
Figure 56. Firearm laws (Study 2).
Figure 57. Misc. firearm laws (Study 2).
3.3.7. CO2 emissions and carbon tax
4. Discussion of results
There were a handful of issues upon which there was a roughly symmetrical balance among participants. In addition to the issues flagged above – i.e., normative theory, the central justification of punishment, and abortion in the third trimester – participants were split over the morality of giving preference to individuals on the basis of their race or gender in hiring and university admission, keeping animals in zoos, bringing back currently extinct species, reducing funding for the police,Footnote 30 and a few others. However, among the ∼100 issues probed in the study, the matters on which there were roughly balanced responses were a decisive minority. On most issues, a clear majority emerged, even if it would be too strong to call it a consensus.
Though more extensive investigation will be necessary to confirm what is suggested here, it is clear that the present studies imply that ethicists largely agree on a wide range of issues. Moreover, the replication of results across Study 1 and Study 2 suggests that it is likely that the results are representative of the broader field. Consequently, standard speculations about the scope of disagreement that the conciliationist challenge depends upon – i.e., that it is widespread and roughly balanced – appear to need considerable revision (Figures 58 & 59).
Figure 58. Response to climate change (Study 2).
Figure 59. Reducing personal emissions pro/contra (Study 2).
5. Are ethicists’ beliefs independent?
One concern that may be raised with both studies is that participants skew heavily toward the liberal side of the political spectrum. Results concerning political viewpoint replicated closely across the two studies. See Figures 60 & 61.
Figure 60. Political viewpoint (Study 1).
Figure 61. Political viewpoint (Study 2).
Participants were approximately ten times more likely to be liberal than conservative and approximately 25 times more likely to be very liberal than very conservative. Though they will find the following concern less than flattering, it may be that participants’ positions – and those of ethicists in general – are largely a registering of antecedently shared political/ideological commitments that have not been subjected to adequate scrutiny. Perhaps ethicists’ bases for their positions are merely post hoc rationalizations and, on account of this, lack independence. Adam Elga describes a group of advisors that embody a pronounced version of similar traits and argues that an important epistemic upshot holds concerning the group’s judgments.
[I]magine a cluster of advisors who you know exhibit an extreme form of groupthink: they always end up agreeing with one another. Now, you may well respect the opinions of that group. So you may well be moved if you find out that one of them disagrees with you about a particular issue. But suppose that you then find out that another member of the group also disagrees with you about that issue. That news does not call for any additional change in your view. For you knew in advance that the group members all think alike. So hearing the second dissenting opinion gave you no real new information.Footnote 31
While it may seldom be the case that philosophers wholly depend upon the testimony of other philosophers for their moral views – one way in which beliefs can lack independence – beliefs can lack independence for other reasons. For instance, beliefs can be at least partially a product of adherence to an unspoken orthodoxy within a group, or there may be the aforementioned antecedently shared political/ideological commitments. In any case, if a similar sort of phenomenon is at work within philosophical ethics, the conciliationist challenge may still have significant purchase in spite of the evidence we’ve seen of convergence. This is because a lack of independence would mean that even sweeping majorities would bear a reduced amount of epistemic weight.
There are at least four things to say in response. First, there is a case to be made that rationality requires us to ascribe some epistemic weight to additional peer judgments even if they lack a considerable degree of independence.Footnote 32 So, the proponent of the conciliationist challenge has more work to do in making the independence objection stick. Second, claiming that the moral judgments of philosophers lack independence would appear to be a dialectically ad hoc reaction to the case we have made above. For most authors that discuss moral disagreement take almost exactly the opposite position for granted: ethics exemplifies anything but groupthink. Like an alley full of stray cats, its practitioners are virtually never in large-scale agreement about non-trivial moral matters. It would be quite a surprising reversal, then, when confronted with the numbers, to maintain that ethics, in spite of what most have thought, in fact embodies a strong tendency toward groupthink.
Third, the two studies provide independent evidence to hold that participants are not like Elga’s advisors. For, as we saw, they are divided on a number of central issues in ethics: the best normative theory, the justification of punishment, and to a lesser degree, realism itself. If it were the case that philosophers are afflicted with a tendency toward groupthink, why hasn’t it permeated their thinking on these issues? Part of what makes the convergence we found on a variety of applied issues so interesting is that those of differing persuasions in normative theory hold that there are compelling, yet theoretically discrete, cases to be made concerning a wide range of those applied issues.Footnote 33
The differing views among philosophers concerning theoretical issues provide independent reason to think that they bear more similarity to a different sort of advisor Elga describes (2008):
In contrast, suppose that you receive an additional dissenting opinion from an advisor who formed her opinions completely independently from your first advisor. In that case, the second dissenting opinion does call for additional caution. The difference is that in this case you didn’t know in advance what conclusion the second advisor would reach…. The general point is that an additional outside opinion should move one only to the extent that one counts it as independent from opinions one has already taken into account.
If many ethicists arrive at their judgments regarding applied issues by deploying their preferred normative theory or justification of punishment, there is a significant sense in which their respective positions on those issues have a considerable measure of independence. Even if it would be implausible to maintain that ethicists opinions are formed “completely independently,” there is reason to think that they possess a significant measure of independence.
At the same time, it should be acknowledged that independence comes in degrees, and that there is clearly a sense in which shared commitments among philosophers may detract to some unspecified degree from the independence of their moral positions. Thoroughgoing independence is, of course, an ideal that presumably no one manages to fully achieve. The question we should ask, then, is: are ethicists’ moral judgments independent enough for them to carry significant epistemic weight? It seems that they are.
Fourth and perhaps most importantly, the formulation of the independence objection we are entertaining predicts a strong positive correlation between being conservative and taking standardly conservative ethical positions (as well as a correlation between being liberal and endorsing standardly liberal ethical positions). Yet, a participant’s being conservative consistently did not predict her position on many of the issues examined in the study. In fact, responses were not at all neatly divided along the lines of political persuasion. The following are pro/contra percentages of conservatives on a sampling of the aforementioned applied issues (ordered from most to least support among conservatives).
Firearm laws:
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–Firearm laws should be more strict.
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Study 1 Pro: 55%; Study 2 Pro: 25%
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–Banning those who are a danger to themselves from purchasing guns.
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Study 1 Pro: 90%; Study 2 Pro: 100%
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–Banning the sale of high-capacity magazines.
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Study 1 Pro: 50%; Study 2 Pro: 50%
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–Requiring background checks for all gun sales.
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Study 1 Pro: 80%; Study 2 Pro: 100%
Animals:
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–It is morally impermissible to use animals for cosmetics experimentation.
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Study 1: 62% agreed; Study 2: 100% agreed
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–It is morally impermissible to consume factory-raised meat.
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Study 1: 25% agreed; Study 2: 25% agreed
Same-sex marriage:
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–Governments are justified in allowing same-sex marriage.
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Study 1: 55% agreed; Study 2: 75% agreed
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–Gay sex is morally permissible.
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Study 1: N/A; Study 2: 75% agreed
Covid-19:
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–Mask policies were morally justified.
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Study 1: 67% agreed; Study 2: N/A
Climate Change:
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–Emissions-reduction is the most promising approach to climate change.
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Study 1: 58% agreed; Study 2: 25% agreed
Capital Punishment:
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–Capital punishment should be illegal.
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Study 1: 47% agreed; Study 2: 0% agreed
Physician-Assisted Death/Euthanasia:
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–Performing physician-assisted death is morally permissible.
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Study 1: 21% agreed; Study 2: 67% agreed
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–Performing voluntary active euthanasia is morally permissible.
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Study 1: 22% agreed; Study 2: 50% agreed
Abortion:
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–Pro-Choice.
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Study 1: 10% agreed; Study 2: 0% agreed
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–In general, abortion should be legal in the first trimester.
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Study 1: 11% agreed; Study 2: 75% agreed
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–In general, abortion is morally permissible in the first trimester.
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Study 1: N/A; Study 2: 75% agreed
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–Abortion should be legal when the pregnancy was caused by rape or incest.
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Study 1: 33% agreed; Study 2: 66% agreed
As can be seen, the prediction of the independence objection is not, in fact, borne out by conservative participants’ responses. On most controversial issues, an ethicist’s being conservative is simply not a good predictor of what her position will be.
6. What’s left of the conciliationist challenge?
Perhaps proponents of the conciliationist challenge would acknowledge that the evidence against the existence of widespread and roughly balanced disagreement in philosophical ethics is problematic for the stronger form of skepticism which demands that ethicists should suspend judgment on most moral propositions. However, proponents may still maintain that a weaker form of skepticism, which says that the disagreement we find on moral matters prevents us from having knowledge concerning them, would still be the appropriate response to the division we find in the field. So, while we may be more or less confident concerning the morality of eating factory-raised meat or capital punishment, for instance, we cannot rationally claim to know that these practices are wrong.
While this weaker form of the conciliationist challenge is more difficult to resist, it’s not clear how much of a challenge it really is. Both studies possessed prompts on the morality of a number of issues omitted in sections 2 and 3. In Study 2 in particular, participants were asked about the morality of once (and in some cases, presently) controversial issues: chattel slavery, using torture to punish, imprisoning or killing people for their religious beliefs (or lack thereof), female and male circumcision, subjecting children to dangerous labor, foot binding, using dead bodies to benefit the living, and other issues. Regarding chattel slavery, imprisoning or killing people for their religious beliefs (or lack thereof), and subjecting children to dangerous labor, 100% of participants agreed that these practices were immoral. So, even if we grant that one dissenting party within a large group of peers vitiates the possibility of knowledge for the group, there are nevertheless some moral propositions that remain unscathed.
However, it is implausible that the knowledge of such a group is hostage to, and can be vitiated by, the dissent of one or even several peers. If this were so, we would have to maintain that climate scientists have not known in the past – and likely still do not know – that anthropogenic climate change is afoot.Footnote 34 Similar examples in the sciences and elsewhere could be multiplied. Consequently, it is plausible that knowledge among ethicists can coexist with some small, unspecified margin of disagreement. Over 97% of participants in Study 2 held that, for instance, female circumcision, foot binding, and using torture to punish are immoral. It is highly plausible that the disagreement of the ∼3% does not vitiate the possibility of knowledge for the majority. And as we saw, there was similar consensus on a substantial number of prompts concerning gun rights, the legality of abortion in specific circumstances, and same-sex marriage.
The results concerning physician-assisted dying, other gun restrictions, voluntary active euthanasia, the use of animals in cosmetics research, and other issues were, as we saw, not far behind. What does the conciliationist challenge suggest about these latter? Can we be said to know, for instance, that capital punishment ought to be abolished when ∼15% of peers disagree? Such numbers are plausibly a problem for moral knowledge. Yet, such a concession does not seem to generate any formidable skeptical challenge. Even if we allow that such a margin of disagreement provides an occasion for some measure of doxastic caution, this is compatible with a comparatively substantial amount of confidence about the moral issue in question. At any rate, the margin of disagreement does not seem to threaten ethics with anything like a devastating skepticism. Instead, such judgments would appear to be appropriately measured responses to complex and difficult issues. But more importantly, as we have seen, the amount of agreement we find among ethicists suggests that even the weaker form of skepticism that denies that we have moral knowledge cannot be categorical. It extends only to a circumscribed – and possibly shrinking – range of issues. That is to say, it is unclear that this really is a form of skepticism worthy of the name, owing to its compatibility with a considerable amount of moral knowledge.
The results rehearsed above are, of course, incomplete. Both more comprehensive as well as longitudinal inquiry is required to further support the idea that there are dominant – and even converging – positions among ethicists. The results do suffice, however, to cast serious doubt upon common speculations about the scope of moral disagreement among ethicists which undergird the conciliationist skeptical challenge.
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