I. Introduction
When Hegel died, his disciples, known as ‘Freunde des Verewigten’, began the edition of some of his hitherto unpublished texts. At the same time, the task of interpreting him also began. On the subjective spirit, however, Hegel never published a book beyond what was explained in his Encyclopaedia. Michelet already reminded us that
‘Hegel says that Psychology is one of those sciences which, in recent times, has drawn the least benefit from the general formation [allgemeine Bildung] of Spirit and the deeper concept of reason, and is still in a very poor state. He adds in another place that he hopes one day to be able to give a further exposition of the main features of this science which he set forth in the Encyclopaedia’ (Michelet Reference Michelet1840: III).Footnote 1
Michelet was one of the first to attempt to reconstruct Hegel’s ideas on subjective spirit in his Anthropologie und Psychologie oder die Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes (Reference Michelet1840). In these years, we also find other works, such as Rosenkranz’s Psychologie, oder die Wissenschaft vom subjektiven Geist (Reference Rosenkranz1863). They truly believed that subjective spirit was a central aspect of Hegel’s Philosophy. Despite the proposals of Michelet and Rosenkranz, the philosophy of subjective spirit has received less attention than other parts of Hegel’s system.
At the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of our century, however, important monographs on the philosophy of subjective spirit have appeared. It is sufficient to recall the books of Fetscher (Reference Fetscher1970), Greene (Reference Greene1972) and Bonito Oliva (Reference Bonito Oliva1995) in the twentieth century, or those of Stederoth (Reference Stederoth2001), Inwood (Reference Inwood2010) or Maurer (Reference Maurer2021), among others, in the twenty-first century. However, Hegel’s philosophy of psychiatry in his Anthropology (the first moment of subjective spirit) has not received enough attention. This lack of interest in Hegel’s philosophy of psychiatry is due to a lack of contextualization which, as we shall see, has produced several misunderstandings.
There are several commentaries on Hegel’s Anthropology, such as those by Corti (Reference Corti2016), Mowad (Reference Mowad2019) and the monograph by Arndt and Zovko (Reference Arndt and Zovko2017). Additionally, there are some shorter but illuminating materials on Hegel’s Anthropology in connection with the whole system, such as those by Padial (Reference Padial and F2015: 8–34; Reference Padial and F2019: 11–83) or Dryden (Reference Dryden2021: 127–47). However, attention to his philosophy of psychiatry sometimes goes unnoticed.Footnote 2 While some books written by Severino (Reference Severino1983) and Berthold-Bond (Reference Berthold-Bond1995) addressed mental illness according to Hegel, we still lack a proper contextualization of the psychiatric framework in which Hegel made his proposal. I think that this is due to the disregard of his therapeutic proposal. Most of the authors who have explained Hegel’s psychiatric theory have focused on his theory of madness, as Severino and Berhtold-Bond already did. Nowadays, authors such as Žižek (Reference Žižek, Gabriel and Žižek2009: 95–121), Wenning (Reference Wenning and Stern2013: 103–17), Feloj (Reference Feloj2014: 122–28), Brauer (Reference Brauer2018: 185), Caldeira (Reference Caldeira2019: 73–80), de Laurentiis (Reference De Laurentiis2021: 153–75),Footnote 3 Gregson (Reference Gregson2023), Prestifilippo (Reference Prestifilippo2024: 31–39), Ricci (Reference Ricci2024: 107–30), and a recently published volume edited by Iannellli and Failla (Reference Iannelli and Failla2024) in some of its chapters (Klauser Reference Klauser, Iannelli and Failla2024; Vieweg Reference Vieweg, Iannelli and Failla2024) have also focused on madness. But psychic therapy according to Hegel has been little treated. Sometimes it seems as if it does not exist. However, psychic therapy is important for us to understand Hegel’s proposal on madness in context.
As we shall see, according to Hegel, there is only one mental illness. There are neither three, nor five, nor are there several mental illnesses, but only one. Consequently, only one psychic therapy is necessary, as I will argue in this paper. However, by omitting his proposal for psychic therapy, this is often overlooked, as I will explain below.
Hegel’s theory of madness—far away from mesmerism,Footnote 4 unlike Schelling’s theory of madnessFootnote 5—has sometimes been compared with Pinel’s ideas on psychiatry.Footnote 6 This is due to Hegel’s praise of the French physician in his Anmerkung to §408, which reads as follows:
This humane treatment, no less benevolent than reasonable (the services of Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement), presupposes the patient’s rationality, and, in that assumption, has the sound basis for dealing with him on this side—just as in the case of bodily disease the physician bases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health. (GW 20: §408)Footnote 7
Hegel is referring to Pinel’s moral treatment as ‘humane treatment’. Due to this note, the few authors who have dealt with psychic therapeutics according to Hegel have seen here a heritage of his connection to Pinel on his therapeutic proposal (Fried Reference Fried1977; Battistoni Reference Battistoni and Achella2021: 96–100). This is correct, but his intellectual heritage goes far beyond some therapeutic practices. Hegel also owes to Pinel his entire framework for psychiatry as a medical discipline.
However, I think that Hegel’s heritage to Pinel’s approach to psychiatry is often overlooked for three main reasons. The first reason is that the editions of Boumann’s Encyclopaedia, and especially the translation of Petry’s Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes, lead to misunderstandings because of their Zusätze, which limit our understanding of Hegel’s conception of psychiatry. The second reason is that Pinel was situated in a psychiatric school that is now obsolete. In contrast to our current psychiatry, which follows the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (hereafter DSM), psychiatry in the nineteenth century had a radically different approach. The third reason is that Hegel does not make his psychiatric position explicit, but he presupposes it.
In this paper, I will try to show how Hegel, at that time, presupposes avant la letter the psychiatric framework of the Einheitspsychose (‘unitary psychosis’). This framework is omitted by many scholars when they deal with his philosophy of psychiatry, leading to some interpretative inconsistencies. To achieve this goal, I will briefly explain the misunderstandings to which Boumann’s and especially Petry’s editions lead. Then, I will briefly contextualize that framework and show the places where Hegel can be identified as following the unitary psychosis through Pinel’s influence. Finally, I will explain Hegel’s psychic therapy in light of unitary psychosis. As we shall see, Hegel took for granted only that which was proper to his time, even if today these ideas are already far removed.
II. The misunderstanding of Hegel’s psychic nosography in the Zusatz
In the philosophy of spirit, the subjective spirit represents the stage where the spirit develops its biological and psychic capacities to later open up to objective spirit. According to Padial (Reference Padial and F2019: 34), we can say that Anthropology deals with the unconscious and preconscious degrees of the individual, Phenomenology deals with consciousness, and Psychology with the higher capacities that an individual develops bio-psychologically. Madness is situated in his Anthropology, whose object is the soul (die Seele). We can consider that situating madness in his Anthropology is an innovation with respect to his time. For Hegel, madness comes from the dark part of consciousness in unity with corporeality because the soul is a unity between the mental and corporal dimensions of the human being (Achella Reference Achella and Achella2021: 31–35).Footnote 8 This approach to the preconscious and unconscious degrees is what allows Hegel to relate madness to other unconscious and preconscious states, such as magnetic somnambulism (Severino Reference Severino2012: 322–27) or the relationship of an embryo with its mother (Paulizzi Reference Paulizzi and Achella2021).
As I said, his approach to madness is novel because Hegel does not present a fully developed individual who is psychically damaged by losing the ability to reason or to feel. Rather, he points to the origin of madness at the unconscious level. Hence, madness is a sinking (Versenkung) into the soul (Seele), which Hegel calls ‘the misfortune’ (das Unglück) of spirit (GW 20: §408A). However, when examining his psychic nosography (by which I mean the classification of mental illnesses), we find that Hegel alludes to various types of mental illnesses that are not always the same. In Petry’s edition, we find that there are six mental illnesses (Hegel Reference Hegel and Petry1978: 327–86). The first is weakness of spirit, which includes imbecility (Blödsinn), absent-mindedness (Zerstreutheit) and babbling (Faselei) (Hegel Reference Hegel and Petry1978: 355–60).Then we find folly proper (die eigentliche Narrheit) or ‘folly’ (Hegel Reference Hegel and Petry1978: 361–66), which is divided into vital tedium (Lebensüberdruss) and melancholia (Melancholie). Finally, there is insanity (Tollheit, Wahnsinn) (Hegel Reference Hegel and Petry1978: 367–72).
The classification of mental illnesses in Petry’s edition makes Hegel’s theory of insanity very practical and useful because it is clear and well organized. But this classification is not Hegel’s; it is Petry’s own work. There is no document where Hegel makes this division. To create this passage on the classification of mental illnesses, Petry used a significant number of manuscripts from Hegel’s pupils in Berlin from different years, along with the texts edited by Pöggeler and Nicolin, and combined this material with Boumann’s Zusätze (Padial Reference Padial and F2015: 14). However, Boumann created his Zusätze from about eight Hegel manuscripts, which dated from between 1816 and 1830 (Williams Reference Williams and F2007: 4). The result of Boumann’s work, as well as Petry’s, is a text that misrepresents Hegel’s intellectual development (Williams Reference Williams and F2007: 4), as it does not consider the differences between Hegel’s propositions from 1816 and those from 1830 in several respects (Padial Reference Padial and F2015: 14). Instead, it presents them as if Hegel had always maintained the same discourse, ignoring his Denkensweg.
Both Boumann and Petry mixed materials from different periods, attempting to present Hegel’s psychiatric theory as completely as possible by omitting his intellectual development. This makes Hegel’s psychic nosography appear as a kind of ‘monolithic theory’, as if Hegel had thought of it in exactly the same way in 1830 as he did in 1816. Although these editions provide a very comprehensive approach for the reader, they are written not by Hegel, but by Boumann and Petry.Footnote 9
On psychic nosography, however, Hegel’s approach changed several times over the years. He taught a total of five courses on subjective spirit: one in 1820, one in 1822, one in 1825, one in the winter semester of 1827–28, and finally the last one in 1830. Of these, only the courses of 1822, 1825 and 1827–28 have been published. It is enough to refer to these last courses to see that Hegel’s psychical nosography is different each year. There was never a theory such as those presented in the Boumann or Petry Additions. There were never six different mental illnesses from 1816 to 1830. Let us look at this briefly.Footnote 10
In 1822, Hegel considered three mental illnesses. The first was idiocy (Blödsinn),Footnote 11 which was divided into theoretical (theoretischer) and practical (praktischer). Then there was folly (Narrheit), which had no divisions. Finally, there was insanity (Wahnsinn), which Hegel explicitly stated is synonymous with Faselei (GW 25, 1: 92–95).
On the other hand, in his Vorlesungen of 1825, Hegel recognizes only two mental illnesses. The first is idiocy (Blödsinn), which is divided into absent-mindedness or dispersion (Zerstreutheit), babbling (Faselei) and cretinism (Kretinismus). The second illness is folly (Narrheit), which he now identifies as a synonym for Wahnsinn (GW 25, 1: 373–87).
The last classification that we have from Hegel corresponds to his lectures in the winter semester of 1827–28. Three mental illnesses appear there. The first is idiocy (Blödsinn), which is divided into natural idiocy, or cretinism (natürlicher Blödsinn, Kretinismus), absent-mindedness (Zerstreutheit), and babbling (Faselei). The second is folly (Narrheit), which is divided into vital tedium (Lebensüberdruss) and melancholia (Melancholie). Finally, insanity (Wahnsinn) now appears as a synonym for Tollheit (GW 25, 2: 113–19; 710–25).Footnote 12
Thus, psychic nosography according to Hegel is different from those established by Petry and Boumann. There was never a definitive psychic nosography for Hegel; it varied in each course.Footnote 13 Moreover, this misunderstanding is often reinforced by a lack of understanding about the theoretical frameworks of psychiatry in Hegel’s time. In the following, I will show this second misunderstanding, which confuses the genera of mental illness with the species.
III. The misunderstanding of psychic nosography in context
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, psychiatry sought to become a discipline within medicine.Footnote 14 Just as medicine had adopted Linnaeus’s botanical more to classify diseases, psychiatrists also adopted Linnaeus’s binomial nomenclature (differentiating between genera and species) to classify mental illnesses. This gave rise to two different theoretical frameworks in psychiatry: unitary psychosis and incipient psychosis (Llopis Reference Llopis1954; Vliegen Reference Vliegen1980).Footnote 15 This context is often omitted when studying Hegel’s theory of madness, but it is important for understanding his theory and therapeutic approach. I will now briefly explain each theoretical framework and then show where his psychiatric proposal was framed.
Unitarian psychosis was popular in Spain, Italy, France and Germany. According to this theoretical framework, madness was not just a disease; it alone was the disease. Each case of madness, different from one another, was a particularization of an ‘original disease’ (Janzarik Reference Janzarik and Huber1969: 29–33; Vliegen Reference Vliegen1980: 77). This original disease manifested itself through different symptoms. For unitary psychosis, a patient could only suffer from one form of madness at a particular time. Thus, unlike today, where we understand that a person can have several mental illnesses at the same time (depression, anxiety, delusions, hallucinations, etc.), the truth is that for unitary psychosis, there was only one disease. The passage from one symptom to another was considered an evolution of madness (or insanity), which was viewed as a single disease (Gualtieri Reference Gualtieri2019: 50). Consequently, since there was only one disease, only one treatment was necessary. To give an example with a physical disease, consider that fever can produce delirium. They are not two different diseases (delirium is a consequence of fever, the original disease in this case); by curing the fever, the delirium is also cured. Therefore, it is really one disease (fever) and not two (fever and delirium), and it needs only one cure.
This psychiatric position was due to his understanding of binomial nomenclature. For unitary psychosis, there was only one genus (madness), and within the genus, there could be different species of madness. But the genus, which was the disease, was only one. For this reason, many psychiatrists of the nineteenth century sought to find a medicinal cure or therapeutic treatment for madness, relying on their belief that only madness was the disease (Janzarik Reference Janzarik and Huber1969: 29–38; Berrios and Beer Reference Berrios and Beer1994: 13–36).
This psychiatric framework was very popular in its time, although it sounds distant to us today. In the early nineteenth century, Pinel in France, Reil in Germany and Chiarugi in Italy were representatives of unitary psychosis. Even in the mid-nineteenth century, there is a re-signification of ‘unitary psychosis’, but in general, as some researchers have pointed out, it will be defended by Georget and Griesinger (Huertas Reference Huertas1999: 69–71; Gualtieri Reference Gualtieri2019; Aragona Reference Aragona2024: 88).Footnote 16
As I mentioned, one of the most influential psychiatrists in Hegel’s philosophy was Pinel. He positioned himself as a follower of unitary psychosis. In fact, in Pinel’s Traité médico-philosophique sur l’aliénation mentale, ou la manie (hereinafter referred to as Traité), only one genus appears, which is ‘mental alienation’ (‘aliénation mentale’). Within this genus (mental alienation), there are several species: mania, melancholia, dementia and idiotism. However, the disease is only one: mental alienation. Pinel explicitly intended to ‘gather and outline all the varieties [species] included in the generic denomination of mental alienation’ (Pinel Reference Pinel1800: 140).
On the other hand, incipient psychosis proposed a theoretical framework in opposition to unitary psychosis. According to incipient psychosis, a person can suffer from several different mental illnesses simultaneously. For example, a person can suffer melancholia, schizophrenia and mania at the same time. Each mental illness is different from the others, so each requires a different treatment (Grivois Reference Grivois1991: 1–4).
In the nineteenth century, we find renowned psychiatrists, such as Farlet, who supported the theory of incipient psychosis (Huertas Reference Huertas1999: 69–71). We also find the best-known disciple of Pinel, J. E. D. Esquirol, who was one of the first representatives of incipient psychosis, thus distancing himself from his mentor. Esquirol himself commented in his work Des maladies mentales considérées sous les rapports médical, hygiénique et médico-légal on this debate between unitary psychosis and incipient psychosis, saying ‘it has led some physicians to reject any distinction and to admit in madness only a single disease that presents itself in various forms. I do not share this way of seeing things’ (Esquirol Reference Esquirol1838: 23; my emphasis).
Thus, where Pinel put one genus and several species, Esquirol considered several genera. In total, in Esquirol’s work there were five genera (or five mental illnesses): lypemania, monomania, mania, dementia and idiotism. Then, within each of them, different species appear (Grivois Reference Grivois1991: 4). This difference between genus and species is not trivial because, as I said, it determines whether there is one mental illness or several mental illnesses.
In short, unitary psychosis and incipient psychosis differed in their theoretical approaches. While the former posited that there was only one disease (madness) that evolved, the latter suggested that there were several distinct mental illnesses. We can also say that while unitary psychosis required only one treatment for madness, incipient psychosis required several treatments, as there were multiple distinct illnesses.
It is true that some Romantic psychiatrists of their time also argued for the existence of a single mental illness.Footnote 17 However, Hegel does not derive his perspective from Romantic psychiatry but rather from the framework of unitary psychosis. This is evident in his Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes, where he elaborates on his philosophy of psychiatry without referencing any Romantic psychiatrists. The only two psychiatrists he cites are Pinel and Reil, both of whom, as previously noted, are classified within the tradition of unitary psychosis in the history of psychiatry. Consequently, it can be asserted that Hegel’s philosophy of psychiatry aligns with the principles of unitary psychosis.
When Hegel was writing about psychiatry in his Anthropology, especially in his Lectures, the debate between unitary psychosis and incipient psychosis was ongoing. The common misunderstanding is to approach Hegel as if he were a follower of incipient psychosis (as if he believed there were several mental illnesses), when in fact he was a follower of unitary psychosis, as I will show in the next section.
IV. Unitary psychosis as a theoretical framework in Hegel: the influence of Pinel and Reil
In the introduction, I have already quoted the note to §408 where Hegel speaks about Pinel as a genius in psychiatry. However, something often omitted should strike us as odd. In §408, Hegel speaks only about madness (Verrücktheit).Footnote 18 He only names some of the other supposed ‘mental illnesses’ (GW 20: §408A) but says nothing about his exhaustive psychic nosography. Moreover, he does not even mention that this classification of mental illnesses exists. As we already saw, Hegel had developed several psychic nosographies in 1822, 1825 and 1827–28. So why does he not speak of the different mental illnesses in 1830? Why does he only refer to Verrücktheit in a generic way? The explanation, I will argue, is that Hegel was following the unitary psychosis framework. There was one mental illness as a genus: Verrücktheit, and within it, several species.
That Hegel had read Pinel is evident from his mention in the note to §408. However, it must be considered that Hegel had also read Reil, the leading proponent of unitary psychosis (in German, Einheitspsychose) in Germany. In an entry in Stolzenberg’s notes of 1827–28, Hegel comments on Pinel, stating that ‘his writing on insanity is by far the best. Also, Reil’s book is quite good. [Reil] makes fun of Pinel’s formal and superficial ideas, but his philosophical formalism is not much better than those superficial representations either’ (GW 25, 2: 713). Beyond the comparison between Pinel and Reil, this annotation proves that he had not only read Pinel but also had Reil’s book Rhapsodieen in mind.Footnote 19 Both Pinel and Reil were two of the main representatives of unitary psychosis in Hegel’s time. Therefore, the hypothesis that Hegel followed unitary psychosis is plausible because of his two major influences.
To prove this hypothesis, it would have to be shown that Hegel supported an evolution of mental illnesses. Therefore, it would be impossible to have several mental illnesses simultaneously. It will also be necessary to show whether this corresponds to his therapeutic proposal, which would have to be a single therapy for Verrücktheit. In this section, I will demonstrate the first hypothesis: there is only one mental illness for Hegel. In the next section, I will show that Hegel thought of a single therapy.
First of all, there is a clue in the issue of translation. Which edition of Pinel’s Traité did Hegel use? There is no evidence that he read the original French version, but it is most likely that he used the German translation. Michael Wagner had translated Pinel’s book only one year after the Traité was published (1800). This translation was published with the title Philosophich-medicinische Abhandlung über Geistesverirrungen oder Manie (Reference Pinel and Wagner1801) (hereinafter called Abhandlung). Several terms of difficult translation emerged here that will help us better understand Hegel’s ideas in psychiatry.
In the original French work, Pinel spoke of the division de l’aliénation mentale en espèces distinctes (‘the division of mental alienation into distinct species’) (Pinel 1799: 135). This was translated into German by Wagner as ‘Eintheilung des Wahnsinns in besondere Arten’ (Pinel Reference Pinel and Wagner1801: 144). Thus, the term espèces is translated into German as Arten. Therefore, espèces, or Arten, is a term that presupposes the division of mental alienation as a genus into species.
It seems to be no coincidence that when Hegel explains his psychic nosography, he uses the phrase ‘die besonderen Arten des verrückten Zustandes’ (GW 25, 2: 710). Here, the term Arten seems a calque of Wagner’s German translation of espèces. While this does not prove that Hegel followed unitary psychosis, it does allow us to posit that Hegel is not referring to the ‘forms of the states of insanity’ but to the ‘species of the states of insanity’ with Arten des verrückten Zustandes.
Perhaps this first clue is insufficient, but it allows us to raise the possibility that Hegel was presupposing the theoretical framework of unitary psychosis. Nevertheless, it can be confirmed that Hegel was following unitary psychosis because he explicitly speaks of the evolution of Verrücktheit in different species.
Secondly, now that we know that Arten could refer to ‘species’ of madness, there is a lack of textual evidence to prove the hypothesis that Hegel was following unitary psychosis. As we saw, this hypothesis centres on the idea that there is one mental illness that evolves, giving rise to different symptoms (as with the example of fever), passing from one illness to another. Hegel explicitly talks about this in 1827–28:
The disease seems to have, like fever, a certain course. It begins with dullness [Stumpfheit], idiocy [Blödheit], and transits then into folly [Narrheit]. The fool [Narr] is healthier than the idiot [der Blödsinnige]. But if he transits from folly [Narrheit] into rage [Wuth] and from there into idiocy [Blödsinn], then healing is not possible. (GW 25, 2: 719).
Hegel comments that mental illness literally has a course (Verlauf) just like fever, i.e., an evolution. It begins with some symptoms (dullness and idiocy) and then transforms into Narrheit, which was one of the species of madness he had pointed out in his classification of 1827–28. Finally, in the last line, Hegel makes it explicit that Narrheit can transit to Blödsinn, which is ‘healthier’.Footnote 20 This proves that he thought of an evolution of the species of madness. There is no patient who has two mental illnesses (Narrheit and Blödsinn), but rather mental illness evolves from one species (folly) to another (idiocy).
In conclusion, we have textual proof that Hegel was developing his psychic nosography from the framework of unitary psychosis. Obviously, this reinforces that translation of ‘species’ with Arten. However, one more issue remains to be addressed before we can claim that Hegel presupposed the framework of Einheitspsychose. If Hegel were suddenly to explain several treatments for each species in his psychic nosography, then we might think that he is actually in the psychiatric-theoretical framework of incipient psychosis. Therefore, I will now go on to show how there is, in fact, only one psychic treatment, which ultimately frames Hegel’s psychiatry in unitary psychosis.
V. Psychic therapy according to Hegel in the light of unitary psychosis
Not many commentators have dwelt on Hegel’s therapeutic proposal.Footnote 21 In fact, due to the lack of attention to Hegel’s psychiatric-theoretical framework, some commentators were surprised by Hegel’s proposal for the healing of madness. Inwood, for example, considered Hegel’s therapeutics to be incoherent because, despite there being three mental illnesses (idiocy, folly and insanity), he proposed only one cure (Inwood Reference Inwood2010: 395). Hence, Inwood said: ‘but he does not distinguish between the types of cures for them’ (Reference Inwood2010: 395).
It is true that Hegel’s proposal is difficult to understand because of the large number of examples he gives. When he deals with psychic therapy (GW 25, 2: 719–25), most of the examples come from the books of Pinel and Reil, who were psychiatrists and thought inductively, moving from practical cases to the generality of their explanations. Consequently, their books are full of examples, so that making their theoretical proposals explicit is a complicated task. However, it is not an impossible task.
Hegel advocates that psychic therapy is a single therapy in his lessons of 1825 and 1827–28. This fits perfectly with the framework of unitary psychosis. It is true that there is a terminological change between 1825 and 1827–28. In von Griescheim’s notes of 1825, Hegel speaks of ‘physiological healing’ and ‘psychical healing’ (GW 25, 1: 390–400). In contrast, in Stolzenberg’s notes of 1827–28, he uses the term Seiten (sides).
I think the term Seiten fits Hegel’s conception better because he always insisted on the soul-body unity. There are not two parts; there is not the body on the one hand and the soul on the other. In this sense, there is an identity between soul and body (Wolff Reference Wolff1992: 100). Rather, what Hegel means is that one must try to heal mental illnesses by treating the spirit as a unity, not as two different substances (Sell Reference Sell, Schneider and Schroeder-Werle2022: 347–62). That is why the term Seiten is shown to be more rigorous. Now, these two sides of psychic therapy in 1827–28 are the physical medicinal side (which corresponds to the physiological healing in 1825) and the psychic side (which is the psychic healing in 1825).
Broadly speaking, the physical-medicinal side consists in applying medication to the mentally ill (GW 25, 2: 718). Thus, Hegel’s consideration of the need for psychic therapy does not negate the potential benefits of medication for patients. He also lists here two other main practices of a physical nature: medicinal baths by drops and hot baths. These practices were common at the time, as Brunianism applied these baths as standard methods to regulate the Erregbarkeit of the patient (see Perkins-McVey Reference Perkins-McVey2023a: 363). Hegel also mentions the use of a straitjacket (Zwangsweste). This method, devised by Cox (Reference Cox1806: 137–76), involves putting a straitjacket on the furious patient and swinging them until they relaxed, with George III being one of the notable individuals who frequently resorted to swinging (GW 25, 2: 719). In general, it was a recommended method for aggressive patients because the practices of the time assumed that bathing the patient calmed their mind. With medication and these physical treatments, the patient was predisposed for therapy on the psychic side.
The psychic side requires different approaches than the medicinal-physical side. Drawing inspiration from Pinel, Hegel points out that it must always be remembered that ‘the madman is a human being who still retains reason’ (GW 25, 2: 720). This Pinealian presupposition, which others have investigated (Padial and Ortigosa Reference Padial, Ortigosa and Arana2021), is the key to Pinel’s moral treatment. Hegel adopted this same idea, believing that reason is not lost forever but can be restored. The philosopher explains it by analogy: just as the physical body (Körper) maintains vitality and can heal from an illness, so can the madman heal from his madness. Moreover, as Wenning (Reference Wenning and Stern2013: 115) has presented, this preserved rationality becomes manifest through lucid intervals. During these lucid intervals, psychiatrists can talk to the sick person to make them aware of the responsibility for their actions (GW 25, 2: 720). This is popularly known as the ‘talking cure’, which aims to restore the moral conscience of individuals (Caldeira Reference Caldeira2019: 151). Through this method, the mentally ill person becomes aware of their madness, which helps them to want to voluntarily continue the healing process (GW 25, 2: 723).
In addition, this therapy of the psychic side has a second objective: to awaken new interests in the patient, so that they stop thinking about what causes their madness (GW 25, 2: 721). As Williams (Reference Williams and F2007: 7) commented in this regard, with this proposal, Hegel is trying to help the patient begin to feel calm so that their psyche can be slowly restored. To heal, the first things needed are calmness and entertainment. In fact, Hegel gives the example of a sanatorium in Naples where the insane were accustomed to order, cleanliness, physical work and watching comedies. According to Hegel, in that sanatorium ‘life is easy for them. They are full of joy in their work’ (GW 25, 2: 721).
This care of the environment and the activities carried out by the patient keep them physically, emotionally and mentally calm. The psychic dimension should not be overlooked because, as Maurer (Reference Maurer2021: 283) points out, ‘his insistence that the mentally ill person never loses his reason is indicative of Hegel’s seeing a relationship of continuity between rational consciousness and the Gefühlssphere’. Added to this idea is the fact that, gradually, insane people must return to trusting each other. That is, they must be taught again how to relate to and trust others (GW 25, 2: 722).
Hegel also comments that on some occasions (depending on the stage of the evolution of the Verrücktheit), it is necessary to make them see that they are mad by means of contradiction. A clear example from Hegel himself is the following: there was a man in Göttingen who did not walk because he believed that his leg was made of glass, even though it was a normal leg. The psychiatrist asked him to accompany him by carriage to a town to do some shopping. On the way, they were ambushed by the psychiatrist’s students disguised as thieves. The psychiatrist ran off across the field, and the patient followed him. Thanks to this, the psychiatrist was able to show the man that his leg was not really made of glass, but a normal leg with which he had just run (GW 25, 1: 397–98).
Thus, both the physical-medicinal and the psychic side are important for therapy. It is true that Hegel gives priority to the psychic side. This is because, while the physical-medicinal side depends on the individual (e.g., adjusting medication), the psychic side has universal scope (Maurer Reference Maurer2021: 279). The final goal of all the techniques that Hegel collects, both on the physical-medicinal side and on the psychic side, is for people to recover their reason, which was the same goal that Pinel had with his moral treatment (Berthold-Bond Reference Berthold-Bond1995: 203).
In conclusion, Hegel’s approach on therapy is complex but unified, and it does not depend on each specific type of madness as it treats madness (Verrücktheit) as a genus. It is not an inconsistency on Hegel’s part to have only one therapeutic proposal; rather, it stems from the theoretical-psychiatric framework of unitary psychosis. Since it is considered a single disease, only one treatment is needed, unlike the proposal of incipient psychosis. Therefore, Hegel meets the final criterion necessary to claim that he presupposed the psychiatric framework of unitary psychosis.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, Hegel’s psychiatric theory has been contextualized within the framework of unitary psychosis. This psychiatric-theoretical framework was inaugurated by Pinel in France and continued by Reil in Germany, both of whom were major influences on Hegel.
As explained, unitary psychosis was represented by Pinel. This theory posited that there was one disease as a genus (madness), while there were several species. Hence, only one treatment was needed. Incipient psychosis, whose main representative was Esquirol, posited that there were several genera, so that for each genus (each mental illness) a new treatment was needed.Footnote 22 However, Hegel relied on unitary psychosis, as I have demonstrated above.
First of all, attention must be paid to the potential issues with the editions by Boumann and Petry. In both cases, the Zusatz corresponding to §408 on mental illnesses was not written by Hegel, but by the editors. This explains why it does not align with Hegel’s proposals in the courses on the philosophy of the subjective spirit from 1822, 1825 and 1827–28. Hegel changed his psychic nosography in each course, creating an increasingly sophisticated classification of mental illnesses.
It is very striking that in his Encyclopaedia in 1830, Hegel only spoke of Verrücktheit, while in each course he had changed his psychic nosography. The reason lies in the fact that he presupposed unitary psychosis as a theoretical framework. Since it was considered a single mental illness (madness, Verrücktheit), no further information was necessary for the Encyclopaedia. It should be recalled that the Encyclopaedia aimed at the exposition of the content of each paragraph in its lectures.Footnote 23 For this reason, it deals only with Verrücktheit, which is, in sensu stricto, the only disease.
Moreover, as has already been shown, there is textual evidence indicating how Hegel followed the unitary psychosis. First of all, we should consider the possibility of the translation of the term Arten as species, and not as forms. As already stated, Hegel most likely did not use Pinel’s Traité, but rather the Abhandlung translated by Wagner. Thus, espèces was translated as Arten. When Hegel refers to his psychic nosography, he used the term Arten in its context to refer to ‘species’ of madness, presupposing madness as a genus. Secondly, textual evidence has been provided showing that Hegel thought of his philosophy of psychiatry within the theoretical framework of unitary psychosis. As has been seen, he considered the evolution from one species of insanity to another. In his context, this was only possible within the framework of unitary psychosis because, with incipient psychosis two (or more) different mental illnesses would be experienced. This reinforced the hypothesis of unitary psychosis as a theoretical framework in Hegel’s work.
Finally, it has been shown that Hegel supported the need for a single treatment for madness. If he had followed the theoretical framework of incipient insanity, then he would have had to provide a different treatment for each mental illness. However, this is not the case in 1822, 1825 or 1827–28. On the contrary, he always proposed only one treatment, just as Pinel or Reil had done. This completes the proof that Hegel followed unitary psychosis as a theoretical framework in his philosophy of psychiatry.
Having sufficiently proved that Hegel’s philosophy of psychiatry fits within the framework of unitary psychosis, new horizons for research now appear. Recently, de Laurentiis rendered an honourable service to Hegel research in his book Hegel’s Anthropology. In chapter seven, de Laurentiis considers that there are various mental illnesses according to Hegel. But de Laurentiis’s main originality (and what I consider a magnificent instance of research for Hegel’s scholars) is the comparison she makes with the DSM-5. Specifically, she compares the species of madness according to Hegel with neurodevelopmental disorders, schizophrenia spectrum disorders and bipolarity (de Laurentiis Reference De Laurentiis2021: 169). There are also other authors who are following this same idea, trying to support a Hegelian view of the DSM (Rivera Reference Rivera2024: 99–104). This is terminologically opposite to what has been presented in this paper. They are not mental illnesses, but species of madness. This is just a suggestion to maintain rigor in Hegel’s approach to madness, but one that could spark a discussion.
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