Our thesis is that the degree of permissible interaction between government and religion and its policy implications is most strikingly documented in the educational arena. To support our claim, we make three arguments: (1) by the early 1970s, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and other states were experimenting with accommodationist policies in education that neither increased religious divisiveness nor denied religious freedom. These policy experiments contributed to the Supreme Court’s new understanding of religious accommodation under the First Amendment; (2) beginning in the late 1970s, a scholarly reappraisal of the establishment clause—based on a close reading of the debates over the First Amendment in Congress and the states—was demonstrating that reasonable governmental accommodations, particularly in education, would not violate the establishment clause; and (3) that periodizing the establishment clause’s history, by focusing on state-level innovations and scholarly reinterpretations, enhances the understanding of the policy developments of the First Amendment, particularly in the educational field.

This essay examines the Army’s efforts to cultivate and gain congressional support for the GI Bill in the 1980s. Focusing on the relationship between Representative Sonny Montgomery, senior Army leaders like Maxwell R. Thurman and Robert Elton, and the staffers who worked for each of them, it illustrates the intentionality with which Army leaders worked to cultivate congressional support for and to head off congressional and presidential opposition to a bill that they saw as essential. Analyzing their public and private efforts at critical moments when the legislation was imperiled reveals that relations between the Army and Congress are more intricate than testimony at hearings and budget requests might reveal, that throughout the 1980s, Army leaders remained deeply concerned about sustaining the All-Volunteer Force, and that the ultimate success of that force and the legislation that helped ensure it rested with individuals who built and then leveraged personal relationships.

The Supreme Court is less constrained than political science has recognized. Motivated justices can dramatically alter politics without deferring to actors in the other branches. Subverting constraints, justices can aggrandize power and impose their irreducible preferences. Using Reconstruction as an example, this article brings new evidence to support the claim that an autonomous Court precipitated the end of Reconstruction. I make three essential arguments: First, the Republican commitment to federal civil rights protection extended longer than is traditionally supposed. Second, the architect of postbellum constitutionalism, Justice Bradley, harbored long-standing fear of Black equality and enfeebled the Reconstruction amendments when neither legal nor political imperatives compelled him to do so. Last, Bradley’s interventions substantially hindered Reconstruction by facilitating the “redemption” of southern state governments. This article employs mixed-methodology, using a difference-in-differences analysis and novel archival data. Contrary to scholarship arguing that the Court simply followed a Republican retreat, the Court dramatically reshaped the political-social development of Reconstruction.

This essay memorializes William E. Leuchtenburg (1922–2025), who over the course of his long, distinguished career made numerous significant contributions to policy history, presidential history, and the history profession in general.