Faith and belief

The truth, or perceived truth, of Statement 1 can be explained by the perspectival account if we assume that the subject's perspective according to which p entails that the subject has some propositional attitude towards p that is incompatible with disbelieving or not accepting p.Footnote ¹⁸ For example, supposing someone has a perspective on the world according to which it is providentially guided by God, we might think the subject with such a faith perspective believes, accepts, or assumes that the world is providentially guided by God, and perhaps that belief, acceptance, or assumption is incompatible with disbelieving or not accepting that the world is providentially guided by God. The inference from having a perspective according to which p to believing, accepting, or assuming p is debatable, but given that one (even implicitly) endorses that inference and the incompatibility between the two propositional attitudes thus described, the perspectival account of faith explains the truth, or perceived truth, of Statement 1.

Statement 2 can also be explained by the perspectival account. From what was said above, a subject's perspective according to which p provides the subject with prima facie justification, but not necessarily ultima facie justification, for believing p. This can occur when, for example, the subject has conflicting faith perspectives, reasons to doubt whether one's perspective is accurate, or additional reasons against p. Suppose a subject has a faith perspective according to which p but does not have ultima facie justification for believing p. If the subject can respond to this justification by not believing p, then faith that p does not require belief that p, and Statement 2 is thus explained by the perspectival account.

Statement 3 is true by virtue of the fact that one's faith perspective affects the subject's evidence, providing subjects with reasons for beliefs. As mentioned above, a faith perspective makes it so that things appear to the subject in a certain way, and these appearances provide the subject with reasons to believe on the basis of those appearances. By providing reasons for beliefs, a subject's perspective (at least partially) explains why the subject has beliefs – the subject has beliefs because of those reasons. The perspectival account of faith thus explains why Statement 3 is true.Footnote ¹⁹

Concerning Statement 4, perspectival faith can intensify belief insofar as one's faith perspective affects one's reasons for one's beliefs by making it so that certain features of the world appear to the subject with more force or clarity than if the subject were not to have such faith. The force or clarity of one's appearances arguably affects the intensity of one's reasons and thus influences the intensity of one's beliefs on the basis of those reasons. For example, if one has a perspective according to which God providentially guides the universe, it might appear more forcefully or clearly to the subject that an extremely unlikely event is an act of God, and the force/clarity of that appearance thus affects the intensity of the subject's resultant belief. Given these assumptions about how the force/clarity of one's appearances contributes to the intensity of one's beliefs, the perspectival account of faith thus explains the truth of Statement 4.

Faith and evidence

The truth of Statement 5 is explained by the perspectival account in virtue of the fact that one's perspective and the propositions one believes on the basis of the evidence provided by one's perspective are mutually supporting. Suppose one's faith perspective provides a subject with evidence (via appearances) for certain propositions p, q, and r. p, q, and r then provide evidence for the subject's faith perspective.Footnote ²⁰ For example, if I have a perspective according to which God providentially directs the universe, it might appear to me as if God has been directing specific events x, y, and z. As a result, I might come to believe that God has directed x, y, and z. If I then reflect on whether my faith that God providentially directs the universe is supported by the available evidence, I could cite as evidence for that claim that God has directed x, y, and z. The justification here is circular, but this circular justification is just as benign as in cases in which I attempt to support the reliability of my sense perception – my reliable sense perception supports my belief that perceptions t, u, and v are accurate, and that t, u, and v are accurate supports the proposition that my sense perception is reliable.Footnote ²¹ The truth of Statement 5 is thus explained by the perspectival account of faith.

Statement 6 states not that faith is supported by evidence but that faith is evidence of things unseen. ‘Unseen’ in Statement 6 probably means not being seen via one's sense perception. Further, it is widely held among faith theorists that the ‘is’ in Hebrews 11:1 is intended in a way other than identity. One way to understand Hebrews 11:1 is to take the ‘is’ to be an ‘is’ of provision, as when I say, ‘My child is my joy.’ Combining the understanding of ‘unseen’ in this paragraph and the provision reading of ‘is’, the perspectival account of faith can explain why Statement 6 is true: faith, according to the perspectival account, provides evidence of certain propositions that are not evidenced merely via one's sense perception. Faith provides this evidence by making it so that certain things in the world appear to the subject that would not appear merely via one's sense perception. For example, one does not see solely with one's sense perception that God providentially directs the universe, yet a certain faith perspective provides the subject with evidence that God providentially directs the universe by making it appear to the subject as if God providentially directs the universe.

Statement 7 is false, given what was said in the first section, ‘The perspectival account of faith’. One's faith perspective provides one with evidence; faith does not imply the absence of evidence. Regardless, the perspectival account of faith can at least partially explain why someone would think Statement 7 is true. Faith does imply the absence of evidence if the perspectival account is combined with the (false) view that having evidence for a proposition requires that the subject be able either (1) to make an argument for the proposition or (2) to make an inference from that evidence to the target proposition. A faith perspective involves a construal of the world that makes it so that certain features appear a certain way to the subject. When something appears to a subject a certain way, the subject thereby acquires non-inferential (prima facie) justification for a proposition p (that the thing is that way), or non-propositional evidence for p, or reasons for p that the subject might not be able to articulate. If one maintains (the false view) that having evidence requires that the subject be able to make an argument or inference from that evidence or that one be able to articulate that evidence, then one can conclude that the appearances provided by a faith perspective do not provide the subject with what is required for something to be counted as evidence. If that is the case, faith implies the absence of evidence. Those who think Statement 7 is true might have experienced cases in which people of faith were unable to provide an argument when asked for evidence for propositions they hold by faith. Someone with such faith might respond to requests for evidence by saying, ‘I believe the tenets of my religion because I just see the world that way; it isn't a matter of arguments.’ So, there is an explanation provided by both the perspectival account and a (false) view of what evidence requires for why one would think Statement 7 is true.

The view that faith ‘goes beyond’ the evidence in Statement 8 means, according to Bishop, that the subject takes certain propositions to be true even when the subject is not rationally required take those propositions to be true on the basis of the publicly available evidence (Bishop Reference Bishop2022, 399–400, 402). Given this meaning of the statement, the perspectival account is compatible with Statement 8. The appearances provided by a perspective are not publicly available in the sense that many subjects can empirically perceive the same piece of public evidence and those subjects might be appeared to differently on the basis of their faith perspectives. Someone rising from the dead might appear to one subject as a miracle and to another as a hallucination. The subject's appearances, and so evidence, go beyond the publicly available evidence due to one's faith perspectives, according to the perspectival account of faith.Footnote ²²

Statement 9 is about resilience in the face of counterevidence. As described in the paragraph on Case 2 above, according to the perspectival account, one's faith in one's spouse persists despite evidence to the contrary. Perspectival faith can provide strong evidence via appearances, intensifying belief on the basis of that evidence, such that counterevidence might be outweighed or swamped by the evidence provided by the perspective. So, the perspectival account provides an explanation of why Statement 9 is true.

Faith and doubt

‘Doubt’ is notoriously ambiguous, and the ambiguity of the term can explain why there are seemingly incompatible statements about the relationship between doubt and faith. One of the meanings of the term, which explains Statement 10, is that doubt is the sufficient diminishment, or perhaps dissolution, of one's perspective.Footnote ²³ If one's faith perspective is diminished to a small extent, such a diminishment might not be worth attributing doubt to the subject, but if such a diminishment results in a failure to construe the world in a particular way, one's faith does not remain, and one's doubt is thus incompatible with faith. One's theistic doubt would, on this understanding, be the failure to construe events in the world as divinely guided or the failure to construe objects as divine creations. In this sense of ‘doubt’, faith is incompatible with doubt.

Another meaning of ‘doubt’ is that doubt is the lack of belief.Footnote ²⁴ When paired with the view that faith does not require that one have a particular accompanying belief, this lack-of-belief meaning explains why one would think Statement 11 is true. Suppose one construes the world in a particular way but also lacks what would be the accompanying belief. For example, suppose someone has a perspective according to which the world is created by God while also maintaining a view that undercuts the support that the accompanying appearances would otherwise provide, leading the subject to suspend belief about whether the world is created by God. A subject might, for example, maintain that his perspective is entirely due to his cultural upbringing, thus undercutting the support that the appearances provide for the target proposition (which the subject now ‘doubts’, in the lack-of-belief sense). The result is that the subject has faith – the perspective that provides the appearances – but lacks the belief that the appearances would support.Footnote ²⁵ There is, then, a way of explaining why one would think Statement 11 is true.

Even if faith is compatible with a failure to believe certain propositions on the basis of that faith, and even if faith is compatible with the slight dissolution of one's perspective, it makes sense to think that faith is incompatible with a pervasive or dominating doubt, as indicated by Statement 12. As mentioned in the paragraph on Statement 10, if the diminishment of one's perspective is pervasive or dominating, one might thereby lack faith. In fact, even if ‘doubt’ means the lack of belief, as it does in Statement 11, and faith does not require a specific belief, a pervasive or dominating lack of beliefs (so doubt) might imply a lack of, or dead, faith. If, for example, a subject's undercutting views are pervasive to the extent that the subject does not believe most of the propositions that would accompany the subject's faith, one has reason to doubt whether the subject has a faith perspective at all. Insofar as the subject has a faith perspective, that subject's faith perspective is not demonstrated by the subject's doxastic attitudes and presumably would not motivate the subject (or direct the subject's motivation) to act in ways characteristic of that faith perspective. Such a faith perspective, if present at all, is ‘dead’; it is as if the subject did not have the faith at all.Footnote ²⁶ Even if doubt is the lack of certain beliefs, then, as it is in Statement 11, at least living faith is incompatible with pervasive or dominating doubts, as indicated in Statement 12.

Faith and trust/commitment

Perspectival faith often implies certain attitudes such as reverence and trust, as indicated in Statement 13. As described in Cases 1 and 2 above, a subject's faith perspective can lead that subject to perceive another as trustworthy and so trust the other person even though there is evidence that the other person might eventually wrong, be wronging, or have wronged, the subject. In Case 1, Mary has a perspective on John according to which he will not defraud her (even if he is found to have defrauded others) or according to which he is not a defrauder to anyone. In Case 2, one spouse has a perspective according to which it appears as if the possibly unfaithful spouse has been and is, in fact, faithful, to such an extent that it swamps what would otherwise be damning counterevidence. These perspectives, then, imply trust or reverence towards others and motivate subjects (or direct subjects' motivation) to act accordingly. According to some specific versions of the perspectival account, trust is built into the perspective that one must have in order to have a faith perspective: a faith perspective requires that the subject be disposed to see the object as trustworthy.Footnote ²⁷

Regarding Statement 14, if one is appeared to as if an action is worth pursuing, one thereby has a strong reason to act on the basis of that appearance, perhaps so strong that one does not thereby have reasons to search for more evidence. If one is appeared to strongly enough, searching for more evidence would be futile. Since one's faith perspective provides such appearances, one's faith perspective explains why faith involves a commitment to act prior to searching for more evidence.

Faith and volition

The debate about whether one's faith is under our direct control, indirect control, or not at all within our control is explained by virtue of the fact that there is a parallel debate about subjects' perspectives. One might argue that subjects' value-oriented perspectives on the world are up to those subjects, just as one can affect a gestalt shift while looking at Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit. Such a position would make it so that Statement 15 is true.

Alternatively, one might argue that subjects' perspectives are not within their control. One might hold that the right kind of religious perspective cannot be formed in subjects via the subject's control and, if one has such a perspective at all, one has the perspective as a gift from God. Such a position would make Statement 16 true.

Finally, one might hold that subjects can affect their perspectives indirectly, by, for example, focusing differently, as when one might create a gestalt shift by focusing on one part of the duck-rabbit picture instead of another. Such a position would make it so that Statement 17 is true. Thus, although the three statements about faith conflict, the conflict can be explained by a parallel debate about perspectives.

Faith and emotions

Statement 18 is true if we adopt a certain view of emotions, such as Robert Roberts's view (Reference Roberts2003, Reference Roberts2007). According to Roberts's view, emotions are concern-based construals. As one's construal changes, so one's emotions change. For example, to fear is to construe a situation as dangerous and to be concerned about avoiding danger. If one were to construe oneself as protected by God or construe the danger in one's situation as insignificant relative to some larger purpose, one would thereby not construe the situation as dangerous, so one's fear would be diminished or eliminated (mutatis mutandis for other negative emotions). Of course, one could maintain that Roberts's view of emotions is incorrect, in which case one might contest Statement 18, but there is at least one prominent view of emotions that makes sense of Statement 18.Footnote ²⁹

Concerning Statement 19, faith makes us vulnerable because having a faith perspective always involves a cost if the faith is inaccurate.Footnote ³⁰ Stronger (central, resilient) faith involves greater costs. When a subject's perspective is resilient, the subject might persistently hold on to certain evidence and thus maintain beliefs on the basis of that evidence, all the while knowing that were the subject's evidence misleading, the subject might be persistently incorrect, resistant to correction. Further, to the degree to which the subject's perspective is central, having the perspective exposes the subject to massive cognitive disruption were the subject to learn the perspective is incorrect. For example, if I have a central perspective according to which God is the being to whom I should direct my life and I end up adopting a contrary perspective, I will have misoriented my life thus far. Perspectives thus create liabilities, which makes us vulnerable, which makes sense of Statement 19.

Faith and motivation/care

As described in the first section, ‘The perspectival account of faith’, faith motivates subjects (or at least directs subjects' motivation). More difficult is the second part of Statement 20. The second part of Statement 20 can be explained by the perspectival account if one's perspective involves construing oneself as a person who does not act on certain desires or if one construes oneself as acting for a purpose which involves acting against one's desires combined with one's care that one act according to that construal. For example, if I have a perspective according to which I am responsible to God and I care about acting according to my duties to God, that perspective might motivate me (or direct my motivation) to act according to those duties even if doing so requires acting against desires that conflict with my duty to God.

Statement 21 is explained by the perspectival account's requirement that for a subject to have faith, that subject must take there to be significant value in the object of one's faith and have a pro-attitude towards that object. Insofar as a subject takes a pro-attitude towards an object that the subject takes to be of value – so it matters to the subject – the subject values and is for, so cares about, that object. Having faith with respect to an object, according to the perspectival account, is thus incompatible with not caring about that object.

I have thus described how the perspectival account of faith either explains why statements about faith appealed to in the current faith literature are true, or, in cases in which they are not true, I have described how the perspectival account of faith explains why one would think those statements are true. In this way, the perspectival account of faith fares just as well or better than other accounts of faith. When paired with the previous section, I hope to have shown that the perspectival account of faith explains the data that alternative views of faith seek to explain. In the following section, I contribute even further to the explanatory argument by showing that the perspectival account also explains why alternative accounts of faith seem plausible.

Cognitive accounts

Many faith theorists argue that faith is a cognitive state. The view that faith is a belief is held by John Locke (Reference Locke1975), C. S. Lewis (Reference Lewis1952, 138), L. J. Cohen (Reference Cohen1989, 387), and Joseph Runzo (Reference Runzo1990, 44). Alvin Plantinga (Reference Plantinga2000, 245) identifies faith with a belief formed via the sensus divinitatis. John Bishop (Reference Bishop2002) holds that faith is a ‘doxastic venture’. Other faith theorists have argued that belief is too strong of a cognitive state to be required by faith (e.g. Howard-Snyder Reference Howard-Snyder2013, Reference Howard-Snyder2016, Reference Howard-Snyder2018) and have argued that faith requires a weaker cognitive state such as acceptance (Alston Reference Alston, Jordan and Howard-Snyder1996) or assumption (Buckareff Reference Buckareff2005; Howard-Snyder Reference Howard-Snyder2013; McKaughan Reference McKaughan2013, Reference McKaughan2016). Ryan Byerly (Reference Byerly2012) argues that religious faith is a disposition to believe.

As described above, according to the perspectival account of faith, faith is primarily cognitive, and it is debatable which other cognitive states result from having a faith perspective. It might be that when one has exemplary, central faith, one also ‘believes by faith’ by having fitting beliefs that accompany the subject's faith perspective. Further, beliefs by faith in paradigmatic cases might all be of a certain kind. They might, for example, be beliefs for which the subject cannot provide an argument, in which case those beliefs are properly basic, perhaps the result of a special faculty, the sensus divinatatis. If, however, the perspectival account is correct and current faith theorists are making progress towards (but incorrectly identifying) faith, we would expect faith theorists to move away from doxastic accounts of faith towards accounts involving weaker cognitive states while maintaining that faith is primarily cognitive. And that is what is occurring in the debate over cognitive accounts of faith, as faith theorists are identifying faith with cognitive states weaker than belief. Neither construals, acceptances, nor assumptions are as strong as belief – to have a belief requires states of affairs that are required by neither perspectives, acceptances, nor assumptions.Footnote ³¹ It is debatable which propositional attitudes are required by perspectival faith, but the movement described in the preceding paragraph shows that faith theorists are moving in the direction of the perspectival account, though not grasping it completely, and those accounts are plausible to the extent to which they are moving in the direction of the perspectival account.

Affective and volitional accounts

Some faith theorists have proposed that faith is an affective state, a certain kind of orientation, and/or a kind of volition aimed at a goal. Jonathan Kvanvig (Reference Kvanvig2013, Reference Kvanvig2018) holds that faith is ‘an orientation of a person toward a longer-term goal, an orientation or disposition toward the retaining of the goal or plan or project in the face of difficulties in achieving it’ (Kvanvig Reference Kvanvig2013, 111). Jonathan Matheson (Reference Matheson2018) argues that faith is grit – passionate perseverance to obtain long-term goals. Malcolm and Scott (Reference Malcolm and Scott2021), (Reference Malcolm and Scott2022) argue that faith is true grit – an attitude that aligns with the content of the faith and in which the subject is disposed to resist ceasing to have that attitude. Louis Pojman (Reference Pojman1986) argues that faith is profound hope, a weaker affective state towards the object of one's faith.

Affective and volitional accounts capture a valuable feature of faith, according to the perspectival account: faith orients subjects to what is valuable, motivating subjects (or directing subjects' motivation) to act accordingly. Kvanvig's account identifies the orientation and motivational feature of one's faith perspective. Matheson describes central, resilient faith, which directs subjects to steadfastly pursue long-term goals. Malcolm and Scott describe resilient faith that resists dissolution, and Pojman identifies an affective state – hope – that accompanies weaker, that is, less central and less resilient, faith.

Ryan West (Reference West2013) maintains that faith is a disposition to have certain proper emotional responses to certain situations. This dispositional view aligns with Robert Roberts's view of emotions and fits with the perspectival account of faith. (See also the paragraph on Statement 18.) On Roberts's view, one is disposed to have certain kinds of emotions because of one's construal of a situation. Likewise, then, one's faith perspective would dispose one to experience certain kinds of emotions in response to certain situations. West's view, then, identifies a feature of the perspectival view of faith – that it disposes one to experience certain emotional responses to certain situations – rather than the perspective itself that disposes the subject to experience those emotions.

Relationship accounts

Another approach to developing an account of faith is to hold that faith principally involves a kind of reliance, trust, or commitment. According to reliance accounts, when I have faith in someone to do something for me, I rely on them to do something for me, and in this way I am vulnerable to them.Footnote ³² According to trust accounts, one person's having faith in another to x is to trust the other person to x. According to these accounts, ‘I have faith in’ and ‘I trust’ can be used interchangeably in a sentence without an obviously discernible change in meaning – for example, ‘I have faith in God to save me’, and ‘I trust God to save me’, have the same meaning.Footnote ³³ Lara Buchak (Reference Buchak2017, Reference Buchak, Rosen, Byrne, Cohen, Harman and Shiffrin2018) argues for a commitment view of faith: a subject has faith that p when he or she commits to act on p without searching for more evidence and commits to acting even when counterevidence arises.Footnote ³⁴ Meghan Page argues that faith is a posture of leaning in, where leaning in is a kind of others-directedness: ‘attuning our lives, decisions and routines around the persons or states of affairs in which we place faith’ (Page Reference Page and Kvanvig2017, 239). Finally, Ryan Preston-Roedder (Reference Preston-Roedder2013) maintains that person-to-person faith involves a cognitive component – the tendency to give people the benefit of the doubt when evaluating their actions, motives, or character – and a volitional component – to be ‘invested in the possibility of people's living morally decent lives and in their realizing that possibility’ (Preston-Roedder Reference Preston-Roedder2013, 668).

These relationship accounts focus on particular applications of faith that involve interpersonal relationships, often explicitly, and so some of these accounts do not seem to fit well with other faith applications. For example, if I have faith that my team will win a particular game, I do not thereby rely on my team – my team could win, and my faith be vindicated, by virtue of my team's opponent's complete failure even if my team flounders and so proves themselves unreliable. I could also have this faith without trusting my team – my team's failure to win does not betray or violate my trust. By having faith that my team will win, I am not thereby committed to act as if the team will win – to place a bet on my team if offered, for example – without searching for more evidence. Nor does the faith that my team will win involve being vulnerable to my team or attuning my life and routine around the team or its win.

Reliance, trust, and commitment accounts do, however, identify attitudes and behaviours that typically accompany strong faith perspectives in the context of personal relationships. Reliance accounts capture instances in which a subject has a resilient faith perspective according to which another will come through for the subject. Trust accounts identify instances in which a subject has a faith perspective according to which another person does what the subject trusts the other person to do, and commitment accounts capture instances in which a subject's resilient faith perspective leads the subject to act in committed ways, such as not searching for counterevidence, as indicated in Statement 14. Page's account focuses on a central faith perspective that orients the subject around other persons or states of affairs that the subject takes to be so valuable that the subject attunes the subject's life, decisions, and routines around them. Finally, Preston-Roedder's account highlights cases in which a subject has a resilient perspective according to which (and in which the subject values that) people are morally decent. Such a perspective motivates the subject (or directs the subject's motivation) to give people the benefit of the doubt and to encourage others to behave well, both of which are, according to Preston-Roedder, expressions of faith in humanity. The perspectival account of faith thus explains the plausibility of relationship accounts – they grasp what strong faith perspectives do for us in the context of personal relationships.

Howard-Snyder's account

Daniel Howard-Snyder advocates for a resilient reliance account of faith, which has been addressed above, but in the last decade or so, Howard-Snyder has also maintained that faith must meet four requirements.Footnote ³⁵ Howard-Snyder argues that his account satisfies these requirements;Footnote ³⁶ I here describe how the perspectival account also satisfies these requirements and so fares just as well as Howard-Snyder's – and others' – accounts in this respect. Howard-Snyder holds that faith must involve four components:

1. 1. a positive evaluation,

2. 2. a positive conative stance,

3. 3. a positive cognitive stance, and

4. 4. resilience to new counterevidence. (Howard-Snyder Reference Howard-Snyder2013, 370)

Howard-Snyder's account captures four important features of faith, according to the perspectival account. First, the positive evaluation component captures the fact that the subject takes the object of the faith perspective to be valuable and that the subject has a pro-attitude towards the object of the faith perspective. Second, the positive conative stance component captures the fact that a subject's faith perspective motivates subjects (or directs the subject's motivation) to act. Third, the positive cognitive stance component captures the fact that one's faith perspective is cognitive (it has a mind-to-world direction of fit), is sensitive to evidence (as indicated in the paragraph on Statement 5), and provides one with reasons (as indicated in the paragraph on Statement 6). Although one's perspective according to which p might not result in belief that p (Howard-Snyder thinks it need not either), it is nevertheless a positive cognitive stance towards p. Finally, resilience to new counterevidence is captured by the perspectival account as it was in Case 2 and Statement 9 above: counterevidence cannot easily outweigh the strong evidence that one's faith perspective provides via appearances, and the subject might look for ways to explain the counterevidence away even when the subject would not do so without the faith perspective. Although Howard-Snyder's account does not capture the fundamental aspect of faith – that it is a kind of perspective – it nevertheless laudably identifies important features of faith, which one would expect if the perspectival account were true.

Alternative accounts, then, all capture what seems like plausible features or consequences of faith according to the perspectival account, at least in particular paradigmatic contexts. Cognitive accounts capture, and over time have honed in on, the cognitive aspect of perspectival faith. Affective and volitional accounts capture the value-directedness and motivational aspects of perspectival faith. Relationship accounts capture the kinds of attitudes and behaviours that typically accompany strong faith perspectives in the context of personal relationships. And Howard-Snyder's requirements capture many key features of perspectival faith. The perspectival account, then, explains the plausibility of these alternative accounts – they focus on a feature or consequence of the true (perspectival) account of faith and take that feature or consequence to be faith itself. That is what we would expect were the perspectival account true.