Initial implementation challenges and local frictions

From the earliest stages of Unified Purchase and Sale, many farmers perceived the policy as overly intrusive. Historically, rural households stored surplus grain to guard against unpredictable factors such as natural disasters, fluctuating market prices, or personal emergencies. ^{Footnote 21} Yet under the new policy, farmers had to relinquish a substantial portion of their yield to government procurement agents at fixed prices. Although the state argued that the purchase was still ‘from the farmers’ hands’, rural communities often felt that these transactions bordered on compulsory exactions. ^{Footnote 22} ‘For the vast majority of farmers, they could not empathize with the state’s efforts to compress their personal consumption for the sake of industrialization’, ^{Footnote 23} noted one contemporary commentary, highlighting the disjuncture between national objectives and individual household survival strategies.

Overnight, the local agrarian economy’s core dynamics changed: farmers lost the flexibility to wait for more favourable market conditions or to retain extra grain as a buffer. Such loss of control sparked discontent, particularly since the purchase price, set by state agencies, frequently fell below what farmers deemed fair compensation. This sense of economic unfairness fuelled a nascent resentment that would soon manifest as local resistance. ^{Footnote 24}

Another source of friction was the way procurement quotas were determined and enforced. As part of ensuring a steady supply to urban centres, fixed grain procurement targets were established at the national level and then allocated downward through successive administrative tiers. Each province, county, and township faced intense pressure to meet or surpass the assigned quota. ^{Footnote 25} This structure left limited scope for grassroots officials to adjust targets in line with actual production capacity, local climatic conditions, or variations in soil fertility.

In practice, multiple layers of administrative hierarchy often engaged in ‘target-padding’, wherein each level slightly increased the quota passed down to the next level in an effort to shield itself against possible under-fulfilment. ^{Footnote 26} The end result was that village officials – those directly responsible for collecting grain from farmers – might face quotas that vastly exceeded local surplus. To fulfil these inflated targets, some cadres resorted to pressuring or coercing farmers to hand over more grain than they could spare. In some instances, local officials guilty of rash adventurism were documented to have encroached on farmers’ basic rations or used forceful rhetoric, further exacerbating rural discontent. ^{Footnote 27}

In the earliest phase of Unified Purchase and Sale (1953–1954 grain year), the policy relied heavily on mass democratic evaluation, wherein farmers were expected to self-report their harvests. The theory was that local discussion and transparency would ensure fairness: farmers would presumably decide who had surplus to sell and who needed state assistance for grain. ^{Footnote 28} However, given the strong pressures at the township and county levels to fulfil quota obligations, many farmers found themselves in contradictory positions. Some felt compelled to over-report yields to align with the government’s call for ‘enthusiastic support’, risking a scenario of selling more grain than they realistically had. Others, wary of losing too much, engaged in hiding surplus.

This chaotic environment soon exposed the limitations of policy mechanisms that depended primarily on voluntary compliance or accurate self-reporting. Lacking accurate statistics or robust enforcement guidelines, local cadres often had difficulty verifying whether a household truly had the surplus it claimed. Thus, unintended problems emerged, such as certain households selling excess grain, while others contributed far less than their actual surplus. By late 1954, it became clear that a more standardised approach was needed, prompting the introduction of ‘purchase in conjunction with the levy’ in some regions. Yet even this approach – tying procurement directly to tax obligations – did not fully address local realities, particularly in disaster-prone areas or among households already struggling with low yields. ^{Footnote 29}

Heightened resistance and grassroots tensions

Local discontent occasionally boiled over into outright hostility. A cited example from Jiangning reveals farmers’ frustration at perceived government inattention to rural welfare. As some farmers remarked, ‘When it comes to unified sale (selling grain back to farmers), we don’t see any of you. But for unified purchase (the state collecting grain), you all show up’. ^{Footnote 30} This sentiment alludes to the sense that the government focused predominantly on extracting grain, with limited effort to ensure fair or timely redistribution.

Such critiques highlight how logistical shortcomings in marketing further damaged trust in the policy. Although the state promised to provide grain to households experiencing shortages, actual implementation was inconsistent. In places where local officials prioritised fulfilling procurement quotas, less attention was paid to systematically distributing grain to those in need. Farmers who received insufficient or delayed relief felt alienated, and stories circulated widely that the government was more concerned with advancing industrial agendas than with sustaining rural livelihoods. ^{Footnote 31}

Local officials, caught between central mandates and grassroots realities, experienced tremendous strain. As procurement targets rose each year, particularly in regions seeing slight production increases, cadres found themselves escalating pressure at each level. When harvests fell short – due to natural disasters like the 1954 floods along the Yangtze and Huai Rivers – these targets often proved unattainable without harsh enforcement tactics. ^{Footnote 32} Some cadres, anxious to avoid reprimand from higher authorities, resorted to shortcuts or overt coercion, such as interrogating households suspected of holding back grain, or confiscating what they believed was surplus. ^{Footnote 33}

Yet not all local officials aligned fully with coercive measures. Many recognised that excessive pressure undermined farmers’ production enthusiasm and could damage state–society relations over the long term. ^{Footnote 34} Still, their ability to adjust targets or adopt more flexible methods was limited by their institutional position: they remained subject to the same top-down accountability structures that rewarded meeting quotas and penalised shortfalls. Thus, the intersection of unrealistic quotas and local accountability imperatives deepened the conflict between policy ideals and on-the-ground enforcement.

Central recognition of policy flaws: Towards revision

By the end of 1954 and into early 1955, central figures such as Chen Yun began to carry out field surveys in rural areas, meeting with grassroots cadres and local residents. These investigative visits revealed a systemic mismatch between the intentions of the policy and how it was unfolding. The central government’s rationale – to sustain industrial progress and ensure stable urban food supplies – remained valid at a macroeconomic level. ^{Footnote 35} However, reports from localities highlighted urgent concerns:

1. 1. Farmers’ morale was deteriorating, as many felt that incrementally higher quotas offered them no avenue to benefit from increased production.

2. 2. Overzealous implementation was leading to ‘purchase above actual surplus’, causing some farmers to lack adequate grain for household consumption.

3. 3. Grain shortages in certain disaster-affected areas underscored the fact that some communities needed more state assistance, not simply more procurement demands. ^{Footnote 36}

Alarmed by these findings, officials came to realise that a rigid, top-down approach could risk alienating rural producers and potentially weaken the agricultural base – precisely the opposite of what was desired for industrialisation. As such, early 1955 marked a turning point. Internal discussions culminated in a recognition that while Unified Purchase and Sale should remain at the core of state grain policy, its mechanisms had to be refined to reduce local friction and restore farmer confidence. ^{Footnote 37}

In March 1955, the Chinese Communist Party issued the ‘Emergency Directive’. This document signalled a crucial moment of policy correction, acknowledging that flawed grain purchase and distribution methods had strained farmer–state relations. It emphasised that local dissatisfaction was not merely a misunderstanding of state intentions but reflected genuine grievances regarding forced sales and inadequate support. The directive also invoked the principle that if farmers saw no tangible benefit in increased output, their willingness to expand production would inevitably wane. ^{Footnote 38} Key points of the directive included: Affirming the necessity of Unified Purchase and Sale but clarifying that it could not become an excuse for coercion; Insisting on realistic procurement figures that corresponded more closely to regional production capabilities and recognised local disaster conditions; Advancing steps towards fixing production, fixing procurement, and fixing sales, effectively laying the groundwork for more standardised mechanisms. ^{Footnote 39}

For policymakers, the directive was not simply a rhetorical statement; it was an acknowledgement that the success of state-led industrialisation hinged on sustaining rural enthusiasm. Without incentivising peasants – or at least refraining from systematically alienating them – grain production might stagnate or even decline, jeopardising the broader national project. ^{Footnote 40}

Towards a more balanced approach: The ‘Three-Fix’ mechanism

Building on the ideas in the Emergency Directive, the government introduced the ‘三定’ or ‘Three-Fix’ approach as a more structured framework for organising grain production and distribution. ^{Footnote 41} This approach encompassed:

1. 1. Fixed Production (定产): Estimating total production (often by local administrative unit) to provide a transparent baseline.

2. 2. Fixed Procurement (定购): Stipulating the grain amount each producing household must sell to the state, relative to the fixed production level.

3. 3. Fixed Sales (定销): Guaranteeing the amount of grain the state would sell (or return) to households in deficit, ensuring that shortfalls did not spiral into crises. ^{Footnote 42}

By 1955, the new policy structure was codified in the Provisional Measures for Rural Unified Purchase and Sale of Grain. This measure not only formally regulated the three fixes but also clarified the state’s intention to stabilise these numbers over a set period – commonly three years for production and procurement quotas, while adjusting sales figures annually. Such stability aimed to restore peasants’ confidence: if farmers could anticipate the volume they owed (and would receive), they might increase productivity, expecting tangible returns from surplus. ^{Footnote 43}

A central goal of the ‘Three-Fix’ method was to resolve inconsistencies that plagued earlier models of Unified Purchase and Sale. No longer would cadres rely solely on household self-reporting or mass evaluation sessions that might be rushed or manipulated. Instead, authorities introduced household-level assessments, examining each family’s land plot, average yields, and storage capacities. ^{Footnote 44} This shift not only reduced the likelihood of surplus concealment but also discouraged ‘over-quota’ purchasing, since local officials had clearer data on expected yields.

Moreover, fixing the policy in a multi-year framework responded to peasants’ call for stability. Rather than constantly altering how procurement targets were determined each harvest season – first through ‘democratic evaluation’, then ‘purchase in conjunction with the levy’, and so on – the government’s new stance signalled that it aimed to fine-tune the existing policy rather than replace it. In theory, if farmers recognised the government’s commitment to consistent targets, they might be less anxious about future changes and more willing to cooperate. ^{Footnote 45}

Nonetheless, some uncertainties persisted. For one, certain households feared that disaster conditions or fluctuations in weather would render fixed targets unfair in practice. Others questioned the durability of the new arrangement, recalling how the policy had already undergone several modifications within a very short time frame. It would therefore take further demonstration of central resolve – and effective local enforcement – before the ‘Three-Fix’ approach could comprehensively rebuild farmer trust. ^{Footnote 46}

Policy backdrop and local autonomy

In the summer of 1955, as part of the nationwide drive to refine the Unified Purchase and Sale policy, the Anhui Provincial People’s Committee issued the Provisional Measures for Rural Grain Unified Purchase and Sale in Anhui Province for 1955. This document translated the CCP Central Committee’s earlier directives on the ‘Three-Fix’ approach – namely fixing production, fixing procurement, and fixing sales – into concrete guidelines for local governments. Among other stipulations, it laid out which grain varieties would be subject to unified purchasing, how ‘surplus’ and ‘deficit’ households should be identified, and the levels of consumption these households would be allowed. By explicitly itemising these regulations, the provincial authorities aimed to tighten administrative control while affording county-level governments a measure of discretion in day-to-day policy implementation. ^{Footnote 47}

Within this framework, Funan County (阜南县) served as a key example of how local authorities sought to balance top-down mandates with the distinct socio-economic conditions of rural communities. The province entrusted the county with some autonomy in organising committees, establishing purchase targets, and carrying out household-level appraisals of grain production. This partial decentralisation reflected the central government’s recognition that local contexts required flexible responses. At the same time, however, provincial authorities put in place a strict regulatory scaffold – comprising prescribed methods for calculating yields, categorising ‘surplus’ and ‘deficit’ households, and mobilising cadres – to ensure that macro-level objectives were met. In so doing, the state attempted to merge a ‘rule-based’ system with an on-the-ground acknowledgement of local variation. The potential for friction lay precisely in reconciling these standardised targets with everyday realities: local cadres had to ensure sufficient procurement for state objectives, while simultaneously mitigating rural dissatisfaction by protecting farmers’ minimum livelihood needs.

However, Funan County’s implementation of the Three-Fix policy diverged significantly from patterns observed elsewhere. In neighbouring Wuwei County (Anhui), for instance, local cadres maintained largely constructive interactions with the Wuhu Prefectural Committee and Anhui Provincial Committee throughout the policy’s initial phase. Disputes there seldom escalated beyond routine negotiations over procurement quotas, and overt grassroots resistance emerged only after famine conditions took hold. Similarly, in Tongbai County (Henan), subordinate compliance predominated during early implementation. Even in Guangdong – where provincial authorities initially hesitated to enforce Unified Purchase and Sale – cadres adopted stringent adherence to state targets once the policy commenced. ^{Footnote 48} By contrast, Funan’s distinctive agricultural pressures intensified inherent tensions between standardisation and local adaptation. This unique context amplified conflicts between local cadres and central directives, while simultaneously straining their mediation role among farmers, resulting in friction more acute and sustained than elsewhere in the nationwide campaign.

Laying the groundwork: Pilot projects and cadre mobilisation

By early September 1955, the Funan County Party Committee convened a series of meetings – bringing together officials at county, district (区), and township (乡) levels – to discuss how best to roll out ‘Three-Fix’ measures in practical terms. ^{Footnote 49} The immediate task was to identify pilot townships in which new procedures for fixing production, procurement, and sales could be thoroughly tested. Officials reasoned that a smaller-scale trial would yield insights into the policy’s logistical difficulties – especially how to refine grain quotas, how to form local committees with sufficient legitimacy, and how to carry out widespread propaganda to dispel lingering distrust stemming from earlier rounds of Unified Purchase and Sale.

For instance, in Xueji District (薛集区), Party authorities decided on Shuangbei Township (双碑乡) as the pilot location. Fourteen cadres were dispatched there in late September to gather baseline data, observe local agrarian conditions, and coordinate with grassroots functionaries. ^{Footnote 50} Over the course of several days, they met with township Party branches, people’s representative assemblies, and evaluation committees – training local technical personnel on how to measure farmland acreage accurately, collect yield data, and communicate policies to farmers. Similarly, in Zhangzhai District (张寨区), officials selected Tianji Township (田集乡) as a pilot site due to its relatively strong ‘work foundation’ and higher level of ‘mass consciousness’. By capitalising on better-organised localities first, district authorities hoped to generate successful examples that could be replicated elsewhere in Funan County. ^{Footnote 51}

The pilot phase underscored the central role of publicity work. Cadres needed to explain repeatedly to villagers why ‘Three-Fix’ offered a more transparent and equitable arrangement than past procurement systems. They had to address farmers’ anxieties about forfeiting grain prematurely, reassure them that the state’s promise of stable sales (in case of deficits) would be fulfilled, and outline how ‘three-year fixed production and procurement’ could motivate households to raise productivity. In so doing, local officials leveraged a variety of mediums – broadcast announcements, blackboard bulletins, small-group meetings, and direct field visits – to illustrate the policy’s rationale and benefits. ^{Footnote 52}

Parallel to the pilot programme, grassroots organisational structures were formed to oversee the practical steps of ‘Three-Fix’. Drawing on previous experiences, Funan County authorities mandated that each township establish an Evaluation Committee – comprising Party members, model farmers, and representatives from women’s federations or youth leagues. At the level of smaller ‘electoral zones’, additional calculation committees were set up, charged with verifying farmland acreage and production data. Indeed, by the time implementation began in earnest, some areas reported more than ten such committees, each responsible for a discrete portion of the township’s territory. ^{Footnote 53} This proliferation of local committees reflected two principal aims:

1. 1. Enhance Accuracy: By enlisting local residents who understood local farmland conditions and yield histories, authorities hoped to produce more reliable assessments of each household’s expected grain output.

2. 2. Foster Legitimacy: Regular farmers were more likely to trust ‘one of their own’ – neighbours or local Party activists – than unfamiliar district officials. Including them in committees signalled at least some democratic input, even if ultimate decisions remained closely guided by official policy. ^{Footnote 54}

Nevertheless, the presence of multiple layers of committees also risked bureaucratic duplication. If mismanaged, too many committees could lead to conflicting yield assessments, contradictory rulings on who qualified as a ‘surplus’ household, and confusion over the quantity each deficit household was entitled to receive. Local authorities thus found themselves balancing the desire for broad participation with the need for efficiency – an equilibrium that proved challenging to maintain in practice.

The heart of the policy: Fixing production in practice

Central to the success of ‘Three-Fix’ was fixing production – the initial determination of how much grain each household could be reasonably expected to harvest under normal conditions. This figure underpinned both procurement and sales calculations. In the pilot townships, cadres spent much of their time devising methodologies for yield estimation that would be transparent enough to garner farmers’ support. ^{Footnote 55} Two commonly adopted processes emerged:

1. 1. Land-by-Land Verification: Committees physically inspected farmland plots, identifying acreage, soil quality, and crop variety. They then reconciled these observations with past yield data (e.g., from prior ‘Four-Fix’ records or official estimates). This approach had the advantage of granular accuracy but was time-consuming, requiring multiple visits to farmland and meticulous record-keeping.

2. 2. Categorised Standard Yields: In some localities, committees grouped farmland into categories – recognising variations in soil fertility, irrigation access, or proximity to roads – and assigned a benchmark yield to each category. Each household’s final production figure would then be computed by summing the acreage of each category multiplied by that category’s standard yield. This method proved more efficient, though committees had to ensure that categories accurately captured local disparities, lest households complain of unfair or one-size-fits-all allocations. ^{Footnote 56}

In Xueji District, for instance, the pilot team placed great emphasis on training the evaluation committees in transparent, step-by-step calculations. They held that building each member’s capacity to ‘report yields truthfully’ and ‘master the correct methods’ would lessen the risk of misreporting or under-the-table negotiations. Cadres were instructed to gather both ‘collective memories’ and direct measurements. Notably, they also encouraged farmers to participate by reconciling official estimates with their own harvest records, thereby reducing distrust of top-down data. ^{Footnote 57}

Despite these efforts, the rollout encountered notable scepticism. Although farmers had accumulated some experience with grain procurement since 1953, the frequent shifts in policy – from ‘democratic evaluation’ in the earlier phase to ‘purchase in conjunction with the levy’ and now ‘Three-Fix’ – left many uncertain whether this new arrangement would truly endure for three years. Some cadres worried about ‘the Five Fears’, namely fear of complaints, reprisals, excessive workload, public criticism, and personal liability if calculations proved unpopular. ^{Footnote 58} Such fears, in turn, bred caution and occasional indecision among cadres who found themselves caught between pleasing higher authorities and avoiding friction with local residents.

In Fopan County’s Jiaopo District (焦坡区), for example, representatives reported reluctance among both officials and farmers: local cadres often took pains to avoid setting yields too high (which would antagonise farmers) or too low (which would elicit censure from above). One villager was quoted saying, ‘If we overestimate yields, we get blamed by the villagers; if we underestimate, Party superiors accuse us of ignoring potential surplus – either way, it’s a headache’. ^{Footnote 59} This quandary points to the precise tension ‘Three-Fix’ aimed to alleviate: how to ensure an accurate yield figure that strikes a delicate balance between state demands and rural livelihoods.

Rallying support: Propaganda, training, and organisational refinement

To address mounting uncertainties, the Funan County Party Committee convened another large-scale conference on 5 September 1955, bringing together officials from county, district, and township levels. The immediate goals were to (1) reaffirm the urgency of ‘Three-Fix’, (2) clarify technical steps – especially the procedure for setting production benchmarks, and (3) strengthen cadre confidence by refining publicity strategies. This meeting resulted in specific instructions:

1. 1. Focus on Pilot ‘Key Townships’: The County Committee selected several target locations (e.g., Shuangbei, Tianji) where a concentrated group of cadres would apply the policy meticulously. The hope was to ‘absorb experience’ from these sites and swiftly replicate successful practices throughout the county.

2. 2. Extend Publicity Deadlines: Recognising that propaganda and local discussion required time, the Committee postponed the initial cut-off date for mobilising publicity to 10 October. This reprieve eased pressure on local cadres, who otherwise might have hurried propaganda and neglected thorough deliberation with residents.

3. 3. Adjust Grain Procurement Tasks: The county lowered its overall procurement quota from 40 million jin to about 25.83 million jin, aiming to mitigate the burden on township officials. By recalibrating targets, the leadership signalled it was willing to adapt top-down figures to on-the-ground realities. ^{Footnote 60}

Moreover, the County Committee allocated 303 personnel – spanning county, district, and township levels – to deepen the pilot work in 18 selected townships. This large mobilisation of human resources underscored the administration’s resolve: cadres underwent multiple rounds of training on measurement techniques, conflict resolution, and promotional communication. ^{Footnote 61} By 10 October, many districts boasted hundreds of newly trained ‘technical personnel’, who were then dispersed across towns and villages to guide ‘Three-Fix’ preparations. ^{Footnote 62}

In tandem, county directives emphasised the principle of transparency, calling for publicity to begin ‘within the Party, then outward to the masses’. ^{Footnote 63} Officials were first to master the policy’s technicalities before disseminating it among Party members and local volunteers, who would then carry the message to each household. The thrust of such messaging included: ‘Production and Procurement to Remain Fixed for Three Years’: Cadres needed to persuade farmers that the frequent policy changes of previous years would not be repeated and that once set, procurement quotas would remain stable for a three-year term; ‘Higher Yields Need Not Mean Higher Procurement’: The promise that if farmers succeeded in increasing production, they would not automatically lose those gains to state requisition. This reassurance aimed to restore farmer morale – countering the sentiment of ‘no benefit in producing more’; ‘Provisions for Disaster Relief’: Under ‘Three-Fix’, areas severely affected by natural calamities could apply for ‘proportional reductions’ in procurement, allaying fears that a poor harvest would unavoidably lead to hunger or punishment. ^{Footnote 64}

On the ground, these messages were relayed through field gatherings, small-group household meetings, or vantage sessions where farmers could observe cadres marking field boundaries or verifying land quality. ^{Footnote 65} In principle, such intimate, face-to-face interactions helped offset the potential alienation that often accompanies top-down policy. When effectively orchestrated, propaganda efforts encouraged rural households to see ‘Three-Fix’ not as a replay of earlier heavy-handed procurement but as an evolving, somewhat more flexible system. ^{Footnote 66}

From fixing production to defining surplus and deficit

Once township committees had established each household’s ‘normal-year output’, the next step was to categorise families as surplus households, self-sufficient households, or deficit households. According to Funan County’s guidelines, surplus households were those whose estimated ‘normal-year output’ comfortably exceeded their family’s consumption needs, whereas deficit households were those whose output fell short of consumption. Self-sufficient households occupied a middle ground. ^{Footnote 67}

County authorities mandated that each district undertake thorough ‘bottom-up’ surveys, comparing local conditions to a ‘reasonable consumption standard’ laid out in provincial documents. By late October, these data would be fed back to the county level to determine whether the designated surplus-deficit threshold required minor adjustments. Evaluation Committees then drew up rosters listing which households owed grain to the state and which would receive state-supported sales. This classification process proved intricate, as it directly influenced farmers’ economic well-being. Households that were marginally above or below the threshold often contested their designation, pushing for reevaluation by local committees. In practice, the multi-stage review included:

1. 1. Initial Committee Discussion: A small group from the evaluation committee proposed thresholds, referencing each household’s recorded production data.

2. 2. Public Consultation: The draft lists were presented at village expansion meetings or mass assemblies. Farmers could lodge objections or request clarifications, especially if they felt they had been misclassified.

3. 3. Final Ratification: The district leadership forwarded the revised lists to the county for official approval, thereby establishing a uniform reference point. ^{Footnote 68}

Despite occasional bottlenecks, many localities reported that farmers participated more willingly once they realised ‘Fixed Procurement and Fixed Sales numbers’ would be publicly debated rather than unilaterally imposed. Farmers who initially feared losing grain to false ‘surplus’ labels could thus question or correct the classification. Such structured feedback mechanisms were essential in smoothing implementation. ^{Footnote 69}

To further institutionalise the process, Funan County required each district to issue official ‘grain purchase certificates’ to surplus households, indicating the precise annual amount owed. This written certification offered a tangible record, especially important for farmers who worried about ‘arbitrary changes’. Meanwhile, deficit households were likewise entitled to a certificate guaranteeing a certain minimum supply from the state. By making the ‘Three-Fix’ arrangement more visible – and not merely a rhetorical promise – officials hoped to reassure rural residents that the new system was systematic and legally grounded. ^{Footnote 70}

Notably, the integration of agricultural production cooperatives with the Three-Fix policy further optimised the implementation process: fixed production quotas were calculated based on the cooperative’s total land area and historical yields; procurement tasks were assigned directly to cooperatives rather than individual households; and fixed sales were managed through internal surplus-deficit adjustments within cooperatives. This cooperative-based approach (termed ‘cooperative-unit accounting’) consolidated fragmented household data into collective-level assessments, reducing administrative redundancies. Furthermore, procurement adopted a seasonal collection with annual settlement model – adjusting seasonal procurement volumes according to actual summer crop growth while adhering to the principle of fixed three-year totals. By dovetailing state procurement with cooperative management, the policy not only enhanced operational efficiency but also deeply embedded the Three-Fix framework within the accelerating collectivisation movement.

Enduring challenges and ongoing adjustments

Despite these measures, not all local cadres or farmers found the ‘Three-Fix’ approach intuitively convincing. Some grassroots officials continued to misunderstand or misrepresent the policy. In Wanghua District (王化区), for example, a local leader erroneously claimed that deficit households would enjoy a ‘higher living standard’ than surplus households, fuelling rumours that the policy was inherently unfair. ^{Footnote 71} Elsewhere, cadres highlighted ‘Fixed Production’ while neglecting to underscore the ‘Fixed Sales’ protections, leading some farmers to believe the state was only interested in securing its own procurement without guaranteeing genuine relief for those in need.

Such misinterpretations could quickly spread. Distrust from the past had not entirely dissipated; repeated policy revisions left certain villagers convinced that the new approach was just another fleeting experiment. Moreover, the tight time frame meant that cadres – tasked with verifying production figures, clarifying thresholds, and distributing certificates – often rushed publicity and training. Funan County responded by convening additional large-scale meetings, pushing back deadlines where necessary, and ensuring that cadres had enough time to grasp the intricacies of the system. ^{Footnote 72}

Throughout late 1955, county officials found themselves in a balancing act. On the one hand, the central government maintained that ‘Three-Fix’ would secure essential grain resources for industrialisation, thereby aligning local practice with the broader socialist modernisation agenda. On the other hand, local authorities needed to avoid repeating the mistakes of earlier grain drives, which often triggered discontent by imposing unyielding quotas. The decision to reduce Funan’s total procurement target signalled a willingness to adapt policy to local agricultural capacity, but the underlying tension remained: any shortfall in meeting these procurement obligations could draw criticism from higher levels of government, while excessive zeal risked alienating farmers and fuelling resistance. ^{Footnote 73}

Crucially, the county’s push to incorporate more transparency and farmer participation in ‘Three-Fix’ can be interpreted as an attempt to legitimise these new policies from the bottom up. Though still limited, the emphasis on consistent committees, local pilot programmes, and consultative meetings reflected a departure from strictly top-down governance. Indeed, some households that previously withheld or under-reported grain now ‘voluntarily declared’ higher amounts ^{Footnote 74} , suggesting that at least in certain cases, trust in the new system was gradually improving.

Renewed enthusiasm for production and household engagement

In the wake of the ‘Three-Fix’ implementation, Funan County’s rural landscape underwent a series of notable changes. Among the most striking outcomes was an unprecedented surge in farmers’ willingness to sell surplus grain and a more positive attitude towards agricultural production. For example, in Jiopo District’s Niuzhai Township (牛寨乡), 336 surplus-grain households collectively delivered 83,000 jin of grain within two days of receiving the official surplus-sale notice. Such swift compliance signalled a significant shift from earlier years, when farmers were often reluctant or resistant to surrendering grain under prior procurement policies. ^{Footnote 75}

An equally telling development was the heightened production enthusiasm. In Niuzhai Township, under the combined impetus of ‘Three-Fix’ and the local cooperative movement, men and women alike joined drought-relief and replanting initiatives. Over the course of 37 days, 10,200 mu of land were cultivated – an impressive 85.7% of the area targeted for drought mitigation. According to contemporaneous statistics, animal husbandry also expanded across Funan County’s sixteen districts; the number of oxen, donkeys, and mules grew by anywhere from 28 to over 300 head per district compared with the previous year. Moreover, farmers began purchasing additional farm inputs and fertilisers. Zhangzhai Township (张寨乡) in Miaoji District (苗集区) reported that 308 households collectively bought 3,430 jin of manure after ‘Three-Fix’ took effect. ^{Footnote 76}

One anecdote illustrates how rapidly farmers’ mindsets had changed: a mid-level peasant, Fan Qitian (范其田) from Fanxiaozhuang in Yangjia Township, confessed that before ‘Three-Fix’, he had been so worried about being forced to sell surplus grain that he secretly stored wheat at a relative’s home – only for that wheat to be consumed over time. He had even used some of his farm implements (such as wooden forks and broom-making materials) as fuel, fearing that any sign of a robust harvest would lead to higher compulsory grain sales. In retrospect, he lamented not having the ‘Three-Fix’ security sooner, which would have spared him from the anxiety and losses experienced under older procurement rules. Such testimonies reveal not merely an improvement in tangible agricultural indicators but also a deeper psychological transformation among rural inhabitants – one that reoriented them towards cooperation with state policies when these were perceived as fair and predictable. ^{Footnote 77}

Shifts in rural social dynamics

Besides fostering changes in grain sale and production behaviours, the ‘Three-Fix’ reforms yielded broader sociocultural effects in Funan’s villages. Because the policy framework underscored ‘increasing yield does not entail higher procurement’ and ‘more grain produced belongs to the producer’, it inspired farmers to see direct benefits from investing in agriculture. This new ethos, in turn, encouraged rural residents who had previously been labelled ‘idlers’ or ‘lazy individuals’ to commit themselves to work. ^{Footnote 78}

One illustrative case is that of He Dashao (何大少), a self-professed ‘lazy man’ from Zhangzhai Village, who publicly declared at a grain-sale assembly that he now realised slacking off was ‘no longer acceptable’. Determined to change, he purchased two manure-carrying baskets, collected manure for nine consecutive days (amassing two cartloads), and proactively volunteered in mutual-aid teams for further manure-gathering. ^{Footnote 79} This transformation exemplifies how policy design combined with local mobilisation can catalyse not only economic participation but also social reintegration of marginalised individuals.

Such improvements in local morale and behaviour were also buoyed by more transparent and responsive governance from grassroots officials. Having learned from earlier mistakes – where forced collection methods had alienated farmers – cadres in some areas consciously strove to ensure fairness in yield calculation and grain quotas. By ‘listening to the masses’ and adhering to ‘transparent and just’ mechanisms, these cadres made strides in repairing the once-strained state–society relationship. A farmer from Jizhuang recounted how, during earlier ‘Unified Purchase and Sale’ drives, local officials had conducted intrusive searches of households, seizing over 1,360 jin of grain. ^{Footnote 80} This heavy-handedness led to deep resentment and a near breakdown in communication between residents and cadres. However, after the new ‘Three-Fix’ framework was implemented – and after local officials apologised for past mistakes – villagers expressed a willingness to reset their relationship with the authorities, indicating a partial reconciliation grounded in mutual trust. ^{Footnote 81}

Persistent shortcomings and uneven implementation

While Funan County’s experience with ‘Three-Fix’ saw many successes, the policy’s rollout remained uneven, revealing that rural social environments and deep-seated mindsets do not change overnight. Certain structural and administrative lapses persisted, pointing to inconsistencies between the policy’s intended design and on-the-ground practice.

One recurring issue was insufficient clarity among both cadres and ordinary farmers regarding the true objectives of ‘Three-Fix’. For instance, in Zhuzhai Village (朱寨村), a cadre openly asked during a local meeting whether ‘Three-Fix’ should prioritise ‘policy’ or ‘the task’. This remark suggests that some grassroots officials still grappled with reconciling the new directive’s emphasis on stable procurement targets with the lingering pressure to ‘meet quotas’. Although central authorities repeatedly stressed that ‘Three-Fix’ was supposed to replace the older model of unpredictable, ever-escalating tasks, deep-seated attitudes about ‘a never-ending search for more grain’ clearly remained. Farmers, too, expressed apprehension. Many worried that any official guarantee of a fixed yield or sale figure might be voided later if actual production levels exceeded expectations. ^{Footnote 82}

Another set of problems emerged during yield evaluation. In principle, the new system was intended to base yield estimates on realistic appraisals of farmland fertility, local climate, and typical harvest volumes. However, some localities resorted to what was described as ‘frame-fixing yields’, wherein cadres loosely grouped farmland parcels without conducting thorough inspections. Districts such as Erlang (二郎乡) in Chaiji District (柴集区) and Miaozhai (苗寨乡) in Wanghua District (王化区) were reported to have engaged in such practices. ^{Footnote 83} While this might reflect grassroots attempts to adjust policy to local realities, it also heightened data inaccuracy and risked undermining the fundamental premise of ‘Three-Fix’ – that each household would know exactly how much they were required to sell and how much they could retain.

Similarly, local officials sometimes set yields too low – partly out of empathy towards farmers who wanted to keep more grain, but also due to lingering uncertainties about whether the state might confiscate any surplus above the fixed quota. Though well-intentioned, this ‘local protectionism’ could sabotage national procurement targets and perpetuate an atmosphere of ambiguity around official obligations. ^{Footnote 84}

Balancing procurement targets and sales reforms

Notably, ‘Three-Fix’ was designed primarily to steady the procurement side – ensuring that the state could reliably meet its industrialisation agenda without antagonising farmers. Yet, as the mid-1950s unfolded, it became apparent that the grain sales dimension also required overhauls. Officials recognised that simply adjusting how much grain was procured from rural areas would not fully alleviate the country’s supply–demand imbalance unless the distribution side was similarly regulated. ^{Footnote 85}

In 1955, People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) published an editorial calling for an immediate reorganisation of rural grain sales. This was followed by a joint directive, On Accelerating the Rectification of Unified Grain Sales Work, issued on 28 April by the CCP Central Committee and the State Council. The directive argued that the phenomenon of ‘abnormally high’ grain sales figures in certain localities could be contained by means of enhanced publicity, thorough re-inspection of local need, and greater transparency regarding grain ration plans. ^{Footnote 86}

This rectification effort dovetailed with ‘Three-Fix’, aiming to stabilise not just how grain left farms but also how it was distributed among potential consumers – thus minimising the prospect of unplanned outflows that undermined state grain reserves.

However, rural reforms alone were insufficient. In May 1955, the Central Committee and State Council issued On Rectifying Urban Grain Planned Supply Work, introducing an urban ration system. This represented an attempt to close loopholes that enabled city dwellers to purchase grain multiple times under various credentials. By tackling this supply-side problem, the government strove to reduce abnormal increases in urban grain demand, thereby mitigating the strain on rural procurement. ^{Footnote 87} Ultimately, these measures formed a dual strategy: refining rural ‘Three-Fix’ processes to maintain procurement at consistent levels while introducing stricter ‘rationing’ in towns and cities to avert hoarding or waste. ^{Footnote 88}

Towards institutionalisation and long-term equilibrium

Taken together, the adjustments to grain sales in both rural and urban contexts – alongside the core changes in procurement under ‘Three-Fix’ – placed Unified Purchase and Sale on a firmer institutional footing. The Provisional Measures for Rural Grain Unified Purchase and Sale and the Provisional Measures for Urban Grain Ration Supply essentially codified how much each part of the population should produce or consume. ^{Footnote 89}

The logic behind these measures was clear: by ensuring a stable flow of grain from the countryside to the city, the state aimed to support industrial development without the risk of food shortages or unpredictable price fluctuations. At the same time, by establishing fixed targets, the government sought to offer peasants a more predictable arrangement, reducing friction with local cadres and moving away from the coercive methods of earlier collection practices. Additionally, urban rationing and oversight of rural grain sales were designed to curb excessive consumption, whether by city dwellers seeking cheap grain or rural families exaggerating their food shortages, thereby preventing waste and ensuring that resources were allocated more equitably. ^{Footnote 90}

While these institutional frameworks mitigated some of the chaos characterising earlier procurement campaigns, structural tensions persisted. The state’s overarching priority remained industrialisation, and this emphasis continued to tilt resource allocation towards urban centres. Thus, it was inevitably ‘urban- and industry-focused’ by design, an imbalance that did not vanish with the introduction of ‘Three-Fix’.