Introduction
The Catholicosate of All Armenians, centred at the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin, stood at the forefront of the Armenian people’s identity, as well as their political and cultural life, during the long centuries of foreign rule. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, EtchmiadzinFootnote 1 was under the rule of Persia, whose leader was Shah Fath-Ali Qajar (1797-1834). During this period, the Russian Empire took steps to establish itself in the South Caucasus.Footnote 2 On 18 January 1801, during the reign of Emperor Paul I (1796–1801), the Russian Empire annexed the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti (East Georgia). His successor Alexander I (1801-1825) subsequently made it one of the states of the empire by a decree of 12 September 1801. By exploiting the unstable political situation in Persia an opportunity was created for the Russian Empire to interfere in the affairs of the Iranian-dominated khanates.Footnote 3 This Russian expansionist policy eventually led to open Russian-Persian antagonism and war.Footnote 4
In such circumstances, the issue of the election of the Armenian Catholicos took on great importance, becoming a crucial factor in the regional politics of these states.Footnote 5 In contrast to earlier periods when the Catholicosate was influenced chiefly by Iran or, on occasion, the Ottoman Empire, the years 1800–1807 marked something fundamentally new: its politicization as a contested arena simultaneously engaged by two, and at times three, rival empires. The succession controversy of this period exposed deep divisions not only within the Armenian clergy but also within the broader nation. Crucially, the political sympathies of the Catholicos toward one imperial power or another carried far-reaching implications, as alignment with Russia, Persia, or the Ottomans was widely perceived as determining the future orientation of the Armenian nation and reshaping its collective identity.
The aforementioned issues can be thoroughly examined through the archival documents of the Etchmiadzin Catholicosate preserved in the Mashtots Matenadaran. These primary sources are of paramount importance, as they provide insight into multiple facets of this complex process. The Catholicosate Archives include correspondence among the Catholicoi, the monastic community of Etchmiadzin, and various Armenian communities, as well as communications with regional rulers. Of particular note is the Alexander Yeritsyan Archive: Yeritsyan, a prominent nineteenth-century Armenian historian who conducted extensive research in the Catholicosate Archives, collected there a wealth of documents relating to the activities of the Armenian Church.
Russian Geopolitical Approaches and Interference in the Electoral Traditions of the Catholicos of All Armenians
On 28 December 1799, the Catholicos of All Armenians Ghukas I Karnetsi (1780-1799) died. Following his death, the Etchmiadzin Congregation initiated the customary process of selecting the next Catholicos. Among the clergy, two candidates were under consideration: Archbishop Daniel Surmarets’i, the Patriarch of Constantinople, and Bishop Ephrem Dzorageghtsi, the nvirak Footnote 6 (envoy) of Etchmiadzin in the Russian Empire. Daniel Surmarets’i was duly chosen.Footnote 7 In adherence to tradition, preparations were made for a written agreement, ensuring approval of the prospective Catholicos by other Armenian spiritual centres, high-ranking clergy, and amiras Footnote 8 (nobility).
Immediately, however, disagreements arose, demonstrating internal fissures in Armenian society arising from the region’s volatile political situation. The Armenians of Tiflis, with the support of King George XII (1798–1800), and encouraged by the Russian administration established in Kartli–Kakheti, overrode the election of Surmarets’i and secured the election of Archbishop Hovsep Arghutyan, the prelate of the diocese of Russian Armenians, as Catholicos.Footnote 9 It is important to note that the Georgian kingdom did not traditionally intervene in the election of the Armenian Catholicos. In this case, however, the Russian presence—and particularly Arghutyan, closely connected to the Russian court and an advocate of its expansionist policy—proved decisive.Footnote 10
The Etchmiadzin delegation, headed by Bishop David Enegets’i, travelled to Constantinople, where the final decision regarding the election was traditionally made. However, the proceedings there were also not without controversy. Although the weight of public and institutional approval of the Armenians of Constantinople was on Daniel Surmarets’i’s side, the Patriarch himself remained hesitant due to the opposition of the Russian authorities.
As a result, of the delay in Constantinople, Hovsep Arghutyan began working actively to promote his own candidacy. On 1 February 1800, he addressed a letter from Petersburg to Archbishop Daniel. Judging by the letter’s contents, Arghutyan already had Russian support. Still, he proceeded cautiously, endeavouring to win over the Armenians of Constantinople to his side without appearing too heavy-handed. Thus, he couched his argument as follows: “the local bishops invited me to sit on the Catholicos’ throne so that I may protect it from the barbarous Persian tyrants.”Footnote 11 In other words, Arghutyan implies that only he, the leader of the Russian-ArmenianFootnote 12 diocese, is capable of protecting the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin.
The obvious source of the protection in question was to be Tsarist Russia. “However,” Arghutyan diplomatically continued, “so that my accession to the throne does not cause resentment, I expect unity and agreement from the nation.”Footnote 13 Thus, the archbishop, hinting that the Russian state was behind his candidacy, expected the Constantinopolitan Armenians to fall in line. Arghutyan continued to work hard to gain universal recognition for his claim to the Catholicosate. As noted, Archbishop Ephrem was also considered a candidate for Catholicos. In this connection, it is important to mention a letter he received from Arghutyan, dated 3 March 1800.
Describing the report of the disagreements that had reached him from ConstantinopleFootnote 14 Arghutyan writes that “the greatest emperor and the Georgian king now recognize me as the Catholicos of the Armenians.”Footnote 15 Arghutyan, relying on this support, then sent an envoy to the synod at Constantinople to stop any further electoral efforts, and subtly threatened Patriarch Daniel, “Do not become a reason for discord between kings.”Footnote 16
Thus, Hovsep Arghutyan, relying on the support of the Russian authorities and the Georgian king acting under their patronage, actually undertook to prevent Daniel Archbishop from being elected. And indeed, just a few days later, on 23 March Hovsep Arghutyan wrote to him again “Your presence there and my presence here [on the throne of the Mother See] is the strength of the Holy See,”Footnote 17 clearly detailing what he means in his letter. “I have written to the Georgian king and to Pyotr KavalentskyFootnote 18 that if any other candidate is chosen instead of me, they should not permit him to enter the Mother See and perform the consecration.”Footnote 19 The Russian intervention plainly alluded to in these remarks is also manifest in another of Arghutyan’s letters, dated 12 April and sent in haste by one of his priests to the Russian ambassador Vasily Tomara in Constantinople. On the strength of an imperial decree, the ambassador is instructed to ensure that “no one moves [i.e., Daniel], because he [i.e., Arghutyan] is the legitimate Catholicos.”Footnote 20 It transpires that Arghutyan’s allies, considering his support from Russia, even proposed dispensing with the need for Constantinople’s approval. In one letter, Vardapet Footnote 21 (archimandrite) Grigor one of the archbishop’s close aides, explicitly argues: “it is not worth waiting for Constantinople’s answer, it is enough that the Russian emperor, the Georgian king and a part of the nation support you.”Footnote 22
One might assume that comprehensive Russian assistance would have been enough to secure Hovsep Arghutyan’s election without further ado. Yet the congregation of Etchmiadzin continued to resist, expressing in a letter of 23 April addressed to Daniel and the Armenian amiras of Constantinople their conviction that the candidacy of Hovsep Arghutyan had been “imposed without [our] will, by the intervention.”Footnote 23 On the same day, Archbishop Minas, deputy of the Mother See, also wrote to Archbishop Daniel, assuring him of his status as Catholicos and urging him to “come forward and take the throne, for this is our choice.”Footnote 24
However, events unfolded in a different manner. Hovsep Arghutyan consistently used Russian support to advance his cause, obtaining a proclamation from the emperor on 28 July supporting his election.Footnote 25 Thanks to active Russian imperial efforts, on 2 August, he also obtained a barat Footnote 26 (certificate) and a firman Footnote 27 (decree) from the Ottoman Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) confirming his election.Footnote 28 Thus, Russian efforts paid off. Confronted with a fait accompli, the congregation of Etchmiadzin, was forced to accept Hovsep Arghutyan. The congregants addressed the matter on 11 October, sending Arghutyan a letter in which they first tactfully wrote that “not wanting to cause division and according to procedure, we sent an envoy to Constantinople, waiting for their response, and have not received a conclusive answer until this day.”Footnote 29
Without delving into the specifics of the events in Constantinople, we may observe that the Etchmiadzin Congregation remained steadfastly under Daniel’s authority until a conclusive response was received from Constantinople. As they detailed in the letter: “On 26 September, we received a letter from Archbishop David (envoy of the Mother See to Constantinople) that the Catholicos chosen by the Russian Emperor, the Ottoman Sultan and the nation was elected and acceptable.”Footnote 30 The letter also mentions that on 17 September, the news of Hovsep Arghutyan’s election as Armenian Catholicos was solemnly proclaimed in the Armenian church at Astrakhan.Footnote 31
The Russian proclamation, as well as the Russian ambassador’s efforts to secure approval from the Ottoman sultan, induced the Armenians of Constantinople to approve Hovsep Arghutyan’s candidacy. The Congregation of Etchmiadzin began to display a sense of urgency, writing to the newly selected Catholicos: “come to the Mother See as quickly as possible, so that you may at least be here by the end of December.”Footnote 32 Such haste had its own motives, which the clergy warned about in their letter. “But if you wait until spring and come only then, turmoil may begin to brew again.”Footnote 33 In other words, with Hovsep Arghutyan’s election officially sanctioned by both the Russian emperor’s proclamation and the Ottoman sultan’s firman, the congregation members urged him to assume the throne promptly. This urgency was driven by concerns that any delay might provide an opportunity for Persian authorities, particularly the Khan of Yerevan, to exploit the situation and sow discord among the Armenians.
At the end of the letter, the congregants avowed that they now accepted Hovsep Arghutyan as the Armenian Catholicos.Footnote 34 As the congregation eagerly anticipated the imminent arrival of the chosen Catholicos, Russian Emperor Paul I officially sanctioned his journey to Etchmiadzin by a special decree issued on 30 October. The decree allocated 1000 rubles from the state treasury for the tripFootnote 35 and instructed the governor of Astrakhan to facilitate Hovsep Arghutyan’s departure to Tiflis. In accordance with the Tsar’s request, King George XII of Kartli-Kakheti was to receive him with honour.Footnote 36 Before his departure on 15 November, Hovsep Arghutyan, now the Catholicos of All Armenians, addressed Paul I in a letter, highlighting several crucial points. Initially, he expressed his utmost loyalty to the Russian state with “most submissive fervour.”Footnote 37 He then turned to the need for a successor to his former office of Prelate of Russian Armenians. Amid expressions of warm praise for the emperor, he nominated one of his underlings, Vardapet Grigor, to assume the role of prelate in his stead.Footnote 38 Thus, with apparent diligence, though without particular haste, Hovsep Arghutyan made preparations for his departure, with an apparent sense of security stemming from his support from Russia.
However, during this period, tensions were gradually increasing at the Mother See as can be clearly seen from the letter written by the congregants to Hovsep Arghutyan in December. It transpires that Archbishop David had already returned to Etchmiadzin from Constantinople, bringing with him the “firman of the Great Ottoman Sultan’’ documenting the confirmation of Hovsep Arghutyan and the mahzar Footnote 39 (letter) with seals validating his election by the community.Footnote 40 In light of this significant development, a special ceremony took place in Etchmiadzin on 23 November: “the mahzar and the Sultan’s firman were unveiled in the presence of both clergy and laity, who enthusiastically celebrated the election of the Catholicos and expressed their wishes for his prompt arrival.”Footnote 41 This notable affirmation served not only as reassurance for the local Armenians but possibly also for the Persian authorities, signalling that Hovsep Arghutyan’s election would no longer be disputed.
Meanwhile, as indicated in the subsequent lines of the letter, the latter group appeared to refrain from directly intervening in the proceedings but subtly conveyed their dissatisfaction with the prolonged delay in resolving the issue of the Catholicos’ election. It is mentioned that upon his return, Archbishop David promptly “journeyed to Yerevan with gifts,” presenting the khan with the sultan’s firman.”Footnote 42 This gesture appears to have been well-received by Mohammad Khan Qajar (1784-1805) of Yerevan, who was close with the Persian Qajar rulers.Footnote 43 He was evidently satisfied that the interactions with the Russians, who had already established themselves in Kartli-Kakheti, were still of a diplomatic nature.
Nevertheless, the prolonged delay in addressing the matter of the Armenian Catholicos was considered unjustified. Amidst the prevailing anarchy, various concerns were surfacing, prompting the congregation to explicitly caution Hovsep Arghutyan to “promptly come to the Mother See by command of the Russian king and provide guidance to the nation and the clergy.”Footnote 44 This desire for haste was due to a number of reasons. As the letter writers had already mentioned, there were ongoing conflicts among both clerical and secular aristocratic circles, but it is also necessary to take into account the factor of the Khan of Yerevan. Although the latter did not openly object to Hovsep Arghutyan’s candidacy, the extended uncertainty at the Mother See and the delay in the arrival of Hovsep Arghutyan created an opportunity to intervene, which he did not hesitate to use. One letter from the Congregation, dated January 1801 sheds light on these endeavours.
It accordingly became apparent that on 13 October, the Khan of Yerevan, trying to influence the course of events, summoned the representatives of the Etchmiadzin congregation and, affecting concern that the chair of the Catholicos was still vacant, offered to elect a Catholicos on the spot. The Etchmiadzin delegation, however, unanimously insisted that “it is Hovsep who was elected Catholicos with the approval of the nation, and he will arrive soon”Footnote 45 The Khan, apparently becoming aware that Hovsep Arghutyan already had the approval of the Sultan and the Russian Emperor, seemed to accept that choice. In any case, in a subsequent letter he expressed his willingness to order a passport for Hovsep Arghutyan.Footnote 46 Nonetheless, a few months later, on 22 October, the Vicar Archbishop of Minas died, plunging the Mother See into complete anarchy. Although Hovsep Arghutyan was en route, he only reached MozdokFootnote 47 (North Caucasus) on 12 January. These circumstances prompted the congregation of Etchmiadzin to plead for Hovsep Arghutyan’s swift arrival, as there existed a threat of more decisive intervention by the Persian Khan if he were further delayed.
We can accordingly assert that the Russian Empire, having solidified its influence in the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti, exerted significant authority within the Ottoman court to secure its preferred candidate for the position of Armenian Catholicos: the leader of the Russian-Armenian diocese.Footnote 48 In the local context, the Georgian royal family, including King George XII and particularly Prince David Bagrationi (1767-1819), played a pivotal role by supporting Hovsep Arghutyan.Footnote 49 Consequently, despite the Ottoman Empire’s initial intransigence, it yielded to Russia and confirmed Hovsep Arghutyan. In the course of these events, the Khan of Yerevan explored the possibility of endorsing an alternative candidate for the Catholicosate,Footnote 50 but eventually acquiesced to the election of Arghutyan.
The involvement of external powers in the election of the Catholicos of All Armenians. The beginning of the David-Daniel Dispute
After a long delay, Hovsep Arghutyan, who was confirmed as Catholicos of the Armenians due to the intervention of Russian imperial authorities, finally made his way to Etchmiadzin. Midway through his journey, however, he fell ill with pneumonia in Tiflis. Ten days later, on 9 March 1801, Hovsep Arghutyan died.Footnote 51 After his death, a new struggle began for the position of Catholicos of All Armenians, which was already claimed by two candidates: David Enegets’i (Archbishop and envoy of Etchmiadzin in Constantinople) and Daniel Surmarets’i (the Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople). The conflict between them lasted for six years, from 1801 to 1807, and is known as the “David-Daniel dispute.”
The David-Daniel dispute for the Catholicosate was affected by the active involvement of various external powers. David’s candidacy was initially strongly supported by the Russian Empire, although the Etchmiadzin congregation continued to favour Daniel. That circumstance was determined by a number of factors. It was known that Hovsep Arghutyan was a cleric with an overtly Russian orientation. David was not only considered his supporter, but the rumour was also circulated that he was the one to whom Hovsep Arghutyan “bequeathed” the Catholicosate on his deathbed. This circumstance, we believe, was crucial to forming the Russian perspective on the issue.
Thus, after the death of Hovsep Arghutyan, a situation was created in which Daniel, re-elected by the congregation, remained in Constantinople, and David began promoting his candidacy. In these circumstances, it was already plain that in the David-Daniel dispute, concerning which the Armenian clergy and people were also divided, either candidate could only prevail with the direct support of a regional power. The historiography has rightly established the point of view that David was the Russian Empire’s favoured candidate at this time,Footnote 52 and archival documents give grounds for asserting that Russian advocacy for David was most often expressed via the Georgian court, particularly by the Georgian heir to the throne, David Bagrationi.
On 16 March 1801, a congregational assembly was convened in Etchmiadzin, at which the members of the order remained true to their prior decision, once again nominating Daniel as a candidate for the throne of Catholicos of All Armenians.Footnote 53 Archbishop David, predictably, opposed the decision, arguing that the election of the Catholicos of All Armenians had taken place without conferral with elders of Yerevan, in violation of tradition. The members of the Etchmiadzin order rejoined that this was not a new election, but merely a re-confirmation of the former decision.Footnote 54 This exchange established beyond doubt David’s ambition to claim the Catholicos’ throne. Seriously concerned, the congregation of Etchmiadzin set about to prevent any of David’s machinations. Placing importance on the role of Constantinople in this matter, the Etchmiadzin congregation addressed a letter on 9 April 1801 to the Armenian amiras of Constantinople, who were to confirm the selection of the congregation as soon as possible and to send the Ottoman firman to Etchmiadzin approving the new Catholicos.Footnote 55 Another letter sent the following day, 10 April, also shows the Etchmiadzin congregation’s urgent desire to make Daniel the Catholicos as soon as possible, because, as they write, they feared that “…a person has come from Tiflis to appoint us another Catholicos.’’Footnote 56
The congregation’s concern was, in fact, well-placed; shortly thereafter they received a letter of 17 April from David, the Prince of Kartli-Kakheti, urging them to elect David as Catholicos. “Our blessed ancestors always supported the Holy See, and according to the final will of your blessed CatholicosFootnote 57 cast your vote for David, and heed to the Russian emperor’s admonitions through General Lazarev.Footnote 58 “Footnote 59 The Georgian prince subtly warned the congregants against objecting to David’s candidacy, writing “now news reaches us that, ignoring the neighbour that lives among you, you are striving for a foreigner,” indirect references to Daniel and David, respectively, which are subsequently made explicit: “because David is not a foreigner, but a member of the congregation and the Holy Synod.”Footnote 60 Here, Prince David actually calls for the Armenian clergy to adopt a political orientation, going so far as to observe that for centuries the Armenian people had sought a means of ridding themselves of the Muslim yoke, and stating that this opportunity had now appeared in the form of the Russian Empire, and that the Armenian clergy should not oppose the emperor’s will.Footnote 61 Accordingly, he urges the congregants: “withdraw your decision and accept our decision, choose a true friend, agree with us and accept the mahzar written by us for the good of all.”Footnote 62 It is clear that due to the Russian presence, the Georgian prince desired to play a decisive role in the Catholicos election process.
After Georgia’s loss of de facto sovereignty, the congregants of Etchmiadzin wanted to eliminate one external factor in the process of electing the Catholicos, while the Georgian side seemed to want to show that they were still a factor in the region and, that they could influence the affairs of Etchmiadzin as before. However, under the existing conditions, in order not to arouse the displeasure of the local Persian authorities, the congregants of Etchmiadzin did not want to accept the Georgian proposal, and the candidate enjoying the patronage of Russia. Therefore, they sent a letter in reply to Prince David and informed him of their unanimous desire for Daniel to be the Catholicos.Footnote 63 Moreover, the congregants urge David not to interfere in their internal affairs, writing in response to his observation: “your worthy grandfather Heraclius [King Heraclius II of Kartli-Kakheti], who ruled the country with order…. did not interfere in such matters in any way.”Footnote 64
Thus, it can be concluded that the Russian political approach to the election of the Armenian Catholicos was actually conveyed through the Georgian side, although it can be assumed that at a certain stage of the David-Daniel dispute, the Georgian prince even acted independently. A letter sent by one of the Tiflis clergymen to Archbishop David further corroborates this claim. It is written in the letter that special envoys, accompanied by clergy, delivered Prince David’s paper and the Tiflis Armenian decision to the khan.Footnote 65 It turned out that Prince David wanted to present to the Khan with the agreement of Tiflis Armenians in favour of Archbishop David. Contrary to the wishes of the Etchmiadzin congregation to exclude the Georgian factor from the election process, archival documents reveal that at this stage of the David–Daniel dispute, another external actor intervened on behalf of the Ottoman Empire: Batal Hüseyin Pasha, the governor of the strategically vital Erzurum Vilayet, situated on the empire’s eastern frontier.
On 13 April 1801, Vardapet Grigor sent a letter to Bishop Hovhannes, Patriarch of Constantinople. In the letter, he justified his attempt to involve the local Ottoman authorities in this matter. “I wrote to my old friend Hüseyin Pasha to forbid Daniel’s movement because he does not have a firman from the two kings.”Footnote 66 Since the Ottoman Empire had readily given the firman to Hovsep Arghutyan after Russian efforts on his behalf, it was expected that the Ottomans would not hesitate to give the firman to David as well. Accordingly, Grigor wanted to legitimize the interference of the Russian Empire in the election of the Catholicos in every possible way. Furthermore, in a letter addressed to David Enegets’i, an Armenian priest wrote that Prince David also sent a letter with the same requests to Hüseyin Pasha.Footnote 67 It emerges that it was expected that Hüseyin Pasha, that is, the Ottoman authorities, would prevent Daniel from coming to Etchmiadzin.
With regard to Archbishop David’s suitability as a candidate favoured by the Russian Empire, significant efforts were undertaken by Vardapet Grigor in this matter. It should be noted that Grigor had his own ambitions in this process. During the David-Daniel dispute, he hoped to gain the position of prelate of the Diocese of Russian Armenians.
In this early period of the David-Daniel dispute, it was Vardapet Grigor who promoted discourse around Hovsep Arghutyan’s “final will”Footnote 68 shaping conversations both in the Georgian court and in Russian governing circles. From the documents, it can be inferred that the process of anointing David was initiated by the reports disseminated by Vardapet Grigor. In any case, this is evidenced in a letter written to David by Gevorg Aghayekov in May 1801, who had already been anointed Catholicos. Aghayekov states that the Russian ambassador had received a decree to the effect that before his death, the Armenian Catholicos had written a will stating that his successor should be Archbishop David.Footnote 69 Aghayekov goes on to state that the Russian ambassador V. S. Tomara sent him to the Armenian Patriarchate, so that the latter would “know their intentions.”Footnote 70
From Aghayekov’s letter, it becomes clear that he received information from the Patriarchate, indirectly proving that Catholicos David, who enjoyed Russian support, had also bribed the Khan of Yerevan. Ensuring that the matter of David’s becoming the Catholicos was not approached from that perspective, Aghayekov writes: “I told everyone that there is no need for idle gossip. The Holy Father became the Catholicos by the will of Hovsep Arghutyan and the order of the Sublime Porte.”
Archival documents suggest that the tsarist side did not fully understand what had transpired, that is, that the candidate they supported was finally elected Catholicos with the support of the Khan of Yerevan. This would mean that the person consecrated Catholicos of All Armenians, who was supposed to be a supporter of the Russian expansionist policy, was actually indebted to the Khan of Yerevan for his election.
Simultaneously, additional developments unfolded in Etchmiadzin. Archbishop David and his adherents continued their efforts to demonstrate unwavering loyalty to the Russian faction. This is evidenced by the new Catholicos’ very first letter, wherein he points out that his election received favour from “Prince David, General Lazarev, and, of course, the testament left by Catholicos Hovsep.”Footnote 71
In any case, on 28 April 1801 David was consecrated Catholicos of All Armenians in Etchmiadzin. It seemed that this should put an end to the matter, the Russian Empire had achieved its political goals by seeing its preferred candidate in the position of Catholicos of All Armenians for the second time over the congregation’s objections. However, events were increasingly clarifying the reality. Thus, one of the archival documents testifies to the process by which David was consecrated Catholicos of All Armenians. The congregants said that it was first of all with the direct participation of the khan (sardar) of Yerevan, at the cost of promising him large amounts of money and with threats to themselves.Footnote 72 It turns out that while Vardapet Grigor, Prince David, and even Hüseyin Pasha of Erzurum worked to make David Catholicos for the sake of the regional interests of the Russian Empire, but that direct participation of the Khan of Yerevan was instrumental in realizing this design. The newly-elected Catholicos, of course, was anxious for the Russian side to remain in the dark about the Khan’s support for his candidacy. For example, in a letter addressed to Hovhannes Lazaryan, a prominent Russian-Armenian figure close to the Tsar’s court, he described what happened as follows: after the death of Catholicos Hovsep, the congregation waited for two months for Daniel to come and be anointed as a Catholicos, but as Daniel did not arrive and the throne could not be left vacant, so they anointed David a Catholicos to prevent a disturbance among the congregants.Footnote 73
The events described could naturally be considered as a blow to the regional interests of the Russian Empire. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the Russian Empire was instantaneously required to adjust its position regarding the Armenian Catholicos, a matter that would become one of the crucial issues of the later Russian-Persian confrontation.
The Russian Stance Towards the Armenian Catholicos and the Russian-Persian Confrontation
Following the accession of the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti to the Russian Empire, a subsequent widening of the Russian expansionist policy became apparent.Footnote 74 In the course of these events, the Russian side also attached importance to selecting a suitable candidate for the position of Catholicos of All Armenians—one who would both enjoy the trust of the Armenian people and align with Russian interests. In the end, the Tsarist authorities came to the conclusion that the 28 April 1801 consecration of David V Enegets’i (1801-1807), which had, in essence, been carried through by the efforts of the Khan of Yerevan, could not correspond to Russian interests. The efforts of influential Armenian clergymen and other actors with a pro-Russian orientation played a not inconsiderable role in the formation of this approach.Footnote 75 Accordingly, the Russian side began to support unreservedly the claims of Daniel I Surmarets’i (1807-1808), who had taken refuge in Bayazet, in Ottoman territory. For this purpose, a special imperial decree was issued on 28 September, by which Alexander I, recognizing Daniel’s rights as Catholicos, instructed the Russian ambassador stationed in Constantinople to make every effort to secure for Daniel the firman of confirmation from the Ottoman Sultan.Footnote 76 This turn of events further deepened the tension in Russian-Persian relations. The Russian effort bore fruit. On 21 February, the Ottoman Sultan gave his firman of approval,Footnote 77 after that the Tsar also recognized Daniel as Catholicos.Footnote 78 With the benefit of this support, Archbishop Daniel was anointed as Catholicos on 25 May 1802, in the monastery of Bagrevand (Bayazet).Footnote 79 This development initiated a serious confrontation between the Russian and Persian sides, which, however, proceeded for the time being only in the field of diplomacy. The Russian diplomatic effort succeeded in securing the Ottoman Sultan’s favourable treatment of Daniel on 11 May, the Ottoman Sultan ordered by a special decree that Archbishop Daniel, then located in his domains, was to be given a proper reception. In particular, the pasha of Bayazet was instructed to take Daniel Surmarets’i “under his care, protection, support, and patronage.”Footnote 80 Furthermore, in this stage of the David-Daniel dispute the Ottoman Sultan effectively expressed his support for the latter candidate, having established in a decree that “Armenian clergy traveling to and returning from the domain of the Persians must first present themselves to the Catholicos.”Footnote 81 Accordingly, Ottoman administrators were strictly instructed that “priests, vardapets, and bishops, wherever they might have come from, if they have come without the order and permission of Catholicos Daniel, must be sent back to Etchmiadzin.”Footnote 82 Nonetheless, this approach of the Ottoman authorities cannot be said to have had a clear orientation; as we shall shortly see, not much later, due to the efforts of the allies of David Enegets’i the same Sultan would give his consent to have Daniel detained and sent back to Etchmiadzin. It is therefore possible to say that the Ottoman side, assisting by turns both the Russian and Persian candidates, basically did not exhibit an essential interest in this issue. All the same, this decree of the Sultan’s constituted a considerable success for the Russian candidate, with regard to which Gregory the patriarch of Constantinople hastened to inform the order of Etchmiadzin that “Daniel is the Catholicos, doubly selected and proclaimed by the Sultan’s firman and by Imperial decree, and henceforth in Ottoman bishoprics there may circulate only those members of clergy whom Daniel permits.”Footnote 83 Since for the time being the goal of the Russian policy was to diplomatically win over the many Khanates of the region and thereby bring them out from under Persian rule, the question of the Armenian Catholicos may also be viewed from this perspective. This is to say that the Russian efforts were directed at bringing their preferred candidate to the Catholicos’ chair by means of negotiations, which, understandably, would greatly strengthen Russian authority and influence over the Armenian population of the area. In relation to this political goal, there are many striking official documents in the Matenadaran archives, which comprehensively describe these efforts. As early as 13 May, Alexander I wrote to Mohammad Khan Qajar of Yerevan that “by means of the Ottoman Sultan’s firman and by the will of all Armenians and the monks of Etchmiadzin, Bishop Daniel has been recognized as the patriarch of the Armenians; he has also received from us an imperial proclamation.” “Therefore,” continued the Tsar, “he must be permitted to enter Holy Etchmiadzin and occupy the Catholicos’s throne.”Footnote 84 However, it was not only in this important matter that the Tsar expected the cooperation of the Khan. He also wrote that “the patriarch and other clergy located at the religious centre under your authority be provided with security and care.”Footnote 85 Thus, the Russian Tsar, substantiating his request with the proclamation of approval traditionally received from the Ottoman Sultan, was in effect demanding that the Khan depose the already-anointed Catholicos, David, install Daniel, and provide for the latter’s security. We cannot suppose, of course, that during the period in question, when Russian forces were stationed only in the Georgian capital of Tiflis, that this demand would be easily carried out by the Khan of Yerevan. In any case, this exchange clearly foreshadowed the subsequent Russian policy, whose objective was to make Daniel into the Catholicos and take the Khanate under Russian patronage, a policy whose consequences the Persian Khan, even if unwilling, could not avoid. The fact that Russian influence was for the time being entirely on the side of Daniel Surmarets’i created opportunities for certain members of the Etchmiadzin congregation to work against Catholicos David. Worthy of note in this context are numerous complaints written by these clergy. We may single out for examination one written protest, dated 20 May, and addressed to the clergy of Constantinople as well as to the local Armenian amiras, which stated about David Catholicos that “this usurper has impeded and corrupted the good order of our congregation and of the nation.”Footnote 86 The authors of the letter identified the root of the issue as foreign intervention: “since the truth is not on his side (by this they mean that their own chosen candidate was Daniel) he relies upon the Khan and thereby receives whatever he desires.”Footnote 87 On the basis of these facts it is possible to state that the entire force of the Russian-Persian diplomatic confrontation was expressed in the dispute between the Catholicos. In the letter it is made clear that Catholicos David, with the help of the Khan, was harshly pursuing any clergyman who made any step in support of the Russian candidate, Daniel. For this reason, the Khan had even ordered that “if anyone fails to carry out the command of the caliph [that is, the Catholicos], his beard shall be shaved and he must pay a fine of 100 tumans to the Khan.”Footnote 88 Not contenting themselves with the aforementioned stricture, the monks of Etchmiadzin also turned to Alexander I. This appeal, dated 2 June, is worthy of attention insofar as it was signed by eight bishops and eighteen vardapets of the order, who proclaimed: “our nation has chosen Daniel as Catholicos, a selection which has been confirmed by decrees of both the Ottoman Sultan and of the Emperor, and meanwhile David has become Catholicos by force with the assistance of the Khan of Yerevan.”Footnote 89 Enumerating David’s abuses, the clergy request the Tsar to “release our order and the patriarchal Chair from this captivity.”Footnote 90 Understandably, in this time of discord, Catholicos David also had his supporters, and in regard to this fact the authors of the letter cautioned the Tsar that “David is forcing the bishops and vardapets to preliminarily sign and stamp papers, after which he prepares whatever writs, he desires and sends them everywhere” and alert him that “if you receive such a message, be assured that the seals have been placed forcibly and not by our own will.”Footnote 91 The Russian authorities continued to advance Archbishop Daniel’s candidacy. Worthy of attention in this regard are events which took place in Tiflis. The local Russian governor Karl Knorring,Footnote 92 to whom had been assigned the work of integrating the newly-conquered Georgian districts into the Empire, arranged a ceremonial assembly in June of 1802 at the Surb Nshan Armenian church, in which there participated not only high-ranking Armenian clergy, but also the Georgian patriarch, and it was officially announced that Archbishop Daniel had been confirmed as Catholicos of All Armenians by the command of the Tsar.Footnote 93 In this context, the already-anointed Daniel addressed a letter to Alexander I, dated 19 June. Daniel notes that “regardless of our being selected by the nation, the Khan of Yerevan has forbidden us from entering Holy Etchmiadzin,”Footnote 94 and beseeches the Russian emperor to “free our Mother See of Persian tyranny and expel David.”Footnote 95 In answer to and in support of Daniel, the Tsarist authorities informed him on 22 July that by an imperial decree Armenian clergy would now require Daniel’s permission to enter the Empire.Footnote 96 It should be noted that at this time the controversy over the Armenian Catholicosate occupied a truly important place in Russian-Persian relations. This much is made plain in the course of a series of Russian diplomatic efforts. The Russian policy was clearly directed toward establishing influence in the Ararat region and in this context, it was considered an important priority to facilitate Daniel’s establishment as Catholicos in Etchmiadzin; meanwhile the Persian side was committed to keeping David on the Catholicos’s throne, as their ally. Multiple documents attest to the Russian diplomatic effort in this matter. We may take as an example the 21 October 1802 letter of Chancellor of the Russian Empire Alexander Vorontsov to the Khans of Yerevan and Nakhijevan. Vorontsov wrote that “Although the Russian Tsar and the Ottoman Sultan by their decrees have recognized Daniel as the Armenian Catholicos, Archbishop David, with the support of certain local amiras, has unlawfully usurped the office and is not permitting [Daniel] to enter Etchmiadzin as Catholicos.”Footnote 97 In the name of the Tsar, Vorontsov expressed the expectation that the Khan will “accept the patriarch Daniel in Etchmiadzin with respect and honour, as accords with his imperial patronage, and seat him on his patriarchal chair.”Footnote 98 The letter of the Russian chancellor is not devoid of attempts at coercion; he writes “and if you disregard the written orders of the two sovereigns, this will be viewed as an offense.” However, at this time the Russian threat not only failed to exert any influence, but had the contrary effect. With the assistance of the Khan of Yerevan, David Enegets’i succeeded in bribing the local Ottoman authorities and having Catholicos Daniel and his allies brought from Bayazet to Etchmiadzin on 27 November 1802.Footnote 99 Evidently having been informed in advance, Daniel Surmarets’i wrote in a 24 November letter addressed the Synod of Etchmiadzin that “today a certain vardapet of David’s party, by the direction of a Persian official of the Khan of Yerevan came before the local pasha and, bought us for a price of paying 30,000 gurush Footnote 100 (silver currency), and tomorrow we and the clergy with us will be bound and taken before David.”Footnote 101 As events proved, the Khan of Yerevan was not only able to defy the Russian demand that Daniel be accepted as Catholicos of the Armenians, but was able to arrange for Daniel’s arrest on Ottoman territory and transportation to Etchmiadzin. It is plain that such an action would have been possible with the permission of the highest Ottoman authorities, but the position of these authorities, as previously mentioned, was an inconstant one, depending also to a certain extent on the attitudes of the Armenian patriarch of Constantinople and the Armenian amiras. The capture of Catholicos Daniel was a serious blow to Russian prestige, but it must be noted that the Tsarist administration made no material steps toward securing his release,Footnote 102 despite continuous requests of assistance from the Armenian clergy. Even Daniel himself, imprisoned in the fortress of Yerevan, succeeded on 2 January 1803 in sending a letter to Pavel Tsitsianov, the Governor General of Georgia. The letter draws the Russian governor’s attention to the circumstance that in spite of his election to the Catholicosate having been confirmed by both Russian and Ottoman decrees, the Russian Empire had in fact made no efforts toward securing his release from prison.Footnote 103 The opposing side did not remain idle either. On 10 February 1803, twelve bishops of the Etchmiadzin brotherhood appealed to Alexander I in support of Catholicos David. It transpires that the order was undertaking to convince the Tsar that the rightful patriarch was David himself, and had they attempted to send a delegation to the imperial court for this purpose. “Last year,” they write, “we sent two prominent bishops to visit Your Highness, so that they might present our request directly; this was in vain, however, since the bishops were able to reach only as far as Tiflis.”Footnote 104 In not allowing this delegation to cross the frontier, the Empire had shown its unwavering position on this issue. But the bishops went further, writing: “You have sent a man to the Khan of Yerevan, so that he might remove the rightful Catholicos, David, from his throne and illegitimately install Daniel. Is it possible that you wish to do so only in order to demonstrate your power, or is it truly your intention to take the Mother See under your protection? But if this is the case, [you must know that] by replacing David with Daniel you will only promote the ruin of the Mother See, the division of the nation, and the abrogation of law and order.”Footnote 105 It is significant that this letter was written in Yerevan, and from its contents it is plainly apparent that it constituted an answer to the Russian demands earlier sent to the Khan; in all probability this reply was written under the latter’s direction. Accordingly, in order not to give way before Russian diplomatic pressure, the Persian authorities undertook to resist by means of the Etchmiadzin clergy. In any case, all Russian diplomatic efforts to seat Daniel on the Catholicos’s throne in Etchmiadzin remained ineffectual. As we have seen, the success of the Persian authorities in this matter was so complete that they were even able to have Armenian clergymen brought out of Ottoman territory and imprisoned in Yerevan. This setback, however, did not impact in any significant measure the greater Russian strategic policy. Throughout this controversy bilateral diplomatic talks continued, and, although the Khan of Yerevan did not consider the question of accepting Daniel a closed one, the Russian-Persian war which began in 1804 made this entirely impossible.Footnote 106 The question of making Daniel Catholicos was important enough in regard to Russian geo-politics. However, presenting it as the fundamental reason for the Russian-Persian war is misled.Footnote 107 Nonetheless, during the unsuccessful Yerevan campaign of Russian general Pavel Tsitsianov, the Persian authorities exiled Daniel Catholicos to Iran. Footnote 108 Even with the onset of the victorious Russian campaign of 1804-1806, in which significant territories including the Khanates of Gandzak, Karabagh, Shaki, Shirvan, Baku and others were conquered one after another,Footnote 109 efforts to free Daniel failed to come to fruition. After causing such heavy military defeats and territorial losses to the Persian side the Russian side succeeded during a brief lull in military operationsFootnote 110 in carrying out its designs in the matter of the Armenian Catholicos as well. In April of 1807, Fath-Ali Shah Qajar (1797-1834) decided to confirm Daniel as the Catholicos of the Armenians in place of David. This decision was also, in the end, a result of awareness of the important role of the Armenian population itself.Footnote 111 In other words, this end was achieved by tacit loyalty of the Armenian population toward the defeated Persian side.Footnote 112 On 12 May Daniel reached Yerevan bearing a decree of recognition from the Shah, and made a formal entrance into Holy Etchmiadzin on 20 May.Footnote 113 This was the conclusion of the so-called David-Daniel dispute over the Catholicosate, in which, as we have illustrated, the three major regional powers were all engaged in pursuit of their own objectives. Subsequently, the matter of the election of the Armenian Catholicos would pass entirely under the purview of the Tsarist authorities.
Conclusions
This study shows that the election of the Catholicos of All Armenians, traditionally a matter of ecclesiastical autonomy, became a focal point of regional power struggles at the turn of the nineteenth century. The election of Hovsep Arghutyan, achieved through direct Russian support, marked a decisive departure from long-standing traditions, as the Mother See of Etchmiadzin was drawn into the competing agendas of imperial actors. Arghutyan’s election was soon followed by the six-year David–Daniel dispute, which vividly illustrated how rival factions of the Armenian clergy, backed alternately by Russia, Persia, and the Ottoman Empire, sought to assert control over the Catholicosate.
The archival documents preserved in the Matenadaran provide a uniquely detailed record of these events, revealing the intensity of Russian efforts to secure candidates favourable to its expansionist aims, the countermeasures of Persia through the Khan of Yerevan, and the opportunistic interventions of the Ottoman authorities, who legitimized one or another candidate as circumstances dictated.
The policies of the external actors evolved as circumstances changed. Russian authorities shifted their support from one candidate to another, depending on who could better consolidate their influence among the Armenian population, while Persian officials balanced between resistance and accommodation in response to Russian advances. The Ottoman Empire, meanwhile, rarely pursued a consistent strategy but instead used recognition of Catholicoi as a diplomatic tool to maintain leverage in the region. These oscillations deepened the divisions within the Armenian ecclesiastical hierarchy and eroded the integrity of traditional electoral practices.
In conclusion, the Russian-Persian rivalry over the Catholicosate not only provoked sustained diplomatic confrontation but also reshaped the internal life of the Armenian Church. The interventions of foreign powers fractured the unity of the clergy and laity, undermined the authority of Etchmiadzin, and set a lasting precedent whereby the election of the Catholicos was subordinated to external political interests.
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