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Kantian Conscientious Objection: A Reply to Kennett
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 December 2022
Extract
In her paper, “The cost of conscience: Kant on conscience and conscientious objection,” Jeanette Kennett argues that a Kantian view of conscientious objection in medicine would bar physicians from refusing to perform certain practices based on conscience. I offer a response in the following manner: First, I reconstruct her main argument; second, I present a more accurate picture of Kant’s view of conscience. I conclude that, given a Kantian framework, a physician should be allowed to refuse to perform practices that break the moral law and, thus, refuse practices that violate her conscience.
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- Responses and Dialogue
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- © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
Notes
1. Kennett, J. The cost of conscience: Kant on conscience and conscientious objection. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2017;26:69–81 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2. Kant E 8:38.
3. See note 2.
4. Kahn, S. Kant’s Theory of Conscience. Cambridge Elements: The Philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2021 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hill, T. Four conceptions of conscience. Nomos 1998;40:13–52 Google Scholar; Ware, O. The duty of self-knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2009;79(3):671–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a similar view, see Paton, JH. Conscience and Kant . Kant-Studien 1979;70(3):239–51Google Scholar.
5. See note 4, Kahn 2021.
6. Another example is found in a passage in the Reflections, where one is asked to imagine a situation in which she is forced to either worship an idol, thereby violating her conscience, or offend those who believe in that idol’s divinity. Concerning this case, Kahn writes: “According to the notes, the lesson that the students are supposed to learn from consideration of this case is that it is always wrong to act against conscience, even if this means causing offense to others, for my conscience ‘must be holy to me’” (see note 4). In other words, this example is meant to demonstrate that, had the person acted against her conscience, she would have broken the moral law.
7. Kant CPrR 5:98.
8. There is a debate about what Kant means when he claims that conscience cannot err (see note 4). As many Kant scholars note, this infallibility only applies to one’s judgement as to whether or not she has broken the moral law. Conscience does not determine whether one has in fact broken the moral law (Timmerman J. Kant on Conscience, Indirect “Duty,” and Moral Error. Sicker, M. When the reflective watch dog barks: Conscience and self-deception in Kant. Journal of Value Inquiry 2017;51:85–104 CrossRefGoogle Scholar disagrees that conscience can be infallible even in this more limited sense supported by Timmerman, Hill, Kahn, and Ware [see note 4]). This result follows from the fact that agents can be mistaken about whether not a particular action is a duty. CONSCIENCE avoids this debate entirely. I am not claiming that conscience is infallible; rather, I am claiming that, when one’s conscience correctly judges that one would break the moral law if she were to perform some action, then she would in fact break the moral law by performing this action.
9. THE OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT OREGON REVISED STATUTES, 127 ORS (2019).
10. Kant G 4:422.
11. See note 10.
12. Kant CPrR 5:22.
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