Introduction
It is a well-known fact that nowadays liberalism’s supporters have grown disillusioned with the direction the international system has taken. Post–Cold War optimismFootnote 1 has faded, revealing that Western liberal institutions lack the universality once assumed. Scholars increasingly voice concerns about rising authoritarianism globally,Footnote 2 framing it as a contest between democracies and autocracies.Footnote 3
Although international institutions now reflect democratic ideas more than ever,Footnote 4 democratic governance is in crisis. Many scholars explain this apparent paradox by noting that modernautocracies often imitate liberal principles without genuine commitment.Footnote 5 This undermines the stability of the liberal order, harming its rationality and efficacy as a governance system. This critique hinges on the concept of authenticity as a fundamental value of liberalism. This is seen as essential for achieving self-realisation of a subject and overall normative stability within a social context. Yet several questions remain: if autocracies’ attempts at imitation are well known within the international community, why do they continue to adopt liberal norms? Why is it so difficult for the liberal order to counter their insincerity? And why are the most successful autocratic regimes often precisely those most adept at maintaining this facade?
In this paper, I challenge the conventional framing of the issue and propose an alternative approach to understanding international political relations, focusing on the concepts of ‘profilicity’ and ‘performativity’.
This paper is primarily based on a theoretical argument, given the novelty of the concepts I introduce. However, I also provide some qualitative empirical analysis to better contextualise my argument within contemporary political relations. This serves to demonstrate how my theoretical framework can be applied to future, more empirically oriented research. Throughout the paper, I will mainly use examples related to democratic governance and free markets as they represent fundamental pillars of today’s Liberal International Order (LIO).
Ultimately, this paper aims to develop a more effective framework for explaining the mechanisms that enable autocratic states to operate within the liberal order, while also highlighting the shortcomings and weaknesses of the liberal system that these actors exploit.
The ‘sin’ of imitation
As Lührmann and Lindberg noted in their 2019 article on autocratisation, ‘while democracy has undoubtedly come under threat, its normative power still seems to force aspiring autocrats to play a game of deception’.Footnote 6 This quote encapsulates well modern liberal scepticism regarding the false commitment of autocratic countries to liberal norms. This concern stems, in modern literature, from the recognition, at the turn of the millennium, that liberalism was not expanding as rapidly as expected.Footnote 7 By the early 2000s, scholars began recognising that some authoritarian regimes had proven more resilient than expected in the post–Cold War landscape. Thomas Carothers famously declared the end of the ‘transition paradigm’ in 2002, dismissing the notion that democratic transitions only required proper management.Footnote 8 Researchers like Gandhi and Przeworski and Kendall-Taylor and Frantz observed that many autocracies had started routinely to adopt liberal governance practices to maintain their international image while resisting domestic reforms. Ultimately, these flexible authoritarian regimes proved to be successful, enhancing through these strategies both their survival perspectives as well as their influence.Footnote 9
These insights led to various complex taxonomies for regimes that failed to achieve democracy while moving away from strict repression as a hallmark of autocracy.Footnote 10 Scholars introduced terms like ‘imitation democracies’,Footnote 11 ‘competitive authoritarianism’,Footnote 12 and ‘defective democracies’.Footnote 13 Reviewing all these concepts is largely unproductive, as they often overlap and devolve into nominalism. Nevertheless, the rise of ‘democracies with adjectives’Footnote 14 underscored a significant point: a stable equilibrium existed between full democracy and classical autocracy, functional enough to grant international relations and domestic political stability.
Arguably, this worried both liberal scholars and politicians alike because they saw in such a tendency the weakening of the liberal system. The erosion of the ‘true spirit’ of democratic institutions was seen as harming the internal value of democratic governance.Footnote 15 Insincere mimicry empties democratic governance from its most essential nature, casting a shadow on its efficacy. This in turn hinders the expansion of the democratic model by discouraging its adoption.Footnote 16 Institutional deterioration and insincere emulation are, on many occasions, also seen as a threat to international governance.Footnote 17 For years, scholars have argued that global liberal governance was not only useful for democracy consolidation but also a democratising process in itself.Footnote 18 Insincere engagement by autocratic actors towards international governance diminishes and spoils common institutions,Footnote 19 preventing the development of a legitimate rule-of-law-based institutional order.Footnote 20
From its inception, liberalism aspired to universalism, believing that the value of internationalism lies in creating institutional orders recognised and accepted by the entire community.Footnote 21 Until a model exists as a stable alternative, even as a minority position, liberalism is indirectly failing because it either cannot achieve its universality goals or it is capped over the rate of its expansion.
The anxiety within liberal politics regarding the unauthentic use of liberal values is not merely about power relations but about maintaining control over the evolution of normative legitimacy standards. Krastev and Holmes (2019, 126) capture this concern: ‘What scares most liberals is not the fact that Russia will run the world but that most of the world will be run like Russia runs its affairs.’ Thus, legitimate affiliation with liberal institutions requires more than a formal commitment to procedures and rituals; it demands authenticity. Liberals must actively collaborate in the expansion, reproduction, and growth of the liberal project towards the ultimate goal of universality. If this tension is not achieved, then the soundness of the liberal project is in a crisis.
The liberal doctrine of self-realisation and its role in international theory
International liberalism’s concern with the idea of authenticity is not necessarily a recent development per se. On the contrary, it has deep roots in classical liberal culture. Thinkers like John Stuart MillFootnote 22 viewed authenticity as central to personal autonomy. Charles Taylor said: ‘Authenticity is a facet of modern individualism … and emphasizes the freedom of the individual to propose of society’.Footnote 23 Habermas connected authenticity to ethical political processes,Footnote 24 and Rawls emphasised that individuals in ‘well-ordered societies’ always ‘enjoy autonomy as authenticity’ and that ‘with respect to this desire when they reflect on their sense of justice, they see themselves as having reasons to bolster and maintain it’.Footnote 25 Collectively, the perspectives from these thinkers upheld authenticity as a liberal ideal, affirming its pursuits as the only valid conduit to self-realisation within society.
This is a key theoretical assumption in the contemporary critique of international liberalism regarding autocratic politics: imitation and conformism conflict with the goal of fostering individual self-realisation within the community. Such actions fail to express individual autonomy, ultimately undermining core liberal goals like self-determination and freedom. Traditional arguments about individualism, authentic commitment, and self-realisation have been well integrated into international theory by prominent schools of thought. Although a comprehensive mapping of this process is beyond the scope of this paper, it is beneficial to review some key relevant literature.
John Ikenberry is probably the author who most effectively adapted classical liberalism to international theory,Footnote 26 arguing that liberalism’s genuine commitment to shared norms builds legitimacy and institutional resilience. While countries like China (or Russia) may exploit the open system temporarily, Ikenberry suggests that autocracies will eventually be unable to sustain such opportunism long-term and will need to commit to shared institutions due to the normative pressures of the liberal order.Footnote 27
Keohane, a key figure in neoliberal institutionalism, sees the pursuit of individual objectives as a coordination problem.Footnote 28 Even as hegemony declines, states benefit from cooperation through institutions that reduce uncertainty, provide stability, and enable open negotiations of individual interests and preferences. Exploitative and deceitful strategies in this process are punished by exclusion, resulting in a net loss of individual welfare.
Close to Keohane’s view is also the liberal constructivism perspective. Authors like Thomas RisseFootnote 29 and Jens Steffek,Footnote 30 drawing on Habermas, argue that a legitimate political order can only be achieved through shared ownership of normative values and consensus. Honest and open negotiation of interests is essential, as established common norms prevent exploitative behaviours by appealing to clear and stable values.
Andrew Moravcsik, drawing, on the contrary, from Isaiah Berlin, argues that harmonious coordination in a liberal society is not always possible.Footnote 31 While his approach is more pragmatic than mainstream liberalism, it still centres on the pursuit of freely defined individual goals. He contends that what states do is determined by what they aspire to as individual aims, valuesm and objectives (‘Variation in ends, not means, matters most’Footnote 32). However, as I argue later, this view does not fully apply to modern international relations.
From this literature, it is possible to understand that states that engage in liberal practices without a genuine commitment therefore not only lack legitimacy but are even perceived as a disruptive factor by the rest of the community. Liberal powers will never be able to accept anything less than a full, genuine, authentic commitment to liberal ideas because its absence will always destabilise the basis of their political project.
Two paradoxes of authenticity
The liberal view romanticises authenticity and champions individualism as an ideological driver to promote shared values. However, more effective frameworks exist for understanding modern international politics. I argue that this emphasis on authenticity leads to paradoxical conclusions, reflecting its inadequacy in today’s context.
To understand these paradoxes, one can analyse the positions of countries like Russia and China within the modern liberal international order (LIO). These countries have frequently been accused of imitating liberal practices, institutions, and language.Footnote 33 As autocracies in a liberal system, Moscow and Beijing face the choice of either imitating systemic behaviour to construct adequate interactions with other members or attracting hostility due to their anti-systemic attitudes. Embracing their non-liberal cultures while adhering to the LIO would be counterproductive; openly anti-systemic aspirations would only cement their status as marginalised actors, limiting their agency and potential for growth.
The paradox arises because, to be considered valid (and therefore authentic) by liberal internationalism, Moscow and Beijing must pursue agendas that ultimately undermine their standing in the community. This is particularly paradoxical by Moravcsik’s or Keohane’s standards, as it requires these countries to act against their own preferences and individual aspirations. Feldman (Reference SImon2014) argues that the blind pursuit of authenticity succeeds only when dissenting or deviant positions are deemed illegitimate. By the same token, states in the LIO are recognised as authentic only when they internalise the hegemonic norms of the system.
The inadequacy of the idea of authenticity to speak about politics in international relations is not, however, limited to autocratic behaviour but extends also to democracies. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been no shortage of questionable politics promoted by democratic states. A few examples of those are the invasion of Afghanistan, the Kosovo intervention, extraordinary renditions and torture,Footnote 34 and extraterritorial killings.Footnote 35 If we include the Cold War period, the list gets even longer and more troubling. It would be bizarre at best to justify the existence of these government programmes and policies on the grounds of a ‘lack of authenticity’ on the part of otherwise ‘authentically’ democratic states. These policies were perpetrated because they were deemed useful and viable ways to pursue the countries’ best interests. It would be unethical to employ authenticity to create a narrative that diminishes or even downplays the responsibility of decision-makers in this regard. As I will argue later, state actions are driven by the need to consolidate identity and relations within the community. Anti-democratic policies by democratic states are not about self-discovery or moral commitment but rather about navigating social relations within complex structures, based on an understanding of what is permissible and a state’s position in the social order.
The authenticity argument emphasises a qualitative distinction between ‘genuine democratic actors’ and inauthentic imitators, but it often raises more questions than it answers. The binary classification of genuine democratic behaviour versus autocratic mimicry is less conceptually useful than it may appear. I argue that in modern international politics, liberal values like democracy emphasise reproduction and influence over true adherence to norms. The divide between democratic and autocratic regimes hinges less on principles and more on an actor’s ability to replicate system-friendly behaviours to enhance its status within the community. As Baudrillard noted, in late modernity, the concepts of ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ become irrelevant: ‘The original [in our times] no longer even exists, since things are conceived from the beginning as a function of their unlimited reproduction.’Footnote 36
Relying on the authenticity paradigm has notable pitfalls, which I will detail further later in the article. Here, it is essential to recognise that labelling autocratic behaviour as merely ‘inauthentic’, such as ‘inauthentic liberalism’, is dangerously dismissive. This framing suggests that autocratic socialisation is suboptimal compared to a presumed ‘authentic’ liberal standard. This limits scholars’ understanding of autocratic agency and socialisation dynamics. Both political leaders and scholars risk confusing socialisation patterns with mere opportunism. As Kissinger noted in A World Restored, during the 19th-century European revolutionary wars: ‘The defenders of the status quo tend to treat revolutionary powers as though their objections were merely tactical … but it is the essence of a revolutionary power to have the courage of its convictions … to push its principles to their ultimate end.’Footnote 37 Academics have often viewed China and Russia’s engagement with international norms as opportunistic, dismissing their policies as ‘inauthentic’ and lacking substance.Footnote 38 In doing so, many replicate the mistake Kissinger identified when analysing the consequences of the Napoleonic wars on the European system. I contend that a new theoretical framework can provide valuable insights into socialisation and normativity in international politics, offering a more accurate depiction of current political dynamics and equilibria.
Profilicity (an essential concept)
To begin my analysis, I introduce the concept of profilicity. This will help highlight how reproduction, rather than authenticity, is central to modern international politics. Developed by Möller and D’AmbrosioFootnote 39 from Luhmann’s system theory, profilicity offers an alternative to the ‘true self’ doctrine of social identity. Instead of discovering and committing to a unique sense of self, people often construct their identity through self-profiling. The term ‘profilicity’ stems from ‘profile’, reflecting Möller and D’Ambrosio’s critique of modern media communication. According to the authors, individuals do not have a unified, coherent self but instead present a fragmented set of profiles, tailored to the platforms and social spaces they access. Rather than faithfully expressing individuality, the most successful identities in modern society are those that maximise external acknowledgement. Status and popularity are not derived from self-realisation, but from adopting behaviours that elevate one’s standing among peers within specific contexts.
To activate these mechanisms, individuals must acquire what Niklas Luhmann termed ‘second-order observations’. The German sociologist developed this concept to illustrate that decision-making in contemporary complex social systems is not solely driven by individual aspirations and preferences. Instead, individual actions are influenced by the evaluations and responses of third parties, essentially: ‘what others say or do not say’ about those actions.Footnote 40 This perspective stands in stark contrast to Moravcsik’s arguments regarding the drivers of political action.Footnote 41 This dynamic is particularly evident in modern politics. Agenda-setting in modern elections, for instance, is rarely spontaneous or dictated solely by a single candidate’s will. Rather, it is shaped through multiple rounds of observation and evaluation, focusing on what will enhance the candidate’s status in the eyes of the electorate.
It is important to note that ‘profilicity’ is not a degradation of the authenticity paradigm but rather an evolution of it. As society became increasingly complex, this complexity necessitated new social technologies to facilitate meaningful social interactions and prevent the breakdown of social relations:
[As] the self became more complex. eventually, the smith could no longer simply be a smith – and to be named Smith no longer provided social identification … In late modern societies, people change jobs with increasing frequency … Consequently, a sincere commitment to social roles and functions becomes less and less determining of identity. Footnote 42
Moeller and D’Ambrosio argue that individuals in complex social environments struggle to assert their individuality due to the overwhelming amount of communication and information. Rigid individual commitments can negatively affect social dynamics, failing to reconcile the contradictions of late modern life and potentially leading to social breakdown. To navigate this complexity and prevent systemic failures, social systems create secondary observation and evaluation mechanisms.Footnote 43 These mechanisms simplify vast information into manageable units, aiding self-reflection and decision-making. In International Relations (IR), examples include democracy scores like V-Dem and Polity, which help individuals form judgements about global democratic governance without needing to analyse each regime in detail. They also establish thresholds and standards for high or low status within the democratic community. This formalisation (among many other examples) allows states to develop a specialised understanding of how to interact effectively with their environment by grasping its ecological rules.Footnote 44 More specifically, in the context of democratic governance, formalising assessment criteria enables secondary observersFootnote 45 (states) to gain insights into the actions necessary for recognition as a high-status democratic regime.Footnote 46
The key takeaway from the concept of profilicity is that, in complex late modern social environments, individuals no longer need to discover themselves to build their identity. Instead, they focus on identifying what maximises external recognition, seeking approval and desired reactions from the community.
Profilicity and international politics
Profilicity is particularly suitable for modern international relations because today’s international system lacks absolute and stable principles to determine the recognition of subjectivityFootnote 47 and agency.Footnote 48 In the modern age, the subjectivity of the state was firmly based on the concept of sovereignty as a self-referential mechanism of identification. Sovereignty was also the absolute prerequisite for the agency of the subjects within the international sphere. Instrumental to achieving this was the capacity to conduct war and to mobilise large amounts of resources. Arguably states are the product of war,Footnote 49 and their legitimacy relied for a long time, mainly, on the capacity to use organised violence.Footnote 50 In the modern Westphalian system, the subjectivity of the state was based on its routine capacity to partake in international security affairs, exercising armed violence on an international level.
In the current liberal system, however, this is not the case anymore. Today a state’s subjectivity and agency within the international system cannot be based in a self-referential manner only on territorial control and legitimate violence. On the contrary, subjectivity (and sovereignty itself, for what is worth) relies on a multiplicity of relations with other international subjects which are subsequently conducive to inclusion in the community. States seek memberships in organisations like the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), adhere to international agreements, and conduct trade relations because this is what contributes to consolidating their identity as subjects in international society.Footnote 51 Losing the capacity to administer and enforce legal rules on a territory would have resulted in the past in security problems for a state, exposing them to conquest and invasion. Today, this is not necessarily the case. State-building missions support the subjectivity of troubled members of the community as long as they do not adopt an openly anti-social stance towards the main normative principles of the system.
To achieve the multiplicity of relations needed for constructing their subjectivity, states engage in governance processes and implement institutional practices. These actions help them create relational ties with other members and subgroups within the community. This in turn generates collective acknowledgement and stabilises their identity within cultural niches. Just as Möller and D’Ambrosio have anticipated, the need for profilicity in international politics is the product of the increased level of complexity in the system. Trade, security, and development policies might have (and indeed do have) contradictory codes and objectives. It is not possible to manage this increasing complexity under the guise of authenticity and sincere commitment. Social relations would collapse very fast under the weight of contradictory needs and directives. This means that states necessarily have to engage in socialisation at the international level on a fragmented basis, not as a unitary monolitic activity. For example, if an actor wanted to engage economically only partners that respect and defend international human rights, this would immediately create considerable problems, not only because a lot of countries that have resources do not have a stellar record with human rights but also because even many liberal democracies have a less-than-perfect history in this regard. Trade would slow downn and the community would experience a breakdown of social relations in this system.
Profilicity instead can opt out of this problem. In profilic trade relations, states do not need to account in front of the community for the entirety of their identity all the time but only for their relevant profiles. To act within the trade system, states do not take into consideration the observation of every piece of social norm by trade partners. Deontic rules for economic gains through trade are formulated first and foremost within the trading system itself and reflect the need of the states to establish successful and functional trade exchanges.Footnote 52
An extreme example of profilicity in modern international relations is the insistence of autocratic countries on defining themselves as democracies. Observing the behaviour and rhetoric of prominent autocrats like Russia and China reveals their ongoing efforts to engage with international democratic standards. Recently, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated:
Russia is an absolutely democratic country and very strong, very proud and very free people live in Russia. Footnote 53
Not long ago, moreover, in its white paper on the nature of democracy, China wrote:
China’s democracy is thriving alongside those of other countries in the garden of civilizations. China stands ready to contribute its experience and strength to global political progress through cooperation and mutual learning. Footnote 54
In February 2022, the countries even released a joint statement in which they declared:
The sides note that Russia and China as world powers with rich cultural and historical heritage have long-standing traditions of democracy … Russia and China guarantee their people the right to take part through various means and in various forms in the administration of the State and public life in accordance with the law. Footnote 55
The ‘genuine’ commitment of Russia and China to democratic values is not the primary focus of these statements, as no one seriously believes these states are truly dedicated to democratic principles. However, both autocracies and the international system benefit from this discourse. For the international system, such rhetoric sustains the normative structures upon which it is built. As noted above, profilic systems rely on mechanisms of reproduction rather than authenticity. Thus, it is acceptable for China and Russia to discuss democracy, as this reinforces the idea that democracy serves as the appropriate framework for articulating political positions, agenda goals, and legitimacy judgements. For Russia and China, engaging with these concepts helps solidify their identity as legitimate actors within the system, enabling them to advance claims and demands in the global community while avoiding exclusion and exercising agency in shaping social structures and power relations.
Performativity as a mechanism for identity building
In the previous sections, I explored the importance of acquiring the codes and norms crucial for the construction of a profile. However, establishing a social identity also requires effectively utilising these codes to navigate social interactions. In this section, I will focus more on the reproduction of these codes. As Moeller and D’Ambrosio aptly observe, ‘identity is achieved as the integrated individual psychological experience of selfhood and its social performance Reference Pada2023’. Consequently, I will concentrate here on the concept of ‘performativity’, which is integral to building identity in today’s international politics. Performativity refers to the externalisation of knowledge that individuals have acquired about what constitutes successful behaviour. This concept encompasses both the theatrical aspect of enacting a performance and the practical aspect of performing tasks to achieve a desired outcome.Footnote 56 In summary, consolidating a social role or identity involves integrating the relevant knowledge from one’s cultural niche. This knowledge must then be reproduced in a performative way to establish beneficial social relationships with others.
Niklas Luhmann and other scholars (e.g. LatourFootnote 57) have extensively discussed how knowledge diffuses within cultural systems, utilising various media (e.g. money). However, language plays a privileged role in this process as it is the primary vehicle for circulating and socialising knowledge among actors. The semantic meanings of language inherently guide behaviour and interaction, particularly in executing key actions and collective tasks.Footnote 58 In international politics, normative language regarding principles and institutions primarily drives socialisation dynamics and interaction mechanisms. For instance, understanding the concept of ‘free market’ involves acquiring task-oriented knowledge for successful interactions that generate economic surplus and material welfare. Similarly, the concept of ‘democracy’ encompasses strategies for political decision-making aimed at ensuring socio-political stability.
Understanding these semantic meanings requires states to learn the related interaction strategies and demonstrate their ability to apply them to foster effective social relationships. Outsiders, like authoritarian states in the LIO, must show they can understand and reproduce the community’s norms to fit in and gain acceptance. However, powerful actors can manipulate common normative knowledge to align with their goals, without needing to fully adapt. This creates a power competition at a meta-level to define the community’s normative knowledge. Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu referred to this as the ‘power to name’.Footnote 59 The authority to define concepts like ‘democracy’ or ‘free market’ has significant consequences for identity recognition and social status.
Profiling one’s identity to fit performative interactions can offer advantages but ultimately places individuals in a passive role, constantly adjusting to the community’s evolving standards. In contrast, setting norms allows one to shape others’ identities and behaviours, leading to greater influence. Norm-setters exercise disciplinary and exclusionary power, deciding what is legitimate and, in turn, who should be rewarded or repressed. High-status actors like the EU and the United States thus have an interest in shaping shared norms to serve their agendas, knowing that many will align with them to gain status and recognition.
Powerful and resourceful actors with competing or irreconcilable agendas (like the EU and Russia or China) may find themselves locked in competition to establish the legitimacy of practices and strategies associated with common normative concepts. The most widespread strategy used by states in this competition is to undermine each other based on performative standards. They may accuse one another of actions that are not in line with the legitimate nature of the principles they are expected to uphold in order to successfully claim agency and status within a community. This can ultimately destabilise their individual profiles, undermining their identities and indirectly affecting their standing within society.
One of the best examples of this is the frequent accusations that Russia and China levelled at the West in regard to international trade, economic relations, and their role within the international political order. Speaking about the new US trade strategy, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin has recently declared:
to politicize, instrumentalize, and weaponize economic and trade issues, with the aim of monopolizing one’s own development advantages … deprives 7 billion people worldwide of the right to pursue a happy life … We must advocate an inclusive economic globalization, firmly oppose anti-globalization and pan security, oppose various forms of unilateralism and protectionism. Footnote 60
Similarly, Russia has accused Western countries of imposing its own economic and political models, fostering the colonial domination and subjugation of the Global South:
Our future is being shaped by a struggle, between the Global Majority in favour of a fairer distribution of global benefits and civilisational diversity, and the few who wield neocolonial methods of subjugation … However … states constituting the global majority are strengthening their sovereignty … his is an excellent response to those who divide the world into ‘democracies’and ‘autocracies’ (author’s emphasis) and dictate their neo-colonial ‘rules’ to others. Footnote 61
These accusations stem from the assumption that Western countries are underperforming according to shared normative codes, such as market neutrality and respect for sovereign independence. These principles are universally recognised in the LIO as essential for achieving high status and recognition. The aim of these accusations is to challenge the Western monopoly on defining standards for common social norms, thereby allowing Moscow and Beijing to gain greater influence in shaping these practices. In the next section, I will explain how these elements interconnect, illustrating how profilicity and performativity create a cycle of normative adaptation that influences contemporary international politics.
Socialisation under profilic conditions: Adoption, performance, and adaptation
I will now bring everything together to outline my socialisation model. Profilicity and performativity are two moments of identity building in late modernity which can generate durable and continuous relations. They work in tandem and influence each other. In this section, I will concentrate on how they come together to explain socialisation in international politics.
Many IR scholars have examined this topic through the lenses of role theory, emphasising how agents and structures co-create one another.Footnote 62 While I do not entirely reject the concept of roles (since constructing a profile involves performing a social role), role theory’s focus on identity formation through role adoption raises concerns about the coherence of a subject’s multiple selves. This theory emphasises ‘commitment’ to roles and the relation that this has with the stability of the self. Theorists discuss concepts like ‘master role’ and view internal identity contradictions as potentially destabilising for individuals since the role shapes the nature of the individual.Footnote 63
By using ‘profiles’ instead of ‘roles’, it is possible to avoid the need for a unified self for states. These can hold contradictory profiles without needing to adopt a ‘master role’ and contradictory behaviours can persist as long as they are functional to avoid systemic breakdown.Footnote 64 Today’s complex international environment makes reconciling these contradictions impractical, as attempting to unify all facets would collapse social relations. Instead, relations unfold through parallel performative schemes, enabling agents to interact.
Socialisation under profilic conditions occurs in three distinct stages. As mentioned earlier, self-profiling involves acquiring relevant knowledge to initiate and maintain meaningful relationships within a specific cultural niche. The first crucial stage for newcomers is adopting these behavioural schemes. For instance, a state seeking access to international markets must learn the necessary information about customs, certifications, and payment mechanisms to be recognised as a legitimate commercial actor. This knowledge allows individuals to construct a functional profile for initiating interactions. Without a proper profile, an actor cannot be recognised by the system as a valid participant and thus cannot exercise agency. This highlights how the profilicity framework differs from classical post-constructivist or postmodernist approaches: self-profiling is not solely an individual experience but is influenced by systemic constraints and regulations that must be navigated for success.
Once the first stage is consolidated, the subject can move to the second stage: performativity. Having agency within a system means, first of all, having the capacity to act within it, taking advantage of the resources and benefits the system offers. This, as I mentioned, is conditional to setting up and performing the intended interaction patterns as defined by systemic normative knowledge. In the context of market relations, this entails the ability to perform economic transactions as the main shared task of the community. This includes a series of subtasks like guaranteeing payments, guaranteeing the functioning of trade infrastructures, and guaranteeing a certain level of safety and stability as well as adequate property rights. Performing all the needed tasks and patterns is aimed, theoretically, at generating higher levels of welfare and surplus for the partners in a stable and predictable way.Footnote 65
Most importantly, however, once an actor has acquired agency through performing successful interaction patterns, this allows them to influence the foundational knowledge that determines the dynamics of the system in which they operate (third stage). Since knowledge is always dynamic, actors can initiate and manage adaptation processes.Footnote 66 This processes usually involve challenging the existing status quo and its representatives based on their performance. This strategy entails that the groups’ existing normsand their supporters are inadequate or poorely suited to fullfil the intended goals. In such a situation states that seek an higher status may have an interest in challeging the status quo.
Critique creates space for reshaping and adapting common normative knowledge to new standards. However, these new standards need to appear as a credible alternative in terms of achieving some kind of desirable output or task. Blatantly and extremely idiosyncratic behaviour cannot believably have any influence. For this reason, it is also better to look at countries like China or Russia rather than, for instance, North Korea. Pyongyang’s model of interaction is so eccentric and extreme that it both brings little concrete benefit to the subject and it is not able to create a credible alternative to mainstream knowledge for performing common interactions.
I will now conclude by presenting a case study that relates to the different stages of the socialisation model. This case study will illustrate why, under these conditions, liberal normativity and the structure of the liberal order face inherent disadvantages and are likely to experience progressive deterioration in the future.
Case studies: Authoritarian socialisation and other weaknesses of the liberal order
It is urgent for the literature to develop innovative approaches to studying socialisation patterns in light of the growing success of authoritarian states. Contrary to Keohane’sFootnote 67 and Ikenberry’sFootnote 68 predictions, the decline of Western (primarily American) hegemony has not led to stronger independent institutions. Instead, we are witnessing a hostile takeover by authoritarian states seeking to align their rising influence with institutional control.Footnote 69 Additionally, contrary to Risse’sFootnote 70 and Steffek’sFootnote 71 expectations, the introduction of stable, liberal-inspired normative standards has not stabilised international politics. Instead, the literature reveals that autocratic regimes are increasingly leveraging liberal concepts to negotiate their own legitimacy within these liberal frameworks.Footnote 72
Failing to update current frameworks for discussing socialisation on the international stage can have significant repercussions for both scientific research and policy. Scientifically, this oversight may lead to inaccurate classifications of autocratic countries’ roles and agendas within the international system. A prime example is the ongoing and inconclusive debate over whether subversive actors like China and Russia are revisionist or conservative powers.Footnote 73 This dichotomy is not only misguided but also fails to capture the essence of these states’ strategies towards the LIO. As China and Russia learn to engage with systemic socialisation patterns, their success grows, leading them to increasingly rely on common norms and concepts to bolster their legitimacy and policy claims. From a policy perspective, this suggests that autocracies will likely intensify their use of liberal normative concepts in diplomatic and political campaigns against the established status quo, especially if liberal powers continue to weaken. Addressing the rise of authoritarian engagement will require robust discussions about new strategic frameworks from liberal powers.
In the next two sections, I will present my case studies to illustrate how profilicity and performativity provide a useful framework for addressing these challenges. I will first focus on Russia and China, two of the most influential authoritarian actors, as they currently exert a significant impact on the evolution of international governance and norms. By examining the roles of Moscow and Beijing today, I will show how these countries have adopted the interaction patterns embedded within the LIO and then adapted them to serve their own interests.
In the second section, I will apply my framework to less prominent autocratic actors. The key difference between Russia and China and smaller autocracies lies in their broader ambitions. Moscow and Beijing, as high-level powers, must engage more systematically with liberal values like democracy and human rights in their pursuit of higher status in the international hierarchy, where these norms are central. In contrast, countries like Qatar and Turkey adopt a more selective approach to self-profiling, focusing on narrower goals that allow for more strategic engagement with liberal norms.
Examining these countries is important for two key reasons.
First, their role as mid-level powers challenges the possibility that the mechanisms described in this paper are exclusive to superpowers like Russia and China. On the contrary, I argue that these mechanisms reflect broader socialisation processes that extend beyond top autocratic players such as Moscow and Beijing.
Second, Qatar and Turkey serve as valuable case studies because, unlike autocratic states that isolate themselves from the liberal system (such as Eritrea or North Korea), both actively engage with it. They pursue proactive foreign policies with direct effects on EU political dynamics, as I will elaborate later.
Turkey is an authoritarian country that remains deeply embedded in Western institutions – it is a NATO member, formally it is still a candidate in the EU membership process, and it is a key EU partner in managing migration routes and Middle Eastern politics. Similarly, Qatar has emerged as a regional powerhouse, successfully positioning itself as a key actor in international affairs. It has also managed to establish its media network, Al Jazeera, as an important opinion-maker which actively shapes political discourse in many Western democracies.Footnote 74
I will conclude the second section by exploring why the self-profiling behaviours of autocracies are successful and how they exploit the structural weaknesses of Western liberal models, which are typically based on an authentic commitment to common normative knowledge and institutions, as argued by liberal IR scholars.
From adoption to adaptation: The rise of Russia and China
As the Cold War ended at the beginning of the 1990s, liberal governance expanded incredibly fast to the rest of the world.Footnote 75 With the failure of the Communist Bloc, it seemed that the Western model was the best if not the only option that states had to achieve a stable political equilibrium and reasonable levels of material welfare. Many states, especially newcomers, started to adopt democratic rhetoric to construct their own liberal identity and seek access to political and market structures connected with the Western world. China and Russia during most of the 1990s managed to profile themselves in a way that was convincing enough for the rest of the world, depicting themselves as the rising stars of the global democratisation and liberalisation processes.
Famously Clinton said about China in relation to its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO):
By joining the W.T.O., China is not simply agreeing to import more of our products; it is agreeing to import one of democracy’s most cherished values: economic freedom. Footnote 76
Similarly, in regard to Russia, Clinton said:
A great deal of the 21st century will be strongly influenced by the success of the Russian people in building a modern, strong, democratic nation … many people across the world have sought to support your efforts, sharing with you a sense of pride when democracy is advanced. Footnote 77
Moscow and Beijing willingly constructed profiles by quickly learning how to engage with the West on the basis of its own fundamental tenets and values. The idea was that reproducing the right signals and patterns would facilitate the engagement of high-profile actors (like the EU and the US), speeding up the consolidation of their role within the post–Cold War equilibrium:
Russia has made its choice in favour of democracy. Fourteen years ago, independently, without any pressure from outside, it made that decision … This is our final choice, and we have no way back. Footnote 78
We believe that without democracy there can be no modernization. We will ensure that our people hold democratic elections, make policy decisions democratically, carry out democratic management and supervision and enjoy extensive rights and freedoms under the law. Footnote 79
More than an authentic moral commitment to liberal democracy, Russia’s and China’s concern was to access social spaces and resources connected with the liberal order while implementing at the same time institutional practices that could take care of its needs for political stability and economic growth. At the time, it seemed that failing to adopt liberal economic and political schemes would have resulted in automatic isolation and repression. Moscow and Beijing demonstrated a remarkable capacity to reshape their own diplomatic strategies to engage meaningfully with international institutions and Western partners.Footnote 80 This won them a considerable position in the economic and institutional space of the expanding new order.
Over time, these countries stabilised their social positions by accessing international markets and other institutional spaces. This has allowed them to narrow the technological and security gaps, gaining greater autonomy within the community. Today, China and Russia are deeply embedded in the liberal order, engaging in governance activities alongside other global actors to maintain their status. Opting out would lead to isolation or increased transactional costs, so they have learned to navigate and function within this system. Their success stems not only from their substantial power and resources but primarily from their ability to use liberal tools to further their own interests and agendas.Footnote 81 They have demonstrated notable proficiency in various aspects of liberal international life, allowing them to secure their status and resist Western normative pressure. Consequently, these autocracies have effectively adapted liberal tools to their needs, and their success has enabled them to criticise liberal countries, transforming from embodiments of liberalising subjects into systemic rivals:
In this global village, all human beings are one big family…Such a vision rises above the exclusive rules of bloc politics, the notion of might makes right, and the “universal values” defined by a handful of Western countries. Footnote 82
The United States and its satellites have taken a steady course towards hegemony The world is too complicated and diverse to be subjected to one system … the West has achieved [this] by robbing colonies for several centuries. This is a fact. Footnote 83
The influence of Russia and China extends today much further than just provocative accusations. Their impact is evident across various domains, including international health governance,Footnote 84 emerging regulations in internet governance and data sharing,Footnote 85 trade,Footnote 86 and development policies.Footnote 87 Additionally, these two countries have been working for years to secure influence within governance structures by promoting candidates to key administrative positions and appointing representatives who align with their political agendas.Footnote 88 In his annual review of the council, Mark Limon (executive director of the Universal Rights Group) in 2023 stated: ‘Generally-speaking, the power balance at the Council continued to see a shift in favour of China … and away from Western States such as the US, EU members, and the UK.’
In the realm of trade as well, while Moscow and Beijing carefully negotiated their entry into global trading routes during the 1990s and early 2000s, today they frequently launch accusations against Western countries to defend their comparative advantages.
Recently China has commented in relation to EU anti-subsidy investigation on electric vehicles:
(The investigation) is a naked protectionist act that will seriously disrupt and distort the global automotive industry and supply chain, including the EU, and will have a negative impact on China-EU economic and trade relations. Footnote 89
Russia also has had a similar engagement, especially in the framework of western-imposed sanctions:
Instability in the world [is today] the result of excessive subsidies to their economies by Western countries, trade wars, protectionism and illegal unilateral sanctions, from which two thirds of the world’s population suffer. Footnote 90
China currently leads a multilateral UN coalition, established in the mid 2000s, representing about 50 per cent of the world’s population. This coalition seeks to counter Western unilateralism, especially in governance decisions around trade and climate change. From this perspective, China has made the pursuit of ‘true multilateralism’ a cornerstone of its international diplomatic strategy.Footnote 91 Recently, China also launched a ‘friends for peace’ initiative with South Africa and Brazil, aimed at promoting global security, starting with the resolution of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.Footnote 92
Russia, on the other hand, over the past 15 years, has regularly passed UN General Assembly resolutions emphasising relativism in human rights and condemning Western-led unilateral sanctions (e.g. RES/21/3; RES/58/198). While its influence in normative settings has declined due to the Ukraine invasion, Russia remains active, presenting amendments in the UN Human Rights Council through alliances with countries like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.Footnote 93 The conflict has also strengthened Russia’s ties with China and India, accelerating discussions on the use of alternative international financial systems as well as the expansion of the BRICS network.Footnote 94
The persistent exposure of the contradictions in how Western countries apply the norms they have themselves developed, combined with the relative performative success the two autocracies have had in re-establishing their positions within the international community, has led them to gain considerable support from various systemic outsiders.
Moscow’s and Beijing’s initiatives may not lead to immediate, sweeping changes, but they engage Western partners enough to compel justification of their actions, exposing contradictions and double standards. This enables Russia and China to maintain an active stance in international discussions, constantly challenging the Western narrative. It also creates space to renegotiate norms and practices and gradually embed their own policy approaches within destabilised concepts.
The more the concepts are destabilised, the more the countries will be able to encompass their own policy patterns and avoid enforcement from the rest of the community. Contrary to Ikenberry’s predictions,Footnote 95 the success that China and Russia have reported is because they have learned how to use properly international liberal structures to their advantage. Leaning into them, especially in times of crisis, has given the countries the communicative instruments to generate successful beneficial interactions with the rest of the community.
Identity self-profiling of authoritarian countries and the strategic weakness of liberal powers
The analysis of how autocracies benefit from radical self-profiling extends well beyond Russia and China as prominent autocratic subjects. It is important to make sure that the mechanisms described are not just consequences of the military and economic power of actors like Moscow or Beijing but instead describe fundamental socialisation dynamics embedded nowadays in the international system. Fortunately, numerous other autocracies have leveraged their socialisation capabilities to secure a stable position within the international sphere.
A notable example is Qatar, one of the most oppressive and absolutist regimes in its region. Its survival is intricately linked to access to international markets, which it has adapted to effectively in order to secure vital resources. These resources, however, have been reinvested not only in consolidating the regime’s stability at home but also in crafting a country-specific international identity.
Qatar has strategically positioned Al Jazeera as a progressive, open voice on the global stage, using the network to influence political developments both in the Middle EastFootnote 96 and in Western countries.Footnote 97 The country has consistently made under-the-table financial contributions to EU representatives to improve its image among the European public, fostering positive narratives about its politics.Footnote 98 Additionally, by hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup, Qatar engaged successfully in ‘sportswashing’ to bolster its international reputation.Footnote 99
It is important to highlight that Qatar has not only managed to stabilise its position within the LIO but has also attained unprecedented levels of influence, outperforming regional partners and extending its reach across the entire MENA region.
Another notable success story of shrewd autocratic policies is Turkey’s management of migration routes. Since 2011, the EU has disbursed 10 billion euros to support refugees in Turkey. Initially conceived to address the migration crisis triggered by the Syrian civil war, this cooperation has evolved into a lasting partnership with Erdoğan’s regime. Ankara has effectively leveraged this arrangement to enhance its international standing, asserting that it has ‘effectively curtailed illegal migration’.Footnote 100
This agreement has proven immensely beneficial for both parties. For Ankara, it has facilitated the acquisition of international recognition by engaging with a high-status player as an equal, without conceding on democratisation or state reforms aligned with EU standards. This has solidified Turkey’s position as a leading international actor and a regional pivot in the Middle East.Footnote 101 For European countries, the arrangement has allowed them to avoid implementing controversial emergency measures to manage the migration crisis, while simultaneously preserving their image as democratic regimes and countering the rise of right-wing populist rhetoric.Footnote 102
At this point, an important question arises: why is it so difficult for liberal powers to exert normative pressure on these actors, and why are these actors sometimes so successful in exploiting the system’s weaknesses? After all, it is well documented in the literature that liberal values, following the end of the Cold War, became a fundamental component of the international rule of law.Footnote 103 This has led to a situation where, since the 1990s, access to resources and institutional opportunities has become increasingly contingent upon adherence to and support for the liberal worldview.Footnote 104
The answer to this question is twofold. First, there is an inherent structural weakness in the ‘commitment all the way’ approach liberal countries have taken towards upholding common norms. This stance is unsustainable because modern international politics involves so many trade-offs and contradictions that strict coherence becomes a strategic burden. No matter how much the European Union prioritises human rights and democratic values, it will always have to reconcile these principles with pragmatic realities, such as its dependence on fossil fuel imports from countries like Azerbaijan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia (and previously Russia). One need only recall that, at one time, both EU scholars and policy documents advocated for increased Russian energy imports, considering them geopolitically preferable to those from the Middle East.Footnote 105
Similarly, the EU’s support for Turkey is a necessity dictated by system complexity. A strict adherence to liberal values would demand cutting funding to a country with a well-documented record of human rights violations happening even within its migrant cooperation efforts. However, such a move would further destabilise the system, tarnishing the EU’s image as a champion of democracy. Massive waves of migration could fuel populist, xenophobic rhetoric, placing additional strain on Europe’s already-challenged democratic systems. In this way, the EU is constrained by the complexities of the system, forced to choose between maintaining stability and fully upholding its normative values.
The second reason for the liberal world’s structural weakness in confronting the predatory nature of autocratic regimes is its ‘double-standard’ accusations. In promoting liberal values, the West has often adopted a ‘holier-than-though’ attitude and presented their application as a non-negotiable condition for full participation in the international community. However, whenever Western liberal countries launch diplomatic campaigns to shame or discourage the behaviour of autocracies, their position is frequently undermined by counter-rhetoric that points out the flaws and infringements occurring within liberal countries themselves.
This dynamic was evident during the 2022 World Cup when Qatar faced criticism. Foreign minister Mohamed al-Thani responded, stating that:
The government is committed to implementing reforms’, but also expressing frustration: ‘We are annoyed by the double standards … It is ironic when this tone is struck by countries in Europe that call themselves liberal democracies. It sounds very arrogant, frankly, and very racist. Footnote 106
Similarly, Russia and China constantly divert attention from their own problem by bringing alleged parallel issues that the West has to the table.
Recently Russia stated in the UN Security Council during a session of Ukraine:
The only thing we wanted was to remind everybody that the echo of NATO’s aggression in the Balkans is still reverberating across the region, which is still unsafe. Thus, we have confronted once again with egregious double standards, which have already become a sort of calling card of our Western colleagues. Footnote 107
Now, the point is not that China or Russia are particularly coherent about the application of international normativity. In fact, they are far from it.Footnote 108 The issue, however, is that the West has committed a profiling mistake because it has consolidated the idea that liberal countries because of their ‘authentic commitment’ should be able to apply rules contradiction-free.
Human rights issues in China, Russia, or Qatar do not match the magnitude of those faced in Europe or the United States. However, autocracies easily equate these issues, as Western countries have developed an unrealistic interpretation of liberal principles since the 1990s. In a moment of strategic superiority, the liberal world defined an absolutist moral perspective on international relations, aiming to consolidate the West’s position as the leader of international values. This approach has backfired, as its commitment strategy failed to address the complexities of international politics. Ultimately, this was a poor profiling choice by Western liberal countries, which undermined themselves by establishing a threshold they could not meet. This misstep jeopardised the integrity of the normative system, particularly as other countries learned to engage meaningfully with the global community, exposing the inadequacies of the ‘authentic commitment’ paradigm. Ultimately it has even led to a loss of legitimacy for liberal powers, partially contributing to the crisis we are witnessing in the LIO today.
Conclusions
This paper argues that ‘profilicity’ and ‘performativity’ offer a more effective framework than the current liberal emphasis on authenticity and self-realisation. Today’s international relations operate under profilic rather than authentic conditions; states succeed by building relevant profiles and engaging effectively within cultural niches. This approach allows them to navigate the complexities and trade-offs of international life. Importantly, this is not a call for opportunistic norm-breaking. Norms remain essential, though as an expression of social technology, normative systems have a limited range of tasks they can achieve, and more complex systems require differentiation and more complete normative frameworks.
The Western liberal model has frequently been promoted as a panacea for various social conflicts and issues. Western liberal countries intended this promotion as a means to assert normative leadership within the international system, but it has ultimately placed them in a precarious strategic position. The structural weakness of the liberal international order is not necessarily due to a lack of Western commitment. As I have argued, Western countries are compelled to adopt diversified strategies to manage complex relations and partnerships within a system that cannot operate under entirely coherent conditions. These partnerships and asymmetrical strategies, however, introduce inconsistencies in European policy that ultimately clash with the very standards of authenticity the West seeks to uphold.
The contrast between autocratic and democratic regimes is likely to intensify, especially if the international governance system weakens further. Contrary to predictions by some liberal theorists (especially Risse and Keohane), emerging powers may attempt not only to challenge but also to take over or repurpose institutions for their own goals.
My case studies show that this framework applies to various issues, and future empirical research could focus on specific areas like security, trade, or human rights. Urgent research is needed to explore new engagement strategies to protect liberal values, as the liberal vision faces increasing pressure from illiberal actors.
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