Introduction
Repugnance, a concept introduced in economics by Alvin Roth in 2007, refers to those behaviours or transactions that individuals find morally inacceptable. People object or resist them, refuse to engage in the transactions or call for restrictions or prohibitions, not for efficiency or informational reasons, but because they judge them to be morally unacceptable as these behaviours or transactions violate deeply held moral beliefs or intuitions. Repugnance is thus an obstacle, a constraint on certain transactions. This was exactly the perspective from which Roth approached it, as a market designer who cannot ignore that individuals do not want to trade certain goods, even when trade might otherwise appear mutually beneficial, when trying to create a market.Footnote 1
What cannot be ignored either is that individuals do not merely avoid repugnant transactions altogether. They often find ways to engage in such morally contested exchanges despite their repugnance, or redraw the boundary between what is perceived as unacceptable and what is not. The insight goes back at least to Fiske and Tetlock’s work on taboo trade-offs, which documents how individuals navigate and sometimes cross the boundaries between what is repugnant and what is acceptable by relying on contextual justifications, relational framing, or indirect forms of exchange (Fiske and Tetlock, Reference Fiske and Tetlock1997, for instance; see also Dungan et al., Reference Dungan, Waytz and Young2014; Healy and Krawiec, Reference Healy and Krawiec2017; McGraw and Tetlock, Reference McGraw and Tetlock2005; Tetlock et al., Reference Tetlock, Mellers and Scoblic2017; see also Zelizer, Reference Zelizer2005). Repugnance, therefore, does not simply block transactions; it is also used, managed, and negotiated. In other words, this literature mostly studies how actors manage the constraint that repugnance represents.
There is also a literature on the strategies that individuals may develop to influence the boundaries of acceptable behaviour and promote their private interests. In this set of works, actors do not simply adapt to existing moral constraints. They develop entrepreneurial strategies to exploit repugnance as a resource, an asset, that, despite its negativity can serve as a source of profit, or, in some cases, even contribute to institutional change. Incumbent firms can mobilize repugnance to protect their position or shape market conditions in their favour. Life insurance companies, for instance, have incentives to amplify moral opposition to secondary markets in life insurance policies, framing them in terms of ‘profiting from death’ or ‘exploitation of the sick’ in order to block market entry and preserve their existing business model (Roth, Reference Roth2007). Professional associations in fertility markets likewise invoke ethical guidelines and moral rhetoric about altruism, dignity, and the protection of women to justify compensation caps for egg donors, even when these caps function as de facto price regulation in a monopsonistic labour market (Krawiec, Reference Krawiec2016, Reference Krawiec, Panitch and Bertrand2023). Similarly, Posner (Reference Posner1992) anticipated this type of argument, arguing that moral rhetoric frequently masks interest-group protectionism and should be treated as strategic.
These contributions, therefore, suggest that repugnance is not just a background constraint on exchange, but an object of strategic action through which actors influence the boundaries of acceptable market behaviour. More recent work extends this insight by examining how firms operating in intensely stigmatized industries, such as extreme wrestling, deliberately position themselves in a ‘repugnant zone’ between public morality and legal limits, preserving the transgressive image on which their activity is built as a product differentiation strategy (Dekker and Gradoz, Reference Dekker and Gradoz2023; Dekker and Quintas, Reference Dekker and Quintas2024). It is even possible for some entrepreneurs – ‘evasive entrepreneurship’ – to challenge prevailing norms in markets such as e-cigarettes, online gambling, or grey-market cannabis marketplace, thereby shifting the boundaries of what is socially perceived as repugnant over time to create spaces for innovation and profits (see, e.g., Allen et al., Reference Allen, Berg and Davidson2023). From this perspective, repugnance can be mobilized in systematically different ways, depending on how actors seek to protect markets, differentiate activities, or reshape normative boundaries.Footnote 2
In this paper, we build on this literature by proposing a framework to analyse when and how such strategic uses of repugnance succeed and under what conditions it is likely to fail. We identify and analyse four mechanisms through which repugnance can be instrumentalized. First, repugnance can function as an entry barrier: incumbents raise the narrative costs of defending morally contested transactions, creating cost asymmetries that protect market share and discourage entry. Second, repugnance can serve as a source of niche differentiation: entrepreneurs position transgression itself as a marker of identity and subcultural value, converting a potential liability into a market asset. Third, repugnance can be weaponized through polarization: political and business coalitions amplify competing moral narratives to reshape normative acceptability, shift regulatory boundaries, and benefit allied groups. Fourth, repugnance can be harnessed to boost attention and visibility by leveraging outrageous or off-putting content to stand out over reasonable alternatives, notably in competitive algorithmic arenas like social media or politics, where platforms reward engagement despite lower quality. These mechanisms suggest that repugnance can be a variable that actors can use through narratives to structure markets and institutions.
The feasibility and durability of these manipulative strategies vary with the characteristics of the transactions. In particular, they depend on whether transactions involve particular (identity-dependent) or impersonal (anonymous) relationships and on the strength of social consensus regarding their acceptability. We provide a 2 × 2 heuristic to clarify how narrative costs differ across contexts, depending on the combination of relational proximity and the strength of social consensus surrounding a transaction. In other words, the purpose of this paper is to identify a distinct mechanism – the strategic use of moral narratives that reshape the perceived acceptability of market transactions – that could complement the already existing explanations based on transaction costs, externalities, or social norms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the Devising narratives to manage the unacceptability of repugnant transactions section, we delineate and characterize transactions, especially in relation with the taste dimension. We emphasize how some individuals – e.g., entrepreneurs – manage the unacceptability of repugnant transactions, notably thanks to narratives. We position transactions within a two-dimensional framework – contrasting particular and universal relationships, and distinguishing whether the acceptability of a transaction constitutes a matter of judgment – which enables the prediction of the costs associated with developing appropriate narratives. The section Using strategically repugnant-related transactions examines four mechanisms by which entrepreneurial individuals detect a repugnance-related opportunity and devise strategies that allow them to exploit the distaste/repugnance dimensionFootnote 3 of some transactions in an innovative business that serves their own goals. Throughout the paper, the used concepts and strategies are illustrated by real-world examples and anecdotal evidence.Footnote 4 Given that strategic repugnance ranges from small niche markets to economically consequential domains such as fertility services, pharmaceuticals, and tax-related intermediation, even seemingly minor examples help clarify mechanisms that scale to settings where legitimacy work and moralized contestation materially shape market structure. The General discussion and conclusion section provides a general discussion and concludes, notably by admitting limitations and suggesting tentative ways to operationalize the core concepts in order to conduct relevant empirical studies.
Devising narratives to manage the unacceptability of repugnant transactions
Strategic repugnance refers to the deliberate use of moral or emotional aversion associated with certain transactions to advance one’s own interests. This does not entail transforming the norm that defines acceptability, nor does it imply that individual actors could, strategically, generate new social or moral norms. Strategic repugnance means modifying how a transaction or behaviour is perceived, amplifying, or reframing already present moral intuitions so that the same practice can be perceived as legitimate, defensible, or even desirable for specific audiences. The central variable in our analysis is not the harm itself but the justifiability or justification of the action that creates it. In other words, strategic repugnance operates through legitimation. It targets the moral status of a transaction and the propriety of engaging in it, and therefore does not simply change the informational attributes of goods or the signalling value of consumption. This is why it goes beyond standard branding or signalling. Branding typically differentiates products or identities under conditions of uncertainty; strategic repugnance, by contrast, addresses moral acceptability or contestation – the fact that a transaction may be rejected even when its quality is known, precisely because it is judged inappropriate, degrading, or norm-violating.Footnote 5
To achieve this strategic goal, individuals rely on a mechanism that is common to taboo trade-offs, which allows them to manage these awkward exchanges (Healy and Krawiec, Reference Healy and Krawiec2017) and, more precisely, ‘to manage the perception of ‘ethically disputed transactions’ (Elías et al., Reference Elías, Lacetera, Macis and Salardi2017: 80; italics added): they invent stories, they devise narratives. Narratives, therefore, make it possible to rationalize a contested practice, to fit it into a socially intelligible category, and to connect it to legitimate motives. Actually, it has been shown that various kinds of narratives – such as stories, historical accounts, and founding myths – help place economic activities within accepted social and cultural frameworks (Wadhwani, Reference Wadhwani2017; Wadhwani et al., Reference Wadhwani, Suddaby, Mordhorst and Popp2018; Wry et al., Reference Wry, Cobb and Aldrich2013). In that sense, narratives are central to justifying some transactions and legitimizing the markets on which they take place. A market thus becomes legitimate when its transactions are perceived as appropriate, valid, and aligned with widely accepted social values. Narratives are thus particularly important for morally contested markets, which often rely on discursive devices that reduce moral discomfort, redistribute responsibility, or reframe intentions – what Bénabou et al. (Reference Bénabou, Falk and Tirole2018) call absolving narratives or sexcuses.
This appears clearly in a certain number of contested transactions. Surrogate mothers, for instance, are often not said to be ‘paid’ when they receive money, but rather ‘compensated’ (Healy and Krawiec, Reference Healy and Krawiec2017; see Farrow et al., Reference Farrow, Grolleau and Mzoughi2018 on the strategic role of words). Kuchař (Reference Kuchař2016) explains how surrogacy can be transformed from a technical possibility into an acceptable practice by entrepreneurs, who challenged existing legal and institutional frameworks of procreation by reshaping interpretations and moral judgments. Similarly, ‘gambling may be reframed as ‘gaming’, and gamblers as ‘enthusiasts’, in an attempt to destigmatize a morally ambivalent activity (Isani, Reference Isani2007). In the case of firms that engage in strategic communication, this narrative dimension becomes explicit: marketing and public discourse can be used to reshape perceptions of contested practices (McGraw and Tetlock, Reference McGraw and Tetlock2005). Diploma mills, for example, may justify selling degrees by framing them as ‘validation of prior experience’ (Grolleau et al., Reference Grolleau, Lakhal and Mzoughi2008). Finally, in intimate settings too, narratives are important: people indeed ‘erect complicated stories and practices for different situations that mingle economic transactions and intimacy’ (Zelizer, Reference Zelizer2005: 12).
These cases confirm that narratives do not change the transaction itself but how it is perceived –altering the context to make the transaction acceptable or the reverse. They consist in renaming a payment, redefining the motives for an exchange, shifting attention away from commercial gain to care, education, recognition, or intimacy, and recasting a contested practice as socially acceptable. From this perspective, narratives may serve self-justification (‘why what I am doing is not morally wrong’), justification to others (‘why you should accept, tolerate, or endorse what I am doing’), or condemnation (‘why what others do should be rejected’).
These functions are not costless. Each stage of the construction of a narrative requires resources and exposes actors to reputational, institutional, and sometimes legal risks. We refer to these combined efforts as narrative costs: the resources – economic (money, time), reputational (credibility, social standing), and cognitive (persuasive effort) – required for an actor to successfully justify, normalize, or condemn a transaction to a target audience. In other words, these costs correspond to the investments in justification, reputation management, coalition-building, legal framing, communication, and moral legitimation that individuals or organizations have to face. We contend that organizations with institutional authority – such as professional associations, regulatory agencies, or established firms – often possess greater credibility and communication resources, allowing them to promote or challenge moral narratives at lower cost. By contrast, isolated individuals or new entrants typically face higher justificatory burdens when attempting to defend morally contested practices. Strategic repugnance, therefore, depends partly on the distribution of narrative authority across actors.
Moreover, the difficulty of justifying a morally contested transaction depends on how repugnance itself is defined and situated. A conceptual clarification is therefore needed. Repugnance is sometimes interpreted as a form of ‘moral externality’ (Krawiec, Reference Krawiec, Panitch and Bertrand2023; see also Bertrand, Reference Bertrand2023). From this perspective, the offense or moral discomfort experienced by the individuals involved in a transaction or by third parties is the problem that explains opposition and can justify regulation. This interpretation captures an important part of the phenomenon. Indeed, approaching the acceptability of certain behaviours or transactions in terms of externalities clarifies how harms are generated, allocated, and internalized (who bears what cost under which legal rule, so to speak). It can account for the resistance to the commodification of certain values – such as intimacy, dignity, or human life – in terms of costs and welfare losses. But the explanation it provides remains incomplete. Repugnance cannot be reduced to an externality, be it moral. Repugnance-as-externality treats the boundaries that generate such resistance as given. It, therefore, does not explain why such boundaries are enforced beyond efficiency (Daou and Marciano, Reference Daou and Marciano2023; Krawiec, Reference Krawiec, Panitch and Bertrand2023). Or why similar transactions can be perceived very differently across time and space, even when external effects appear comparable. An approach based on repugnance precisely deals with this aspect of acceptability, explaining how the boundaries of acceptable exchange are constructed, contested, and strategically mobilized, how certain transactions become defensible or indefensible in the first place.Footnote 6
This is precisely where narratives come in: actors strategically devise and use them to define and redefine the boundaries of acceptability. Repugnance is thus, from this perspective and at least partly, endogenously determined through the strategic use of such narratives, rather than being purely exogenous (see also Bowles, Reference Bowles1998; Fehr and Hoff, Reference Fehr and Hoff2011 about the importance of examining endogenous preferences). When incumbents perceive threats to their market position, they can amplify repugnance to raise entrants’ costs. This does not mean that repugnance is ‘fake’ or merely instrumental; rather, such narratives shape moral intuitions that, in turn, constrain market outcomes. Our paper adds explanatory value by identifying cases where asymmetric information alone cannot account for restrictions – for example, organ sales are globally prohibited despite low information costs, whereas kidney exchanges are permitted despite comparable characteristics. This variation suggests that repugnance narratives, rather than information asymmetries, drive the observed legal differences.
In this paper, we, therefore, adopt a contextual definition of repugnance: a behaviour or transaction is repugnant when it is perceived as inappropriate for the context in which it takes place. Context is understood here in terms of relational models that individuals use to make sense of interactions: for instance, communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, and market pricing (Fiske, Reference Fiske1991, Reference Fiske1992, Reference Fiske2000, Reference Fiske2002, Reference Fiske and Haslam2004), or charity, contract, solidarity, and status (Khalil and Marciano, Reference Khalil and Marciano2018). These models generate expectations about motives, permissible actions, and legitimate forms of exchange. Repugnance arises when a behaviour imports criteria from one relational model into another where they do not belong.Footnote 7
This perspective explains why money is acceptable in some contexts and repugnant in others. Customers are expected to pay for goods in market transactions, but using money as in market exchanges within family life – between spouses, parents and children, or close friends – often violates norms attached to intimacy, solidarity, or communal sharing. Similarly, acting as if one were in a charity context (benevolence) while the interaction is structured by a contract context (self-interest) can be difficult to accept, just as self-interested behaviour in contexts governed by friendship or family ties can trigger moral discomfort. Boundaries may be blurred, for instance in inheritance disputes where family dynamics and strategic behaviour collide, or in arrangements where relational and market logics coexist. In all these cases, repugnance reflects a perceived mismatch between what the context demands and what the behaviour expresses.
Context, however, can be defined at different levels, and this matters for the narrative costs individuals have to pay. First, context may be defined socially, at the macro level, through the shared values, norms, and rules around which a society is structured. In this case, the relevant moral boundaries impose themselves on individuals. These norms can be said to be ‘universal’, in the sense that they are widely shared and remain valid independently of the specific transaction and the identity of the parties involved. Here, thus, repugnance is not only a matter of personal opinion, of personal preference. It refers to the violation of deeply held social rules. For example, buying and selling human beings is today widely regarded as unacceptable in most societies, independently of what any particular actor might believe.Footnote 8
Second, context may be defined locally, at the micro level, through the specific relationship and the expectations that govern it. Acceptability then depends more directly on the judgment of the parties involved and on the norms of a particular interaction.Footnote 9 This is the case, for instance, when dinner guests offer to pay for their invitation (Roth, Reference Roth2007: 44), or when someone deliberately leaves a price tag on a gift offered to a friend. These acts may be experienced as repugnant because they violate the norms of friendship or intimacy, not because they violate a universally shared social prohibition. Repugnance, in such cases, is linked to the local context of a relationship.
To better understand variations in the levels of narrative costs and the associated strategies, we propose to summarize the factors likely to influence these costs by focusing on two major features of the acceptability or unacceptability of transactions. The previous distinction yields a first dimension that matters for narrative costs: whether acceptability is constrained by widely shared social prohibitions (consensus-based repugnance) or whether it is shaped by individual or subcultural evaluation (judgment-based repugnance). Intuitively, a transaction is consensus-based when strong agreement exists across various demographic groups, geography, and time that it is unacceptable (low variance of moral opposition). By contrast, judgment-based repugnance corresponds to the absence of stable consensus: acceptability varies substantially across groups and contexts, and disagreement may be persistent and organized.
The second dimension is the difference between particular and universal relationships – ‘people draw a normative line in the sand between particularistic and universalistic relationships’ (McGraw and Tetlock, Reference McGraw and Tetlock2005: 12). This means that they care about whether or not they know the identity of the individuals who are involved in the transaction. What McGraw and Tetlock (Reference McGraw and Tetlock2005) show is that individuals who were given a good by people they know are reluctant to sell it. By contrast, such reluctance disappears and the transaction becomes acceptable when no personal dimension is attached to the good. In terms of narratives, this means that an individual would find more costly or more difficult to build a narrative that makes acceptable a transaction over a good that has a personal meaning. On an axis from ‘particular’ to ‘universal’ (or non-personal), moving towards the particular makes the narrative more difficult to invent.
For the sake of presentation, we discuss the four quadrants defined by the intersection of these two dimensions, but emphasize that these dimensions are continuous and audience-dependent (Figure 1).
Characterizing transactions along two dimensions.
Figure 1. Long description
The diagram is divided into four quadrants. The horizontal axis represents the relationship type, ranging from particular relationship on the left to universal relationship on the right. The vertical axis represents whether the acceptability of a transaction is a matter of judgment, with not a matter of judgment at the top and matter of judgment at the bottom. The top left quadrant, labeled A, represents a particular relationship that is not a matter of judgment. The top right quadrant, labeled C, represents a universal relationship that is not a matter of judgment. The bottom left quadrant, labeled B, represents a particular relationship that is a matter of judgment. The bottom right quadrant, labeled D, represents a universal relationship that is a matter of judgment. Arrows indicate the direction of the axes, and labels within each quadrant describe the type of relationship and judgment status.
In quadrant A, transactions involve personally meaningful items or relationships, but are widely accepted as repugnant or unacceptable. In this situation, even though the relationship is personal, its level of repugnance or distaste is not a matter of personal judgment. In other words, the costs of devising a narrative do not depend on what the parties involved think of the transaction or of the behaviour. It is therefore particularly difficult or costly to justify or create narratives for acceptability, such as selling a human being or family heirloom. However, in that case, there exists a personal dimension that affects the cost of devising a narrative – one example is the selling of human organs, for instance, but for the benefit of a friend or a family member (see, e.g., Gino et al., Reference Gino, Ayal and Ariely2013). It is therefore likely that the costs of devising the narrative or justification are reduced by the proximity between the individuals.
When one moves along the vertical axis towards quadrant B, or when repugnance becomes a matter of judgment, the costs of devising a narrative diminish. We are still in the frame of a particular relationship that is, however, no longer governed by a general norm. Thus, in quadrant B, transactions involve personal items or relationships. The personal dimension of the transactions located in quadrant A remains. However, in that case, the nature of the transaction or behaviour becomes a matter of judgment. In other words, the acceptability of an action or a behaviour relates to the personal opinions of the parties and therefore varies based on individual opinions. Narratives can be constructed to justify the transaction, which involves personal relationships – one could think of selling an unwanted Christmas gift from a friend. The narrative cost remains limited for two reasons: first, there are no social norms to oppose, and the parties know each other; they can build a personal narrative and adapt it to the reaction of the other involved person.
This is not the case in quadrant C, since transactions or behaviours are controlled by a strong social norm as in quadrant A – deciding whether or not a transaction is repugnant is not a matter of personal opinion, not a matter of judgment. These transactions involve impersonal or universal goods and services, and they are widely accepted as repugnant or unacceptable. The difference now is that these transactions no longer involve personal relationships. It would be the case of selling organs to unknown persons. The cost of devising a narrative and justifications is as high as it is in quadrant A. It may actually be even higher because the personal dimension is missing.
Finally, in quadrant D, there are transactions that are a matter of judgment or personal opinion. These are the kinds of transactions that one may or may not find repugnant, as in quadrant B, with the difference that now the relationship no longer has the personal dimension existing in B. Examples of such transactions are leaving a price tag on a gift or selling a Christmas gift. Here, the costs of devising a narrative are probably very low because it is possible to adjust the narrative to the situation (no strong social consensus constrains the transaction), and even lower than in B because the personal dimension is absent.
This framework is certainly not a strict classificatory device with sharply delineated categories. Transactions may move (or be moved) across quadrants over time, audiences may disagree on their location, and some cases may combine features of multiple quadrants. The purpose of the framework is therefore heuristic: to clarify how variations in moral consensus and relational proximity affect narrative costs and strategic opportunities. It helps to understand how the nature of relationships and societal judgment influence the perception and acceptability of potentially repugnant transactions. It clarifies how the nature of relationships and the strength of social consensus jointly shape both the perception of repugnance and the costs of narrative work. It does not claim that all morally contested transactions can be exhaustively reduced to four quadrants; rather, it provides a structured way to analyse why narrative costs differ across settings, and why strategic uses of repugnance are easier, harder, more durable, or more fragile depending on where a transaction is located in this space. This is precisely what makes the framework useful for the analysis of strategic repugnance developed in the next section.Footnote 10
Using strategically repugnant-related transactions
In our argument – according to which repugnance is not only a constraint but also a resource, an asset – it was first necessary to identify the variable that makes such a transformation possible. This is what we did by emphasizing the role of narratives and by using narrative costs to show how the space of transactions could be structured. This was indeed necessary: an entrepreneur who wants to use the fact that a transaction or a behaviour is perceived as repugnant must first understand the nature of the transaction. That space provides a guide to this understanding. The strategic possibilities differ depending on the quadrant in which the transaction lies, since the costs of instrumentalizing repugnance vary according to the nature of transaction, change with the strength of social consensus and the nature of the relational context. Thus, the stronger the social consensus against a transaction is, the more costly it becomes to devise or build a narrative capable of legitimizing it – and therefore to use repugnance strategically. By contrast, when repugnance is judgment-based, narrative costs should be lower and the strategic use of repugnance becomes easier.
What we do in this section is to identify how entrepreneurs can redistribute, amplify, redirect, or calibrate repugnance to derive advantage from it. Here, the goal is not simply to manage repugnance – so that a transaction can be accepted – but to manipulate repugnance itself, manipulate the limits of acceptability to transform the market or institutional environment. To reach that goal, we identify four distinct, though not mutually exclusive, mechanisms. First, actors can raise rivals’ narrative costs by making entry into a market morally expensive, thereby creating an entry barrier. Second, they can recalibrate repugnance through dual narratives, while preventing the extension of moral reproval to a level that would justify prohibition. Third, they can weaponize moral polarization in order to shift regulatory and reputational boundaries in directions that benefit allied groups. Fourth, they can cultivate repugnance as visibility, using outrage and moral shock as instruments to capture attention and convert it into market power.
Using high-cost narratives as entry barriers
To elucidate this first mechanism, one must start from the fact that some markets involve goods or services for which there exists a strong and widely shared moral opposition – that is, transactions located in quadrants A or C. The firms that operate in such markets must defend their activities in the face of stigma, regulatory scrutiny, and reputational risk. This, in particular, requires devising sophisticated – and often costly – narratives. The resulting narrative costs function as fixed entry costs: participation in such markets demands sustained investments in legal defense, compliance, public persuasion, and reputation management before any genuine competitive activity can begin. Incumbents who have already absorbed these costs can benefit from the fact that potential entrants must incur comparable costs before being able to compete with them. In addition, incumbents may reinforce or sustain morally charged narratives in ways that maintain these entry costs at a high level. In this way, repugnance becomes a barrier to entry. Such narratives discourage entry because newcomers must confront not only economic competition but also entrenched moral opposition and heightened scrutiny (see, e.g., Bacq et al., Reference Bacq, Toubiana, Ruebottom, Ormiston and Ajunwa2023). As a result, these markets tend to remain highly regulated and, in practice, insulated from competition.
Many markets could be cited to illustrate this mechanism, but the transactions about human body provide a particularly clear and paradigmatic case of such a mechanism. Indeed, in most societies, human beings are protected by strong and largely shared social norms. In these contexts, commodifying – whether partially or totally – them is therefore seen as a violation of human integrity (Wilkinson, Reference Wilkinson2003). Such transactions are therefore typically located in quadrant C. The firms that intend to participate in such markets face exposure to intense social stigma and legal oversight. Operating in this environment requires sustained justificatory effort, including legal compliance, reputational management, and continuous public defense. Incumbents – the entities that succeeded in entering these markets at some earlier stage – have already borne these costs and institutionalized the necessary infrastructure. Potential entrants, by contrast, face substantial fixed narrative burdens before they can compete. High moral consensus thus makes entry in such markets costly, and incumbents use narratives to maintain an environment morally costly.
The use of an expression like ‘organ leasing’ is typical of this strategy, mixing two registers, two contexts – the commercial and the human – with a verb which associated with the human body, with organs, immediately evokes repugnance. Another example of an active strategic use of repugnance that relates to the human body, though slightly differently, is the sale of opioid pain-killers. Actually, the example is more complex and less straightforward than the previous one. It captures another stage in the functioning of the market, and reverses the role of repugnance. Indeed, pharmaceutical firms did not initially rely on a pre-existing repugnance surrounding opioids to raise rivals’ costs. Instead, they first attenuated repugnance by reframing opioid prescribing as an expression of compassionate care while redirecting moral concern towards alternative treatments. As a result, not prescribing opioids could itself be portrayed as repugnant. In this way, narratives displaced repugnance: moral concern progressively shifted away from opioid prescribing itself and towards the refusal to alleviate suffering. Once this framing became institutionalized and incumbent firms had consolidated their moral and market position, they could exploit the resulting moral and regulatory environment to raise the costs faced by competitors and alternative treatments. This case illustrates a distinction crucial for our demonstration, namely between information manipulation and narrative framing. The first move of pharmaceutical firms consisted in downplaying or obscuring information regarding the addiction risks linked to the use of their products, which corresponds to a classic asymmetric-information problem (Marks, Reference Marks2020). That was, however, not the only strategy adopted. Narratives were built and promoted insisting on the need to use and prescribe opioids to relieve the suffering of patients. This framing changed the perceived moral status of prescribing opioids and sustained its acceptability even when the risks were known. Thus, two mechanisms were at play here: information suppression and norm-shifting. Both represent forms of narrative manipulation but operate differently.
Such narratives were produced by or with the help of the producers themselves, i.e., mainly by advocacy groups financed by major pharmaceutical firms, during professional conferences, and communication campaigns. But not only. These so-called ‘bootleggers’ were joined by the ‘Baptists’, those individuals or groups who see pain relief as ‘a fundamental human right’ (see, e.g., Brennan et al., Reference Brennan, Carr and Cousins2007) without being part of the supply side of the market (Yandle, Reference Yandle1983). By devising and promoting narratives that focused on ‘harm reduction’,Footnote 11 firms operating on these markets had managed to shape a policy environment in which restricting opioids was portrayed as equivalent to denying legitimate patient care (AOA, 2022; Marks, Reference Marks2020). In other words, refusing to relieve patients’ suffering with opioids was depicted as somewhat repugnant. This amounted to a barrier that protected them from other competitors and the regulator who could hardly fight against the ills these pain-killers created – addiction – because they had contributed to them. This narrative increases the costs for new entrants, who must invest significantly to overcome negative public views and to deal with laws or rules that may be influenced by this morally grounded opposition. Progressively, other narratives were built that allowed to introduce stricter regulations. However, incumbent producers had already consolidated their market share, distribution networks, and legal defenses. New entrants – generic manufacturers or non-opioid therapy developers – then faced heightened narrative costs, expressed through public skepticism and insurer resistance, which slowed the diffusion of safer alternatives and further entrenched incumbent dominance.
Another illustrative example is the use of evangelical leaders and ‘family values’ campaigns in U.S. casino politics, where moral opposition to gambling was mobilized to block new casinos that would have competed with existing tribal or commercial operators. Incumbent casinos sometimes acted as ‘Bootleggers’, operating in the background while supporting ‘Baptists’ who foregrounded repugnance-based arguments (e.g., Schmidt, Reference Schmidt2005; Simmons et al., Reference Simmons, Yonk and Thomas2011). The public narrative emphasized protecting communities from the ‘repugnant’ spread of gambling, but the practical effect was to entrench a small number of license holders and keep rivals out (see, e.g., Simmons et al., Reference Simmons, Yonk and Thomas2011).
These examples evidence a similar process: when moral consensus is strong, narrative costs are high and unevenly distributed; the actors who can absorb, institutionalize, or strategically reinforce these costs transform repugnance into a durable barrier to entry. From this perspective, isolated individuals or new entrants typically face higher justificatory burdens when attempting to defend morally contested practices. By contrast, organizations with institutional authority – such as professional associations, regulatory agencies, or established firms – often possess greater credibility and communication resources, allowing them to promote or challenge moral narratives at lower cost. In the cases discussed here, the repugnance of selling goods or services linked to the human body was used as a competitive instrument shaping market structure. In some cases, the first actor(s) to successfully organize a repugnant transaction can gain a narrative-based first-mover advantage that becomes a path-dependent barrier to entry. This advantage stems notably from moral framing, regulatory alignment, and perceived legitimacy rather than purely economic efficiency. Indeed, the first movers benefit not necessarily because they operate more effectively, but because their narratives shape what counts as acceptable and subject to regulation, and partly determine the costs that competitors must bear to enter the market in question.
Crafting dual narratives: amplifying repugnance for niches while softening it for outsiders
In certain contexts, the narrative cost of a transaction can drop significantly. As discussed in Devising narratives to manage the unacceptability of repugnant transactions section, this happens when acceptability relies on the participants’ own judgment rather than widely shared social norms. Entrepreneurs dealing in repugnant goods sometimes pursue a dual strategy: they emphasize repugnance for audiences who find it appealing while simultaneously reframing it for others as a matter of personal choice rather than a social violation. This logic can be observed in the case of Extreme Championship Wrestling. Firms positioned themselves as intentionally transgressive to capture a niche market, while carefully managing not to cross legal or moral boundaries to avoid the social ostracism that would have been fatal to them. They projected a more extreme image than reality – to appear more repugnant than it actually was – while using interpersonal norms, skillful performance, narrative development, and controlled crowd involvement to manage physical and legal risks (Dekker and Quintas, Reference Dekker and Quintas2024). Moving the transaction below the level that corresponds to a social sanction allows them to transform opposition into tolerance and establish profitable niche markets around otherwise unacceptable activities. Niche markets differ from black markets in that, although the traded goods may face some social disapproval and often involve ‘countercultural’ groups, the transactions remain legal and enforceable. In contrast, black markets are characterized by efforts to conceal unlawful activities and their revenues from government authorities or regulators. While niche markets comply with legal obligations (such as paying taxes), they often maintain discretion or reframe their activities when engaging with social groups that disapprove of their transactions, without resorting to illegal behaviour.
In these subcultural spaces – governed by private and localized norms rather than broad social consensus – repugnance functions differently than in quadrant C. Actors rely on implicit agreements and dual narratives that allow them to attract interested partners without provoking broad external condemnation. They use repugnance both to signal exclusivity and strengthen in-group loyalty, and to protect their niche from excessive public reaction. The strategy thus consists in calibrating repugnance: increasing its intensity too much would invite widespread opposition, while reducing it too much would dissolve the niche. The goal is not to eliminate repugnance – since it remains a key feature valued by the target audience – but to prevent it from escalating into broad condemnation that could threaten the market’s survival. Repugnance is therefore maintained at a level that sustains demand within the niche without triggering prohibition from the broader public.Footnote 12 Although this case may seem less salient today, some cannabis brands, such as MedMen, appeal to recreational users with ‘stoner culture’ vibes – celebrating the rebellious high that anti-drug advocates find repugnant – while simultaneously pitching to conservatives the idea of cannabis as a ‘personal adult choice’ like alcohol (Coskuner-Balli et al., Reference Coskuner-Balli, Pehlivan and Üçok Hughes2021).
Another interesting example is the one of U.S. ‘oddities’ – the sale of taxidermied animals or vintage medical curiosities – or dark-tourism memorabilia – photographs, postcards, or replica artefacts from places such as Chernobyl, Auschwitz, or former battlefields. The way these items are traded allows actors to use repugnance to attract certain audiences while simultaneously appeasing broader moral discomfort associated with the commodification of once-living beings. To reach that goal, these repugnant goods are often traded through private agreements among collectors, dealers, and museums (on the trade of oddities see Carrigan, Reference Carrigan2017). Thus, the governing norm is negotiated locally: rather than relying on legal or mainstream enforcement, buyers and sellers construct a shared narrative that legitimizes the exchange. The narrative operates by strategically reframing the transaction from a category likely to provoke outrage to one confined to localized moral judgment, thereby removing the social or moral repugnance associated with the origins of the goods – particularly the potentially unsettling fact that the object of trade is an ‘item’ that was once a living part of a human being and, as a bodily remnant, may be perceived as repugnant insofar as it infringes upon the notion of bodily integrity. Thus, the oddities are presented as ‘historical artefacts’, ‘art pieces’, or ‘educational specimens’, just like the memorabilia are also marketed as ‘historical education’, ‘memory preservation’, or ‘ethical remembrance’ (see, e.g., Dresler, Reference Dresler2022)Footnote 13 . Mercenaries, to refer to another example, present themselves to a general audience as ‘security contractors’ or ‘protective service firms’, while through other channels appealing to clients interested in their willingness to participate in morally controversial actions. The narrative cost therefore remains low, allowing these niche markets to persist and even flourish.
Thus, actors do not eliminate repugnance; they contain it within a framework that allows the market to persist without triggering broader suppression. To reach that goal, they first engage in strategic reframing, recasting the core transaction in terms that align with socially accepted values such as art, education, sustainability, personal autonomy, or scientific inquiry. One could also say that this strategy gives birth to private – consists in privatizing – norms of enforcement that confine the acceptability of the transaction to relatively closed communities – collectors, hobbyists, enthusiasts – where internal standards replace broader legal or cultural sanctions. This allows to avoid direct confrontation with mainstream moral judgment and preserve the matter-of-judgment status typical of transactions situated in quadrants B and D.
Weaponizing repugnance to polarize and shift markets
The previous subsection explained how repugnance can be used as a dual strategy to maintain a niche – calibrating, tailoring the narrative to maintain the right level of repugnance within the niche and in the society. Because moral evaluations are plural and group-specific, repugnance is rarely uniform across a society; this pluralism creates strategic opportunities to target particular audiences and to shift justificatory burdens across communities (see Roth and Wang, Reference Roth and Wang2020). Here, we thus study another dual calibration strategy similar to the previous one – in that it also consists in using repugnance in a selective way – but different – in that it aims not to contain moral intensity, but to increase it selectively. Here, the strategy consists in, on the one hand, raising the narrative cost of defending a transaction for one audience while, on the other, lowering it for another audience. In the terms of our framework, this means devising a narrative to push the transaction towards quadrant C for critics – framing it as a violation of shared norms – while presenting it as legitimate or corrective to supporters to shift it to quadrant D. In such cases, repugnance becomes a weapon in struggles over legitimacy, regulation, and market structure. Because repugnance operates as a highly salient moral signal, such calibrated polarization tends to generate self-reinforcing narratives within each camp, making compromise increasingly difficult. This strategy, in other words, means increasing the distance between the two types of audience. In some cases, rather than being a pre-existing, universally shared repugnance, it becomes a feeling that can be instilled and acquired, particularly through political rhetoric and strategic framing. Repugnance can be socially constructed within certain groups and strategically leveraged to create in-group versus out-group dynamics.
Same-sex marriage (or DEI initiatives in another domain) – and more precisely how the debates changed around it (them) – provides a well-known example of this type of narrative polarization. The first opponents tended to devise stories in terms of the violation of a universal social norm, which was governing the organization of family and reproduction. In other words, they placed same-sex marriage in the category of morally unacceptable transactions – those of quadrant C. Then, supporters reframed the issue in personal terms – in the terms of individual rights, rather than in those of universality. Thus, competing narratives were devised that were clearly polarized at one extreme – a universal norm – or the other – a contestable social judgment.
We can also cite the case of several large corporations market aggressive tax-planning schemes as ‘smart fiscal stewardship’, a positive narrative that reduces their perceived repugnance and makes the behaviour more acceptable, while progressive lawmakers and activist groups categorize the same arrangements as ‘corporate theft’ (see, e.g., Huemer, Reference Huemer2017). This framing does not simply express disagreement; it constitutes a strategic attempt to reclassify the practice as a violation of a universal norm – an offense against society as a whole rather than a technical regulatory matter. In doing so, the discussion is shifted from a negotiable space (‘smart business strategy’ or ‘complex regulation’, aligned with quadrants B or D) to the territory of moral absolutes characteristic of quadrant C. Such a strategy raises the narrative cost of defending the practice, while lowering the cost of attacking it.
A third illustration involves paid online influence and astroturfing (Chan, Reference Chan2024; Abdelnour et al., Reference Abdelnour, Grolleau and Mzoughi2026),Footnote 14 where political campaigns contract firms that supply fake followers, comments, ‘boosted’ reviews, or fabricated grassroots groups. Opponents label these practices as ‘undermining democracy’, aiming for the absolute violation category, whereas campaign insiders frame them as ‘leveling the playing field’ against a biased mainstream media. The same practice is thus simultaneously presented as a moral transgression, a narrative that pushes it towards quadrants A or C, or as a defensive necessity that aims to maintain them into B or D. Using repugnance becomes a means for polarizing the public into a ‘corrupt-bot’ camp and a ‘defensive-innovation’ camp.
A similar dynamic can be identified in the prison industry. Companies that profit from incarceration finance research and advertising that portray mass imprisonment as a ‘public-safety necessity’ (a justifiable, negotiable position, as in quadrant D). Civil-rights organizations, in turn, depict the industry as ‘caging individuals’, ‘profiting from human suffering’ (an absolute moral violation, which corresponds to the quadrant C perspective; see, e.g., Lichtenstein, Reference Lichtenstein1996 for historical evidence in the U. S.). These opposing narratives increase the narrative cost for those defending the industry’s morality, while supporters benefit from a reduced cost by invoking security rhetoric.
Across these cases, several common patterns and recurring dynamics can be identified. There is always one side who typically presents the transaction in the terms of a violation of core values – justice, fairness, dignity – thereby increasing the narrative cost of defending it; and there is also an opposing side that reframes the same practice as corrective, necessary, or defensive, reducing that cost within its own constituency. These us-versus-them narratives (Tajfel et al., Reference Tajfel, Billig, Bundy and Flament1971) tend to transform policy, and technical, disagreements into conflicts of identity, which creates or reinforces polarization. Strategic intermediaries – lawyers, public relations firms, lobbyists, or bot networks – often construct and disseminate these narratives, protecting the primary actors from any direct attack or criticism. Repetition within media ecosystems and social platforms then generates echo-chamber effects, making the selected moral interpretation appear self-evident and difficult to challenge. In this way, elevated moral stakes are translated into tangible economic and regulatory consequences (Kempf and Tsoutsoura, Reference Kempf and Tsoutsoura2024).
Repugnance does not merely reflect a societal opposition. It actively creates a higher narrative cost for adversaries and a lower one for allies, fueling polarization and consolidating support around contested transactions. The impact of such polarization extends beyond individual companies, affecting the broader economy through changes in investment patterns, regulatory approaches, and public policy formulation (see, e.g., Dimant, Reference Dimant2024).
Cultivating repugnance as a strategic tool in the attention economy
This fourth mechanism differs from the previous ones in that it does not concern a specific transaction, but rather the strategic production and promotion of repugnant content. Entrepreneurs operating in this kind of environment, such as influencers in social media, could – and some of them do – produce content of a superior quality. However, algorithms are built in a way that rewards content that triggers strong emotions (e.g., anger, disgust, fascination, and fear) because these keep users engaged longer and create a feedback loop where content that provokes intense emotional reactions that is then algorithmically promoted (Metzler and Garcia, Reference Metzler and Garcia2024). Creators notice what works and adapt their style to fit the pattern. Platforms adjust again to sustain engagement, further amplifying emotional or controversial content. In short, social media platforms frequently reward outrageous (and often low-cost apart image and reputation considerations) content which, despite being of lower quality, is more engaging. In this system, visibility becomes inversely correlated with moderation, opening the way for a creator to shock more (via repugnant acts) to get more attention, even if the substance is poor. Agents employing this mechanism weigh the costs and benefits of provocative narratives by positioning their operations along the axes of the matrix presented above. From this perspective, the content involved here is typically impersonal – the individuals targeted on social media are often unknown to the audience – and its repugnance depends largely on the judgments of particular communities rather than on broad social consensus. Such content is therefore generally located in quadrant D, where repugnance remains audience-dependent, unstable, and contestable. The strategic objective is therefore to maintain the level of repugnance of the content within this quadrant. More precisely, the entrepreneurs cultivate repugnance by activating shared moral disgust or judgment-based triggers that mobilize in-group/out-group distinctions, or by framing violations as breaches of universal principles versus particular loyalties, thereby effectively manufacturing and amplifying outrage. Indeed, if moral consensus became too strong, the same strategies would risk exclusion, deplatforming, or legal prohibition rather than visibility gains.
This dynamic exists far beyond social media influencers (see, e.g., Dahl et al., Reference Dahl, Frankenberger and Manchanda2003; Bartholomew, Reference Bartholomew2018). For instance, some YouTubers or TikTokers engage in fake pranks, extreme political statements, or absurd stunts precisely because such actions are rewarded with clicks. Some brands sometimes provoke controversy to spark discussion (e.g. Balenciaga’s or Dolce & Gabbana’s infamous ad controversies). Online comedians deliberately flirt with taboo topics, not necessarily out of conviction, but because their ‘boundary-pushing persona may attract both fans and detractors, fueling engagement metrics. Some politicians willing to be perceived as outsiders use off-putting, blunt or repugnant rhetoric and behaviour precisely to signal that they do not belong to the polished elite. These abrasive styles enable them to distance themselves from establishment figures, and sometimes build appeal by breaking civility norms, signalling authenticity through transgression. Although this approach has found a new field of application within the attention-based economy, an old French expression – also used in English – neatly captures its essence: seeking a succès de scandale (Grolleau et al., Reference Grolleau, Marciano and Mzoughi2020).
Beyond human vanity, an important underlying driver is algorithmic incentive design. Algorithms are designed to optimize for engagement metrics – click-throughs, watch time, shares – rather than truth, nuance, or civility. Thus, disturbing material systematically outperforms informative or balanced content. This leads to behavioural convergence: creators across domains gradually adopt outrage or sensationalism as a strategy, not because they start that way, but because the digital environment rewards it. In short, digital ecosystems favour traits that enhance virality – on social media, repugnance pays off – often at the expense of moral restraint or informational value (see Shorenstein Center, Undated). By framing repugnant acts as boldness, authenticity, or defiance, these narratives transform moral outrage into attention capital – turning social disapproval into an advantage within engagement-driven economies.
General discussion and conclusion
The nature or type of a transaction – in terms of acceptability or repugnance – is not fixed once for all, but varies over time and therefore it can be manipulated for strategic reasons. This was the starting point of this paper: rather than adopting the view that repugnant transactions are a constraint on what individuals do or can trade – that therefore must be systematically avoided or managed – rather than viewing repugnance as an obstacle, we argue that it can be a potential resource for certain entrepreneurs. To understand how this resource can be used, we identified a variable – the narratives used to present, frame, any transaction and the costs to devise these narratives – and analysed the conditions under which individuals can devise narratives to change how the transaction or behaviour is perceived. It is precisely this very possibility to write or re-write narratives that opens the door to possible profits. Under some plausible circumstances, a causal ambiguity on one’s intention can be exploited. The moral judgment of a negative transaction from a taste viewpoint is frequently related to the interpretation/understanding of motives and intentions. An individual can disguise their real intention behind a more socially acceptable one, implying a form of deception. However, the costs of devising such narratives are not fixed. They notably depend on the perceived universality of a transaction’s repugnance and on the position (e.g., influence, wealth, and institutional power) of the actors willing to construct narratives.
That the perceived repugnance of a transaction is malleable and can be strategically manipulated offers intriguing insights into the dynamics of financial and social interactions. One important application of this idea – that individuals and firms can timely reframe transactions for their benefit, sometimes even by exaggerating their repugnant or distasteful elements – is what could be called a temporal opportunity window. These windows are specific periods during which the categorization or perception of a transaction can be more easily influenced or manipulated. Or, in other words, moments where the boundary between the upper part of our graph – transactions not being a matter of judgment, i.e., consensus-based (quadrants A/C) and its lower part – “transactions are a ‘matter of judgment’ or judgement-based’” (quadrants B/D) – can be crossed. Possibilities of profits not only depend on the capacity to manipulate the nature of a transaction and to capitalize on or influence these changing perceptions but also crucially depend on the capacity to recognize the existence of such a window – a point that, to our knowledge, has not been explicitly put forward before.
This is confirmed by the fact that social acceptability of repugnant transactions is sometimes reframed during crises or rapid social change (e.g., wars, epidemics, natural disasters, and social upheavals), when existing moral or legal boundaries are relaxed because the transactions in question serve instrumental or communal needs, and when previously repugnant transactions might become more acceptable due to necessity or shifting norms (see, e.g., Werner et al., Reference Werner, Punzi and Turkenburg2024). For instance, during wartime, citizenship has been offered to foreign recruits and framed as a reward for service rather than an upfront commercial exchange. Similarly, during the COVID-19 crisis, anticipated shortages of ventilators led to significant and justifiable shifts in allocation practices that would otherwise have been considered repugnant. At the same time, new markets flourished on the dark web, offering ventilators and other critical medical supplies at exorbitant prices – illustrating how repugnant transactions can gain traction as social norms around certain goods evolve in times of crisis. Frequently, when prohibition causes significant and visible harm, need-based rationales (such as preventing deaths or alleviating suffering during emergencies) come into play and foster greater tolerance – even encouragement – of transactions that would otherwise be banned. Entrepreneurs or policymakers who recognize these windows can strategically position themselves to capitalize on or influence these changing perceptions. This shift is made possible by reclassifying transactions (e.g., from a sale to a compensation), reframing the context (emphasizing necessity or public benefit), or obfuscating exchanges.
Importantly, we do not argue that the strategic use of repugnance should be encouraged. Rather, we seek to understand how and under which conditions repugnance can be employed by certain agents to promote their own goals. This practice raises significant ethical concerns that cannot be dismissed merely because it generates profit opportunities. Entrepreneurial creativity can sometimes transform what is typically viewed as a constraint into an opportunity, and even exploit the veil of repugnance to advance private interests that may conflict with socially desirable outcomes. Equipping observers and policymakers with this understanding is crucial, as it increases awareness of the multifaceted use of repugnance.
At this point, let us add an important caveat to our analysis. Modern societies are characterized by moral complexity, so law and policy must work within moral pluralism rather than above it. Our framework may thus appear convenient for the sake of exposition but too simplistic in contrasting universal and particular relationships alongside the judgment dimension. The coexistence of multiple, and sometimes conflicting, moral orders within each quadrant is both possible and likely. Apparent universality may conceal internal contestations. Even seemingly individualized actions can operate within niche or subcultural moral settings. Considering a more layered understanding of normative guidance – one that accounts not only for the evasion of norms but also for the strategic navigation between overlapping normative orders – makes sense. This view aligns with Calabresi’s argument that law inevitably makes implicit value judgments when regulating activities and should acknowledge society’s pluralism by openly managing and balancing competing values rather than assuming a single ideal set of norms. In our setting, this means repugnance is negotiated across overlapping mainstream and subcultural norms, and any legal rule will inevitably privilege some narratives and harms over others. Seeing regulation this way complements our framework: actors do not just evade norms, they also navigate among rival moral orders, while regulators act as arbiters of those conflicts. This helps explain why narrative costs, social acceptability, and policy outcomes vary across settings and over time.
In this perspective, rules, norms, and institutional arrangements cannot be treated as fully exogenous constraints within which actors operate. They result, at least in part, from the strategies individuals develop to shift transactions from one quadrant or category to another, as described in this paper. When actors navigate among rival moral orders and attempt to shift transactions across quadrants, they do not merely adapt to existing rules; they also contribute to redefining the boundaries of transferability and the conditions under which entitlements are protected. This is where our framework intersects with the classic typology of entitlement protection proposed by Calabresi and Melamed (Reference Calabresi and Melamed1972). Their analysis explains how different legal regimes protect individual entitlements. Our contribution complements theirs by explaining how certain transactions come to be associated with one form of protection or one legal regime rather than another. Strongly entrenched forms of repugnance tend to push transactions towards inalienability, whereas more context-dependent or judgment-based forms remain compatible with property or liability rule protection. Moral consensus and relational structure do not only affect narrative costs; they shape the legal feasibility of transferability itself. In this sense, we do not simply assume a given allocation of rules; we show how strategic actors mobilize and deploy repugnance narratives to defend, stabilize, or contest (and extend) the existing allocation of property, liability, and even inalienability regimes. For instance, organ sales are restricted partly through repugnance narratives (gift of life, commodification horror), which this framework explains.
As a natural limitation, our contribution does not explain how to operationalize or empirically test the proposed framework. However, we argue that the dimensions used are measurable (e.g., through surveys, interviews, or experiments), as are narrative costs. The latter can be approximated through variations in informational framing and in the persuasive, reputational, and cognitive effort required to support or contest a transaction. Such variations should translate into systematic changes in stated attitudes, experimental choices, or market behaviour, thereby yielding falsifiable predictions about their direction and magnitude. We predict that shifts in narratives should generate predictable changes in expressed willingness, behaviour, or market outcomes.
At the same time, the framework does not become a catch-all explanation because it imposes analytical discipline: not every phenomenon can be explained unless one can identify coherent preference transformations and link them to observable patterns. In that sense, preference-based analysis shaped by narratives narrows rather than dilutes explanation by requiring clear microfoundations instead of invoking repugnance as an undifferentiated residual category. The framework can therefore be used to generate falsifiable hypotheses, such as the prediction that narrative costs are highest (respectively, lowest) in the Universal + Consensus (Universal + Judgment) quadrant. While remaining modest, we believe that future empirical work could test these hypotheses through content analysis of narratives, econometric analysis of regulatory costs, or survey-based tracking of norm shifts.
Data Availability Statement
We do not analyse or generate any datasets.
Acknowledgements
We wish to thank Erwin Dekker, Julien Gradoz, the editors of the journal and eight referees for their comments and feedback.
Conflict(s) of Interest
The authors have no competing interests to declare that are relevant to the content of this article.
Funding Statement
No funding was received to assist with the preparation of this manuscript.
Author contributions
All the authors equally contributed to the paper.
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