On the basis of new historical research on the Soviet command system we analyze the choices of a plan-setter and an effort-setter who interacted with each other and an external market to determine real output, hidden inflation, and the quality of corruption. We show that the performance of the Soviet economy was affected not only by the level of corruption but also by its quality, that is, how corrupt incomes were used. Our results explain rapid Soviet economic growth despite high corruption levels, and why slower economic growth in the 1970s was accompanied by increased privatization of rents.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, U.S. tobacco manufacturers were not forging ahead of their leading European counterparts in technology, productivity, or managerial techniques. On some indicators, including per capita cigarette consumption, the United States strikingly lagged. Fiscal discrimination against cigarettes, amplified by the monopoly pricing, strategic choices, and organizational overload of the American Tobacco trust, were among the retarding factors.

“Of all things American, nothing is more so than the cigarette.”Written by an enthusiastic booster of the addiction (with the assistance of the American Tobacco Company) in 1916. See Young, Story, p. 4.

Some English country banks were more like modern venture capital firms than modern banks in terms of legal and managerial structure, size and source of investment funding, size and nature of investments, and riskiness. This is exemplified by Praed & Co. of Truro, which was heavily engaged in financing the adoption of a risky new technology—Watt steam engines—by Cornish copper mines in the period 1775–1800. If some banks were proto–venture capital firms, rather than proto-banks, then their illiquid and relatively undiversified investment strategies are more reasonable and their bankruptcies more understandable: high-risk investments sometimes earn negative returns.

The NBER's pre–World War I dating of business cycles implies that the U.S. economy spent nearly every other year in recession. This article extends earlier efforts at redating for the 1796–1914 period using a single metric: Davis's (2004) annual industrial production index. The new chronology alters more than 40 percent of the peak and troughs and removes the most questionable cycles. An important implication of this is the lack of discernible differences in the frequency and duration of industrial cycles among the pre–Civil War, Civil War to World War I, and post–World War II periods.

We estimate a threshold autoregressive model to assess medieval financial integration. Our approach is based on the analysis of deviations between exchange rates and parity, which in a fully integrated market should not exceed bullion points. Hence, the time needed for adjustment, following a violation of the bullion points, is a measure of integration. We apply this approach to exchange between fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Flanders, Lübeck, and Prussia, results showing that whereas it took about eight months to reduce deviations between Flanders and Lübeck by 50 percent, those between Flanders and Prussia were roughly twice as persistent.

Could the Federal Reserve have reversed the decline in the money supply during the Great Depression without causing a loss of confidence in the U.S. commitment to the gold standard? This article uses the $1 billion expansionary open market operation in 1932 as a crucial case study. Using forward exchange rates and interest rate differentials to measure devaluation expectations, we find virtually no evidence that the large monetary expansion led investors to believe that the United States would devalue. The financial press and Federal Reserve records also show scant evidence of expectations of devaluation or fear of speculative attack.

This article uses money order data to examine the determinants of British migrant remittances prior to 1914. Using panel data and cointegration analysis, it provides evidence of four distinct types of remittance behavior, lending support to Lucas and Stark's theory that remittances are driven by an implicit contract between remitter and remittee. The relative strengths of these different forms of remittance varied across the English-speaking world, with the largest differences occurring between migrants residing in America and those in the self-governing dominions. The explanation for these differences is seen to lie in the distinctive nature of British emigration to America.

Manufacturing contributed almost all—83 percent—of the growth of total factor productivity in the U.S. private nonfarm economy between 1919 and 1929. During the depression manufacturing TFP growth was not as uniformly distributed, and only half as rapid, accounting for only 48 percent of PNE TFP growth. Yet the overall growth of the residual between 1929 and 1941 was the highest of any comparable period in the twentieth century. This resulted from the combination of a still potent manufacturing contribution with advances in transportation, public utilities, and distribution, fueled in part by investments in public infrastructure.