Migration has become a cornerstone of populist strategies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), particularly following the 2015–2016 Syrian refugee crisis, which enabled right-wing populist parties to frame immigration as a threat to a country’s cultural identity, national sovereignty, and security (Waterbury Reference Waterbury2020).Footnote 1 Such rhetoric has embedded anti-immigration discourse into mainstream politics (Krzyżanowska and Krzyżanowski Reference Krzyżanowska and Krzyżanowski2018), legitimizing exclusionary policies while deflecting attention from other domestic issues including democratic backsliding and the undermining of liberal democratic norms (Grzymala-Busse Reference Grzymala-Busse2019). Governments in CEE countries, including Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, have leveraged these narratives to strengthen border controls, reject European Union (EU) relocation quotas, and criticize the EU as an external entity undermining national autonomy (Csehi and Zgut Reference Csehi and Zgut2021).
Of these three countries, Hungary is perhaps the most prominent example of anti-immigration rhetoric and policy (Szalai Reference Szalai2024), which is best illustrated by the 2016 national referendum on EU-mandated refugee-relocation quotas. Although the referendum failed to meet the minimum turnout threshold to be considered valid (Musiał-Karg Reference Musiał-Karg2019),Footnote 2 the overwhelming rejection by voters (98.4%) gave Fidesz (i.e., Federation of Young Democrats) government legitimacy, if only symbolic, to adopt a hardline stance toward immigration. Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS)Footnote 3 closely followed Fidesz’s example, integrating anti-immigration rhetoric into a broader strategy of democratic backsliding (Przybylski Reference Przybylski2018). Such alignment highlights a shared agenda of resisting EU pressures while framing its anti-immigration policies as safeguards of sovereignty and cultural protection (Holesch and Kyriazi Reference Holesch and Kyriazi2022).
Poland’s 2023 referendum on immigration, held concurrently with the parliamentary elections, illustrates how populist tactics can be used to polarize society and mobilize voters in an effort to secure reelection. Similar to Hungary’s 2016 referendum, the 2023 referendum framed immigration as an existential threat. This strategy exemplifies how populist governments use symbolic politics to influence public discourse and consolidate their power.
Poland’s 2023 referendum on immigration, held concurrently with the parliamentary elections, illustrates how populist tactics can be used to polarize society and mobilize voters in an effort to secure reelection.
This study examines how populist governments in CEE use migration as a tool to mobilize their electoral base and deepen social polarization. It draws on two key concepts: (1) the international collaboration of autocrats, which highlights their strategic alliances and shared practices (Erdmann et al. Reference Erdmann, Bank, Hoffmann and Richter2013; Holesch and Kyriazi Reference Holesch and Kyriazi2022; von Soest Reference von Soest2016); and (2) populist polarizing referendum, used as a tool for amplifying ideological divisions as well as legitimizing contentious policies under a democratic façade and consolidating power through fear-based mobilization (Musiał-Karg and Casal Bértoa Reference Musiał-Karg and Bértoa2025). By expanding on these two concepts and using a comparative qualitative case-study approach (George and Bennett Reference George and Bennett2005), the article addresses three core research questions: (1) To what extent did PiS’s 2023 referendum mirror the tactics used by Fidesz in Hungary?; (2) How was migration policy used as a strategic tool to mobilize PiS’s electoral base?; and (3) Through which mechanisms was immigration anxiety amplified and leveraged to deepen polarization and influence electoral outcomes?
At the theoretical level, we engaged with both the literature on authoritarian diffusion and what Diamond (Reference Diamond2020) called the “dictator’s playbook.” Whereas many authoritarian-leaning regimes worldwide (e.g., Turkey and Venezuela) use similar tactics—such as fear-based messaging, plebiscitary politics, and institutional capture—the Polish case is particularly notable for its deliberate and ideologically aligned emulation of Viktor Orbán’s governance model in Hungary (Kerpel-Fronius Reference Kerpel-Fronius2017; Pirro and Stanley Reference Pirro and Stanley2022; Sata and Karolewski Reference Sata and Karolewski2020). We argue that PiS did not merely draw from a generic populist repertoire; it also engaged in strategic learning from Hungary, adapting proven mechanisms—such as judicial reforms, media control, and referendum timing—to local political and electoral dynamics. This makes the Polish case unique by bridging two different logics: (1) participation in a wider transnational pattern of populist governance; and (2) targeted, cross-national borrowing within a regional alliance that has developed a distinctive illiberal playbook within the EU.
The article is organized in six sections. The first section situates Poland’s 2023 general elections (i.e., parliamentary and referendum) within broader European trends and emphasizes the intersection of migration anxiety, populist rhetoric, and electoral strategy in shaping contemporary political landscapes. Methodology, data, and case selection—justifying the comparison with Hungary—are presented in the second section. The third section examines Hungary’s influence on PiS governance, and the fourth section explores shared patterns in both countries’ anti-immigration policies. The fifth section analyzes migration narratives in Poland’s 2023 referendum, assessing their impact on voter mobilization, regional turnout, and electoral outcomes. The conclusion in the sixth section reflects on the broader implications of fear-based populism for democracy, highlighting how it challenges democratic norms and reshapes political landscapes.
MIGRATION, POPULISM, AND ELECTORAL STRATEGIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
The strategic use of migration has become a cornerstone of populist governance in CEE, particularly since the mid-2010s (Cinpoeş and Norocel Reference Cinpoeş, Norocel, Norocel, Hellström and Jørgensen2020). Right-wing populist parties consistently have framed migration not as a humanitarian or structural issue but rather as a threat to cultural identity, national sovereignty, and public security (Gidron and Hall Reference Gidron and Hall2020; Glied and Zamęcki Reference Glied and Zamęcki2021; Mach Reference Mach, Sondel-Cedermas and Berti2022). This securitization of migration has embedded exclusionary rhetoric into mainstream politics, deflected attention from democratic backsliding, and legitimized illiberal reforms across the region (Grzymala-Busse Reference Grzymala-Busse2019; Szalai Reference Szalai2024).
By expanding on Wodak’s (Reference Wodak2015, Reference Wodak2021) research on the politics of fear and the discourse–historical approach, it becomes evident that the populist construction of migration as an existential threat relies on emotional and moral narratives that define who belongs and who is excluded. Wodak’s (Reference Wodak2015, Reference Wodak2021) insights into the communicative dimensions of right-wing populism explain how governments in CEE use strategies to mobilize collective anxiety and a sense of national victimhood to consolidate support. The dynamics described by Wodak (Reference Wodak2015, Reference Wodak2021) are vividly reflected in the Hungarian experience, where fear-based narratives have been embedded systematically into state institutions and electoral strategies.
Hungary has been a leading example of this trend (Mudde Reference Mudde2015), particularly through Orbán’s 2016 referendum on EU-imposed refugee-relocation quotas (Arbatova Reference Arbatova2022). Although the referendum did not meet the turnout threshold to be formally valid, the overwhelming “no” vote allowed him to claim symbolic legitimacy and entrench his anti-migration stance as part of Hungary’s national-identity politics. Paired with state-controlled media narratives and securitized border policies (Tóth Reference Tóth2021), the referendum became a model for other governments seeking to consolidate power through fear-based mobilization (Eeden Reference Eeden2019; Gessler Reference Gessler2017).
Poland’s PiS party followed a similar path (Mikołajczyk and Jagielski Reference Mikołajczyk, Jagielski, Stoyanova and Smet2022). In power from 2015 to 2023, PiS aligned closely with Orbán’s approach, portraying the party as a defender of national culture and Christian values against both migration and the liberal European establishment (Styczyńska and Meijer Reference Styczyńska, Meijer, Dajč and Styczyńska2023). Anti-immigration discourse became a pillar of PiS’s broader populist strategy, closely tied to Euroscepticism, nationalism, and attacks on judicial independence and media pluralism (Kabata and Jacobs Reference Kabata and Jacobs2023). Yet, the similarities between Fidesz and PiS should not obscure their underlying differences: whereas Orbán’s populism is pragmatically adaptable and largely unbound by ideology, which allows for opportunistic shifts and narrative reinventions, PiS’s populism remains more ideologically rooted and (self-)constrained, requiring a degree of consistency between its moral rhetoric and political actions (Kopper, Szalai, and Góra Reference Kopper, Szalai, Góra, Giurlando and Wajner2023).
This use of migration rhetoric also reflects what Huysmans (Reference Huysmans2000) and other scholars defined as securitization; that is, a discursive process in which political actors construct an issue as an existential threat that justifies extraordinary measures. In the Polish case, PiS framed migration not as a manageable social or policy challenge but rather as a fundamental threat to national sovereignty, public safety, and cultural identity. This framing enabled the party to elevate migration into the realm of security politics, thereby legitimizing tools such as referenda, border militarization, and emotionally charged media narratives to consolidate support and marginalize dissent.
Thus, although the 2015 “refugee crisis” provided the original discursive template, the 2023 Polish campaign represents a strategic revival and adaptation of immigration anxiety (Thevenin Reference Thevenin, Dajč, Jarić and Dobrovšak2022). It illustrates how populist leaders can recycle previous narratives in new electoral settings, using institutional tools such as referenda to polarize public opinion and reinforce their claim to power (Stanley Reference Stanley and Kaltwasser2017).
In this context, we conceptualized the Polish referendum as a populist polarizing referendum—that is, a mechanism designed not to resolve policy questions but instead to deepen ideological divisions, create a sense of existential threat, and mobilize partisan loyalties (Musiał-Karg and Casal Bértoa Reference Musiał-Karg and Bértoa2025). This type of referendum blurs the boundaries between democratic participation and strategic manipulation (Bíró-Nagy Reference Bíró-Nagy2022; Eeden Reference Eeden2019), thereby legitimizing the ruling party’s agenda while marginalizing nuanced debate (Diamond Reference Diamond2020; Grzymala-Busse Reference Grzymala-Busse2019).
RESEARCH DESIGN
Subsequent sections analyze how PiS’s strategy mirrored Hungary’s earlier example, explore the shared mechanisms of anti-immigration populism in both countries, and assess why the referendum ultimately failed to secure the intended political outcome. First, however, the following subsections clarify our case selection, explain our methodology, and present our data.
Case Selection
This study focuses on the two most prominent examples of illiberal democracy in post-communist Europe: Hungary and Poland. In addition to the obvious sociohistorical similarities (e.g., political culture, communist legacy, and EU membership), they share a history of populist rule: Hungary since 2010 and Poland between 2015 and 2024. Although formally in coalition with other minor parties, their two main populist parties (i.e., Fidesz and PiS, respectively) share ideological roots, previous non-illiberal government experience, and a pattern of mutual inspiration, particularly in the use of migration and fear narratives for political gain (Kerpel-Fronius Reference Kerpel-Fronius2017). By comparing these two cases, our study explores how similar populist strategies can travel across contexts but lead to different outcomes—that is, consolidation of populist power in Hungary and governmental defeat in Poland—depending on diverse opposition strategies. We use Hungary as our reference case because it pioneered the strategic use of referenda in 2016 and 2022 to legitimize exclusionary policies. However, Poland’s 2023 referendum constitutes the critical test case by providing an opportunity to assess whether such tactics could succeed in a more competitive political environment.
Methodology
The study applies a comparative qualitative case-study approach to examine how populist governments can instrumentalize migration and referenda as tools of electoral mobilization and democratic backsliding as well as how and under which conditions populist strategies are transferred and transformed across political contexts. Thus, the analysis is based on the empirical details of the Polish case while systematically comparing it to Hungary’s earlier examples to explore the mechanisms and limits of populist diffusion in CEE. This design enabled an in-depth exploration of causal processes and contextual differences between two closely related cases (George and Bennett Reference George and Bennett2005).
The study applies a comparative qualitative case-study approach to examine how populist governments can instrumentalize migration and referenda as a tool of electoral mobilization and democratic backsliding as well as how and under what conditions populist strategies are transferred and transformed across political contexts.
In particular, this study combines two complementary methods. First, a thematic discourse analysis identified how migration and sovereignty were framed in political discourse, focusing on recurring emotional and moral tropes such as “threat,” “protection,” and “defense of the nation.” Second, process tracing aligned with George and Bennett’s (Reference George and Bennett2005) research is used to reconstruct causal sequences linking rhetorical choices, institutional strategies, and electoral consequences. This allowed us to identify the mechanisms through which populist actors borrow, adapt, and modify successful tactics developed elsewhere. Together, these approaches capture both the discursive and the procedural dimensions of populist diffusion.
Data
The analysis draws on primary and secondary materials. Primary sources include official data from the National Electoral Commission (2023), referendum questions and campaign materials, public statements by party leaders, and audiovisual propaganda disseminated during the election and referendum campaigns. Secondary sources include party manifestos, academic publications, and press coverage from major national and international media outlets. All of these materials were catalogued and organized thematically according to four key analytical categories derived from our three research questions: migration framing, fear rhetoric, referendum design and timing, and electoral outcomes.
The following section addresses the first of our three research questions by examining how PiS governance and electoral strategy reflected key elements of Orbán’s model in Hungary.
POLE AND HUNGARIAN COUSINS BE: A DECADE OF COPYCAT STRATEGIES
Among the most durable populist incumbents in the EU, the Fidesz and PiS governments have pursued strikingly similar strategies to consolidate power, undermine democratic norms, and redefine national identity in opposition to what they portray as “liberal Europe.” These parallels are not coincidental. They reflect a process of ideological alignment and mutual reinforcement in which Hungary often acted as a forerunner or reference model for PiS.
Within the region, the two parties have constantly engaged in mutual legitimation (Holesch and Kyriazi Reference Holesch and Kyriazi2022; Weyland Reference Weyland2017) through shared opposition to EU migration policy and recurring references to the defense of a Christian Europe. This dynamic reflects a strategic alliance of autocrats (Erdmann et al. Reference Erdmann, Bank, Hoffmann and Richter2013), in which like-minded regimes exchange tactics, provide normative support, and shield one another from external scrutiny.
Across several key areas—including judicial reform (Blanke and Sander Reference Blanke and Sander2023; Cheesman and Badó Reference Cheesman and Badó2023); media control (Bajomi-Lázár Reference Bajomi-Lázár2013; Vadhanavisala Reference Vadhanavisala2019); civil-society restrictions (Kákai and Bejma Reference Kákai and Bejma2022; Ploszka Reference Ploszka2020); and cultural and foreign policy (Avar Reference Avar2024; Coman and Leconte Reference Coman and Leconte2019; Jaskułowski and Majewski Reference Jaskułowski and Majewski2022; Mackoway Reference Mackoway2024)—PiS selectively adapted Hungary’s illiberal governance toolkit to strengthen executive dominance and control public communication. Taken together, these borrowings demonstrate how diffusion operated through selective adaptation rather than wholesale imitation: each party reinterpreted illiberal tactics to its own institutional and cultural context.
Poland’s adoption of Hungary’s illiberal governance model under PiS has several dimensions and reflects a systematic alignment with Orbán’s strategies that are aimed at consolidating power, eroding liberal democratic norms, and reshaping national identity. Both governments have sought to exploit nationalism, historical revisionism, and anti-EU sentiment to stifle dissent and strengthen domestic support, exemplifying a broader trend of authoritarian governance in CEE (Cichocki and Jabkowski Reference Cichocki and Jabkowski2019; Glied and Zamęcki Reference Glied and Zamęcki2021).
Although many of these similarities stem from shared ideological foundations and regional political trends, in several cases, there is clear evidence of direct emulation. The most explicit form of strategic borrowing, however, occurred in the sphere of electoral strategy and referendum politics. Thus, PiS repeatedly praised Orbán’s defiance of EU migration quotas and his successful use of referenda as tools for political mobilization. Hungary’s 2016 quota referendum provided the discursive template: emotionally charged language framing migration as a civilizational threat to sovereignty, national security, and Christian culture. PiS replicated this approach by designing its 2023 referendum questions in similarly loaded terms—linking illegal immigrants from the Middle East and Africa with the relocation mechanism imposed by the European bureaucracy. This framing transformed migration into a symbolic confrontation between national survival and external domination.
Equally important was the procedural borrowing from Hungary’s 2022 referendum on “LGBTQ+ propaganda,” which was held concurrently with parliamentary elections. Scheduling the Polish referendum alongside the general election turned the contest into a plebiscite, merging campaign and government resources while reinforcing identity-based polarization. Together, these tactics illustrate targeted learning: Hungary provided the model that PiS adapted and reproduced in 2023. This diffusion followed a three-step process of observation, adaptation, and institutional translation through which Hungarian referendum tactics were embedded in the Polish 2023 campaign. As subsequent sections demonstrate, this emulation ultimately failed to produce the same political benefits in Poland due to contextual differences and a more unified opposition. Expanding on this, the following section addresses our second research question when exploring how migration was framed as a central electoral tool in both Hungary and Poland.
POLE AND HUNGARIAN BROTHERS BE: A SHARED ANTI-IMMIGRATION PLAYBOOK
Anti-immigration policies in CEE gained prominence during the 2015–2016 Syrian refugee crisis, with Hungary and Poland at the forefront of adopting restrictive measures. Both countries leveraged immigration as a central political issue, using intimidation and threat-based narratives to mobilize their electoral bases and suppress dissent.
Under Orbán’s leadership, migration became a cornerstone of Hungary’s national-populist strategy, weaponized through populist rhetoric to consolidate power. This culminated in the 2016 referendum on EU migrant quotas, marked by an emotionally charged aggressive campaign portraying migrants as criminals and cultural threats. Government-controlled media amplified the narrative of a “migrant invasion,” using disinformation, fearmongering, and xenophobic imagery. Although turnout was not high enough to validate the referendum, it successfully galvanized Fidesz’s support cementing Orbán’s anti-immigration stance as a central pillar of his political agenda.
PiS observed this strategy closely and implemented border walls, stricter asylum rules, and anti-immigrant rhetoric to deter arrivals (Czyż Reference Czyż2022). Migrants were framed as cultural “others,” linked to Islam and security threats, which reinforced societal resistance and justified exclusionary policies (Jaskułowski Reference Jaskułowski2019).
The mechanism of transfer operated through the following three levels:
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1. Framing: Hungary’s migration-as-identity-threat discourse was copied into Polish slogans and referendum wording.
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2. Design: Poland adopted Hungary’s plebiscitary toolkit by holding the referendum alongside parliamentary elections.
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3. Media Messaging: Pro-government media in both countries amplified similar fear signals, from border chaos to the decline of Christian Europe.
Table 1 summarizes these shared mechanisms across several dimensions, highlighting the procedural and rhetorical dimension of diffusion rather than simple regional similarity.
Shared Mechanisms of Anti-Immigration Politics in Hungary and Poland
Source: Authors’ synthesis based on comparative literature (Bíró-Nagy Reference Bíró-Nagy2022; Eeden Reference Eeden2019) and official party materials (Fidesz 2016/2022 referendum coverage; PiS 2023 campaign ads).
These patterns demonstrate more than regional similarity—they reveal a process of strategic borrowing. PiS adopted Orbán’s logic of turning referenda into instruments of fear-based mobilization and adapted them to Poland’s more competitive political environment. The emphasis on sovereignty and “defense of traditional Europe” gave the Polish campaign its moral urgency, but the mechanism remained the same: transforming migration from a policy debate into a moral and security referendum on national identity. The success of this playbook in Hungary, where Fidesz converted fear narratives into long-term legitimacy, convinced PiS that the same approach could consolidate its base. The diffusion of these tactics demonstrates how illiberal regimes learn from one another through observation, adaptation, and institutional translation. More broadly, table 1 also reveals a cohesive and calculated approach by populist parties to polarize societies, undermine EU solidarity, and consolidate political power—often by aligning their nationalist and Eurosceptic agendas at the expense of democratic principles (Bergmann Reference Bergmann2020).
The following section analyzes in greater detail not only how this playbook (i.e., the combination of anti-immigration discourse and the use of referenda to mobilize its base) was deployed in the Polish 2023 campaign; it also focuses on what rhetorical and institutional mechanisms were used to amplify migration anxiety and deepen social divisions, thereby addressing our third research question.
MOBILIZING FEAR: THE 2023 REFERENDUM
Poland’s 2023 referendum highlighted a clear alignment with Hungary’s political strategy, particularly in the elevation of migration policy to a central issue. For PiS, migration was more than a policy concern: it was a powerful symbol of its alignment with Hungary’s broader illiberal agenda (Pirro and Stanley Reference Pirro and Stanley2022). Consequently, by adopting anti-immigration rhetoric and presenting the party as a defender of national sovereignty and identity (Everett Reference Everett2021), PiS aimed to position the party as a leading force in the national-populist wave reshaping the region (Jaskułowski and Majewski Reference Jaskułowski and Majewski2022). The following subsections examine each mechanism used toward that aim.
Borrowing Ideology and Tactics
Poland’s 2023 referendum embodied strategic borrowing from Hungary at two levels. Substantively, it echoed the 2016 Hungarian quota referendum, which presented migration as a civilizational threat to sovereignty, national security, and Christian culture. Procedurally, it replicated Hungary’s 2022 LGBTQ+ propaganda referendum by strategically holding the vote on the same day as parliamentary elections, thereby turning the campaign into a plebiscite and merging state resources with political communication. This convergence of ideological and procedural borrowing demonstrates how populist actors selectively combine content and format from previous cases, adapting them to local political contexts for the maximum polarizing effect.
This also reflects the operationalization of what we call a populist polarizing referendum—that is, a hybrid instrument of democratic legitimation and political manipulation. Adopting a similar approach, PiS used an anti-immigration stance to consolidate its core electoral base and attract undecided voters, framing the party as the defender of national interests. This is typical of populist polarizing referenda that are designed to consolidate power by deepening social divisions, exacerbate polarization, and hinder meaningful public deliberation. By fostering ideological conflicts and manipulating emotions through fearmongering and misinformation, this type of referendum becomes a tool for populist agendas, ultimately weakening democracy (Musiał-Karg and Casal Bértoa Reference Musiał-Karg and Bértoa2025).
In both cases, the referendum functioned as a mechanism of emotional mobilization. PiS used an anti-immigration stance to consolidate its core electorate and attract undecided voters, framing participation as a patriotic act of defense against external imposition. Such referenda deepen polarization by transforming moral and security narratives into electoral tools, turning fear into political capital.
Fear Amplification
Whereas the Fidesz party framed migration as a cultural and security crisis, the PiS party adapted this narrative by emphasizing economic fears, national identity, and demographic shifts. Amplified by state-controlled media, PiS also used anti-EU rhetoric, portraying Brussels as imposing harmful policies. This narrative shift reflects what securitization theory describes as the transformation of an issue into security threats that justify exceptional political responses (Huysmans Reference Huysmans2000). By portraying migration as a destabilizing force and external imposition, PiS legitimized heightened emotional rhetoric and extraordinary policy measures, casting electoral participation as a patriotic act of national defense.
Whereas Orbán secured a decisive victory in 2022, PiS failed to convert fear into electoral gain and, as explained by Musiał-Karg and Casal Bértoa (Reference Musiał-Karg and Bértoa2024), was outmaneuvered by the opposition, ultimately losing power.
Despite the structural similarities between the two cases, key contextual differences shaped divergent outcomes. In Poland, the 2023 referendum was perceived widely as an overtly partisan campaign instrument rather than a genuine consultative exercise—a perception that was reinforced by its timing, leading language, and direct connection to PiS’s electoral interests. In Hungary’s 2016 referendum, a fragmented opposition allowed Fidesz’s plebiscite to stand symbolically. In Poland, opposition boycott and ballot-secrecy fears curtailed turnout and legitimacy, exposing the limits of Hungary’s playbook in a more polarized and electorally competitive setting.
These contrasts illustrate how the same populist repertoire can yield divergent outcomes. Poland’s experience reveals both the adaptability and the limitations of fear-based populism: that is, effective in shaping political discourse yet insufficient for securing power in a more pluralistic environment.
Wording
Based on official referendum documents and campaign discourses, this analysis examined the referendum questions, illustrating how they were constructed and framed by the ruling party. Of four 2023 referendum questions, the following two directly addressed migration issues:
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Q3: “Do you support the removal of the barrier on the border between the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Belarus?”
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Q4: “Do you support the admission of thousands of illegal immigrants from the Middle East and Africa, in accordance with the relocation mechanism imposed by the European bureaucracy?”Footnote 4
The wording of Q4 framed the issue in stark, emotive terms, combining anti-immigration, anti-Muslim, and anti-EU sentiment into a single message. Loaded expressions such as “illegal immigrants” and “European bureaucracy” evoked threat and resentment, steering voters toward a predetermined “no.” Migration was portrayed as a danger to Poland’s sovereignty, security, and cultural identity, thereby reinforcing stereotypes of disorder and depicting the EU as an overreaching, coercive force. In turn, Q3, about removing the Belarus border barrier, amplified security fears by implying threats such as illegal border crossings and hybrid warfare.
Together, both questions portrayed a simplified form of securitization because they not only reduced complex policy issues to emotional choices but also suppressed the space for a more nuanced debate. By framing EU migration rules as externally imposed relocation mechanisms, PiS heightened Euroscepticism and rejected the idea of cooperative policy making.
The referendum questions were part of a deliberate strategy by the populist government to exploit sensitive and polarizing topics including national identity, welfare, and security. The aim was to position PiS as the defender of Polish values and sovereignty against EU pressures and perceived threats from Russia and Islam while also undermining the opposition—particularly its leader, Donald Tusk.
Facebook videos promoting the referendum heavily relied on fear-driven narratives, accusing the opposition of jeopardizing Polish sovereignty by allowing illegal immigrants into the country and depicting them as source of violence and chaos. A widely circulated PiS video from August 2023 warned that opposition leader Donald Tusk would “let in thousands of illegal immigrants,” claiming that only PiS could protect Polish families. As shown in the YouTube clip,Footnote 5 the video featured violent protest imagery, closely echoing the fear-driven tone used by Fidesz during Hungary’s 2016 referendum campaign (Barát Reference Barát2017; Gessler Reference Gessler2017; Tóth Reference Tóth2021). Furthermore, PiS leaders also urged support of their national-security stance, warning that Poland could be Putin’s next target. In a video presenting the fourth referendum question,Footnote 6 Minister of Internal Affairs Mariusz Błaszczak suggested that under Tusk, there will be no borders, no control—only chaos and threats from foreign cultures—thereby linking migration to cultural and religious fears. This rhetoric was amplified by public media, which portrayed the opposition as aligned with EU-imposed quotas and hostile to Poland’s security (Hargrave and Jarosz Reference Hargrave and Jarosz2023; Potulski and Modrzejewski Reference Potulski and Modrzejewski2024).
Timing
Such manipulative framing was reinforced further by the timing of the referendum. By holding it alongside parliamentary elections, PiS ensured that migration and security dominated the national agenda. This blurred the line between policy making and electoral strategy, effectively transforming the referendum into a populists’ campaign tool. Although the referendum failed to meet the statutory turnout threshold, it effectively mobilized fear among PiS supporters. Participation was confined largely to its voters because the opposition electorate boycotted the referendum due to its partisan nature. Although the strategy successfully mobilized the PiS electorate at the general elections, the opposition’s unified stance against the perceived erosion of democratic standards proved effective: it secured a parliamentary majority and succeeded in forming a new government.
Secrecy of Ballots
Another key factor contributing to the low turnout in the referendum vote was widespread concern about the lack of ballot secrecy. Casting a referendum vote at the polling station was perceived widely as a signal of support for PiS because the party was the main architect and promoter of the referendum. This perception created social and political pressure, deterring many opponents and undecided voters from participating—even if they voted in the parliamentary election. For some voters, refusing to participate in the referendum was a deliberate act of dissent, aligned with the opposition’s boycott strategy.
Electoral Results
The outcome of the general elections revealed significant regional differences in electoral support for PiS and the referendum turnout, shaped by proximity to national borders. As shown in table 2, the eastern and southeastern border regions located near the Belarusian and Ukrainian borders—including Podkarpackie, Lubelskie, Podlaskie, Małopolskie, and Świętokrzyskie—exhibited strong referendum turnout and high susceptibility to PiS’s messaging, with support ranging from 46.2% to 52.8%. These results clearly emphasized the role of geopolitical tensions and migration-related fears in shaping electoral behavior.
Migration Questions Results, Referendum Turnout, and Support for PiS in Poland’s 2023 Parliamentary Elections by Region
Notes: Border regions are in bold and light gray. Western and Northern provinces are in italics and dark gray.
Source: National Electoral Commission (2023).
The data in table 2 highlight how migration anxieties were distributed unevenly across Poland. In the border provinces (indicated in bold and light gray), PiS fear-based messaging had greater traction. This likely was due to the physical proximity to recent crises (e.g., migrant pushbacks at the Belarusian border in 2021–2022) and a heightened sense of insecurity sparked by the war in Ukraine. In contrast, the more urbanized, EU-oriented, and opposition-leaning western and northern provinces (indicated in italics and dark gray) recorded significantly lower participation rates. This suggests that the opposition’s boycott strategy was more effective in regions where migration was perceived as a less immediate threat.
The referendum results also underscore a strong alignment between PiS support and rejection of migration-related propositions. In PiS strongholds near the Belarusian and Ukrainian borders (e.g., Podkarpackie and Lubelskie), the lowest percentage of “yes” votes was recorded, reflecting a broad endorsement of PiS’s anti-migration stance and framing of migration as a national-security threat.
The proximity to the border intensified these fears. In 2021, Belarus—with support from Russia—facilitated the movement of Middle East migrants toward the Polish border as part of a hybrid destabilization campaign. The historical legacy of Russian influence in Poland and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, which brought a large wave of refugees into the country, reinforced the public concern over border security, particularly in the eastern regions.
These dual crises not only heightened fears of instability and external intervention but also amplified the resonance of PiS’s nationalist and traditionalist messaging, which emphasized religious values, national sovereignty, and cultural identity in the affected provinces. This was reflected in the high referendum turnout in PiS strongholds, where migration was framed as an immediate threat. In contrast, turnout was significantly lower in western and northern provinces, where urbanization, stronger EU integration, and the opposition’s boycott call weakened the referendum impact. This further demonstrates the success of counterstrategies in regions affected by the fear of migration and external intervention.
Overall, the results of the referendum demonstrate how PiS successfully mobilized its base by framing migration as an immediate and symbolic threat. The party strategically linked local concerns about border instability with wider geopolitical anxieties, portraying migration as a threat not only from the Middle East but also as part of a larger external threat linked to Russia’s aggression and Belarus’s destabilization efforts. Although this approach effectively energized PiS’s core supporters, it ultimately failed to secure victory in the parliamentary elections, which highlights the limitations of divisive tactics in an increasingly polarized political landscape.
CONCLUSIONS
By using a comparative qualitative case-study approach, this article examines how Poland’s 2023 migration referendum served as a strategic instrument of populist mobilization. It addresses three interrelated research questions concerning the diffusion of populist referendum tactics, electoral strategy, and amplification of migration-related anxiety. Our analysis clearly demonstrates that Poland’s ruling populist party and its allies mirrored tactics that were pioneered by Orbán in Hungary, transforming migration from a policy issue into an existential threat to sovereignty, security, and cultural identity. Thus, the Polish case exemplifies a broader process of cross-national populist diffusion within CEE.
This study presents three key findings. First, PiS framed migration as an existential threat through emotionally charged rhetoric and highly biased referendum wording—linking illegal immigrants from the Middle East and Africa and relocation mechanisms imposed by the European bureaucracy with terrorism, cultural decline, moral decay, and national insecurity. Second, this anti-immigration framing polarized the electorate and positioned PiS as the sole guardian of Polish sovereignty. Campaign videos and speeches, including Deputy Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki’s warning that “under Tusk, there will be no borders, no control, only chaos and threats from foreign cultures,”Footnote 7 illustrate how PiS weaponized fear to mobilize its base. Third, the design and timing of the referendum held concurrently with the parliamentary elections replicated Hungary’s 2022 model to create a plebiscitary atmosphere. However, although this approach proved effective in PiS strongholds (e.g., Podkarpackie and Lubelskie), it ultimately failed to secure national victory, revealing the limits of fear-based strategies in a more competitive and polarized environment.
Despite PiS’s electoral defeat, the strategies deployed during the 2023 campaign reveal the resilience and adaptability of populist governance in shaping political discourse. The referendum deepened polarization, legitimized securitized language, and pushed migration debates further toward exclusionary narratives. The Polish case demonstrates both the power and limits of fear-based mobilization. Although such tactics energized the ruling party’s base, a unified opposition and voter backlash ultimately counterbalanced their effects, highlighting the potential for democratic resilience in the face of polarizing populist narratives.
This study shows that PiS’s 2023 referendum strategy was not an isolated national development but rather part of a broader pattern of strategic borrowing from other populist regimes—most notably Hungary under Orbán. The Polish case illustrates how referenda can be instrumentalized for fear-based mobilization by linking migration to terrorism, cultural decline, and threats to sovereignty. By embedding these narratives in an emotionally charged electoral context, PiS aimed to polarize society and energize its core electorate. Although this approach successfully mobilized PiS’s core electorate in border regions—where referendum turnout and PiS support were strongest—it ultimately failed to deliver national victory, highlighting the limits of fear-driven polarization as a universal strategy.
This study advances the concept of the populist polarizing referendum as a tool that combines emotional mobilization, procedural manipulation, and plebiscitary legitimacy. By situating Poland’s experience within a broader pattern of authoritarian learning in the EU, particularly in reference to Hungary, the study highlights how fear-based referenda serve not only short-term electoral goals but also long-term challenges to democratic resilience.
This article advances the concept of the populist polarizing referendum as a tool that combines emotional mobilization, procedural manipulation, and plebiscitary legitimacy.
Overall, Poland’s 2023 referendum and its parallels with Hungary’s experience provide valuable insights into the mechanisms and consequences of populist electoral strategies, highlighting both the power and the limits of fear-based populism. That is, it is effective in reshaping discourse and reinforcing identity politics on one hand but insufficient for sustaining power in pluralistic democracies on the other. Ultimately, these findings call for continuous vigilance against the exploitation of social fears by populist parties while highlighting the critical role that opposition plays in defending democratic integrity.
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The authors declare that there are no ethical issues or conflicts of interest in this research.
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