United Nations (UN) peacekeeping stands at a crossroads. Since the early 1990s, the organization has relied on an ambitious liberal template that combined traditional functions of observation and interposition with expansive mandates for elections, rule of law reform, human rights monitoring, and market-oriented reconstruction.Footnote 1 In the immediate post–Cold War period, this approach was enabled by permissive geopolitics, concentrated Western sponsorship, and a normative cascade that elevated the protection of civilians (POC) to a central doctrinal commitment.Footnote 2 Today, however, while the formal language of liberal peace remains in many mission mandates, practice has narrowed considerably. Host governments increasingly leverage the consent requirement to constrain operations. Growing rivalry among the permanent members of the Security Council (P5) reshapes what can be authorized or renewed. Mission leaders on the ground adapt their behavior to preserve access and minimize risk, even if this means diluting or deferring liberal objectives.
In this brief essay I explain these changes as a process of institutional drift rather than rupture: formal rules and vocabularies persist, but their enforcement and application have shifted toward sovereignty-first stabilization. The analysis highlights three mechanisms and links them to potential future trajectories. First, US retrenchment has reduced the political sponsorship, financial resources, and normative pressure that once underwrote expansive governance agendas. Second, China and Russia’s growing assertiveness has tilted mandates toward sovereignty and development while providing host governments with alternative sources of finance and security assistance, thereby raising their bargaining power. Third, UN staff agency under constraint has translated systemic pressures into operational behavior, as mission leaders recalibrate implementation to maintain access, force protection, and diplomatic relations.
The contemporary moment is distinctive not only for the rise of new constraints but also for their convergence. The simultaneous withdrawal of US leadership, the assertiveness of alternative powers, and the strategic use of host-state consent have combined to produce a peacekeeping environment unlike that of either the Cold War or the immediate post–Cold War period. Situating this moment historically makes clear that today’s narrowing is neither inevitable nor unprecedented. Peacekeeping has always evolved through adaptation to systemic and political change. What is new is the specific constellation of power and institutional responses that has steered practice toward sovereignty-centered stabilization.
The argument proceeds in five steps. I first situate contemporary developments within the longer arc of UN peacekeeping, contrasting Cold War minimalism with the post–Cold War liberal turn. I then link geopolitical realignment to institutional adaptation, specifying how host assertiveness, US retrenchment, and Chinese and Russian influence interact with staff agency. The third section briefly illustrates these dynamics with comparative evidence from Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR). Fourth, I map four plausible trajectories for peacekeeping over the coming decades, showing how different variable configurations alter the relative probability of each scenario. Finally, I conclude by briefly outlining implications for scholars and practitioners.
Liberal Peacekeeping: Historical Foundations and Norm Diffusion
During the Cold War, peacekeeping was tightly circumscribed by superpower rivalry and by the principle of sovereignty. Missions were deployed primarily to monitor ceasefires, separate inter-state combatants, and provide neutral buffers. The classic observation and interposition missions in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the Golan Heights (UNDOF), and southern Lebanon (UNIFIL) embodied this model. Mandates were narrow, resources modest, and the authority of the UN rested more on its symbolic role than on any capacity to compel compliance.Footnote 3 The guiding principles of consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defense were treated as sacrosanct.
The tragic failures in Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995) revealed the limits of lightly armed neutrality in the face of atrocities. The inability of UN peacekeepers to protect civilians under their watch sparked a crisis of legitimacy and galvanized subsequent doctrinal reforms.Footnote 4 These events underscored that Cold War minimalism was ill-suited to the complex intrastate conflicts that dominated the post–Cold War era.
What distinguished the shift in the aftermath of these atrocities was not the discovery of principles like consent and impartiality but their reinterpretation in service of a new ambition: rebuilding war-shattered states. Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace was programmatic in this regard, linking preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and postconflict peacebuilding under a single strategic umbrella.Footnote 5 The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Namibia (UNTAG) exemplified this multidimensional turn. These operations combined election administration, political transition, judicial reform, human rights monitoring, and economic liberalization.Footnote 6
The liberal model diffused rapidly. Finnemore and Sikkink’s account of norm cascades is instructive: Western powers and UN officials acted as norm entrepreneurs, and the model spread as the new standard for international legitimacy.Footnote 7 By the late 1990s, mandates routinely incorporated democratization, human rights, and market integration.Footnote 8 The Secretariat adjusted its administrative machinery accordingly, introducing integrated mission planning so that political, military, police, and civilian components were designed as a single instrument rather than parallel efforts.Footnote 9
Operational lessons were consolidated in the Brahimi Report,Footnote 10 which insisted that mandates required commensurate resources, clearer rules of engagement, and better intelligence and logistics. The report redefined impartiality as fidelity to the mission’s mandate and the peace process, rather than simple equidistance between belligerents. It also endorsed robust use of force when necessary to uphold the mission’s purpose. These principles were codified in the Capstone Doctrine in 2008.Footnote 11
As a result, protection of civilians (POC) had moved from emergent practice to central doctrinal commitment. The UN articulated a three-tiered POC strategy: dialogue and engagement with belligerents, physical protection of civilians, and creation of a protective environment.Footnote 12 Human rights sections became standard in multidimensional missions, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights routinely embedded monitors.Footnote 13 The endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) at the 2005 World Summit reinforced expectations that the international community had obligations when states failed to protect their populations.Footnote 14
Foundational empirical scholarship reinforced these normative and doctrinal changes. Some examples include Fortna,Footnote 15 who demonstrated that peacekeeping reduces the likelihood of war recurrence, as well as Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon who showed that well-resourced missions lower civilian victimization.Footnote 16 More recently, Hegre, Hultman, and Nygård confirmed that peacekeeping shortens conflict duration and improves civilian outcomes.Footnote 17 These findings gave donor governments and Secretariat officials confidence to authorize expansive mandates.
By the late 2000s and early 2010s, multidimensional missions displayed a standardized repertoire: static protection of vulnerable sites, mobile patrols, quick reaction capacities, and, in the case of the DRC, coercive elements such as the Force Intervention Brigade.Footnote 18 Police components trained and mentored local services while conducting joint patrols. Justice and corrections sections supported courts and prisons. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs were paired with security sector reform (SSR). Electoral assistance ranged from technical support to full administration, while public information campaigns sought to socialize new norms.
Missions invested heavily in coordination. Joint Operations Centers and Joint Mission Analysis Centers, for example, fused information and streamlined decision making. Air mobility, engineering, and medical units enabled presence in remote areas. Critically, these diverse functions were consolidated under a single leadership structure and a unified budget, designed to concentrate leverage and synchronize political and technical tools.
Yet this shift generated vulnerabilities. Ambitious mandates often raised expectations that could not be met, producing gaps between promises and performance.Footnote 19 Where national elites perceived reforms as threatening, consent became contingent and transactional. Host governments used visas, flight clearances, and status-of-forces agreements as bargaining chips. On the ground, robust protection language was frequently undercut by national caveats, as troop contributors proved unwilling to assume risks.Footnote 20 Burden-sharing debates sharpened as Western governments financed missions while Global South governments provided the bulk of troops.Footnote 21
The Secretariat sought to address these frictions through iterative reforms. Examples include the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy in 2013, the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations in 2015, and the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiatives in 2018 and 2021. Each sought to realign mandates with political realities and clarify achievable priorities. Nonetheless, the expansive liberal model remained the default template, even as its limitations became increasingly apparent.
Seen from this vantage point, the current narrowing of peacekeeping practice is not a sudden rupture but a drift back toward more conservative readings of consent and sovereignty under altered systemic conditions. The organizational apparatus designed for multidimensional liberal operations remains in place, but its center of gravity has shifted toward stabilization, technical support, and access preservation.
Drivers of Drift: Geopolitics, Host-State Leverage, and Bureaucratic Agency
The narrowing of UN peacekeeping practice in recent years is best explained through the interaction of systemic shifts in global power, host-state strategies of resistance, and the adaptive behavior of UN staff. These dynamics are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, they reinforce one another in ways that systematically constrain the liberal model while preserving the institutional shell of peacekeeping.
To begin, it’s vital to note that the US was the primary proponent of expansive UN peacekeeping in the 1990s and 2000s, both politically and financially. As the largest contributor to the peacekeeping budget and a critical backer in the Security Council, US leadership was indispensable to authorizing and sustaining multidimensional missions.Footnote 22 Yet by the late 2000s, political fatigue after costly interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan eroded bipartisan support for ambitious state building abroad.Footnote 23
During the first Trump administration, skepticism toward multilateralism reached a peak. Washington proposed steep cuts to the UN budget, sought to cap US contributions below treaty levels, and pressed for more streamlined mandates.Footnote 24 Although the Biden administration restored diplomatic support, structural constraints persisted: US payments to UN peacekeeping remain capped at 25 percent, below the agreed assessment level of 26.94 percent, generating chronic shortages.Footnote 25 Shortly after the second Trump administration was sworn in, debates in Congress have again placed US support under pressure, with proposals to withdraw funding altogether.Footnote 26 The erosion of US financial, political, and normative leadership has undermined the political coalition behind expansive mandates and emboldened other governments to contest liberal conditionality.
At the same time, China and Russia have become more assertive in shaping the normative and operational contours of peacekeeping. China is now the second-largest financial contributor and among the top ten troop contributors, with over 2,200 personnel deployed as of 2024.Footnote 27 In Security Council negotiations, Beijing consistently emphasizes sovereignty, host-state consent, and development as the foundations of durable peace.Footnote 28 China has opposed provisions mandating intrusive human rights reporting and pressed for greater recognition of host governments’ priorities.
Russia’s role is less financial but no less influential. Moscow has used its veto power and bilateral partnerships to shield governments from intrusive mandates. In contexts like Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR), Russian security contractors have provided alternative security assistance, allowing host governments to resist or even expel UN missions. Russia’s advocacy of “non-interference” dovetails with China’s sovereignty-first approach, reinforcing a coalition that blunts liberal initiatives in the Council,Footnote 29 especially in the context of the withdrawal of a strong norm entrepreneur like the US.
Rather than launching a frontal challenge to liberal norms, both China and Russia have pursued incremental reinterpretation. By reshaping mandate language, opposing expansive reporting, and providing outside options to host states, they have effectively narrowed peacekeeping’s operational scope. As Barnett and Finnemore argue, bureaucratic norms evolve less through rupture than through reinterpretation.Footnote 30 It’s becoming apparent that peacekeeping today exemplifies such incremental but consequential change.
This fundamental shift in the dynamics of global politics has emboldened host governments. Indeed, host governments have also become increasingly adept at leveraging the UN’s dependence on their consent. Peacekeeping missions rely on national authorities for logistics, security guarantees, and freedom of movement. Governments exploit this dependency by delaying visas, restricting patrols, obstructing flights, or threatening expulsion.Footnote 31 These tactics transform consent from a one-time authorization into a continual bargaining process, which can involve powerful external actors like China and Russia.
In many cases, consent has become the ceiling of peacekeeping ambition. Governments allow missions to operate only insofar as they do not threaten regime survival. Efforts to advance governance reforms, protect civilians from state-aligned militias, or investigate abuses often trigger backlash. For example, Sudan in 2020 successfully lobbied for the closure of the hybrid AU–UN mission in Darfur (UNAMID), replacing it with a smaller political mission that posed fewer constraints on Khartoum.Footnote 32 Similarly, Malian authorities in 2023 demanded MINUSMA’s withdrawal, citing a “crisis of confidence” provoked by its human rights reporting.Footnote 33 The availability of alternative security and financial partnerships strengthens host bargaining power. Governments can turn to bilateral patrons such as Russia or regional partners to fill gaps left by UN withdrawal. This creates a competitive environment in which UN leverage is reduced and sovereignty claims carry greater weight.
Finally, it’s worth highlighting that UN staff agency under constraint translates systemic pressures and host demands into operational practice. Peacekeeping is not a passive instrument. Rather, it is carried out by international civil servants and mission leadership who exercise discretion within the limits of mandates. Barnett and Finnemore highlight how international organizations develop bureaucratic cultures that both reproduce and reinterpret norms.Footnote 34 In peacekeeping, this manifests in pragmatic adaptation to preserve access, manage risk, and sustain mission continuity.
Faced with host resistance, staff often recalibrate by muting critical reports, downscaling liberal benchmarks, or prioritizing technical support over political engagement.Footnote 35 The logic is clear: losing host consent risks mission expulsion and civilian exposure, whereas adjusting expectations allows the mission to remain operational, even if diluted. Over time, such pragmatic decisions accumulate into institutional drift,Footnote 36 whereby the formal mandate remains intact, but the function shifts toward stabilization and sovereignty support.
Drift in Action: Evidence from Recent Missions
The dynamics of drift described before are evident across recent missions. Briefly examining Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR) highlights how systemic shifts, host assertiveness, and bureaucratic adaptation interact in practice.
Mali (MINUSMA)
The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established in 2013 with a broad mandate to stabilize the country, support political transition, and uphold human rights.Footnote 37 Initially envisioned as a textbook multidimensional operation, MINUSMA soon confronted deteriorating political conditions and intensifying violence in the north and center.
Following a coup in 2020, relations between the mission and the junta government soured. Bamako denounced MINUSMA’s human rights reporting and cooperation with civil society as illegitimate interference. In June 2023, the government demanded the mission’s immediate withdrawal, citing a “crisis of confidence.”Footnote 38 The Security Council, facing the collapse of consent and lacking appetite for confrontation, terminated the mission. During the withdrawal, Malian authorities restricted UN surveillance capabilities and reassigned vacated bases to Russian-backed Wagner forces.Footnote 39
The Malian case illustrates how host leverage, backed by alternative security partnerships, can override UN mandates. MINUSMA’s termination was not the result of doctrinal change at UN headquarters but of sustained host resistance, geopolitical alternatives, and UN staff adaptation to preserve an orderly exit.
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)
The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) is one of the longest-running and most resource-intensive peacekeeping operations. Originally central to postwar elections and governance reform in the early 2000s, MONUSCO has steadily scaled back its ambitions as Congolese authorities grew increasingly critical of its presence.
By the 2010s, Kinshasa portrayed the mission as infringing on sovereignty. Public discontent culminated in widespread protests in 2022, during which demonstrators accused MONUSCO of failing to protect civilians. The protests turned violent, leaving dozens dead, including four UN peacekeepers.Footnote 40 In response, the Congolese government expelled MONUSCO’s spokesperson and later announced an accelerated withdrawal timetable.Footnote 41
The DRC case demonstrates how domestic political calculations and sovereignty claims dictate mission timelines. MONUSCO’s shift toward stabilization and technical assistance was driven not by doctrinal decisions in New York but by host pressure and UN adaptation to preserve presence.
South Sudan (UNMISS)
The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was created in 2011 to support state building in the newly independent country. Within two years, civil war erupted, forcing the mission to adapt to crisis response. UNMISS became the primary protector of civilians, sheltering tens of thousands in Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites.
This protective posture placed UNMISS in direct tension with Juba, which accused the mission of harboring rebels and undermining sovereignty.Footnote 42 Between 2017 and 2021, the government imposed more than 700 restrictions on UNMISS operations, including blocked patrols and delayed visas.Footnote 43 In Security Council debates, China abstained on resolutions urging Juba to ease restrictions, citing sovereignty and non-interference.Footnote 44
UNMISS illustrates how host obstruction and Council divisions compel missions to recalibrate. While its mandate still references governance and human rights, the mission has shifted to emphasize technical support and humanitarian relief, avoiding confrontation over delayed elections or accountability for atrocities.
Central African Republic (MINUSCA)
The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) was established in 2014 to protect civilians and extend state authority. While it supported elections in 2016 and 2020, its liberal ambitions have been curtailed by geopolitical competition.
The CAR government invited Russian private military contractors to bolster its fight against insurgents. Reports of abuses by these contractors were muted in UN discourse, reflecting the mission’s sensitivity to host preferences and external backing.Footnote 45 At the Security Council, China has supported CAR’s calls for “non-interference,” reinforcing a sovereignty-first approach.Footnote 46 MINUSCA remains in place but focuses on stabilization and technical support rather than governance reform or rights monitoring.
The CAR case shows how parallel patronage and sovereignty rhetoric can hollow out liberal mandates. Mission leaders prioritize continued access and operational viability over confronting host-aligned abuses.
Cross-case Patterns
Taken together, these cases underscore a consistent pattern: the UN retains presence by narrowing ambition. Democratization, accountability, and human rights persist in mandates but are selectively implemented or indefinitely deferred. Sovereignty and access dominate practice, reflecting systemic shifts, host leverage, and bureaucratic adaptation. As noted before, many of these trends are likely accelerating as geopolitical realignments are sparked by rapid US retrenchment during a period where public support for multilateral efforts is waning.
Scenarios for the Future of Peacekeeping
The preceding discussion identified four variables as central to the evolution of peacekeeping: (1) the extent of US political and financial engagement, (2) the degree of Chinese and Russian influence within the Security Council and beyond, (3) the bargaining leverage of host states, and (4) the adaptive strategies of UN staff in mission settings. These variables jointly determine the scope of operational authority and the content of mandates. US retrenchment narrows the resources and political backing available for liberal projects; Chinese and Russian assertiveness shapes the language of mandates and restricts intrusive governance components; host bargaining power conditions what missions can do in practice; and staff agency influences how far mandates are stretched or constrained on the ground. Importantly, these dynamics rarely operate in isolation: the effect of one variable often depends on the value of others. For example, high host bargaining power is more constraining when coupled with low US engagement and assertive Chinese or Russian positions, while activist UN staff can offset some geopolitical pressures when host receptivity is greater.
To illustrate the forward-looking implications of this framework, I develop a set of scenarios that map different constellations of these variables onto likely trajectories for UN peacekeeping. Rather than prediction, these scenarios provide theoretically grounded expectations that clarify how and why liberal peacekeeping may persist in some form, fragment, or be supplanted.
The most likely outcome is a continuation of current trends, emerging when low US engagement combines with high Chinese and Russian assertiveness, elevated host bargaining power (often as a result of Chinese and Russian involvement), and cautious adaptation by UN staff. In this configuration, mandates formally retain liberal references, but practice consolidates around stabilization. Missions emphasize ceasefire monitoring, logistical support, and training of security institutions, while liberal objectives such as democratization and governance reform are diluted. As Karlsrud notes, stabilization discourse already dominates peacekeeping debates, often substituting regime security for political transformation.Footnote 47 Under these conditions, drift persists: the institutional shell of liberal peacekeeping endures, but its practice centers on sovereignty and stability.
A second possibility builds from this drift but pushes further toward fragmentation, arising when low US engagement interacts with strong Chinese and Russian obstruction and high host bargaining power, producing Security Council deadlock and a turn toward regional or ad hoc arrangements. In such cases, UN operations may remain formally mandated but lose centrality to regional organizations such as the African Union or ECOWAS, or to ad hoc coalitions backed by external patrons.Footnote 48 The result is not the stabilization of a single UN-led model, but a patchwork of interventions with divergent practices: some emphasizing counterinsurgency, others regime protection, and a few prioritizing liberal reforms. Somalia’s ATMIS and Haiti’s MSS illustrate how these alternatives already fill gaps left by constrained UN roles. Fragmentation, however, comes with costs, such as normative inconsistency in civilian protection and erosion of the coherence of global peacekeeping standards.Footnote 49 This scenario is plausible if Council paralysis persists and US withdrawal continues.
Although drift and fragmentation dominate current trends, the possibility of a selective liberal resurgence should not be dismissed. This scenario emerges when high US engagement aligns with lower Chinese and Russian obstruction, receptive host governments, and activist UN leadership. Under these favorable conditions, liberal mandates could resurface where reformist governments are willing partners and geopolitical contestation is muted. Historical precedents such as Timor-Leste show that when conditions align, such as reformist leadership at home, broad international backing, and minimal Council rivalry, ambitious state building remains possible.Footnote 50 These cases are rare, but they demonstrate that liberal peacekeeping remains within the repertoire. This outcome is less likely under present dynamics but feasible, depending on how the geopolitical environment evolves over the next few decades.
Finally, the most dramatic trajectory would be the codification of a sovereignty-first model, crystallizing when deep US disengagement coincides with rising Chinese and Russian influence, strong host bargaining power, and a cautious stance by UN staff. In this scenario, reinterpretation becomes formalized: China, supported by Russia and others, could use the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping (C-34) to enshrine peacekeeping as sovereignty enhancement rather than political transformation. Such a move would institutionalize a model centered on capacity building, development, and host consent, while marginalizing governance and rights. While China currently benefits from incremental drift rather than overt rupture,Footnote 51 medium- to long-term shifts cannot be ruled out. The probability of this outcome is lower, but its impact would be significant: the liberal consensus would give way to an explicitly sovereignty-first paradigm.
Taken together, these scenarios highlight how different constellations of US engagement, Chinese and Russian influence, host bargaining power, and staff adaptation map onto alternative futures. Drift remains the baseline, fragmentation the plausible extension of current trends, resurgence a conditional outlier, and codification a low-probability but high-impact shift. Linking scenarios directly to these interacting variables provides a clearer theoretical basis for evaluating how peacekeeping may evolve in the decades ahead.
Conclusion
UN peacekeeping is evolving through drift. The liberal model of the 1990s, once sustained by Western sponsorship and a permissive geopolitical environment, has not been abandoned but reinterpreted under new systemic and political conditions. The erosion of US support, the assertiveness of China and Russia, and the strategic use of host-state consent have combined to narrow peacekeeping practice. On the ground, UN staff exercise agency under constraint, prioritizing access and survival over liberal transformation.
This shift has important theoretical and policy implications. Conceptually, it demonstrates how international norms evolve not only through contestation or abandonment but also through institutional drift, defined as the gradual reconfiguration of meaning and practice without formal rupture.Footnote 52 Empirically, it shows that host governments are not passive recipients of international intervention but active agents leveraging sovereignty, alternative patrons, and UN dependence to reshape operations.
Which future scenario prevails will depend on the interaction of key variables. If US disengagement persists and sovereignty-first pressures mount, gradual adaptation is the most likely outcome. If Council polarization deepens, fragmentation will rise. If conditions align favorably, liberal reaffirmation may occur in niche contexts. Formal norm contestation remains a less probable but consequential possibility.
For practitioners, the challenge is to manage drift without overstating the UN’s autonomy. Peacekeeping’s trajectory is largely determined by coalitions of states: when Western sponsors disengage, rising powers press sovereignty-first agendas, and hosts gain leverage, ambitious mandates lose support regardless of staff preferences. Yet within these constraints, the UN still retains limited forms of agency. Indeed, secretaries-general, mission leaders, and staff can frame mandates realistically, prioritize protection, and preserve multilateral presence even when transformation is off the table. The future of peacekeeping will thus emerge not from doctrine alone but from the uneasy interaction of structural shifts and the everyday choices of those operating within them.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the editors and three anonymous reviewers for their help improving this manuscript.
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