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Value Commitments, Value Conflict, and the Separability of Belief and Value

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Isaac Levi
Isaac Levi*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Columbia University
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Abstract

Leeds (1990) levels an objection against the criterion of rational choice I have proposed (Levi 1997, Ch. 6; 1980; 1986), pointing out that the criterion is sensitive to the way possible consequences are partitioned. Seidenfeld, Kadane and Schervish (1989) call into question the defense of the cross product rule by appeal to Pareto Unanimity Principles that I had invoked in my 1986. I offer clarifications of my proposals showing that the difference between my views and those of my critics concerns the extent to which full belief, probabilistic belief, and value judgment are separable.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 66 , Issue 4 , December 1999 , pp. 509 - 533
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Send requests for reprints to the author, 718 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027.

‡

Thanks are due to Teddy Seidenfeld, Philip Kitcher, and an anonymous referee for helpful criticism.

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