MEDIA AGENCIES

The official Weibo accounts of news organizations represent the largest component of Weibo's verified users in the digital debate on Sino-Japanese relations, making up more than a third (36.61%, n = 3,972) of the total sample. As previous studies have suggested, in today's digital environment, news institutions and journalism continue to be central “sense-making” institutions, providing resources for societies to understand public issues (Peters and Broersma Reference Peters and Broersma2016). In the Chinese context, traditional media agencies have a high degree of public credibility, and they have expanded their influence in the digital space with respect to a variety of issues related to China's domestic affairs and foreign relations.

There are four distinct types of media agencies actively engaging in the digital debates around Sino-Japanese relations. These are (1) China's national party organs (e.g., the People's Daily); (2) China's provincial- and municipal-level news organizations (e.g., Zhejiang Daily); (3) China's nation-wide commercial media corporations (e.g., Sina Corp and Caijing magazine); and (4) Chinese language, non-mainland media institutions (e.g., Phoenix Television and Ta Kung Pao). However, despite being heterogeneous in terms of their ownership, profit model and base location, a shared practice of most media agencies with respect to the issue of Sino-Japanese relations on Weibo concerns their inclination towards conflict-focused discourses, and their downplaying of benign, friendly, and cooperative interactions between China and Japan.

It has been suggested that by 2015 nearly all of the Chinese traditional media agencies had established their own Weibo accounts, utilizing it as a platform to expand their influence (Huang and Lu Reference Huang and Lu2017). Some prominent examples include @ People's Daily, which launched in August 2012 and had 51.76 million followers; @ CCTV NEWS, which launched in November 2012 and had 49.22 million followers; and @ the Southern Metropolis Daily, which had 9.24 million followers by the end of 2016. The Weibo accounts of these news agencies automatically inherited the reputation, influence, and audiences of their parental bodies. In the online discussion of Sino-Japanese relations, China's national party organs’ Weibo accounts also inherited the privilege of providing exclusive news and information, thus becoming a crucial information source for other media participants on Weibo. Other domestic media agencies, including local news organizations and commercial corporations, are only allowed to select and repost the official media's narratives.

It is worth noting that while most mainland Chinese news organizations are actively engaged in “going Weibo” by opening official accounts and becoming verified users, so are established news suppliers in the Greater China region. For instance, the Hong Kong-based Chinese-language news organizations Phoenix Television, Ta Kung Pao, and Wen Wei Po all launched their own Weibo accounts. Among these, Phoenix Weekly has been the most successful, attracting 11.38 million Weibo followers (in 2016), surpassing many of its Mainland Chinese counterparts. In another case, Lianhe Zaobao, a Singapore-based newspaper and the only overseas Chinese-language newspaper that can be purchased in the major cities in Mainland China, also opened a Weibo account, which attracted 1.74 million followers. These news agencies have focused their attention on a variety of China's domestic affairs and foreign policies, especially China's relations with world powers and its Asian neighbors.

As would be expected, party organs and approved media play a large role in the media space, though foreign sources have gained a foothold too. However, also not surprisingly, these foreign sources tend to be favorable to the national party's views. Media institutions abroad that were allowed to launch Weibo accounts were usually deemed by the Chinese authorities as ‘friendly’ toward China. This is verified by examining the users’ profiles. When reporting China–Japan relations, those media agencies abroad held a perceptible bias towards China's position, reposting high-ranking Chinese officials’ statements, and publishing information from pro-China foreign media (such as content from the Russian news agency), as well as inviting some pro-China columnists or scholars to comment. During significant bilateral crises, the biased stance of those media institutions abroad became even more obvious. For instance, in reporting the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute on Diaoyu Island (Senkaku in Japanese), @Ta Kung Pao and @Wen Wei Po frequently cite foreign countries’ critiques of the Japanese government's nationalization practices, stressing to the domestic opposition from the Japanese government, its opposition party, civil groups, the media and ordinary people. Some representative posts included:

With regard to another prominent issue of bilateral relations—the war-related controversy—@ Zaobaowang, the official Weibo account of the Singapore-based Lianhe Zaobao, posted a comment quoting China's Foreign Minister Wangyi, who said in a speech: “Japan is backpedaling on war-related issues” (@Zaobaowang 08/03/2016). It is notable that in this post, @Zaobaowang added a GIF showing a car that kept reversing until it fell from a terrace. In this way, @Zaobaowang showed its (implicit) support for China's view that Japan would eventually pay the price if it continued to falsify war-related history. In general, despite occasional deviation from China's official discourse, the posts of these media institutions abroad often provide support for, rather than challenging, the Chinese state's stances. What distinguishes them from domestic Chinese media is that the former organizations’ Weibo accounts sometimes adopt a broader geopolitical perspective, considering the negative influence of deteriorating bilateral relations on the prosperity and stability of the Asia-Pacific region generally. Many Weibo posts touch on this theme with such statements as: “The worsening Sino-Japanese relations inflict heavy losses on Japanese business in China, as well as hurting the regional economy”(@Ta Kung Pao 24/08/2012) and “Chinese and Japanese navy forces will perish together if there is a war between them. Then the US will take over Asia immediately and readily” (@Ta Kung Pao 28/08/2012).

While most Western-based global media groups, such as the BBC and CNN, have been completely barred from entering the Weibo sphere, these non-mainland Chinese media institutions are allowed to enter the Weibo sphere, becoming alternative voices from outside China on China's domestic politics and foreign relations. Therefore, from the perspective of information exposure to China's micro-bloggers, and the shaping the Chinese public opinion, these non-mainland media institutions have achieved a profound discursive power expansion by becoming influentials in China's political communication space.

PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS

Public intellectuals, including scholars, writers, critics, and individual media workers, represent the second largest group (31.28%, n = 3,394) of Weibo-verified users in the digital discussion of Sino-Japanese relations. They constitute a core bloc of the influentials in China's cyberspace as well, almost as large a presence as the media sector. Chinese intellectuals’ active engagement concerning their country's external strategies, while within bounds, is clearly evident. Although a few well-known writers and international relations experts open Weibo accounts and actively promote their viewpoints, many previously inaudible individuals, including scholars, amateur essayists, and self-media operators, use Weibo as a platform to launch their voices, and they have achieved considerable discursive power. The online posts by these public intellectuals demonstrate a fierce competition between two contrasting propositions regarding Sino-Japanese relations, with one referring to a more ambitious, proactive, and nationalist agenda, and the other referring to a moderate and pragmatic stance (with some supporters of this viewpoint defining themselves as the “knowing Japan” group).

Public intellectuals’ Weibo posts regarding China's stance towards Japan and its strategies in the wider international engagement vary conspicuously, reflecting contradictory elements in China's foreign policy at the elite level. There are clear indications of enthusiasm among some experts for more vigorous assertion in Sino-Japanese relations. Yan Xuetong, dean of Tsinghua University's Institute of Modern International Relations, Li Ao, a Chinese-Taiwanese writer and celebrity, and the military essayist and self-media operator, Keluo Liaofu (whose real name is unknown), exemplify the strong presence of nationalist perceptions on Weibo. As a high-profile expert in international relations, Yan opened his Weibo account in 2011, and collected 130,000 followers, providing in-depth analyses and explanations of a variety of China's foreign affairs. Yan, who is a strong supporter of China's strategic transformation from “keeping a low-profile” (taoguangyanghui) to “striving for achievement” (fenfayouwei), argues that “striving for achievement” was a more effective way to shape a favorable environment for China's national rejuvenation. Yan's Weibo posts regarding Japan are obviously conflict-focused and highlight the Japan–US alliance, Japan's military expansion, and Sino-Japanese territorial disputes. Yan's posts present an image of Japan as China's geopolitical rival, as well as a challenger of Asian-Pacific peace and prosperity (e.g., @Yanxuetong 02/09/2013; 24/05/2014).

As a famous Chinese-Taiwanese writer, historian, and independent politician, Li Ao is considered by many to be one of the most important modern East Asian essayists. Li Ao's strong nationalist sentiment and witty writing style have made him a popular figure among Chinese netizens (Cai Reference Cai2015). Li has a verified Weibo account with the name of “Hello Li Ao,” which has attracted 10.32 million followers—even more than China's most successful commercial newspaper's Weibo account. When discussing Sino-Japanese relations, Li's strong hostility toward Japan characterizes him as an assertive nationalist. For instance, Li has metaphorically suggested that in the late Qing era (between the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries), China was a “sex slave” of Western countries, and Japan, as a strong neighbor of China, also actively engaged in “raping” China in modern times. When commenting on contemporary international relations, Li uses the words “Japanese devils” and “America's running dog” to refer to Japan. Li frequently uses (sexual) profanities to express his indignation towards Japan and in his description Sino-Japanese relations (such as the word “rape” to refer to Japan's invasion of China). This caters to the taste of a large number of net users (Cai Reference Cai2015). His posts referencing Japan have thus been widely read and re-posted on Weibo.

Unlike Yan and Li, who were already famous scholars or writers before opening their Weibo accounts, the military essayist and self-media operator Keluo Liaofu (an alias, the real name of the operator of this Weibo account is unknown to the author of this study), who represents another force of nationalist expression on the issue of Sino-Japanese relations, only became an influential public intellectual after entering the Weibo sphere. Keluo Liaofu opened his Weibo account in 2010 and has attracted 8.19 million followers—more than the majority of Chinese news agencies attracted. Keluo Liaofu's posts have a strong nationalist flavor, for example in his description of Japan as a “devil” and his suggestion that “resisting Japan should not be a passing phase” (@Keluo Liaofu 09/10/2013). Furthermore, as a military essayist, Keluo Liaofu often mentions military themes, including comparisons between China's and Japan's military strength, reflecting his firm belief that China has overtaken Japan (e.g.,@Keluo Liaofu 21/08/2013; 27/07/2016).

Conflict-focused narratives and nationalist perceptions have not dominated public intellectuals’ online discourses, however. The emergence of the “knowing Japan” group (zhiripai) in China's digital sphere represents the other ideological trend, which calls for a more moderate, pragmatic, and forward-looking perspective on this issue. Although Sino-Japanese relations have been frequently debated in China's academic and policy fields over the past decades, the narrative of conflict has been rather uniform at the public level (Reilly Reference Reilly2014). In 2002, following the publication of Ma Licheng's provocative article “New Thinking on Relations with Japan,” a fierce public debate emerged in China regarding the country's Japan policies. However, scholars such as Ma, who called for a more moderate and rational attitude toward Japan, were quickly labeled as traitors or “Japanophiles” (qinripai), and their voices became submerged.

The situation has changed more recently, with the emerging “knowing Japan” groups adopting social media as a new, contested arena in which to debate antagonisms toward Japan, and providing alternative viewpoints that receive mass critique and attention. The “knowing Japan” group, which is mainly composed of intellectuals, media professionals, scholars, researchers, and writers, distinguish themselves from the “pro-Japanese” (qinripai) and the “anti-Japanese” (fanripai) groups, and brand themselves as authentic experts on Japanese issues. They have adopted Weibo as a platform for “mini talk shows” and “mini public lectures,” comprehensively introducing Japan's domestic affairs and foreign policies and expressing their opinions about considering Japan rationally and reconstructing pragmatic bilateral relations. Two representatives of the “knowing Japan” group are Jiang Feng, editor-in-chief of Riben Xinhua Qiaobao (Japan's overseas Chinese Newspaper), and Feng Wei, from Fudan University.

Riben Xinhua Qiaobao is a Japan-based newspaper that focuses its reports on Sino-Japanese relations and Japan's overseas Chinese residents. Jiang Feng launched his Weibo account during the stage of Weibo's emergence in China in September 2009. Using his Weibo account, Jiang has written numerous posts introducing Japanese history, tradition, pop culture, the fashion industry, arts, and other aspects of contemporary society, covering negative issues in Japan, including gangdom (@Jiangfeng 22/10/2014), political scandals (@Jiangfeng 12/11/2012), and the country's high suicide rate (@Jiangfeng 02/06/2016), as well as its social progress. In addition, Jiang's Weibo posts often mention his personal interactions with ordinary Japanese from the business, cultural, media, and education industries with an amiable tone. The aim of these posts is to provide a multifaceted representation of Japan and the Japanese to Chinese netizens so as to replace the deep-rooted image of Japan as the one-sided “invader.”

Feng Wei is a professor of Japanese history at Fudan University with a friendly attitude towards Japan, who strongly criticizes the popular anti-Japanese sentiments in China's online sphere, arguing that, although Japanese prime minster Shinzo Abe is a trouble-maker, many Japanese are very kind and conscientious. Since Feng's posts usually provoke heated debate on Weibo, some microbloggers have labeled him “China's traitor” or “Japanophile.” Despite often being attacked by netizens with a torrent of abuse, Feng has not closed his Weibo account or become silent. In contrast, he acts as a very active microblogger, posting about five daily mircoblogs on Japan and Sino-Japanese relations. Two Weibo posts express not only Feng Wei's key views on Japan, but also those of all the “knowing Japan” groups:

In addition to Jiang and Feng, some ordinary individuals who are amateur critics also use Weibo to launch their viewpoints and attract a mass of followers. Some prominent players include @Kelisituofu Jin, @Yangguan Riben, @Chahaer Xuehui. The “knowing Japan” group of intellectuals has been able to use Weibo as a low-threshold and effective platform to express alternative viewpoints, making them (controversial) influentials in China's digital media space. In general, analysis of public intellectuals’ online discussion illustrates that it would be wrong to assume there is unanimity among China's intelligentsia regarding Sino-Japanese relations. Rather, political deliberation is taking place at both social and elite levels, and multiple viewpoints co-exist and compete in a digitally facilitated, animated domestic debate.

At the same time, public intellectuals’ online discussions are by no means free from government censorship. While it has been demonstrated that the strong sentiments and rational critiques of ordinary netizens regarding the Chinese state have been allowed to be expressed in the online sphere as long as they do not call for rebellious collective actions (MacKinnon Reference MacKinnon2011), such leniency is not given to public intellectuals (Creemers Reference Creemers2017; Schneider Reference Schneider2017). Since they enjoy more discursive power and can exert more influence on public opinions, the “bottom line” has been significantly raised for them, and it is not uncommon for their negative comments regarding the authorities to disappear. In this way, the official agenda remains fundamentally unchallenged.

GOVERNMENT BODIES AND OFFICIALS, AND CULTURAL AND BUSINESS SECTORS

Government bodies and officials, as well as those in the business and cultural sectors, represent relatively very small percentage of the verified Weibo users (7%, n = 760; 5.3%, n = 576; and 4.29%, n = 465, respectively). As authoritative and authentic information sources, these governmental bodies and officials are online influentials by default (Schlaeger and Jiang Reference Schlaeger and Jiang2014). However, their official accounts show self-restraint with respect to their discursive power in the digital field. For example, their Weibo posts reflect a low-key and cautious stance with respect to discussing Sino-Japanese relations, and they tend to repost the Chinese government's official condemnations of Japan and its assertive stance on bilateral relations rather than providing original commentaries or news. Analysis also reveals that the major Weibo accounts of the government bodies and officials that engage in digital debates on Sino-Japanese relations are at the local level.

Government departments and officials in the legal system are relatively active participants on Weibo. Some courts, procuratorates, and public security bureaus register their Weibo accounts, and post and repost news and comments on China's domestic and foreign affairs, including Sino-Japanese relations (Zheng and Zheng Reference Zheng and Tuo2014). Some examples are @Yucheng public security (Yucheng is a county-level city in Shandong province), @Qingdao public security (Qingdao is also a city in Shandong province), and @Cool breeze Kaifeng discipline inspection commission (Kaifeng is a city in Henan province). However, the content analysis shows that the majority of the government sectors’ Weibo accounts are quite inactive on the subject of Sino-Japanese relations in general (with less than three posts per year on average), but become enthusiastic when reposting the statements of Chinese officials and spokespersons’ speeches regarding Japan during China's Two Sessions (the annual plenary sessions of the two organizations that make national-level political decisions). This demonstrates that many government departments and officials use their Weibo accounts to show “political correctness” and support of the central government's attitudes and policies, rather than to engage in real, effective political discussions (Schlaeger and Jiang Reference Schlaeger and Jiang2014).

In addition, the content analysis reveals that the majority of governmental and official Weibo accounts that post content on Japan are at the local level. City-level accounts make up 68% (n = 517) of the government-related Weibo accounts, followed by provincial- (16%, n = 122), county- (9%, n = 68), and central- (7%, n = 53) level accounts. The central-level government sector that publishes information on Japan and Sino-Japanese relations on Weibo mainly focuses on the official Weibo account of the Public Diplomacy Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, @ Waijiao Xiaolingtong. Because Weibo posts and comments published by central governmental departments and high-level officials are considered to be representative of the state's stance, they are very cautious in releasing significant and sensitive foreign affairs news compared to their local level counterparts (also see Zheng Reference Zheng2013). However, despite being relatively active actors, the local-level government officials tend to use Weibo to repost the central government's statements regarding Japan so as to remain politically correct.

Those from commercial circles and the cultural industry (including the publishing, tourism, and education abroad industries) represent two other small components of Weibo's verified users in the discussion of Sino-Japanese relations. Analysis also revealed that those from the cultural and business sectors usually hold a more pragmatic and rational attitude on this issue, considering bilateral relations from the perspective of investigating the impact of China–Japan relations on their own field. For instance, one Weibo post from the CEO of an environmental technology company noted:

Furthermore, online discussions among cultural and commercial circles regarding Sino-Japanese relations reflect the often-cited view of “Hot economics and cold politics” (zhengleng jingre). In the more-than-40 years since the two nations normalized their diplomatic relations in 1978, China and Japan have become increasingly interdependent, particularly in the fields of economy, trade, and cultural exchange (Reilly Reference Reilly2014). The fluctuation of bilateral relations impact not only politician's policies but also a variety of industries and those who work in them. For some in the Chinese cultural and commercial sectors that have engagements with Japan, the country might represent a market of opportunities rather than a politically sensitive neighboring country that has had a long-term feud with China (Fisman et al. Reference Fisman, Hamao and Wang2014). Therefore, they often hold a more pragmatic and moderate perception of Japan and believe that stable bilateral relations are beneficial to China and to themselves. Nevertheless, considering the anti-Japanese sentiment prevailing in China's cyberspace, posting counter-mainstream discourses, such as calling for reconciliation and cooperation between the two governments, is an unwise practice. Therefore, those from the business and cultural sectors refrain from engaging in political discussion, focusing on less sensitive themes like economy, culture, and society. Some typical posts from the cultural and business sectors include:

In general, the cultural and business sectors, once inconsequential players in China's political communication space (Schneider Reference Schneider2017), still keep a low profile in the discussion of Sino-Japanese relations on Weibo. They post comments on this issue, but from a narrow, industrial-focused perspective, without running counter to the overwhelming public sentiment or challenging the key policies of China's central government.