Political settlements and (foreign) policymaking

The idea of a political settlement started its career in the field of peace and conflict studies, as a terminology used in debates about conflict resolution and stabilisation. In these discourses, political settlements describe an underlying ‘social order’ that resolves societal violence through political means (North et al. Reference North, Wallis and Weingast2009; Khan Reference Khan2010). From these debates, Khan (Reference Khan2010) and others developed a concept that, though intertwined with the original meaning, brought political settlements also to the realms of political economy, comparative politics, development studies and other fields of social sciences. This perspective, as explained by Khan (Reference Khan2010), sees political settlements as both reflecting and shaping the power balance among various social classes and groups, providing a political-economy framework for the formation of both formal and informal institutions within a country. It diverges from the idea of settlements as intentional actions by international mediators. Instead, it views stable political settlements as contingent political orders arising from historical processes, a notion supported by Gray (Reference Gray2019), who views political settlements as inclusive agreements among state elites, aimed at managing peace and establishing a stable political order. In this context, state-building is seen as organisational processes stemming from these political settlements, as discussed by Putzel and di John (Reference Putzel and di John2009) and Dudouet and Lundström (Reference Dudouet and Lundström2016). However, there is still limited consensus on the definitive elements of political settlements and how they might vary. Scholars like Khan (Reference Khan2010) and Whitfield et al. (Reference Whitfield, Therkildsen, Buur and Kjær2015) have shown interest in the relative holding power of different groups and organisations contesting the distribution of resources within predominantly clientelist systems. Their typology of settlements is defined by distinct patterns in the vertical and horizontal distribution of power among various patron-client networks that underpin the ruling coalition’s control of the state. The key issue is the degree of contestation faced by the ruling elites, determined by power dynamics both outside (whether major groups are excluded) and within the coalition (whether it is fragmented or contains strong factions with veto power). These structural features jointly shape the ruling elites’ perceptions, incentives and actions as they seek to maintain and consolidate power (Whitfield et al. Reference Whitfield, Therkildsen, Buur and Kjær2015: 105).

After briefly outlining the evolution of the concept of political settlements, we now focus on the reconceptualisation presented by Kelsall et al. (Reference Kelsall, Schulz, Ferguson, vom Hau, Hickey and Levy2022). Their definition integrates multiple perspectives, viewing political settlements as ongoing agreements among a society’s most powerful groups over political and economic institutions. These agreements ensure that these groups receive minimally acceptable benefits, thereby preventing or resolving political and economic disorder, including civil war. Kelsall et al. (Reference Kelsall, Schulz, Ferguson, vom Hau, Hickey and Levy2022: 31) emphasise that these groups must agree on both formal and informal institutions, which govern crucial aspects such as rule-making, the acquisition and exercise of power and its limitations. These institutions encompass legislation, norms and the policy direction defined by the ruling coalition.

A key element in this framework is the concept of ‘power configuration’, which describes how power is structured within a political settlement. When power is concentrated, decision-making becomes more coherent, and collective-action problems among elites are resolved either through consensus or dominance. On the other hand, dispersed power reflects fragmented authority and unresolved social divides, leading to conflicts between elite factions. This reconceptualisation thus retains the horizontal and vertical dimensions of power configuration, but it expands on the elite-focused Khan school by introducing the ‘social foundation’ as an essential dimension (Kelsall Reference Kelsall2018). For a group to be considered part of the social foundation, it must have enough influence to pose a credible threat to the stability of the political settlement, either on its own or in alliance with others. Additionally, the political leadership must actively seek to incorporate the group through co-optation. In contrast, groups that lack the power to disrupt the settlement are deemed marginal, even if they align with insiders and receive some indirect benefits from the settlement’s outcomes. (Kelsall et al. Reference Kelsall, Schulz, Ferguson, vom Hau, Hickey and Levy2022: 51). These groups may or may not agree with the political arrangement, but they initially struggle to challenge it because they lack the determination, resources or organisational strength to do so. The configuration of political groups within and excluded from the ruling coalition has significant implications for policies and institutional reforms across various domains. While not all policy areas are equally affected by the broader political settlement, this paper argues that foreign policy decisions are closely linked to the internal distribution of power.

Political Settlement Analysis (PSA) functions not only as a diagnostic tool for explaining why institutions and policies vary across different contexts but also as a framework for understanding the origins and motivations behind specific policy decisions. By analysing the power distribution among elites and their strategies to co-opt broader societal groups, PSA reveals how underlying power dynamics shape policy choices and the need to maintain political stability. This approach also uncovers the strategic interests driving policy decisions, offering insights into the rationale behind specific governance systems.

While PSA has been widely used to explain divergent development paths in areas such as healthcare, poverty reduction and agricultural policy across African countries, its application to foreign policy has received less attention. In particular, the role of political settlements in shaping a country’s foreign policy and influencing foreign entities, especially during transitions between settlements, remains underexplored (Cao and Noesselt Reference Cao and Noesselt2024:4).

Subnational factors in foreign policy analysis

Foreign policy refers to the strategies and actions a government adopts to manage its relationships with other countries and international actors, shaping how a state engages with its external environment. It encompasses a wide range of activities and responds to demands arising from both external and internal sources. Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) focuses on understanding the processes behind these decisions by examining the internal and external factors that influence the formation and execution of foreign policy. While external factors fall outside the scope of Political Settlement Analysis (PSA), this article will demonstrate that the internal dimension – what Alden and Aran (Reference Alden and Aran2017:8) call the ‘domestic sources’ of foreign policy – can be effectively understood using PSA.

FPA itself emerged as a reaction to the dominance of realism and its state-centric portrayal of international interactions, offering a more nuanced approach to how domestic factors influence foreign policy. In line with the realist school of thought, the state is viewed as a cohesive, unitary actor. This perspective diminishes the need to dissect the distinct roles of government sectors (such as the executive or legislature), political elites, society and individual actors in shaping state foreign policy. A fundamental concept in classical realism is the notion of ‘national interest’. While the term is often debated, it remains central for both policymakers and realist theorists in understanding and assessing state behaviour. Hans Morgenthau (Reference Morgenthau1949) equated national interest with the pursuit of power, asserting that national interest not only guides a state’s foreign policy direction but also serves as a crucial indicator of its ability to achieve its objectives. Alongside national interest, other systemic, deterministic theories have focused on power maximisation to explain a country’s foreign policy (Hollis and Smith Reference Hollis and Smith1986: 269).

In response to these realist views, which predominantly scrutinised state-to-state interactions while largely neglecting internal actors and processes, a decision-making-centric perspective emerged in the exploration of foreign policy. The seminal works of Snyder et al. (Reference Snyder, Bruck and Sapin1954) on decision-making in international politics, Rosenau’s ‘Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy’ (Reference Rosenau and Farrell1966) and Sprout & Sprout’s research on the man–milieu relationship in international politics (Reference Sprout and Sprout1956) are often recognised as catalysts for this field, which subsequently experienced swift advancement during the 1960s and 1970s (Hudson Reference Hudson2005:5). These works shifted the focus from state-level analysis to decision-making processes and the human actors involved, advocating for multifactorial explanations drawing upon multiple social sciences. Scholars like Robert Jervis (Reference Jervis1976) and Kenneth Boulding (Reference Boulding1959) further redirected attention from foreign policy outcomes to the decision-making process, emphasising the role of individual decision-makers and their beliefs and biases.

Despite the significance of individual actors in the first and second waves of FPA, the field eventually shifted toward a positivist approach (Morin and Paquin Reference Morin and Paquin2018:9). This shift was driven by the ambition to create more systematic, macro-level theories that could explain the overarching drivers of international behaviour. Consequently, leader attributes were often dismissed as either irrelevant or too complex and idiosyncratic for a systematic analysis. In line with this thinking, attempts to build more deterministic models, inspired by Popper (Reference Popper1966), sought to minimise the unpredictable influence of individual leaders. Another factor contributing to the shift in FPA away from a pluralist approach – one that recognises and accounts for the diversity of interests, perspectives and actors – was the enormous success of structural realism (e.g., Waltz Reference Waltz1979) and neoliberal institutionalism (e.g., Keohane Reference Keohane1984). These two approaches, which have dominated international relations for decades, rest on the assumption that states are unitary actors and that individuals are essentially irrelevant to foreign policy processes and outcomes. Although individuals have been theoretically and methodologically excluded in IR, the focus on people as the unit of observation in some subfields of FPA has never disappeared and has seen a remarkable resurgence in recent years. (Davis and McDermott Reference Davis and McDermott2021). Scholars in IR and FPA are rediscovering the significance of decision-making processes, acknowledging that people – not states – are ultimately responsible for foreign policy decisions. This renewed focus highlights the crucial role of specific actors and groups, as well as the significance of domestic-level variables in shaping foreign policy. In the past two decades, several new approaches in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) have gained popularity, characterised by an actor-specific focus, based on Hudson’s (Reference Hudson2005:1) argument that all international interactions are grounded in human decision-makers acting individually or in groups. It is observed that within nations, the diverse perspectives and agendas of elites and foreign policy bureaucracies, such as defence and trade ministries, significantly influence foreign policy choices (Saunders Reference Saunders2022). These influences often reflect narrow departmental priorities rather than broader national interests. Recognising the importance of the executive decision-maker in the foreign policy process, it becomes evident that these decisions occur within a broader institutional framework responsible for interpreting and executing the state’s foreign and security policies. The significance and contributions of specialised ministries, departments and agencies, along with temporary working groups assigned specific foreign policy tasks, are recognised as critical elements that need to be considered in FPA studies. This perspective also acknowledges that group dynamics and crisis-induced pressures can distort the decision-making process (Alden and Aran Reference Alden and Aran2017: 9). Some authors have emphasised the role of leaders (Horowitz and Fuhrman Reference Horowitz and Fuhrmann2018; Gerring et al. Reference Gerring, Emre, Morrison and Pemstein2019) or elites (Saunders Reference Saunders2022), but also other subnational factors, such as social groups or the bureaucracy, became an object of study in FPA (Morin and Paquin, Reference Morin and Paquin2018). In line with the ‘domestic politics turn’ (Kaarbo Reference Kaarbo2015), research on political institutions, public opinion, political culture, discourses, political parties and media has been systematically incorporated into foreign policy analysis (Mello and Ostermann Reference Mello and Ostermann2023).

Within this broader trend of integrating domestic variables into the study of foreign policy, Neoclassical Realism (NCR) and Role Theory have played a particularly influential role in bridging the gap between systemic pressures and domestic-level determinants. NCR emerged out of dissatisfaction with structural realism’s inability to account for variations in state behaviour, particularly when states deviate from systemic incentives (Ripsman et al. Reference Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro2009). It retains the core assumption of an anarchic international system but introduces unit-level intervening variables – such as leader images, strategic culture, state–society relations and domestic institutions – that filter how systemic stimuli are perceived and translated into foreign policy (Beach Reference Beach2012; Foulon Reference Foulon2015; Ripsman et al. Reference Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro2009). These intervening variables do not eliminate structural constraints but mediate their impact through processes of threat perception, elite bargaining and implementation capacity (He and Feng Reference He and Feng2023). While NCR has brought greater nuance to foreign policy analysis, critics have highlighted its tendency to lack parsimony – especially in early applications where domestic factors were selected in an ad hoc manner (Ripsman et al. Reference Ripsman, Lobell and Taliaferro2009: 175). Efforts to address this, such as the typology developed by Juneau (Reference Juneau2023), have clarified distinctions between NCR as a theory of deviation (Type I), a theory of foreign policy (Type II) and a broader theory of international politics (Type III). Yet even in its most ambitious form, NCR typically treats domestic politics as a modifier of systemic imperatives, often undervaluing cases where domestic priorities override structural incentives altogether.

Role theory, on the other hand, shifts focus to the ideational and cognitive dimensions of foreign policy. It examines how leaders interpret internal and external role expectations and articulate state identities such as ‘regional power’ or ‘liberator’ (Holsti Reference Holsti1987; Walker Reference Walker1987). Its strength lies in providing a descriptive vocabulary that links leader perceptions, societal expectations and international norms. However, its focus on elite identities and role conceptions may neglect material and institutional constraints, particularly in states where political authority is fragmented or clientelist. In such contexts, aspirational roles can be rhetorical, lacking the domestic support needed to translate them into sustained foreign policy behaviour.

Both NCR and role theory rest on the assumption that states act rationally in pursuit of the national interest – albeit shaped by domestic filters. Recent scholarship by Mearsheimer and Rosato (Reference Mearsheimer and Rosato2023) distinguishes between ‘goal rationality’ (e.g., pursuit of survival) and ‘strategic rationality’ (choosing effective means to that end). They argue that rational foreign policy requires leaders to base decisions on coherent theories of how the world works. Yet this raises a critical question: what defines the ‘national interest’, and who gets to interpret it? In many Global South contexts, especially in hybrid regimes or neopatrimonial systems, the overriding priority may not be national survival per se, but the survival of the ruling coalition or political settlement. Here, PSA offers a powerful complement to NCR and role theory. PSA focuses not just on formal institutions but on the informal power bargains among elites that underpin them. It shows how regime stability, patronage networks and elite contestation shape the strategic preferences of leaders and redefine what is considered rational foreign policy. Thus, PSA shifts the analytical focus from how leaders perceive structural incentives or roles to how power configurations within the state shape those very perceptions and choices.

The added value of PSA lies in its ability to connect domestic political configurations with foreign policy behaviour in a way that complements and deepens existing frameworks such as NCR and role theory. While these approaches have made significant strides in incorporating domestic-level variables – such as elite perceptions, institutional constraints or leader identities – they often treat these factors as filters or modifiers of systemic pressures. PSA, by contrast, starts from the domestic distribution of power as the constitutive basis for state behaviour, especially in the Global South.

Foreign policy, in this view, is not only about how leaders interpret threats or define roles but also about how they navigate and preserve the elite bargains that underpin political order. Political settlements are understood as the formal and informal agreements among powerful groups to share power and distribute resources. These settlements emerge historically and evolve over time, shaped by elite contestation and the need to maintain minimally acceptable benefits for dominant coalitions (Khan Reference Khan2010; Kelsall et al. Reference Kelsall, Schulz, Ferguson, vom Hau, Hickey and Levy2022). Importantly, these coalitions are not limited to the state apparatus; they may include business actors, military factions, religious networks or mobilised popular constituencies – any group that can credibly threaten the political status quo.

This focus allows PSA to capture the full spectrum of domestic constraints that shape foreign policy decisions. For example, a foreign policy that privileges economic engagement with a particular state may appear puzzling under a structural realist lens but becomes comprehensible when seen as a strategy to reward key actors in a ruling coalition. Similarly, the withdrawal from international institutions may reflect not a rejection of global norms, but a calculation to shield domestic elites from legal accountability or external scrutiny. In these ways, PSA grounds international behaviour in the domestic imperatives of political survival, elite cohesion and resource distribution.

Where NCR asks how internal variables mediate systemic incentives, PSA asks, ‘Which domestic actors have the power to define the state’s interests, and how does that shape what is politically possible?’ Where role theory considers how leaders interpret identity and expectations, PSA investigates whether such identities align with the interests of the ruling coalition. Even ambitious role conceptions or reformist foreign agendas are only viable if they resonate with the distributional logic of the existing settlement.

This perspective is especially useful in African and Global South contexts, where formal institutions often coexist with highly personalised or factionalised political systems. In such cases, foreign policy outcomes cannot be fully explained by abstract national interests or leader psychology alone. Instead, decisions often reflect internal struggles between elite factions, competing accumulation strategies and pressures from influential societal groups. As Behuria et al. (Reference Behuria, Buur and Gray2017: 521) argue, PSA’s strength lies in its ability to distinguish context-specific power configurations and avoid the reductive assumption that all African states operate under the same clientelist logic. By emphasising how specific historical trajectories and economic structures shape elite bargains, PSA provides a more grounded understanding of political agency and constraint.

In sum, PSA contributes an integrated framework for analysing foreign policy that accounts for how state preferences and capabilities are shaped by elite bargains and domestic political dynamics. It allows scholars to move beyond seeing domestic politics as background context and instead place it at the centre of the analysis. The framework is particularly well-suited for countries where regime stability depends on the careful balancing of intra-elite rivalries, social constituencies and contested control over economic resources. As the next chapter will show, applying this lens to the case of Tanzania – particularly during the transition from President Magufuli to President Hassan – reveals how shifts in the political settlement reconfigured foreign policy priorities in ways that neither systemic incentives nor leader beliefs alone can fully explain.

The case of Tanzania

Tanzania is an ideal candidate for a first attempt to analyse the impact of changing political settlements (PS) on a country’s foreign policy for several compelling reasons. The country has featured prominently in recent studies examining the effects of political settlements across various policy fields. Examples include industrial policy (Gray Reference Gray2013), education policy (Languille Reference Languille2016), corruption (Andreoni Reference Andreoni2017), legitimacy (Pedersen and Jacob Reference Pedersen and Jacob2019), poverty reduction (Chinsinga et al. Reference Chinsinga, Weldeghebrael, Kelsall, Schulz and Williams2022) and cash transfers (Mwinuka et al. Reference Mwinuka, Macha, Kilonzo, Buur and Nystrand2024). Moreover, Tanzania serves as a showcase for Kelsall’s analytical framework, which introduced many of the definitions and typologies used in this study (Kelsall Reference Kelsall2018; Kelsall et al. Reference Kelsall, Schulz, Ferguson, vom Hau, Hickey and Levy2022). As will be outlined below, the recent shifts in the government have led to significant instances of PS change. By focusing on the internal dimensions of power concentration and social foundation, one can observe several developments that have impacted Tanzania’s international relations. In Tanzania, as in many other African nations, the creation of foreign policy or macro-policy concepts primarily falls under the jurisdiction of the chief executive, reflecting a prevalent pattern of power centralisation in the region (Clapham Reference Clapham1996; Khadiagala and Lyons Reference Khadiagala and Lyons2001). This concentration of authority has varied through different presidencies, from Nyerere to Hassan, with perhaps the most notable centralisation occurring during Magufuli’s tenure. Despite the high authority of the presidency in foreign policy, the special role of the CCM in Tanzania makes this field of policy formulation more complex than simple personality politics; it involves contestation between different factional networks and their leaders.

The reciprocal relationship between business elites and politicians, along with the tendency to combine public office with lucrative private business activities, created fertile ground for political conflicts fuelled by business interests rather than normative ideals (Collord Reference Collord2022: 16). As we will show in the following analysis, this dynamic extended to foreign policy, transforming it into a proxy battleground for Tanzania’s elite factions. Given this context, analyses focusing solely on the presidency, bureaucracies or legislatures may offer limited insights into the actual motivations behind certain foreign policy decisions. Consequently, this research places greater emphasis on the role of political elite configuration, significantly informed by how interview partners depicted policy formulation as predominantly a competition between different groups and their backers within CCM.

Before Magufuli: Nyerere’S traditional policy to Mkapa’S economic diplomacy

Though this paper will focus on the presidencies of Magufuli and Hassan, we will start with a short recap of the years before Magufuli’s rise to power with a special focus on the adoption of Tanzania’s economic foreign policy in 2001.

Julius Kambarage Nyerere, Tanzania’s founding president, established both domestic and foreign policies rooted in his vision of Ujamaa (African socialism). His policy focused on self-reliance, social equity and collective ownership. Domestically, Nyerere promoted one-party rule under the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), later renamed Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), to ensure national unity and avoid ethnic divisions. His foreign policy was characterised by strong support for African liberation movements, non-alignment during the Cold War and a commitment to Pan-Africanism. Ali Hassan Mwinyi succeeded Nyerere in 1985 and initiated significant economic and political reforms. Mwinyi’s presidency marked a shift from socialism to more liberal economic policies, including structural adjustment programmes endorsed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These reforms aimed to stabilise the economy, which had suffered under Nyerere’s socialist policies. Politically, Mwinyi introduced multi-party democracy in the early 1990s, moving away from the one-party system. His foreign policy was more pragmatic, focusing on economic diplomacy and improving relations with Western countries to attract foreign aid and investment.

Benjamin William Mkapa, who took office in 1995, continued the liberalisation policies initiated by Mwinyi, placing a stronger emphasis on good governance and anti-corruption measures. His administration focused on consolidating democracy and implementing market-oriented reforms to drive economic growth. While Mkapa’s foreign policy in his first term did not significantly diverge from that of his predecessor, it placed greater emphasis on economic diplomacy, regional integration and active participation in international organisations. He played a key role in revitalising the East African Community (EAC), promoting regional stability and cooperation (Shule Reference Shule2014: 277). In 2001, shortly after his reelection as president, Mkapa announced that the country’s domestic environmental priorities would focus on building a ‘modern’ and ‘sustainable’ economy, which would also be reflected in its diplomacy. He emphasised the importance of creating a favourable environment for trade and investment. This new foreign policy strategy, termed ‘Economic Diplomacy’, marked a departure from Nyerere’s traditional ujamaa principles and represented the first significant shift in Tanzania’s external strategy since independence.

Domestically, there was a notable shift during this period. While Mkapa’s first term saw the rise of a faction in the CCM advocating for a relatively clean, neoliberal, quasi-authoritarian government, another more business-oriented entrepreneurial party elite emerged. As a result of economic liberalisation and privatisation in the 1990s, politicians, bureaucrats and ex-bureaucrats responsible for certain economic sectors in the government or civil administration started their own commercial enterprises or acted as middlemen between investors and emerging industries (Osei and Bruhn Reference Osei and Bruhn2023: 489). This new faction shifted power from the Presidency to the so-called mtandao (network), a group of ‘politician-businessmen’ focused on private gains rather than political objectives (Andreoni Reference Andreoni2017).Footnote ¹

With the death of Nyerere in 1999, who, even after his presidency, remained an influential moral authority in the CCM and preserved its original values, the path was clear for the mtandao to take over party politics (Osei and Bruhn Reference Osei and Bruhn2023: 489). By the time of the 2000 election, Mkapa had increasingly aligned himself with individuals known for their corrupt practices (Kelsall Reference Kelsall2002). The network provided vital campaign finance to the ruling party and lower-level ruling party factions, which now played an increased role in choosing the presidential candidate and expected patronage in return. The influence of these profit-oriented strongmen within the CCM and on the presidency led to a shift in Tanzania’s foreign policy from the normative, value-based approach initiated under Julius Nyerere and continued by his successor Mwinyi to ‘economic diplomacy’, showing how domestic shifts in power configuration had already influenced foreign policy before Magufuli and Hassan. In terms of PSA, the advocacy by the mtandao for a foreign policy geared towards economic benefits can be explained by the reconfiguration of power within the ruling coalition. The newly empowered business elites have mobilised towards a policy that aligns with their interests, which can be understood as a distributional instrument rather than solely as a collection of strategies to guide Tanzania’s relationships with other countries.

Under Jakaya Kikwete’s government, who was foreign minister before being elected president in 2005, Tanzania continued to build on Mkapa’s economic diplomacy. Though Kikwete’s tenure was noted for regional integration, particularly within the East African Community (EAC), and active participation in regional conflict resolution and peacekeeping missions, the overall foreign policy remained tilted towards the business interests of mtandao members, who remained a powerful force in the CCM (Kell et al. Reference Kell, Masabo and Feltes2024: 16; Osei and Bruhn Reference Osei and Bruhn2023: 490). Kikwete even tied his efforts for conflict resolution in the region to economic prosperity and encouraged investments from many different countries, such as the UK, Kenya, India and the US (Kuo Reference Kuo2013; Shule Reference Shule2014: 223). Notably, China became one of the most active investors during that time, and Kikwete successfully lobbied Beijing to finance or co-finance several of his ambitious projects aimed at enhancing Tanzania’s infrastructural framework (Lammich Reference Lammich2024; White 2023).

Despite Kikwete’s success in regional conflict resolution and attracting foreign aid and investments to Tanzania, domestic politics became more heated during his tenure. Kikwete’s laissez-faire approach and the party’s relatively poor performance in the 2010 elections intensified internal tensions, ultimately leading to a splintering of the already brittle factional coalition that had supported Kikwete in previous elections (Collord Reference Collord2022: 13). As his influence over factional dynamics waned, the presidential nomination process for the 2015 elections became increasingly contentious (Osei and Bruhn Reference Osei and Bruhn2023). By that time, internal divisions within CCM had coalesced into two main camps: the so-called CCM safi (clean) faction led by Samuel Sitta, advocating for transparency and anti-corruption, and the CCM mafisadi (corrupt) faction led by Edward Lowassa, who was linked to high-profile corruption scandals. Kikwete’s strategy of extending patronage and pledging support to multiple aspirants temporarily obscured the underlying conflicts but could not prevent their eventual eruption.

The party’s Ethics and Security Committee, tasked with vetting and forwarding candidates to the National Executive Committee (NEC), deviated from standard practice and submitted only five names from a pool of 38 aspirants, excluding prominent figures like Lowassa. The shortlisted candidates included John Magufuli, Bernard Membe, January Makamba, Amina Salum Ali and Asha-Rose Migiro. Several interviewees suggest that Kikwete, who favoured Membe, played a role in engineering Lowassa’s exclusion. ‘Kikwete and Lowassa had a deal […] After the fallout, Kikwete started preparing Bernard Membe […]’ (Interview with CCM member A). In retaliation, Lowassa’s supporters within the NEC withheld their backing for Membe, effectively blocking his advancement to the final round of three candidates. As a result, Magufuli – widely seen as a neutral figure without strong factional allegiances – emerged as the compromise candidate. In the final vote on July 12, 2015, Magufuli secured 2,104 out of 2,416 votes, decisively outpacing Amina and Migiro.Footnote ² ‘Magufuli ascending to power, was accidental […] CCM had not followed its procedures for presidential candidates. So eventually, with Lowassa out of the race, they decided to vote for Magufuli and get rid of Membe but also counter the Lowassa network’ (Interview with political observer).

The marginalisation of former Prime Minister and CCM heavyweight Edward Lowassa in the run-up to the 2015 elections thus marked a ‘significant realignment in the power blocs that contest Tanzanian politics’ (Kelsall Reference Kelsall2018: 18). Yet, it was the subsequent presidency of Magufuli that introduced a new political settlement, one characterised by a markedly different foreign policy orientation compared to the ‘economic diplomacy’ that had shaped Tanzania’s external engagements over the preceding 15 years.

Magufulism and isolationism

Magufuli’s nomination as the CCM presidential candidate was unexpected. As a low-profile contender with no strong political base, he then faced an unprecedented challenge in the presidential election when former Prime Minister Lowassa defected to the opposition coalition and mounted a vigorous campaign to unseat the ruling party. However, what began as a challenge for Magufuli arguably became an opportunity once he was in office. Lowassa’s departure weakened one of the most powerful informal networks within CCM, creating a vacuum that Magufuli could exploit to centralise power. Magufuli’s lack of previous engagement in CCM’s internal factionalism and the absence of a party base gave him far more personal power, which he then used to centralise authority within the party and government. His administration marked a departure from previous practices, emphasising centralisation and personalisation of power. Magufuli’s approach was characterised by a rigorous crackdown on corruption, which included firing over 10,000 ‘ghost workers’ and dismissing various high-ranking officials from institutions such as the Tanzania Investment Centre and the Tanzania Revenue Authority (Kelsall Reference Kelsall2018: 18; Osei and Bruhn Reference Osei and Bruhn2023: 491).

Taking lucrative contracts away from mtandao members, especially those associated with Lowassa’s camp, Magufuli favoured state- and military-owned enterprises, channelling resources through state bureaucratic entities often led by individuals he personally appointed.

Magufuli’s centralisation efforts also extended to the CCM itself, as he sought to bring the complex web of patronage networks under control, unlike Kikwete, who remained entangled with various factions. Magufuli focused on limiting and regulating private accumulation within the party (Collord Reference Collord2022:22). Aware that he lacked a strong base of loyal supporters, he aimed to consolidate power by introducing several reforms. These changes were also intended to reduce party expenses by cutting down the number of members attending various meetings (Interview with CCM member B). Officially, Magufuli framed these reforms as being in line with the ideals of the party’s founding chairman, Nyerere. The reformation process, which began in 2015, significantly restructured the party’s leadership, reducing the National Executive Committee (NEC) from 388 members to 158 and the Central Committee from 34 to 24 members. Additionally, by precluding members of parliament from participating in the powerful NEC, Magufuli severed established networks and party factions, allowing him to exert more direct control over party decisions (Andreoni Reference Andreoni2017:39). A Tanzanian academic noted that Magufuli marginalised intellectuals, political elites and government bureaucrats, with the exception of certain religious leaders who supported him and benefited in some way. Magufuli strategically placed loyalists in key government and party positions, often choosing individuals from his own ethnic background, region or those lacking strong ties to existing factions. This approach extended to academics from the University of Dar es Salaam, his alma mater, including Bashiru Ally, who became the Secretary-General of CCM in 2018. Magufuli’s approach to power consolidation was not merely administrative – it reflected a deliberate reconfiguration of the ruling coalition by undermining traditional party structures. Rather than relying on long-standing CCM elites, he drew support from outsiders, loyal technocrats and political novices with no entrenched factional loyalties. As one opposition figure observed, ‘He brought in people who had never been in CCM… And so, he captured the party. CCM became the Magufuli party, not really the CCM party’ (Interview with Tanzanian Opposition). This account illustrates a broader shift in the political settlement: away from consensus-based elite inclusion and toward a more personalist, loyalty-driven configuration. It helps explain why Magufuli’s foreign policy often bypassed multilateral norms and institutions – it mirrored a domestic strategy of bypassing checks, sidelining rivals and prioritising control over consensus.

This approach enabled him to build a network of personal loyalists, further consolidating his power. Critics and opposition within the party faced severe repercussions, including public apologies or expulsions from the party (Osei and Bruhn Reference Osei and Bruhn2023:493).

This reconfiguration of power shifted Tanzania’s political landscape, transforming it from a party-based regime to what Osei and Bruhn (Reference Osei and Bruhn2023: 496) describe as a party-personalist regime under Magufuli’s rule. Viewed through the lens of PSA, Magufuli’s rise to power marks a transition toward a concentrated political settlement. His efforts to sideline mtandao networks and restructure CCM leadership reflect an attempt to redefine the ruling coalition in narrow terms – excluding previously influential elites and consolidating authority around himself. This reconfiguration shaped foreign policy in ways consistent with PSA’s predictions: weakening multilateral cooperation, prioritising regime survival and favouring state-controlled ventures over international engagement. Thus, his foreign policy was not merely ideological but rooted in a domestic struggle to reshape elite bargains and enforce a new distribution of power.

Unlike his predecessor Kikwete, Magufuli’s power did not primarily stem from the CCM political elite but from his support base. The results of the 2015 elections indicated that the CCM had lost much of its voter base due to numerous corruption scandals and internal party conflicts. With Magufuli’s ‘bulldozer’ approach to fighting corruption and dismantling established patronage networks, he gained immediate popularity, especially among rural and working-class citizens. To appeal to his support base, he even adopted a slogan reminiscent of another populist president of that time. During a speech at the University of Dar es Salaam, President Magufuli asserted that Tanzania had long borne the burden of other nations’ conflicts and emphasised that it was time for the country to prioritise its own national interests. He stated, ‘We have carried the burden of other people’s conflicts for too long … our goal is to focus on the interests of our country – Tanzania first’.Footnote ³

While the formal tenets of Tanzania’s foreign policy, particularly the economic diplomacy framework introduced in 2001, have remained largely unchanged in official documents, Magufuli’s administration represents a substantive reorientation in practice. The shift did not manifest through a new policy declaration but through a pronounced change in emphasis, tone and priorities. By centralising decision-making and foregrounding national sovereignty, Magufuli departed from the cooperative and externally oriented approach of his predecessors. This practical redirection – emphasising control over natural resources, limiting external legal scrutiny and reducing multilateral engagement – amounted to a de facto transformation of foreign policy, even in the absence of formal doctrinal change.

The remodelling of the political settlement also had implications for Tanzania’s foreign policy. In the following, we will look at some of the decisions concerning external relations and foreign investment and tie them to the change in domestic power configuration. One area where Magufuli’s new centralisation of power and control over accumulation directly affected external investors was the resource sector. His policies aimed to maximise the state’s control and revenue from the extractive industries, posing significant challenges for external investors and signalling a shift away from foreign dependency towards a more isolationist strategy. Magufuli’s government passed three new pieces of legislation in 2017 to reinforce state sovereignty over natural resources, including mandating state ownership of at least sixteen percent in future mining operations and giving state-owned enterprises the right to acquire up to fifty percent of shares in mining companies. These laws also eliminated the option for companies to take disputes to international arbitration, further deterring foreign investment (Jacob and Pedersen Reference Jacob and Pedersen2018: 291). Several foreign-owned companies were accused of illegal operations and tax fraud and had their assets seized.Footnote ⁴

Although there was already a tendency towards resource nationalism under his predecessor, Kikwete, the new agenda under Magufuli had a more populist and interventionist twist (Barton Reference Barton2023: 342). Under the previous government, the main intention of intervening in the resource sector was to change conditions in favour of mtandao members and the backers of Kikwete. As shown by Andreoni (Reference Andreoni2017), the curtailing of privileges, disciplining of rents and enforcing of a nationalised agenda did not stop at the extractive sectors, but other foreign companies in the telecommunication sector, construction and agriculture were targeted with similar practices (Lammich Reference Lammich2024: 893).

Under Magufuli, the state became the primary beneficiary of new regulations, and foreign investors were directly targeted and publicly accused of exploiting the country. With this move, Magufuli appealed not to the local business elites but to the social foundation of his support base, trying to repair the damaged legitimacy among large segments of the electorate.

Another example of the interlinkage between the reconfiguration of the political settlement and foreign policy under Magufuli was Tanzania’s withdrawal from multilateral commitments, including the Open Government Partnership (OGP), the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) and most notably accepting non-governmental cases at the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR). The African Court, located in Arusha, the judicial centre of East Africa in northeastern Tanzania, was established by member states of the African Union (AU) to implement the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter). Since its first judges were elected in 2006, the African Court has been a popular recourse for the Tanzanian opposition and NGOs to voice their grievances with the CCM. Tanzanian citizens filed the highest number of cases at the African Court, including 107 of its 172 pending cases in 2016, and the Tanzanian government also had the highest number of judgements issued against it by the court.Footnote ⁵ The first judgement of the African Court on the merits, rather than on technical or procedural grounds, in 2013, was also a case put forward by the Tanzanian opposition. The court ruled that Tanzania’s constitutional requirement for election candidates to be affiliated with a political party violated the African Charter’s provisions on non-discrimination, freedom of association and the right to participate in public affairs.Footnote ⁶

Following Magufuli’s 2015 victory, grievances from the opposition, civil society and other groups multiplied as his government swiftly altered the rules to secure CCM’s dominance at all costs. This crackdown included measures to intimidate both opposition and ruling party politicians, escalating into a full-scale political and legal offensive that fuelled a rise in potential cases that could be brought before the African Court (Kelsall Reference Kelsall2018: 18). ‘Magufuli saw democracy as an essence to be controlled. He banned political activities and arrested opposition leaders, concentrating power within himself and his supporters’ (Interview with Tanzanian Opposition). The government censored and suspended media outlets, arbitrarily deregistered NGOs and failed to investigate abductions and attacks on journalists and opposition figures, further harassing and prosecuting those perceived as critics. These actions effectively silenced organisations promoting various rights and stifled political opposition by limiting their activities and prosecuting opposition members for government criticism.Footnote ⁷ The institutional decline of the Tanzanian Parliament under Magufuli’s rule further limited the opposition’s ability to effectively challenge the government’s actions through domestic courts and institutions (Collord Reference Collord2022: 23).

Since 2017, Tanzania has failed to report on its implementation of numerous African Court decisions against it, refused to implement some decisions, or stated that it could not or would not implement others. In November 2019, a year before Magufuli was running for his second term in office, his government announced the withdrawal of its special declaration to the court. The announcement clearly signalled that individuals and NGOs would lose their ability to directly submit applications against Tanzania at the African Court (De Silva and Plagis Reference De Silva and Plagis2023: 45). The withdrawal from the African Court is thus a logical continuation of Magufuli’s quest to concentrate power and further silence oppressed and marginalised groups. After bringing domestic structures to heel and closing many channels for the opposition and NGOs to challenge his authority, the withdrawal from the jurisdiction of the African Court also closed the possibility of taking matters to the international level.

While these two examples highlight the interlinkages between the narrow configuration of Magufuli’s settlement and Tanzania’s foreign policy, other examples include his administration’s resistance to the IMF and international finance, his handling of the Bagamoyo port project with China and his dismissal of international efforts to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic (Lammich Reference Lammich2024; Kell et al. Reference Kell, Masabo and Feltes2024).

Samia Hassan: forward to the past

The demise of Magufuli while in office in March 2021, amid conjectures linking his death to COVID-19, led to a shift in leadership, with his vice president, Samia Suluhu Hassan, assuming the presidency. Hassan’s tenure has marked a tentative return to the cordial diplomacy that characterised Kikwete’s presidency. In the following section, we will first analyse the changes in the political settlement that have occurred from Magufuli to Hassan. We will then examine the alterations in policies regarding foreign investors and the African Court, which are emblematic of the new settlement.

While the political settlement under Magufuli has been well researched, the recent changes under the new presidency are less well documented. This section will thus incorporate more interviews and media sources to highlight the recent reconfiguration of power structures in Tanzania. Hassan’s ascendancy to the presidency was not automatic. Although the country’s constitution states that the vice president assumes office upon the death of a president, there were factions within the ruling party that sought to prevent her from taking over. The tense transition following Magufuli’s death exposed the fragility of elite consensus within CCM and the uncertainty over who held effective power. The fear that Hassan might be blocked from assuming office – even though she was constitutionally next in line – signals deep resistance from factions loyal to Magufuli. One CCM member recalled:

This quote highlights how fragile the settlement had become by 2021, with no automatic continuity of power. Hassan’s eventual success in claiming the presidency required quickly renegotiating elite bargains, drawing on older networks, including that of former President Kikwete. Her subsequent foreign policy shift – marked by diplomatic re-engagement – can be read as both a signalling strategy to external actors and an internal strategy to broaden her coalition by returning to a more inclusive and institutionally embedded political order.

Hassan assumed power with limited political capital both within her party and outside.Footnote ⁸ Though Hassan was involved in the inner circles of CCM for over two decades, she could neither rely on a strong faction inside the CCM nor was she immediately popular among ordinary Tanzanians. Despite not being fully endorsed by Magufuli’s supporters when she took office, Hassan quickly built a solid base of trusted party insiders with the help of former president Jakaya Kikwete.

Hassan then swiftly dismissed several key Magufuli loyalists, including Chief Secretary Bashiru Ally and Minister of Foreign Affairs Palamagamba Kabudi.

She also reinstated individuals sidelined by Magufuli, such as January Makamba, a presidential aspirant in 2015; Nape Nnauye, a former party secretary for ideology and publicity; and Abdulrahman Kinana, the party’s former secretary general. Makamba and Nnauye were brought back into the cabinet, and Kinana returned as the mainland vice-chairman of the party. These three were prominent campaigners in Magufuli’s election before falling out of favour.

Hassan also quickly sought to secure the loyalty of the bureaucracy by increasing wages for civil servants, rescinding bans on moving personnel or equipment, and giving institutions more leeway to act independently (Interview with Political Analyst, Tanzania). Under President Hassan, Tanzania’s foreign policy has returned to a more balanced and cooperative orientation, often described as a revival of the principles of non-alignment and economic diplomacy (Kell et al. Reference Kell, Masabo and Feltes2024:8). While not replacing the 2001 Foreign Policy, the revised 2024 edition reaffirms the centrality of sovereignty, good neighbourliness and Pan-African solidarity, while also introducing new priorities such as economic diplomacy, climate change, diaspora engagement and the blue economy. These thematic emphases provide a formal policy anchor for Hassan’s recalibrated diplomatic approach, marking a clear contrast with Magufuli’s state-centric and isolationist tendencies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation 2025: ii).

According to President Hassan, the new foreign policy focuses on ‘active international engagement, aiming to achieve economic objectives while preserving past achievements and reinforcing the fundamental principles of the country’s traditional foreign policy’.Footnote ⁹ Hassan’s administration has also incorporated its more open foreign policy objectives into Tanzania’s national development strategy, connecting issues such as regional integration and attracting FDI with domestic development targets. Hassan quickly sought to rebuild strained relationships with international partners, restore investor confidence and re-engage with regional and global institutions. Unlike Magufuli, who made only eight trips in six years, President Hassan has undertaken 47 foreign trips between 2021 and 2023, including 23 outside of East and Southern Africa (Kell et al. Reference Kell, Masabo and Feltes2024:18). Her foreign travels since taking office have included numerous state visits to the US and European countries, as well as to Beijing, Oman, Dubai and Doha, among other non-Western partners.

Shortly after her appointment by Hassan, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation, Liberata Mulamula announced the reversal of the government’s decision to withdraw from the African Court. This reversal occurred despite the official withdrawal notice having been submitted to the African Union by the previous government and never officially recalled.Footnote ¹⁰ A year later, President Hassan claimed in a speech that Tanzania had indeed withdrawn from the court but is considering rejoining.Footnote ¹¹ Despite the unclear status of Tanzania’s membership in the African Court, Hassan has pledged her full support to the institution. Her government has dedicated 25 hectares of land and Tsh4 billion ($1.7 million) for the construction of the court’s permanent building on the outskirts of Arusha.Footnote ¹²

The limbo surrounding the membership of the African Court aligns with a series of apparent inconsistencies in Hassan’s domestic reforms. These reforms include a mix of strengthening liberal rights, such as improving the independence of the National Electoral Commission, while simultaneously hindering some opposition parties.Footnote ¹³ Some observers view this as a necessary strategic manoeuvre to protect her from the Magufulists, who remain a hardline faction within the party and may seek to undermine her in the 2025 general elections.Footnote ¹⁴

Hassan has also tried to reverse some of the policies associated with ‘resource nationalism’ under President Magufuli, giving more leeway to large-scale mining operations in the country.Footnote ¹⁵ Under her leadership, the investment climate for foreign corporations in the extractive sector has greatly improved. She has announced plans to raise the mining sector’s contribution to at least 10 percent of GDP by 2025 – nearly double its share under her predecessor – while also opening the door to joint ventures with some of the world’s largest mining companies. These measures resonate with the broader national development trajectory articulated in Tanzania Development Vision 2050 (Dira 2050), which projects a one-trillion-dollar, upper-middle-income economy by mid-century. Dira 2050 highlights regional integration, global competitiveness and environmental stewardship as central pillars, underscoring that sustained economic transformation depends on an outward-looking and cooperative foreign policy (National Planning Commission 2025: vi).

Several persons interviewed during fieldwork described a palpable shift in the tone and accessibility of government under Hassan. One official noted, ‘Under Magufuli, we had to wait. You never knew if a foreign deal would go through […] there was suspicion, delays and no clear channel. Now, there are meetings again. You know who to talk to’ (Interview, Former Trade Official). This statement reflects more than a procedural change; it signals a strategic shift in the political settlement. Whereas Magufuli’s coalition derived legitimacy from nationalist rhetoric and state control over rents, Hassan’s coalition appears to depend on reviving investor confidence and repairing relationships with transnational partners. The re-opening of bureaucratic channels is as much about satisfying the interests of re-integrated business elites as it is about shifting international posture. The five-year plan for 2021/22 to 2025/26 includes ambitious targets to increase the number of foreign investors fivefold, aiming for $15 billion per year by the end of 2025. While Hassan has relaxed some of the most restrictive regulations in the mining sector, she has not yet fully followed through on her promise to foreign investors to completely roll back the restrictions introduced under Magufuli. Mining projects must still be at least partially owned by the government of Tanzania and ‘indigenous’ companies, and they must hire – or at least favour – local suppliers, service providers and employees.Footnote ¹⁶

The embrace of foreign investors on the one hand, while still maintaining some of the regulations introduced under Magufuli that pose hurdles for foreign actors, again demonstrates an attempt to balance the interests of various groups within the dispersed power configuration of the ruling elite. The influx of foreign capital has already led to the revival of some networks from the Kikwete era that act as major party financiers but were suppressed during Magufuli’s tenure. Due to Hassan’s close political ties to Kikwete and his mtandao, there are certain expectations among the capitalist elite that thrived before Magufuli took over that Tanzania will quickly return to the liberal investment climate they benefited from before 2015. On the other hand, both traditionalists in the CCM and figures who became influential during the Magufuli era – who view Hassan’s approach either as a departure from Nyerere-era ideological purity or a betrayal of Magufuli’s legacy – have to be kept in check (Interview with CCM member B). Populist rhetoric of anti-imperialism retains enduring appeal for many citizens and offers political expediency for Magufuli’s remaining allies in CCM. There is also an entrenched reluctance and suspicion among many government officials towards foreign investors and a fear of infringement on sovereignty (Kell et al. Reference Kell, Masabo and Feltes2024: 18).