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Do financial incentives motivate conservation on private land?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 December 2018

Maï Yasué*
Affiliation:
Quest University Canada, Social Science, Squamish 604 898 8034, Canada.
James B. Kirkpatrick
Affiliation:
University of Tasmania, Geography and Spatial Sciences, Hobart, Tasmania, Australia
*
(Corresponding author) E-mail maiyasue@gmail.com

Abstract

Financial incentives may aid in conservation if they broaden the numbers and types of landowners who engage in protection and conservation management on private land. We examined the hypotheses that financial incentives (1) encourage participation of people with lower autonomous motivation towards conservation and lower self-transcendence (i.e. benevolence and universalism) values compared to participants in similar programmes without such incentives; (2) enable more on-ground works and activities; and (3) enhance feelings of competence and autonomy with respect to conservation actions. We surveyed 193 landowners in private land conservation programmes in Tasmania, only some of whom had received financial incentives. All of these landowners had high self-transcendence values, and autonomous motivation towards the environment. Owners of large properties and participants with higher self-enhancement values, lower self-transcendence values and lower autonomous motivation towards the environment were slightly more likely to engage in incentive programmes. However, people who received funding did not report more conservation actions than people in programmes without incentives. Owners of larger properties receiving incentives reported fewer conservation actions. Thus financial incentives probably recruited a few into nature conservation who may not have otherwise engaged, but did not result in a more intensive level of conservation management. Our results caution against the blanket-use of incentives amongst landowners who may already have values and motivations consistent with environmental action, and point to the need for further research on the socio-psychological characteristics of landowners, to examine the contextual factors that influence the effects of conservation payments.

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Article
Copyright
Copyright © Fauna & Flora International 2018
Figure 0

Table 1 Items used to measure values. The instructions indicated ‘Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description and think about how much each person is or is not like you.’ People responded either 1, ‘Not like me at all’; 2, ‘Not like me’; 3, ‘A little like me’; 4, ‘Somewhat like me’; 5, ‘Like me’, or 6, ‘Very much like me’, to each of the items.

Figure 1

Table 2 Comparison of demographic and property characteristics, programme experiences, values, motivations and behaviours between participants of incentive and non-incentive private land conservation programmes (values are % or mean ± SE; test statistic is Kruskal–Wallis for continuous data and χ2 for categorical data).

Figure 2

Fig. 1 The proportion (with binomial errors) of landowners who participated in a programme with financial incentives, by (a) education (secondary education includes landowners who also attended technical college programmes) and (b) property characteristics (median values were used to dichotomize property size). Numbers above bars indicate sample size.

Figure 3

Fig. 2 The proportion (with binomial errors) of landowners who received financial incentives, by self-enhancement values and (a) self-transcendence values, (b) non-autonomous motivation, (c) autonomous motivation among people with lower self-transcendence values, and (d) autonomous motivation among people with higher self-transcendence values. Median values were used to dichotomize continuous variables. Numbers above bars indicate sample size.

Figure 4

Table 3 Regression coefficients (± SE) for each of the independent variables in a hierarchical logistic regression predicting participation in programmes with financial incentives for 162 landowners. The three progressively complex models are listed from left to right and accounted for an increasing proportion of the variability, based on the Nagelkerke R2 (Model 1 = 0.28, Model 2 = 0.33, Model 3 = 0.47). The reference category for gender is male (i.e. men are more likely to participate in incentivized programmes) and the reference category for education is people who do not have a graduate degree (i.e. people with graduate degrees are more likely to enrol in incentivized programmes than people without graduate degrees).

Figure 5

Fig. 3 The number of conservation actions (with standard errors) implemented by landowners, by (a) their openness to change and self-transcendence, and by (b) autonomous motivation and (c) the presence or absence of incentive and property size. All significant interaction terms from the model are shown. Numbers above bars indicate sample size.

Figure 6

Table 4 Regression coefficients (± SE) for hierarchical linear regressions predicting the number of conservation actions by 162 landowners. The four progressively complex models are listed from left to right and accounted for an increasing proportion of the variability (Model 1 = 0.07, Model 2 = 0.11, Model 3 = 0.17, Model 4 = 0.21).

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